Eliciting Peace:  Mediating the Sandinista – Miskito Conflict

By Keith Swartzendruber

15 November 2002

 

            Civil war in Central America has gone the way of the cold war.  With the waning of tensions between the United States and Soviet Union during the mid to late 1980s, the opportunity was ripe for ending the violence that had torn apart the area.  Landmark processes such as Contadora and Esquipulas helped bring a framework for resolution to wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  These agreements were negotiated in a familiar fashion; with heads of state gathering to create a document that all would have to abide by.  What remains hidden is the extensive work and numerous internal agreements and negotiations that were conducted within Contadora and Esquipulas between governments, rebel groups, and indigenous peoples.

            One of these hidden processes was the Miskito-Sandinista negotiations in Nicaragua.  This conflict was a smaller part of the overall war between the Sandinistas and the U.S.-funded Contras.  With the conflict between a government and a non-state actor, talks did not take the traditional, diplomatic form as with Contadora and Esquipulas.  Instead, both sides worked together to create a framework unique to their situation.  Out of this more dynamic process of conflict resolution developed an elicitive approach to mediation that enabled the sides to reach an agreement.  Through analyzing this particular process, we can gain perspective on how mediation can best be conducted in other cultural settings and expand the tools and perspectives available to the conflict resolution field.

 

 

 

A Brief History of the Miskito in Nicaragua

            The Miskito are an indigenous people living on the east coast of Nicaragua.  Mosquitia is an area rich in resources and well suited to agriculture with its variety of land including rivers, swamps, tropical rain forest, and lakes.  It is not surprising then that much of the history of the Miskito is a story of resistance against others who want to exploit those resources for their own gain.  The history of their struggle for self determination traces its roots back to the creation of colonial Nicaragua five hundred years ago.

 

Colonial Mosquitia

            The unique ethnic identity of the Miskito stems from the process of colonization by the Spanish.  When Columbus found the Atlantic coast already inhabited in 1502, the Spanish moved instead to the Pacific coast.  As a result, the Pacific and central regions of the country are more ethnically Spanish than the indigenous Atlantic coastal regions that were largely ignored.  It would be another century before the British arrived on the coast in 1633. [1]  It wasn’t until 1687 that the Miskito came under the direct influence of a colonial power, Great Britain, with the creation of a Miskito protectorate that could be exploited by the British for material resources.  The British left temporarily in the late 18^th century, leaving Mosquitia to the Spanish to attempt to annex, which they never did successfully.  After a brief period of Miskito hegemony in the area, the British returned in the 1840s because of economic interests only to leave again in 1860.  Following their departure, a treaty was signed by Nicaragua establishing an autonomous reserve for the Miskito.  By 1894, Nicaragua declared the treaty juridically invalid and promptly annexed the new territory.[2]  They continued to refuse to recognize the Miskito until the 1980s.

            At the time of annexation in 1894, the U.S. became particularly interested in the region due to its growing commercial ties, including the search for a canal route through Central America.  By 1890, North American business accounted for ninety percent of the total investment, a value of over ten million dollars.[3]  The U.S. supported the Nicaraguan annexation because it made negotiating rights for a canal simpler.  The Miskito appealed to the British for protection, setting up a U.S.-Nicaragua versus British-Miskito confrontation.  British protection, however, fell far short of what the Miskito were hoping for.  Following a brief struggle, by the end of 1894 the Miskito had acquiesced to annexation by Nicaragua.

            Despite the successful annexation of Mosquitia by Nicaragua, - which the U.S. initially approved of - the U.S. and Nicaragua had several confrontations during the 1900s. The first direct U.S. military action came in 1909 when they supported a rebellion against President José Santos Zelaya, the very president who they had originally supported in the annexation of 1894.  Zelaya’s growing nationalism was viewed as a threat to U.S. economic interests along the coast.  During the rebellion, U.S. Marines occupied a number of urban centers.  The U.S. maintained this presence and direct control of Nicaragua for the next 16 years.[4]

            A second insurrection broke out in 1927 when nationalist Augusto César Sandino led a revolt against U.S. economic and military interests.  Discontented with working conditions in U.S. businesses located in Mosquitia, the Miskito supported the revolution.  Many important battles were fought in the heart of Miskito territory, along the Rio Coco, which today separates Honduras and Nicaragua.  Eventually, the U.S. withdrew direct military involvement and instead helped Anastacio Somoza establish the National Guard which defeated Sandino.[5]  Somoza ruled with U.S. support and an iron fist until the Sandinistas seized power in 1979.

 

The Moravian Church

            The Moravians first arrived in Mosquitia in 1849 after an invitation from the Miskito King that was initiated by the British.[6]    At first, the Moravians had little success in converting the Miskito.  By 1910, however, the success of the Moravian church at drawing in the Miskito and becoming an integral part of the community was evident.  There were 50 communities that had been reached by Moravian missionaries, and their influence continued to expand.  By 1960, nearly half of the Miskito were members of a Moravian church.  The strict rules and discipline doled out by the church helped to build its influence within the community as well as its pervasive character.  Moravians ran stores, medical clinics, and schools that greatly improved life for the Miskito.  In addition, the Moravian church helped to reinforce a separate identity from the rest of Nicaragua.[7]  This would prove particularly important during rebellious periods of history, such as the rebellion in 1927 as well as the resistance against the Sandinista regime during the 1980s.

 

The Modern Miskito Resistance

            By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, the quality of life in Mosquitia had begun to decline.  The Miskito were treated like second class citizens by both the Spanish mestizos and the Chinese businessmen who dominated the region politically and economically.  As a result, the Miskito organized an ethnic resistance organization called ALPROMISU in 1973.  It was founded by local elders as well as leaders in the Moravian and Catholic churches.[8]  Despite their originally disdainful view of the Miskito as heathen, the Moravians provided acknowledgement and validation of the unique Miskito culture in contrast to “Spanish” culture, as the rest of Nicaragua was referred to as.[9]  The role of the Moravian church in encouraging the Miskito was essential.  Many of the clergy were attending seminary in San Jose, Costa Rica during the 1960s and 1970s where they were exposed to liberation theology.  This helped to empower the movement and gave religious weight to the aspirations of the Miskito.  It was this theology that gave rise to ALPROMISU.  The defining goal was pawanka or growth and self development. [10]  The focus was not so much on autonomy or political power as it was in improving the living conditions for the Miskito and ensuring their rights were respected.

            The influence of ALPROMISU declined soon after its creation.  It was viewed by many in rural areas as an urban intellectual group and not concerned with the struggle of the Miskito against the government for recognition.  A counter-current of militancy, characterized by more political demands, began to surface shortly before the Sandinista revolution in 1979.  This was primarily expressed as anti-Somozan and generally was encouraged by the actions of the Sandinistas as well as their promises for the people of Nicaragua.  Following the success of the revolution, the new Miskito organization MISURASATA participated in the government and held a seat on the Council of State.  The Sandinistas saw it as a popular organization that support the revolution, but still had misgivings about its strong ethnic distinctions.[11]  This organization however not only represented Miskitos but other indigenous people as well, including Sùmu, Ramas, and the group Sandinistas United.

            Over time, MISURASATA became a strong rival political force to the Sandinistas in the Atlantic coast region.  Continued militancy led the Sandinistas to begin to confront MISURASATA in order to maintain its hold over that area.  At the same time, MISURASATA felt that what had originally been a promising Sandinista revolutionary message was nothing more that propaganda used to gain the support of the people and win power from Somoza.[12]  Tensions gradually increased, with arrests of MISURASATA officials and an increased presence of government troops.  By April 1980, government troops had occupied most of the towns and many of the leaders had fled into neighboring Honduras to escape arrest.  Soon after, MISURASATA carried out armed raids against Sandinista military posts from the safety of their Honduran hideouts.[13]

Miskito resistance against the Sandinistas had turned to a primarily military movement by 1981.  Focus was transferred from longer term goals of development and protection of rights to more immediate military and political concerns.[14]  The Moravian Church again played a major role in organizing and legitimizing the movement.  The Miskito had reversed the ethnic balance of the church which had been dominated by Creole in the recent past.  With the Moravian Church now a mainly ethnic Miskito social institution, it lent full support to the struggle, conferring upon it religious authority as well as the vast social network of the church.[15]

            The period from 1981 until the beginning of reconciliation efforts at the end of 1984 was particularly violent and bloody.  This was also the period during which the Reagan administration greatly increased its support for the larger Contra war that was raging, separate from the Miskito war.  The Miskito, however, were viewed as allies to the Contras.  As a result, the Miskito received aid from the U.S at their bases in Honduras.  This aid came primarily from the CIA.[16]  As a result of strong Contra activity along the Honduran border, in early 1982, the Sandinistas decided to remove villagers along the border and move them to resettlement camps fifty miles south.  This enabled the Sandinista to further militarize the border region in an attempt to prevent attacks from Honduras.  Following two years of assassinations, kidnappings, and cross border raids the Sandinistas began to view the Miskito, rightly or wrongly, as unwitting participants in the larger Contra war.  As a result, they offered to begin negotiations in late 1984.  Brooklyn Rivera, the leader of MISURASATA, seized the opportunity and accepted the Sandinistas offer.[17]

 

Negotiation and Reconciliation

            Even as talks began in 1984, war continued to ravage the countryside.  But within Central America as a whole, there was a move towards creating a regional peace approach that would outline principles for settling the conflicts in all of the countries at war.  This was a direct challenge to the Reagan administration’s policy of arming the anti-left insurgents which arguably increased the intensity and duration of the wars.  Peace in Central America was not to come in one large peace conference, but over a period of several years and with many different peace efforts at and moving between different levels; international, national, and local.  Therefore, to discuss one particular part of this larger effort, the Miskito-Sandinista negotiations, we must include the context within which those negotiations developed.

 

Regional Peace Efforts

The first Contadora meeting in January 1983 involved only one Central American country (Panama) but included other Latin American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico) concerned with the possibility that the whole of Central America would be engulfed in violence.  This first Contadora meeting was short on substance but provided a model of regional discussion for future efforts.  It also provided an opportunity to begin to build confidence and trust which would prove essential for future efforts.  But the lack of specificity within this first effort limited its support from outside for any kind of peace agreement agreed upon within an ad hoc group outside of treaty organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), of which the U.S. was a part and in which it could exert influence on any peace process.[18]

Outside involvement in the Contadora process guaranteed its demise.  The Central American leaders had grown tired of outside manipulation, not only by the U.S. and Canada but the original Contadora group as well.  This paternalistic approach did little to assuage the legitimate security concerns of the parties.  Rather it served as a tool of manipulation, especially by the U.S.  Emphasis was on reduction of armaments and verification, negative peace, not on dealing with the vast physical, psychological, and relational destruction that the wars in Central America had caused, positive peace.  

            The next peace efforts followed on the heels of the failed Contadora process.  President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica called together the heads of state of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in February of 1987 to broach a proposal that had been circulating within the Costa Rican government.  Arias’ plan was to agree in principle on the proposal and present it to Nicaragua, hopefully for their quick approval as well, bypassing entirely the Contadora countries.  This of course greatly upset Reagan and his wish to control events in Central America.  At the last minute, before a summit of the five parties to the plan in Esquipulas, Guatemala, Reagan attempted to put forward his own plan modeled on Arias’ plan.  This tactic failed and the Esquipulas Agreement was signed.[19]

            Esquipulas provided a general framework for more detailed negotiations.  In it the parties agreed to the principles of cease-fire, national reconciliation, amnesty, democratization, elections, and ending aid for insurgent movements.[20]  This process produced mutual confidence between the parties, especially because outside parties had not played a role in dictating the terms for peace.  Rather than a formal treaty obligating each side to do specific things, Esquipulas provided steps in building confidence.  Like Contadora, it provided a verification body that would help to ensure that the agreements were carried out.  This brought in outside help from Canada, Spain, Germany, and Venezuela as well as the Secretaries General of the UN and OAS.  While this was important, it was only part of the process.  The hard work of national reconciliation still had to be done.

 

The Miskito-Sandinista Talks

            Meetings and negotiations occurred off and on during the period that the larger Central American peace process was happening.  By 1984, the concept of autonomy for the Miskito was accepted by the government.  But before autonomy could be fully accepted, the war had to be stopped.  Despite final passage of the autonomy law in April 1987, Brooklyn Rivera continued to hold out.  He argued that autonomy kept the Miskito a part of Nicaragua, when in truth the Miskito were a separate people and nation.[21]  Talks broke off in 1985 between MISURASATA (which became YATAMA in 1987) and the Sandinistas and did not substantively restart for some time.  In order to resolve this impasse and end the war, a new effort was necessary.

            Following the conclusion of the Central American Peace Accord in August 1987, hope was high that this would give impetus to establish talks between the Miskito and Sandinistas.  The creation of National Reconciliation Commissions in the Accord offered the space for those negotiations to take place.  Rev. Andy Shogreen, superintendent of the Moravian Church in Nicaragua, embarked on a process of shuttle diplomacy between Managua and San Jose where Rivera and other Miskito military leaders were in exile.  Shogreen was aided by John Paul Lederach of Mennonite Central Committee, who would call back and forth between Managua and San Jose, transmitting the latest wording proposals.  Following these go between encounters, both sides eventually were able to meet together in early 1988. 

            What resulted from this meeting was the Nicaragua-YATAMA accord.  This agreement was viewed as a preliminary step towards resolving the conflict.  The accord formalized Nicaraguan recognition of the Miskito right of autonomy.  It also allows for the political integration of YATAMA into Nicaraguan politics.[22]  In general the accord provided a starting point for the reconstruction of the political relationship between the Miskito and the Sandinistas.

            One important element of the accord was the creation of the Conciliation Commission.  The commission consisted of clergy of the Moravian Church, an official of CEPAD, a local protestant development organization, and Lederach as technical adviser.  Given Lederach’s position as a North American, his role was limited.  Often he served as recording secretary, not involved materially in the discussions that were going on in the room.  But his preliminary shuttle work was essential to creating the accord.  The purpose of the commission was to serve as the forum for future negotiations between YATAMA and the Nicaraguan government.[23]  Two years later, after four rounds of negotiations, an agreement was reached and was successful in eventually reintegrating the two leaders back into the political process that helped to establish for the Miskito contiguous autonomous territory and allowed the Miskito to begin to rebuild their communities.[24]

 

Conflict Transformation:  Elicitive Peacebuilding and the Insider-Partial Model

Throughout the process of negotiation, the Conciliation Commission was guided by the concept of conflict transformation.  This approach focuses upon moving beyond just reaching an agreement to recreating the relationships that have been broken by conflict.  In addition to resolving the immediate crisis of war, the Commission sought to foster reconciliation.  In order to do this, the parties had to be committed to the process and trust those who were facilitating the dialogue.  To achieve this, mediators used an elicitive approach that developed an insider-partial process of negotiation.

The elicitive approach focuses on empowering participants within a process to find solutions and methods to resolve their own conflict.  This approach is inherently more culturally adaptive and sensitive because of this aspect.  It is not surprising then that the successful conclusion of an agreement not only between the Miskito and Sandinista but for Central America as a whole resulted from an approach that gave the parties an integral part to play in the process.  Earlier, more prescriptive approaches by the Contadora Group as well as the U.S. were unsuccessful because of the paternalistic feeling they created.  The outsiders maintained control of the process, rather than letting the parties control it.  The elicitive approach requires the mediator to relinquish some control.  Lederach observes that, compared to traditional mediations and negotiations,  it seemed that no one had control over the Miskito-Sandinista negotiation process.[25]

            The role of the mediator in the elicitive frame is not to come up with a solution or even a process but to work with the parties in developing the entire conflict resolution structure and process.  The mediator creates the conditions for parties to find one another and their solutions to the conflict.[26]  Culture becomes an essential element in this model.  Discovering local methods of conflict resolution and understandings of conflict is the key to creating an effective process.  In this case, the elicitive process led to the development of an insider-partial framework for negotiations.

This insider-partial model of negotiation is not surprising given the cultural context.  This model is part of a pattern of counsel, confidence, and connections that Lederach describes as the essential framework for dealing with conflict in Central America.[27]  Former President Jimmy Carter, who helped monitor elections in Nicaragua, argues as well that an insider is a much more acceptable third party in many cases that an outside party like the U.S. or UN.  Parties prefer to seek out people or organizations that have been in an area for a long time and understand to a greater degree the cultural context.[28]

At the base of the insider–partial model is trust.  Without it, no process of reconciliation can be effective.  But especially within the insider-partial model, trust is essential.  The third party must have a bond of understanding with both sides.  They must have connections with both communities.  In the Central American context, this is described as confianza.[29]  This kind of third party is one that often has lived through the conflict with the parties and has experience the same pain as well.

The Miskito-Sandinista negotiations were a model of the pivotal role of trust in the construction and execution of a negotiation process.  The importance of trust in this context is reflected in the essential role of insiders to the negotiation process.  Third parties all came from within the conflict context.  Even the supposed “outsider” Lederach was undoubtedly chosen not only for his expertise by also because he had lived and worked in Central America for a year and a half prior to his involvement in the talks.

In addition to sharing a history, the mediator and the parties within the insider-partial model have a shared future as well.  Often the downfall of traditional, outsider-neutral, prescriptive mediations is that once an agreement is reached, the mediator leaves.  They are not personally invested in the process of implementation and peacebuilding.  In the insider-partial model, the mediator gains trust because they will not leave the post-negotiation context.  They will continue to relate to the parties as they try and rebuild their relationship over the coming years and even decades.[30] 

But is the insider-partial a new model to be added to the conflict resolution lexicon?  Perhaps, but before we begin rewriting our theory books, we must understand the theory.  The unique contribution of the insider-partial model is not so much that it is a new process to try.  Rather, the process of developing the model is more important.  The participatory nature of the elicitive approach to conflict resolution is what should be modeled and theorized upon.  Insider-partial was merely the visible creation of a dynamic process that allowed the development of a model that worked in a particular context.  What we should take from this then is the need to remain flexible in general and elicitive specifically as we attempt to deal with conflicting parties.

 

Developing Elicitive Conflict Resolution

What might elicitive conflict resolution look like?  When would it be useful and when would it not be understood?  These are only two of many questions that need to be asked in analyzing any new approach to theory.  The most practical application of elicitive conflict resolution would be for third parties mediating conflicts in cultural contexts outside of their own.  But elicitive conflict resolution is not only a different approach to process but to the role of the third party as well.  Within an elicitive model, the third party would tend to seek out an insider to a particular conflict or culture to learn from.  Emphasis is placed not on the expertise that the third party brings but instead upon gleaning the expertise that exists in the conflict context.  Above all other tasks listening is essential to developing an understanding of the context.

Beyond developing a process to deal with conflict, elicitive conflict resolution serves a peacebuilding function as well.  By taking ownership of the process, parties are more committed to making the process and any resulting agreements work.  This is because their personal reputations are intertwined with it.  The agreement and process are not just some abstract thing imposed from outside, but a dynamic and living organism that has grown out of collaboration and is the creation of the parties themselves.  Failure of the agreement or process is much more personal and cuts deeper in an elicitive approach than in the case of an outsider-imposed framework.  Therefore, they will be completely given to ensuring its success.

The importance of this aspect can be seen on a larger scale in the Esquipulas process and the creation of the National Reconciliation Commissions.  Unlike the Contadora process that preceded it, Esquipulas was created by Central Americans for Central American conflicts.  This may not have ensured its success but it did increase the chances that the parties would be more committed to the process than if an agreement had been imposed from outside.  In addition, the third party in the case of Esquipulas (Costa Rica) had more influence because of their insider status and evenhandedness.  This combination often leads to a successful mediation.[31]  In total, this created an organic and local mediation process.

But what does this mean for current prescriptive models and theories of conflict resolution?  Elicitive conflict resolution theory by no means replaces traditional approaches to conflict resolution.  Indeed, much of what has been learned over the past fifty or so years has proved invaluable in the development of methods and models for positively dealing with conflict.  In many cultural contexts, especially within North America and traditional diplomatic contexts, prescriptive conflict resolution will continue to be the primary approach.  What elicitive theory does is provide a new way of dealing with conflict in culture settings that are different than that of the mediator or facilitator.

Is it a panacea?  No, far from it.  Problems and limitations remain.  One major one is that it is generally a very long process that requires a large commitment of time.  In situations where crisis situations exist, old conflict management techniques may be best in the short term to de-escalate the conflict and reduce the deaths caused by it. 

In addition, often many of the people one would think would be the most trusted and able to carryout a process are part and parcel of the problem.  One example would be Rwanda.  There the church was not a source of trust but actually aided authorities rounding up civilians for slaughter.  In situations of gross humanitarian disaster, such as Rwanda or Bosnia, trust is destroyed and to rebuild it requires many years if not decades of work.  Elicitive modalities are essential at some point during the process of rebuilding peace following an agreement, but initially in such cases it becomes most important to stop the killing.

 

Conclusion

            Given the relative success of negotiations in the Sandinista-Miskito conflict, it is important that we take a few lessons from that experience to inform future interventions and the field in general.  Traditional track one attempts at diplomacy in the case of Nicaragua proved futile for the most part when initiated by parties outside the conflict.  While the Contadora group was well meaning, it failed to involve its subjects in the development of the process and to allow them to own it.  A more elicitive approach- using local resources and insiders who were respected and were more intimately familiar with the conflict-proved to be successful.  Integral to this approach is an understanding of the concept of conflict transformation.  Rather than merely seeking to a resolution to conflict, a third party uses elicitive conflict resolution to move beyond drafting an agreement to engaging the parties in a process of reconciliation and transformation.  Through this more holistic and humble approach, conflict is more effectively addressed and resolved.

Works Cited

 

Basic Preliminary Accords Between the Government of Nicaragua and the Organization YATAMA Resulting From Dialogue From January 25 Through February 2, 1988.  Translated from Spanish by Center for World Indigenous Studies.

 

Bent, Norman.  “To Accept the Enemy as a Challenge:  The Ministry of Reconciliation.”  In Philip McManus and Gerald Schlabach, Relentless Persistence:  Non-Violent Action in Latin America.  New Society:  Philadelphia, 1991.

 

Carnevale, Peter J. and Sharon Arad.  “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation.”  In Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts:  The Theory and Practice of Mediation.  Lynne Rienner:  Boulder, 1996.

 

Carter, Jimmy.  Interview.  The Carters:  A Conversation.  PBS.  WETA, Arlington, VA.  12 November 2002.

 

Child, Jack.  The Central American Peace Process:  1983-1991.  Lynne Rienner:  Boulder, 1992.

 

Coleman, Salomón Osorno.  “My People, Our War:  Why I Fought Against the Sandinista Revolution.”  In Timothy C. Brown, ed.  When the AK-47s Fall Silent:  Revolutionaries, Guerrillas, and the Dangers of Peace.  Hoover:  Stanford, CA, 2000.

 

Hale, Charles.  Resistance and Contradiction:  Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894-1987.  Stanford University Press:  Stanford, CA, 1994.

 

Lederach, John Paul.  Interview.  Conciliation Quarterly.  Vol. 7, No. 2.  Mennonite Central Committee:  Akron, PA, 1988.

 

Lederach, John Paul.  Of Nets, Nails, and Problemas:  A Folk Vision of Conflict in Central America.  Dissertation, University of Colorado, 1988.

 

Nietschmann, Bernard.  The Unknown War:  The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States.  Freedom House:  New York, 1989.

 

Ortiz, Roxanne Dunbar.  The Miskito Indians of Nicaragua.  Minority Rights Group, Report Number 79:  London, 1988.

 

Robertson, C. Alton.  The Moravians, The Miskitu, and the Sandinistas on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast:  1979-1990.  The Moravian Church in America:  Bethlehem, PA, 1998.

 

Wehr, Paul and John Paul Lederach.  “Mediating Conflict in Central America.”  In Jacob Bercovitch, ed.,  Resolving International Conflicts:  The Theory and Practice of Mediation.  Lynne Rienner:  Boulder, 1996.