1."Even if we stared for one hour/half an hour at the clock, we wouldn't see it move". What kind of faculty lacks here? Is something wrong about our seeing?
2. I found what I was thinking about
Looking for something as restricting the field of suspects. A work on
the object.
3.What is the difference between looking for something and looking for a method to find it? If I looked for something without looking for a method to find it, then I should have no reason to regret for having looked for it in a wrong way.
4.Is looking for a method to find an object the same as looking for new places where the object could be?
5. "If I had been exposed to different stimuli, then I would have had different perceptions/different concepts/different grammar rules". How do I know that? How do I know that my very belief in inateness of my concepts is not caused by certain stimuli?
6."New" is a meta-adjective, like "similar". It says something about first-order properties.
7. "I could have felt no fear at this situation that frightens me". Yes, but perhaps the feeling I express by this sentence is caused by the fear I am feeling now.
8. "I might not have had this memory" (efshar she lo zacarti et ha zicaron haze). But perhaps there is a dinamics of my thoughts, so that the event I now remember is the cause of my thought that I might not remember it".
9. (Bergson says that the person who is really pittiful will want his
pity to last longer). The same with regret. Regret is an interesting
feeling, since we sometimes think we shouldn't have it - not that
i should go on without regrets after the regretted event happened, but
that events which (legitimately) cause regret should not happen.
On the other hand, since that particular thing happenned, it is
preferrable to regret.
There is a difference between someone who does not want to regret,
because only bad things motivate regrets, and bad things should not happen;
and someone who does not want to regret because he should not care.
10. "I might have not had the memory of my first day in school". But isn't your first day in school the cause of your thought that you might have not remembered it?
11. The identity of an argument, of a point of view
How is it possible to argue from several directions for the same thesis?
IF your arguments come from the same point of view, they are only different linguistic
formulations for the same argument.
If they are different arguments, they come from different points of
view.
What does "identity of an argument" mean? "Even if the first argument
had not been formulated, the second argument would have been".
Often when we argue, we bring forward several arguments (rhetorics?).
Perhaps a few arguments will not convince; more arguments will.
(At least the number of the arguments will convince, even if no
single argument will) --> the heap paradox, the last drop that fills
the glass.
The troubling problem is that the identity of an argument depends on the
identity of a point of view and vice versa (circularity?).
Arguments and causes of persuasion. (An argument like a legitimate
cause for persuasion).
for example, the right to inherit property can be held with two
arguments: 1. faute de mieux if the successor of the dead person
does not deserve the inheritance, then who does?; 2. such a right
"stimulates" the bequather to increase his wealth and not spend it
lavishly before death.
Two arguments that n power 0 = 1. One argument is "induction".
Then the standard argument: 2 power 3 by 2 power -3 = 1 = 2 power (3-3)
= 2 power 0.
What would "(dis)proving the identity of these two arguments mean"?
12.Does Leningrad still exist?
Think of the following sentences:
13. In what state of mind do you have to be in order to understand other people's mental states?
14. Assuming that leaving a good impression is morally neutral,
perhaps even immoral (insofar as "the desire to do the good" and
"the desire to leave a good impression" are redundant causation),
then it follows that the desire to leave a bad impression is a
moral thing.
But this is how you risk not doing the good - since a good thing
is not one that seems to you to be good.
Therefore, ethics' main problem: How to do the good without
being at all interested in leaving a good impression?
15. Linguistic counterfactuals. How would culture have looked like, if noone had ever written any text before reading all the texts written until him?
16. Is looking for something the same as wanting for it to change the
description under which I think it falls? (by means of which I pick it out).
IF I am asked the solution of an equation and that solution is 3,
I cannot discover the solution by counting mentally 0,1,2,3 - for I might
not recognize 3 as being the solution.
On the other hand , it would be absurd to say that I want
the number 3 to appear to me under the description "the solution of the equation".
For, had this been the description under which I wanted 3 to come to me, it would have
come.
The same thing happens when I lose my key. I look for it in my
pocket, I touch it, perhaps I also see it - but I don't recognize it
as my key. (I take it for a coin).
Is the
key is precisely what I looked for or its place?
(Or its place? No: when I touch it i know its place as well).
17. We sometimes have the object but not the description that fits it, sometimes the description but not the object that fits it.
18. I am prone to say: I want that something unpredictable should happen. I cannot influence the arrival of the moment when I (rightly) recognize the key as the key, the number 3 as the solution to the eqation. (Trivial solution: "two kinds of attention: attention to an object and to a feature of it - attention fo an object is physical attention, attention to a feature of object is mental attention").
19. How is it possible to measure the same length (or duration of time) in several different ways?
20. Wittgenstein and Zeno - the third man argument
21. Since there is so much written, all you can hope is to be read instead of someone else. Irrationality?
22 How is it possible to do anything at all while knowing it is in the things' nature to do so? To avoid fatalism: after doing it, you realize it was predictable.
23. How can you tell whether your failure to find an object is due to its non-existence in that place, or to your having looked for it in a wrong way?
24. "Go take out some money from your account". I obey the order and go to the bank; when I reach it, I can't remember why I am near the bank.
25. On analogy Criticism of organicist
analogy (Plato, Rousseau). We suppose that for a state
it is essential to win battles over other states.
Likewise, for an individual it is essential to
win conflicts over other individuals. But a citizen
of a state must be identical with all other citizens.
Therefore the organicist analogy does not
state merely: for any property had by the state,
it (or its counterpart) must be had by the individual:
in some cases, if a property belongs to the state,
its opposite must belong to the individual:
the warmonger disposition towards one's neighbours.
26.akrasia as concealment of the wil. The paradox of akrasia is that the agent acts
27.akrasia and the distinction between the
dispositional/occurential account of knowledge.
(Perhaps the agent knows "in general" that it is
good to do D. But at a certain moment he forgot.
28.Thus, akrasia as weakness of knowledge (not
of the will).
29.Speaking of nothing USSR does not exist. Burma does not exist (it is called Myanmar).
30.The problem is not whether one should draw signs (insemnari) on the books one reads; the problem is whether, and how you could tell, the difference between your insemnari/insemnari; the problem why it is immoral to make insemnari with the ball-point and less immoral to use a pencil.
31.Things have memory the foundations of
probability (does a ball which you extract from
the urn remember what ball was extracted before it?).
Does the first extraction influence the second extraction? (hotsa`at-cadur)?
Memory of the things is not the same as causality - why?
32."The bang was softer than I had expected".
General form: the feeling that waiting was
not confirmed. The general problem: does this mean that
,when you wait for smthg, you keep in mind the
waited-for in a potential state? (a trace of the
waited-for) - how do you identify it?
"I hoped this would stiate me (szavu'a,lehasbia' saturat),
but I would barely appeased my hunger".
"I expected X to come, but Y came instead".
"I expected everything would finish sooner".
Take the simplest example: "I expected John to came,
but Bill came instead". Bill's coming stimulates me
to think of John.
33.Criticism of the causal theory of names. Let's assume that
Homer did not exist; no blind individual called Homer wrote the Illyad and the Odissey;
then my sentence "Homer was so-and-so" is false.
But let's assume there is a unique author of both poems; he was called
Remoh. Now, what evidence do you have that Homer is not the Attic
translation of Remoh?
Then, as it were, if I refer to Homer of not according to the causal theory
of naming, this depends on facts external to the causal chain.
Say, if the name of the author of Ilyad and Odyssey is "Lulu", it is
not likely that "Homer" is a translation of "Lulu". But "Remoh" resembles
"Homer" more. So?
34. Putnam nu uita sa pomenesti si Yerushalaim-EL-Quds. Sigur ca nu e situatia lui Putnam, pentru ca sunt nume diferite. Exemplul e mai interesant pentru kripke's puzzle about belief..."spargerea" (extensionala) unui obiect in functie de sensurile diferite ale numelui sau. Ce mai poti zice daca refuzi ca numele au sens.
35. Do some sentences you wrote when you comment a text have themselves the property that they will be read by other people? Attention (do some things the property that we pay attention to them?)
36.(Putnam) Our words reach the reality - no need for senses, as our seeing reaches the reality - no need for sense-data. Hmmm...what do our arguments reach?
37. There are circumstances in which it is allowed to pretend to be
mad; circumstances in which only a madman would pretend to be mad.
We know it is impossible to pretend all the time. If someone
pretends to be insane when signing papers, receiving money etc, then one is
insane.
38."angry behavior" as a family resemblance: one cannot tell in advance what everyone should do to be angry. A dynamic reconstruction of behavior. Is this family-resemblance due to the interaction between the "behaviorer" and the spectator (the Subject who ascribes anger)?
39.Putnam What if small pieces of Aluminium were eparpillees (mefuzarot) among pieces of Molibdenum, both on our earth and on TwinEarth? Wouldnt Aluminium and Molibdenum form a natural kind?
40.Plato-Laws: Plato nu mai cere Episteme, se multumeste
cu doxa adevarata. Astfel, "virtue is knowledge" nu mai e infirmata
de pasajul cheie: cea mai mare ignoranta este sa aplici
ceea ce stii ca este rau. acum in 2002 nu mai inteleg nimic din asta
Oare, asa cum zice Saunders, teza ca "nimeni nu face raul stiindu-l rau"
depinde cumva de teza ca viata virtuoasa e in mod necesar mai fericita
decat cea vicioasa? Oare qadu teza se bazeaza pe importanta rusinii
(Dodds) ?
41.PENTRU ESEU PE PUTNAM:
Putnam neaga FPA
Putnam neaga ca esenta = gramatica