The largest complaint related to the North Korean nuclear problem is that a large segment of the population understandably wonders if North Korea actually possesses nuclear weapons at this very moment.

One group, when taking into account North Korea's activities during this period, fears that in reality they already possess 1~2 nuclear weapons, and that the danger is that they could manufacture 4~6 more within a few months.  On the other side, there are those who strongly insist that North Korea clearly has the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, but that at least up to now there is no possibility that they actually possess any.  Still other analysts even evaluate North Korea's nuclear activities as a tactical means with the goal of obtaining negotiations with America rather than nuclear weapons.

Each of these arguments is accurate in some ways, but the fact is that it is very difficult to pass judgement for certain.  Rather than anything else, only the vague notion of 'nuclear weapons' accurately explains the situation, and there are limits to forecasting.  If nuclear weapons are to be able to sufficiently exhibit great power as an object of terror, then some of the essential points that must be combined are the political/strategic conviction that more profit can be obtained through the public announcement of the possession of nukes than pressure or retaliation, and reliable means of delivery.

That is to say that the existence in itself of a 'nuclear weapon that can be applied at any time according to objectives and intentions' is a very real danger.   The fact is that the rigid camps that have been visible in the past few months have a duty to act as though, sure enough, North Korea has crossed over from 'token nuclear weapons' to possessing 'actual nuclear weapons'.  The reason is that there is a strong likelihood that the drastic measures that were made full use of within a mere 2~3 months during the past North Korean nuclear related troubles, which lasted over a year (1993~94), originated not out of a sense of self-confidence but a sense of impatience and some sort of obsession.

Nevertheless, the fact that North Korea does not yet possess an 'actual nuclear weapon' and the insistence that this does not pose a threat to us are two totally separate things.  This is because from the point of view of we who stand face to face across a military border from North Korea, even the suggestion of the most crude and elementary nuclear weapon carries sufficient potential to summon a huge calamity.

Related to this, it is necessary to bear in mind that the idea that North Korea uses nuclear development as simple negotiation is the mistaken fruit of very dangerous circular reasoning.  The fact is that all this time North Korea has been continuously pushing negotiations with America using the curse of nuclear development.  However, this in itself is not their objective.  These actions are properly viewed as means by which to realize their ultimate goals.  Namely, solutions to the problem on the Korean peninsula, such as eliminating South Korea, securing resources to alleviate their economic crisis, and maintaining military superiority over South Korea.  From the North Korean point of view, the promise of securing more profitable and successful negotiations with South Korea and the International Community due to the fear engendered by their possession of nuclear weapons is sufficient motive for them to intend to possess them in actuality.  
Since the early nineties, the persistent North Korean nuclear problem has led to a kind of security frigidness that writes off North Korea's nuclear development as a 'routine problem without a solution', rather than the primary potential threat to our society.  This attitude is possibly more dangerous than North Korea's nuclear weapons, and might be yet another intentional objective of the suspicious expansion of nuclear production that North Korea has extended for over ten years.

<Korea Institute for Defense Analyses Senior Analyst Doo Hyun Cha>