|
����
��EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been
declared to be that at which all things aim.(1-1)�]�U���V���ס^
��though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is
finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for
city-states.(1-2)�]��a��������ӤH�^
��The fact, too, that a friend is different from a flatterer seems to make
it plain that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures are different in
kind; for the one is thought to consort with us with a view to the good,
the other with a view to our pleasure, and the one is reproached for his
conduct while the other is praised on the ground that he consorts with us
for different ends....It seems to be clear, then, that neither is pleasure
the good nor is all pleasure desirable(10-3)�]��������ּ֡^
��if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something
else, while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be
placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for
the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything, but is
self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from
which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous
actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing
desirable for its own sake.(10-6)�]���֦۬��ت��^
���z��
��If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that
it should be in accordance with the highest virtue....this activity is
contemplative we have already said....(since not only is reason the best
thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable
objects).....it is to be expected that those who know will pass their time
more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the self-sufficiency that is
spoken of must belong most to the contemplative
activity....(10-7)�]���G���ʬO�̰��Q�����֡^
��nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical
activities we gain more or less apart from the action. And happiness is
thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure,
and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical
virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions
concerned with these seem to be unleisurely.(10-7)�]���֦s�b�v�����A�]���b����G�ӫD���^
��But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he
is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present
in him...But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think
of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as
we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in
accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk,
much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.
(10-7)�]����O���b�ë����ʪ��O�s�^
�����
��For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit;
but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle
knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.(1-3)�]�F�v�Ǥ��A�X���g�窺�C�֦~�^
��Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is
not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them;
with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to
have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good.
(10-9)
��Now laws are as it were the' works' of the political art; how then can
one learn from them to be a legislator, or judge which are best? Even
medical men do not seem to be made by a study of text-books. Yet people
try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments, but also how
particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated --
distinguishing the various habits of body; but while this seems useful to
experienced people, to the inexperienced it is valueless. (10-9)�]�@���H�g�笰���k�^
���w��
��The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned
with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of
avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their
contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the
good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially
about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies
all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear
pleasant.(2-3)�]�ּ֩εh�W�^
��Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the
intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which
excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is
praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful
are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean,
since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.
Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class
of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the
limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason
also one is easy and the other difficult -- to miss the mark easy, to hit
it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are
characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;
For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.(2-6)�]�w�ʬO���e�ӳ�ª��^
��Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear
of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of
danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn
pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is
thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of
character.(4-9)�]�ۮ��u�O���P�ӫD�w�ʡ^
���ۨ�
��To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most
vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or
happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of
enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life --
that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative
life......so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for
they are loved for themselves. (1-5)
��Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we
choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but
honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves
(for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them),
but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means
of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses
for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to
follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient.(1-7)�]�۬��ت��^
�����e
��First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things
to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength
and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the
evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise
destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below
a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate
both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the
case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who
flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against
anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes
to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in
every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the
man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible;
temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and
preserved by the mean.(2-2)
��How far, therefore, and how a man must stray before he becomes
blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words; for the decision depends on
the particular facts and on perception. But so much at least is plain,
that the middle state is praiseworthy -- that in virtue of which we are
angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so
on, while the excesses and defects are blameworthy -- slightly so if they
are present in a low degree, more if in a higher degree, and very much if
in a high degree. Evidently, then, we must cling to the middle
state.(4-5)�]�������H�����������`�H���e�����k�^
���ʾ�
��SINCE virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary
passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are
involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary
and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the
nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the
assigning both of honours and of punishments. (3-1)�]�D�w�P�_�����Ϥ����@�P�_�^
��It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object
of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation?
At any rate choice involves a rational principle and thought. Even the
name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other
things.(3-2)�]��ܬO�@�زz�ʡA�P���@���P�^
��Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly
or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily, he
acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does
things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is or is not one
of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or
involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same
time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things that are
unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as
well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things
in a man's own power which he does with knowledge, i.e. not in ignorance
either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that
will be attained (e.g. whom he is striking, with what, and to what end),
each such act being done not incidentally nor under
compulsion(5-8)�]���q�欰���P�_�]�����ھڰʾ��P�{���^
��Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that
being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with one's neighbour's wife, to
wound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our power, but to do
these things as a result of a certain state of character is neither easy
nor in our power. Similarly to know what is just and what is unjust
requires, men think, no great wisdom, because it is not hard to understand
the matters dealt with by the laws (though these are not the things that
are just, except incidentally); but how actions must be done and
distributions effected in order to be just, to know this is a greater
achievement than knowing what is good for the health(5-9)�]�ʾ����Φ��O�����P�_���^
��For, as has been said at the beginning, some are human and natural both
in kind and in magnitude, others are brutish, and others are due to
organic injuries and diseases. Only with the first of these are temperance
and self-indulgence concerned; this is why we call the lower animals
neither temperate nor self-indulgent except by a metaphor, and only if
some one race of animals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness,
destructiveness, and omnivorous greed; these have no power of choice or
calculation, but they are departures from the natural norm, as, among men,
madmen are. (7-6)�]�����㦳��ܯ�O�~����c�A�ҥH�ƤH��������I�I�^
���i��
��In what circumstances, then? Surely in the noblest. Now such deaths are
those in battle; for these take place in the greatest and noblest danger.
And these are correspondingly honoured in city-states and at the courts of
monarchs. Properly, then, he will be called brave who is fearless in face
of a noble death, and of all emergencies that involve death; and the
emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind. Yet at sea
also, and in disease, the brave man is fearless, but not in the same way
as the seaman; for he has given up hope of safety, and is disliking the
thought of death in this shape, while they are hopeful because of their
experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is
the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble; but in these
forms of death neither of these conditions is fulfilled.(3-6)�]�b�������`�̳̫i���^
���۱�
��But to die to escape from poverty or love or anything painful is not the
mark of a brave man, but rather of a coward; for it is softness to fly
from what is troublesome, and such a man endures death not because it is
noble but to fly from evil.(3-7)�]���k�צӦ۱��̬������^
��he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the
right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is
acting unjustly. But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards
himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated
unjustly. This is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss
of civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground
that he is treating the state unjustly.(5-11)�]�۴ݪ̪������q�b�������ˮ`�^
���ּ�
��Temperance must be concerned with bodily pleasures, but not all even of
these; for those who delight in objects of vision, such as colours and
shapes and painting, are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent; yet
it would seem possible to delight even in these either as one should or to
excess or to a deficient degree.(3-10)
��but in the actual enjoyment, which in all cases comes through touch, both
in the case of food and in that of drink and in that of sexual
intercourse. This is why a certain gourmand prayed that his throat might
become longer than a crane's, implying that it was the contact that he
took pleasure in. Thus the sense with which self-indulgence is connected
is the most widely shared of the senses; and self-indulgence would seem to
be justly a matter of reproach, because it attaches to us not as men but
as animals.(3-10)�]IJı���֬O�����[�H�`��^
��the best thing in the world cannot be pleasure. (1) The reasons given for
the view that pleasure is not a good at all are (a) that every pleasure is
a perceptible process to a natural state, and that no process is of the
same kind as its end, e.g. no process of building of the same kind as a
house. (b) A temperate man avoids pleasures. (c) A man of practical wisdom
pursues what is free from pain, not what is pleasant. (d) The pleasures
are a hindrance to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them,
e.g. in sexual pleasure; for no one could think of anything while absorbed
in this. (e) There is no art of pleasure; but every good is the product of
some art. (f) Children and the brutes pursue pleasures. (7-11)�]�ּ֫D���^
��Now there can be too much of bodily goods, and the bad man is bad by
virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary
pleasures (for all men enjoy in some way or other both dainty foods and
wines and sexual intercourse, but not all men do so as they
ought).(7-14)�]�����b�ּ֦Ӧb��L�ס^
��It is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since for
every one it completes life, which is desirable. But whether we choose
life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a
question we may dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up
together and not to admit of separation, since without activity pleasure
does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant
pleasure.(10-4)�]���z�Ѱl�D�ּ֡^
�����[
��And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary of
liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than prodigality, but men
err more often in this direction than in the way of prodigality as we have
described it.(4-1)
���I��
��And he is apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original
benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the
gainer by the transaction. They seem also to remember any service they
have done, but not those they have received (for he who receives a service
is inferior to him who has done it, but the proud man wishes to be
superior), and to hear of the former with pleasure, of the latter with
displeasure(4-3)
�����q
��Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common
advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or
something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those acts just that
tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the
political society.....proverbially 'in justice is every virtue
comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it
is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who
possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his
neighbour also.(5-1)
��this is plain from the fact that awards should be 'according to merit';
for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to
merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of
merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of
oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy
with excellence. �]���M���Ȫ��{�w���P�A���W�n���ӼƾǤ�ҡ^
The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being not a
property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract units, but
of number in general). (5-3)�]���t���q�^
��This, then, is what the just is -- the proportional; the unjust is what
violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too
small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has
too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is good.
In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is reckoned a
good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is rather
to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and
what is worthier of choice a greater good. (5-3)�]�v�š^
��But the justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality
indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind
of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion......This
is why, when people dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to
the judge is to go to justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort
of animate justice; and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in
some states they call judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get
what is intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an
intermediate, since the judge is so. (5-4)�]�H�ڥ橹�譱�h�O�H��N�����������^
��there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are
one's own, but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain
age and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one
chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice
towards oneself). (5-6)
���F��
��Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth --
sensation, reason, desire. �]�j��T���k�G�Pı�B�z�ʡB����^
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that
the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are
in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned
with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning
must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the
latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of
intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is
contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state
are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything
intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the
good state is truth in agreement with right desire.....�]�D�w��ܡG�@�ع��z�ʡ^
Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and
such an origin of action is a man.(6-2)�]�H���ҥH����V�~�b���ܡ^
��Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical
wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right
mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.
(6-12)�]���Ȳz�ʻP�u��z�ʡ^
�����z
��Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the
art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is
not the best thing in the world. Now if what is healthy or good is
different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always
the same....there are other things much more divine in their nature even
than man, e.g., most conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are
framed. From what has been said it is plain, then, that philosophic wisdom
is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things
that are highest by nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men
like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom, when we see them
ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know
things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless;
viz. because it is not human goods that they seek.(6-7)
���۹�
��I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female who, they
say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in
which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are
said to delight -- in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their
children to one another to feast upon -- or of the story told of Phalaris.
These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or,
in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his
mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow), and others are
morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g. the habit of plucking out
the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition
to these paederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as
in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit.
Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one would call
incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women because of
the passive part they play in copulation; nor would one apply it to those
who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit. To have these various
types of habit is beyond the limits of vice, as brutishness is too; for a
man who has them to master or be mastered by them is not simple
(continence or) incontinence but that which is so by
analogy(7-5)�]������Ƭ۹��[�G�X���~�ʡB�߫U�B�f�A���A����@���{���c�^
���z��
��Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For some men
after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the
conclusions of their deliberation, others because they have not
deliberated are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people who
first tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first
perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and
their calculative faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it
be pleasant or painful. It is keen and excitable people that suffer
especially from the impetuous form of incontinence; for the former by
reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence of
their passions do not await the argument, because they are apt to follow
their imagination.(7-7)�]�z�ʪ��H���P���p���o�^
���ͷR
��And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only
refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people
by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are
failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble
actions -- 'two going together' -- for with friends men are more able both
to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for
offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and
among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and
especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even
in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship
seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than
for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this
they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when
men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just
they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to
be a friendly quality.(8-1)
��Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven
when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is
what opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune'
and 'all things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as
others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at like.
(8-1)�]�ۤϬۦ��B�����D��^
��Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of
what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure
do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as
the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.
And thus these friendships are only incidental....This kind of friendship
seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue
not the pleasant but the useful)....On the other hand the friendship of
young people seems to aim at pleasure; for they live under the guidance of
emotion(8-3)�]���D�Q�ΩΧּ֪���اC���ͽˡ^
��Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in
virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are
good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake
are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not
incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good --
and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification
and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and
useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant
both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own
activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the
good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected
permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should
have.(8-3) �]�@�P�l�D�����ͽˤ~�O���[�ӧ������^
��And in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good
man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, then, both
loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and
in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these
are found most in the friendship of the good.(8-5)�]�J�R�H�S�۷R�����A�^
��One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship
of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many
people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the
nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for
many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or
perhaps even to be good in his eyes. (8-6)�]�@�ӤH���i��\�h���ͽˡ^
��But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated
by the delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their
children to be brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love
them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but
seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves love
their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of
a mother's due. Now since friendship depends more on loving, and it is
those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the
characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is
found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship
that endures.(8-8)�]�ͷR�O�@�ئp���R�뤣�D�^�����I���^
��Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the friendship
of utility, and this is only to be expected. For those who are friends on
the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each other (since that is a
mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each
other in this there cannot be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended
by a man who loves him and does well by him -- if he is a person of nice
feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the other. And the man who
excels the other in the services he renders will not complain of his
friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires what is good.
(8-13)�]���ͽ˧Ʊ����ۤv�n�I���d�ƪ��O���ۧQ�Ϊ��ͽˡ^
��Further, love is like activity, being loved like passivity; and loving
and its concomitants are attributes of those who are the more active.
Again, all men love more what they have won by labour; e.g. those who have
made their money love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be
well treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others well is a
laborious task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder of
their children than fathers; bringing them into the world costs them more
pains, and they know better that the children are their own. This last
point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.(9-7)�]�R�H�Y���̡A�Y���W�̡A�O�u�����̡֪^
��If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy man (since
it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very
much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now
that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient in
this respect. The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous
friends.(9-9)�]���צۨ����H���B�ͬO���M���^
��For this cause it would seem that we ought to summon our friends readily
to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent character is a noble one),
but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give
them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough
is my misfortune'. (9-11)�]��h�O���֦P�ɡA�����v���^
��Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is
the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because
on it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends
the most desirable thing is living together? (9-12)�]�R���̰��Ҭɦb���[�ݡF�ͱ��h�b��P�~�^
���۷R
��Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to
himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is
the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid
wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be
either friendly to oneself or a friend to another.(9-4)
��Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both
himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the
wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours,
following as he does evil passions.....It is true of the good man too that
he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if
necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours
and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for
himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure
to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years
of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones.
Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore
a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away wealth
too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's
friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore
assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and
office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is
noble and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good,
since he chooses nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions
to his friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting
than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised
for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what
is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover
of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought
not.(9-8)�]���H�ۧ��묹�A���O�u�����۷R�̡^
���k��
��But it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the
right nurture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up,
practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well,
and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most people obey
necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of
what is noble.(10-9)�]�g�@���g��ġ^
���F��
��One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns
of them even in households. For the association of a father with his sons
bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children; and
this is why Homer calls Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of monarchy to be
paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father is
tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a
master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master that is brought
about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government, but the
Persian type is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different
relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be
aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those
matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he
hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes over
into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not acting in accordance with their
respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Sometimes,
however, women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in
virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The
association of brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in
so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the
friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly
in masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in
those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as he
pleases.(8-10)
���樥
�֦s�b�v����...�z�����ʻݭn���v�A�b�ۨ����~�O�L�ҨD�A���ۥ����T�����ּ֡C(Nico,p.224)
��u�ꪺ�ͤH�D�O�ĤG�ۧڡA�ͽ˴N�O�۷R���̨Ϊ��{�CĴ�p��������U�A���M�ۤv���x����֡A���믫�����Q���k��v�A�i��o���ש��֡C
��B�ͪ��T�h���G�\�Q����/�s�פ���/�D�q����(freindship of good)(Nichomachean Ethics)
��ͽ˥��p�R�����ˡC�]���R���O�@�عL�סA�۵M���@�H�W���C(Nicomachean ethics p.171)
�}���H���ȩt�W�A�@�P�ۤv�@��A�åH������....�̤��ΨӳW�w�ͽ˪��ݩʡA���O�q�v�����ΥL�H�C�]���@�ӤH�O�L�ۤv�̦n���B�͡C(Nicomachean
Ethics, p.194)
��@�ӷ��j�ּ֪��u�Ȯɤ�ӹL���`�ּ֪��h��A�@�~���|���ͬ��ө�h�~���e���ɥ��A�@�����|���j���欰�ӹL�h�����H����ʡC�]Nicomachean
Ethics p.203�צ۷R�̡^
��Ҧ����H����g�L���W�ӱo�Ӫ��R��[�÷R�A....���R�]�ͨ|���W�ӱj�P....���̸����̧�ּ֡C(Nichomachean Ethics,
p.200)
1999.4.11
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