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Section 601(b)(2) of the Act provides a child custody proceeding is commenced 
"by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child 
but only if he is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. " 
(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1994). This language requires 
nonparents seeking custody to demonstrate the child is not in the physical 
custody of one of his parents. See In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 
2d 48, 52-53, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152, 96 Ill. Dec. 690 (1986). The standing 
requirement applies to motions to intervene as well as initial custody petitions. 
In re Marriage of Nicholas, 170 Ill. App. 3d 171, 176, 524 N.E.2d 728, 731, 120 Ill. 
Dec. 698 (1988); In re Parentage of Unborn Child Brumfield, 284 Ill. App. 3d 950, 
954, 673 N.E.2d 461, 464, 
The determination that a parent does not have physical custody of a child turns 
not on possession; rather, it requires that that parent somehow has voluntarily 
and indefinitely relinquished custody of the child. In re Petition of Kirchner, 
164 Ill. 2d 468, 491, 649 N.E.2d 324, 335, 208 Ill. Dec. 268 (1995). Not every 
voluntary turnover of a child will deprive the parent of physical custody, however. 


The court must consider factors such as (1) who was responsible for the care and 
welfare of the child prior to the initiation of custody proceedings; (2) the manner 
in which physical possession of a child was acquired; and (3) the nature and duration 
of the possession. In re Marriage of Santa Cruz, 172 Ill. App. 3d 775, 783, 
527 N.E.2d 131, 136, 122 Ill. Dec. 759 (1988); In re Marriage of Brown
On May 31, 1995, Chrystal Millage filed a petition to modify custody in these proceedings, 
in which Eric and Cara Rudsell had previously been divorced and the custody of their daughter, 
Elizabeth, had been awarded to Cara. The circuit court first found that Chrystal and her 
husband William had standing pursuant to section 601(b)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1994)), and then on 
January 14, 1997, modified its previous order and awarded custody of Elizabeth to them. 
Cara appeals. 
The trial court's determination that Cara voluntarily relinquished physical custody to the 
Millages is clearly correct. There can be no dispute that Cara's turnover of the child was 
voluntary. Furthermore, this was not a babysitting arrangement or otherwise limited arrangement. 
The Millages very quickly became the persons responsible for the care and welfare of the child. 
Cara argues that her original intent was that the Millages would have Elizabeth only for a 
few weeks, and she never changed that intent, although she kept putting off the time when 
she would resume responsibility for the child, citing Franklin v. Devriendt, 
(1997), 288 Ill. App. 3d 651, 681 N.E.2d 578, 224 Ill. Dec. 263, where a finding there 
was no standing was affirmed. Franklin did note that the parties there intended 
Section 601(b)(2) of the Act provides a child custody proceeding is commenced "by a person other 
than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child but only if he is not in the 
physical custody of one of his parents. " (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/601(b)(2) (West 1994). 
This language requires nonparents seeking custody to demonstrate the child is not in the 
physical custody of one of his parents. See In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d 48, 52-53, 
491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152, 96 Ill. Dec. 690 (1986). The standing requirement applies to motions 
to intervene as well as initial custody petitions. In re Marriage of Nicholas, 170 Ill. App. 
3d 171, 176, 524 N.E.2d 728, 731, 120 Ill. Dec. 698 (1988); In re Parentage of Unborn Child 
Brumfield, 284 Ill. App. 3d 950, 954, 673 N.E.2d 461, 464,