Turkish Feminist Movement and EU

Turkish women have long been politically active in the public sphere, writing in newspapers and journals, mounting campaigns, launching protests, and organizing within associations to improve women’s status in Turkish society. The history of the feminist movement in Turkey dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, the latter period of the Ottoman Empire.1

At the time, being aware of the growing feminist activism in Europe and the United States, some well-educated upper-class women most of whom were close relatives of high-level civil servants began discussing how to improve women’s lives in Ottoman society. In numerous women’s journals, Ottoman women focused on issues ranging from quest for education and participation in the labor market to the elimination of polygyny (marriage of a man with multiple women) and peçe (an Islamic facial cover) (Cakir 1994; Tekeli 1998). According to Cakir (1994), among the journals Kadınlar Dünyası (Women’s World), which was published between 1913 and 1921, deserves special attention as it showed that the demands of women for change in their roles would necessitate a transformation in the Islamic structure of the Ottoman Empire.

Within the Ottoman society which was governed by Şeriat (the Islamic Canon Law), women had to wear peçe and çarşaf (long loose garment that covers the body from head to toe). They were not allowed to have education. Men could have multiple wives. Most of the time men and women were socially separated. Ottoman feminists whose works appeared in Kadınlar Dünyası criticized the wearing of peçe because they found it demeaning as if women had something terrible to hide (Cakir 1994: 180). They asked for the elimination of polygyny, opposed the marriage of underage girls, and advocated for marriage on the basis of love rather than arrangement. (Cakir 1994).

Kadınlar Dünyası included writings of women who saw the lack of formal education among the reasons for women’s second-class status in Ottoman society and blamed men, especially their fathers, for curbing their education (Cakir 1994: 226). Most women believed that the wellbeing of society depended on the degree to which women became active members. They found the developments in western countries positive and suggested that western civilization be followed for the improvement of society and thus women’s status (Cakir 1994: 257). In addition to education, the journal reflected the demands of women for the opportunity to work and achieve economic independence. In later years, women advocated for political rights such as to elect and be elected. In 1921, this last demand was also put in the party program of the feminist association that owned the journal and became the main issue around which feminists met during the early years of the Turkish Republic (Cakir 1994).

The political activities of the Ottoman feminists coincided with the wide-ranging reforms operationalized by the Ottoman governors after 1839. In order to eliminate the set backs that the Empire was going through, high level state officials decided to take the West as a model for making changes in social, military, political, and economic arenas. Reforms that helped to improve women’s status were the opening of a middle school in 1859, a high school in 1913, and a university for women in 1915. Women began to be trained as midwives in 1842 and as teachers in 1876 (Kadinin Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel Mudurlugu: 1999).

The Ottoman Empire declined despite the western-style measures taken by the governors. Yet the reforms regarding women’s status continued after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.2 In 1926, Swiss Civil Code was adopted.3 Polygyny was outlawed. Women gained the same rights of divorce and inheritance as men. They gained the right to vote and be elected first in the local elections in 1930 and then in national elections in 1934. Although çarşaf, peçe, and headscarves were never banned, their use was discouraged by the state (Fleischmann 1999). Some studies on the feminist movement in Turkey have pointed out that rights were strategically given to women in the early years of the Republic in order to bring about structural change in areas where Islamic laws had previously been dominant. Changing women’s status and appearance were considered necessary measures to modernize and break ties with the public governance of Islam (Kirkpinar 1998; Tekeli 1986). Still, top to bottom changes did not mean that Ottoman feminists abandoned their activism with the establishment of the Republic. Before they gained the right to vote and be elected, some of the members of the Ottoman feminist movement had established a women’s party. Later, when the party was not approved by the government, it turned itself into an association called Kadınlar Birliği (the Union of Women) and demanded political rights for women. After women gained political rights, the association dissolved itself in 1935 with the acceptance of the idea that the secular modern regime gave women comprehensive rights and there was no need for further women’s activism. Although the association reopened in 1949, it was different. It became one of many women’s associations that worked to protect the new system and supported the education of women who were considered as mothers of next generations (Kilic 1998).

Beginning in the mid 1960s, women became politically active again in social movements, this time mostly in Left-oriented organizations within the larger Leftist movement.4 However, these political activists predominantly focused on social class issues. They did not form a collective action to question women’s roles and status until a feminist movement emerged in the early 1980s (Tekeli 1995).5

1980 marks an important turning point in Turkish history. The 1980 military coup suppressed Leftist and Rightist movements of the previous decade.6 Associations, political parties and their branches were closed. The feminist movement began within this atmosphere. Tekeli (1986), a feminist scholar, argues that the suppression of male-dominated movements during this period allowed the emergence of the feminist movement because women could have a space to focus on the woman question without being co-opted. My earlier project on the contemporary feminist movement in Turkey revealed that disappointed by the suppression of their Leftist actions, some women found refuge in feminism (Aldikacti 2001). Coming from a Leftist movement background, a feminist pointed out that in the absence of a Leftist movement “feminism filled an empty space” for her and many other Left-oriented women (Aksu Bora, interview, 1999). As implied in this feminist’s remark, most feminists who were at the forefronts of the movement were active in the previous Leftist movement. These women remember those years of Leftist activism as a major experience in shaping their lives and feminism later on. They point out that they could utilize the self-confidence and organizational skills that they had learned in the Leftist movement within feminist organizations in later years (Aldikacti 2001).

In the 1980s, meetings of consciousness raising groups, publications of feminist journals, street protests, and issue-based campaigns, shaped feminism in Turkey. Consciousness raising groups were the basic forms of organization during this period. These small groups first got together in private homes. Then they rented apartments or met in meeting rooms of other public organizations (Timisi and Gevrek 2002; Tekeli 1986; Arat 1994). Sexual division of labor, the meaning of heterosexual love, violence against women, and discriminatory laws were among the major topics for discussion. Feminists published journals among which were radical feminist oriented Feminist and socialist feminist oriented Kaktus. Both journals are good sources for researchers who are interested in the history of feminism in Turkey in the 1980s.

One of the major campaigns was the 1986 campaign to pressure the state to implement the “Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” a measure which the state had signed in 1985 at the United Nations’ Convention in Nairobi. Feminists launched campaign and street protests in 1987 against the battering of women (Arat 1994; Kilic 1998). This campaign was important for two reasons. First, it brought about the issues of domestic violence and harassment which were commonly considered as private matters into the public arena. Second, it showed the importance of the issue of violence against women for Turkish feminists. During the campaign and in later years violence against women remained as an important issue for the feminist movement (Aldikacti 2001). In 1989 a feminist group launched a campaign against sexual harassment. The national assembly of 1989 marked the struggle and success of feminists to separate themselves from the Left. This success might have been also why feminists were not suppressed by the state. They were not seen as part of the Left, thus they were not a major threat to the state establishment.

Many feminists agree that feminism in Turkey went into a different phase in the 1990s. This phase can be described as institutionalization. Feminists moved from street protests and campaigns, which were planned and organized mainly in small meetings, into universities and non-profit organizations. Women’s studies was first adopted as a program in Istanbul University in 1993, later spreading to big universities in other metropolitan cities. Since the early 1990s women’s studies programs have given undergraduate and graduate degrees.7 Gender related courses have been taught in different programs and departments. Today universities seem to be the major source of recruitment for the feminist movement (Aldikacti 2001). Although in the 1990s and early 2000s feminist organizations opened in cities other than the three major cities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir (Kardam and Ecevit 2002), the recruitment trend of the movement and the middle-class, educated, urbanized characteristics of movement members did not undergo a substantial change. This trait tended to limit the movement and its effects on women with lower-class, less educated, and rural backgrounds.

Other major organizations that signified the institutionalization of feminism in Turkey in the 1990s were a women’s library which was opened in Istanbul in 1990, Ucan Supurge (Flying Broom), a networking firm, in 1996, and KA.DER (Association for Supporting Women Candidates) in 1997. KA.DER supported women who wanted to participate in politics and become candidates in the elections. In addition to these organizations, new women’s journals were published such as Martı (the Gull), Minerva, and Pazartesi (Monday). Martı and Minerva were published sporadically. Pazartesi, which started its publication in 1995, still continues regularly.

The 1990s were also the years during which feminist groups were involved in violence against women institutionally. Except for one campaign in 1990 against violence, feminists preferred to deal with this issue by opening consultation offices and shelters. Mor Cati (Purple Roof) was opened in Istanbul in 1990. Altindag Women’s Consultation Center was opened in Ankara in 1991. When it was established, the Center was allowed by the local government to use a municipality building. Yet after the local government changed, the Center lost the building. Currently most women’s shelters feminists run are closed due to lack of funding. Regardless, feminist activists against violence managed to meet at four general assemblies by the year 2001 (Isik 2002).

The situation of shelters regarding the funding problem reflects a general characteristic of the feminist movement in Turkey. Like many other feminist organizations, these shelters did not receive funding from the state. Feminist activists pointed out that they did not want funding from the state even if the state offered them such support because they were afraid that the state would interfere with their approach to handling problems related to women. In the 1980s since the main organization type had been consciousness-raising groups, the issue of money had not been as problematic as it became in the 1990s. In order to find funding, feminists begun to contact international organizations and the embassies of western countries in the 1990s. Organizations such as Ucan Supurge and Pazartesi were established and they remained active over the years with the funding they received from international organizations. The way to receive monetary support was to submit a project to an international organization. Women’s studies programs also received funding from United Nations for their projects. Feminists themselves call the organizations of the 1990s and 2000s as “project organizations” (Yildiz Temurturkan, interview, July 7, 1999).8

Since the mid 1990s, working within institutions and being involved in projects instead of focusing on launching street protests and campaigns have raised some questions among feminists about whether or not the feminist movement is dissolving. Despite these discussions, feminist activists keep working to make a difference in their and other women’s lives.9

Feminist activism that vigorously continues in feminist-oriented organizations is a concrete example of women’s involvement in politics in contemporary Turkey. Nonetheless, this political involvement has not been reflected in political party ladders and in the Parliament. Turkish women are not fully represented in these political bodies. Today the number of women in the Parliament is 24 (less than 5%). The total number was 18 in the early years of the Republic. Throughout the Republic’s history women have never been fully represented in the Parliament.

There are some positive developments regarding women’s political participation. Contrary to assumptions, women in Turkey tend to vote for parties and candidates that they prefer, not for the parties that husbands and other close male relatives favor. Moreover, with the 1995 lifting of the ban on women’s and youth branches of political parties, which had come about with the 1980 military coup, women began to be active in women’s branches of political parties (Gunes-Ayata 1995). Still, these positive trends are overshadowed by the low number of women in leadership positions in political parties and in the Parliament. Since feminist groups are highly critical of this low representation, recently they have been working to change this situation. They established KA.DER with the purpose of encouraging and supporting women to be candidates in elections.

Today Turkey is rapidly urbanizing with more women living in urban areas than in countryside. In 1990, about 16 million women lived in cities whereas 11.5 million women resided in rural areas (State Institute of Statistics: 1995). However, the labor force participation of women has not increased parallel to the speed of urbanization. Statistical records in 2000 show that only 23% of labor force are women. Women constitute 15.7% of labor force in cities and 34.9% in rural areas. The majority of women work in the agricultural sector. These statistics indicate a decrease in women’s labor force participation since 1955 (Kadinin Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel Mudurlugu 2002). The percentage in 1955 was 43 (State Institute of Statistics 1995).

Nevertheless, the decreasing number of women in labor force can be deceiving because statistics miss the number of women working in the informal sector, especially in jobs like cleaning and babysitting in urban areas. Unfortunately, there is no reliable statistical information about the number of women in the informal sector. Considering the economic problems of the country in recent years which has been reflected in wellbeing of individuals, some scholars expect that more women will be in the informal sector (Ecevit 1998). Indeed, being in the informal sector means lack of health and other benefits in addition to lack of job security. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of housewives in urban areas. Statistics show that the number moved up from 8 million in 1985 to 11 million in 1994 (State Institute of Statistics 1995). Majority of women who migrate from rural areas to urban areas become housewives instead of participating in the labor market (Ilkkaracan 1998).

The labor force participation of women increases with the level of education. 1999 statistics indicate that 69.3% of women with college degrees participate in the labor force. These women are concentrated in professional jobs. According to 1990 records, 50% of pharmacists and computer programmers were women. Women made up 30% of architects, 28.7% of medical doctors, 32%of dentists, and 26% of lawyers (Kadinin Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel Mudurlugu 2002: 207). The relationship between the level of education and labor force participation of women is encouraging, as it shows that women with higher education prefer to work professionally.

Even though urbanization continues, the socio-economic gap between urban and rural areas and between recently urbanized people and people with urban backgrounds remains a problem. Most educated and professional women live in urban areas where there are more and better public schools and universities. Women in urban areas tend to stay in school longer than women in rural areas (Zeytinoglu 1998). Many women in Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey do not know about their legal rights. Traditional religious values and norms govern their lives. There are child marriages (under age 15) which are not legally possible, but accepted by the locals when it is done by a religious ceremony.10 Although it became illegal with the Civil Code of 1926, polygyny still exists in these regions. In the Eastern part of Turkey, 1 in every 10 women is one of multiple wives. Arranged marriages are still common (Ilkkaracan 1998).

The statistics reveal that there is much to be done to increase women’s labor market participation. The number of women in leadership positions both in the political and professional work areas needs to improve. Women’s access to higher education tends to improve their quality of life in Turkey, but women suffer from lack of opportunity. There are still women who are illiterate. Regional differences create further obstacles for women who face problems such as honor killings, child marriages, and polygyny in Eastern and Southeastern areas. Education of women and elimination of problems that originate from regional differences are crucial for the empowerment of women.

Since Turkey’s official application to become a full member of the European Union (EU) on April 14, 1987, the EU has increasingly played a role as a mechanism that prompts the Turkish State to make legal and economic changes in women’s lives. Following the initial application for accession, the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 linked Turkey’s full membership to the amendment of a set of political criteria which would bring about some sweeping changes in Turkey. In December 1995, The European Parliament approved the customs union between the EU and Turkey. In the Helsinki Summit, which was held in December 1999, the EU officially recognized Turkey as a candidate for full membership (Karluk 2003). In the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the European Commission (EC) declared that by May 2004 ten countries and by the year 2007 two more countries were going to be accepted to the EU. Turkey did not receive a date to start the negotiations for accession. The main reason, according to the Commission was that although Turkey made a considerable improvement in meeting the EC’s requirements, she has not yet fully satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria. In the official web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish officials expressed their disappointment with the results of the Summit: “The decisions taken at the Copenhagen European Council regarding Turkey fell short of our expectations. Nevertheless, they are perceived as a basis of a new stage in Turkey-EU relations” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).11

In order to speed up the membership process and to show the EU that they are serious about the accession, Turkish officials have passed some changes in the Constitution, the Civil Code and the Criminal code in recent years. Within the scope of this essay, I will focus on some major changes that are directly related to women living in Turkey. In compliance with the EC’s requirement that the members and candidate countries must provide gender equality, Turkey adopted the new Civil Code on January 1, 2002. The new Civil Code inaugurated crucial changes for the betterment of women’s status. In the new Code the statement of the “head of the family” is omitted. According to the old Civil Code, the husband was considered as the head of the house. In the new Code, the husband and wife can both decide on matters such as where the couple lives and which schools children attend. The old Code recognized the husband as the main decision-maker in these matters. One of the most important changes in the new Code is regarding the divorce rights. Women are now entitled to half of the assets gained by the couple during marriage. This change covers the assets which are obtained after January 1, 2003. Women’s groups in Turkey criticize this date limit as it will leave out many women especially housewives who were married before this date and now do not have their own assets.12 The new Code increases the legal age for marriage to 18 for both sexes. In the old Code girls were allowed to marry at the age of 15 and boys at the age of 17. The new Civil Code also reduces the age from 35 to 30 for people who want to adopt children (State Institute of Statistics: 2003).

The major development in dealing with violence against women was the enactment of the family protection law in 1998. This law calls for measures such as removal of the offender from the house and the imprisonment of the offender for 3 to 6 months if the removed offender does not comply with the legal orders. The Criminal Code also went through some revisions. Adultery that was considered as an offense is not considered as such anymore. Previous article on adultery in the Criminal Code had more implications for women than for men, and therefore was discriminating against women. In the present context, adultery can be a reason for divorce (State Institute of Statistics: 2003).

Before the amendment of the Civil and Criminal Codes Turkish feminists had advocated for a long time for the changes mentioned above. They criticized the old Codes for discriminating against women and also called for tougher measures against the person who committed a violent act. Their activism against the old Civil and Criminal Codes kept the issue of discriminatory laws in the public forum. Months before the revisions made in the Civil Code, the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women organized a protest walk with other women’s groups to call for change in the Code.13 Similar to the activism to amend the Civil Code, feminist groups publicly questioned the Criminal Code for benefiting men in the issue of adultery. They also called for tougher measures against violence toward women.

In the amendment of the laws the role of feminist women’s groups cannot be denied. They have always worked to create a public opinion about the issues related to women and after the amendments have not hesitated to criticize the shortcomings of the new laws and regulations if there were any. Still, many legal changes about women have been realized primarily because Turkish State wants to create a certain international reputation. For instance, the change in the Civil Code was mainly the result of Turkey’s ambitions toward becoming part of the EU. By changing the Civil Code Turkey fulfilled not only a European Union’s requirement, but also a United Nation’s requirement. In Turkey’s report to the UN, prepared in 1994 to be presented at the UN Convention on Women in Beijing in 1995, various articles of the old Civil Code were criticized for violating UN-CEDAW agreement (Turkish National Report 1994).

Since UN and EU requirements for developing women’s status show parallel trajectory, by fulfilling requirements of one union of nations, Turkey improves its international image in both groups. On July 30, 2002, Turkey approved the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (UN-CEDAW). This Protocol allows a UN Committee to monitor complaints from individuals who claim to be discriminated against on the basis of sex within a signatory state. In addition to reforming the Civil Code, Turkey has taken a significant step by signing this protocol, showing in the international arena that the state takes responsibility of implementing the CEDAW agreement. By signing this protocol Turkey has also increased its chance for membership to EU because she made another significant movement toward eliminating discrimination against women (Commission of the European Communities 2003).

All these changes in Civil and Criminal Codes in compliance with the international agreements have been desired reforms by the feminist groups in Turkey. In this sense, the preparations of the Turkish State to enter the EU has helped Turkish feminists to see concrete results for what they have advocated over the years. Still, Turkish feminists seemed to be concerned with to what extent women will benefit from the current legal changes. During a recent interview (May 20, 2003), Ilknur Ustun, an administrative committee member at KA.DER, has emphasized:

The positive chemistry between feminist women’s groups and the EU is not limited to having similar goals of changing laws to provide gender equality. Over the years Turkish women’s organizations have received financial support from the EC in relation to the Commission’s policy on promoting human rights and civil society in member and candidate nations. Thus, since 1995 the EC has granted financial support to projects of the following women’s groups in Turkey: Women Solidarity Foundation (provides counseling to women who were subject to domestic violence), the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter, Association for Supporting Women Candidates, and the Foundation for Supporting Women’s Labor. In addition to these, the EC granted funding to organizations that are not necessarily women’s organizations but whose projects may benefit women. For example, the Confederation of Turkish Artisans and Tradesmen received funding from the EC to train and support female entrepreneurs. Turkish Development Foundation received funding from the EC to educate women in the cities of Van and Diyarbakir (EC Representation to Turkey 2001).

These facts indicate that Turkish women’s groups have had an increasing level of relations with the EU parallel to the acceleration of relations between Turkey and the EU. To a large extent, feminist groups have welcomed the legal amendments on women’s status. These amendments were realized as a result of Turkey’s international commitments which eventually would secure full membership of Turkey to the European Union. The EC has had a policy on women’s status similar to the agendas of Turkish women’s groups on how to improve women’s lives in this country. Abolishing laws that discriminate against women and promoting gender equality at the legal level, eliminating violence against women, educating women, as well as encouraging women to participate in the labor market and be involved in politics are the common aims of the EC and the feminist groups in Turkey. Since the beginning of the feminist movement, its members have praised their movement in developing the civil society in Turkey (Arat 1994; Tekeli 1986). They have believed that as autonomous civil society entities, women’s organizations should engage in improving women’s socio-economic, cultural and political conditions. The EC’s support for non-profit organizations (NGO’s) in representing different groups and opinions and in policy-making further benefits feminist organizations.

Nevertheless, from time to time critical voices among feminist activists emerge against the role of the EU and other international bodies in dealing with the gender issue in Turkey. A point made by an academician at Marmara University who has been actively involved in projects dealing with women’s issues is worth noting. She questions the motivation behind the financial support of international bodies including the EU for women’s organizations in Turkey:

The above example reveals that criticisms stem from the discontent with the historical and ideological baggage of colonialism. Skeptics are especially concerned that EC and other western international organizations that support projects in Turkey use the issue of women’s empowerment to point out the superiority of the West and to disseminate western countries’ worldview to other countries like Turkey. In other words, the colonial attitude still exists and is perpetuated with the way of handling issues such as gender equality, human rights, and democracy.

Significant changes on the legal rights and status of women in Turkey took place at the end Ottoman Empire and then, during the early years of the Turkish Republic. The next phase of the changes came about predominantly after 1980, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, the timing of this next phase was not a coincidence. The presence of a feminist movement in line with women’s movements of Europe and the United States played a very important role in organizing women, bringing issues concerning women to the public, and advocating gender equality in social, cultural, political and economic arenas. The primary force behind the drastic legal changes though seems to be the European Union. The possibility of becoming a member of the European Union has prompted the Turkish State to make major changes in Constitution, Civil Code and Criminal Code. Turkey has also taken part in UN international agreements on women’s status with EU membership being a significant motivating factor.

In line with its policies on women’s rights the EU has supported Turkish women’s groups by providing them with funding for projects that would benefit women. However, a greater number of women’s groups would have utilized EC’s monetary support to help women if they had known about the funding and the projects for which the funding is given. As Ilknur Ustun from KA.DER has stressed, information about the EC-supported projects is not disseminated adequately to women’s organizations in different parts of Turkey: “This is a major difficulty. Women are not informed about EC projects and many other projects. I guess there are some well-informed organizations that manage to benefit from the support, but many women’s organizations have economic difficulties which limit what they can do.”

Even if some criticisms emerge against the motivations of the EU, most feminist groups seem to be happy with the European Unions’ pressure on Turkey for recent legal changes and with EU’s financial support. They also welcome Turkey’s signature under international agreements that would eventually improve women’s lives in Turkey. Nevertheless, they accentuate that women should be better informed about these legal changes and their possible effects on their lives.

The EU has proven to be a valuable resource for Turkish women activists in recent years and promises to be one in the near future. Yet in spite of the efforts of the EU and women’s groups in Turkey, how long it will take to implement some of the legal changes in the daily life and to what extent the projects supported by the EU will help women, especially women in rural areas and women with little or no resources, remain to be seen.

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* German translation of this paper was published in Europas Töchter: Traditionen, Erwartungen und Strategien von Frauenbewegungen in Europa (Europe’s Daughters: Traditions, Expectations, and Strategies of Women’s Movements in Europe). Edited by Ingrid Miethe and Silke Roth. Opladen: Leske and Budrich. 2003.

1 The Ottoman Empire began to grow in the Thirteenth Century in a location called Sogut in North- West Turkey. The leaders of the Empire had originally migrated from mid-Asia. The Empire had its glorious days, especially in the Sixteenth Century. At its height, the Empire’s borders reached as far as the outskirts of Vienna in the North, parts of Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the South, the Caspian Sea in the East and the Algiers in the West. The Empire started to decline at the end of the Seventeenth Century. After a six-hundred-year rule, it was replaced by the Turkish Republic in 1923.

2 The Turkish Republic was established in October 29, 1923. The founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and his friends abolished the Sultanate in 1922 and the Islamic Caliphate in 1924. During its early years, the Republic was governed by a single party (the Republican People’s Party). The transition to multi party system took place in 1946. Since then, there have been two military coups. The 1960 coup was to remove the right-wing oriented Democrat Party. The 1980 coup came after a period of violence between Right and Left wing groups. The country began to go back to normalcy with the 1983 elections.

3 The purpose of adopting a western code was to redesign the family law in a modern fashion and banish the Şeriat. As Gole points out, family law was “the sphere most resistant to Westernization” (1996: 74). Replacing the Islamic rules that governed family matters with western rules was necessary to abolish the governance of Islamic Canon. Why the Swiss Code, not another western code, may be related to the background of the minister of justice who was the head of the committee to prepare the new code. Mahmut Esat Bey graduated from the Faculty of Law in Switzerland (Gole 1996: 76).

4 These organizations included associations which organized as women’s branches of Leftist associtions such as Democratic Women’s Union, Worker Women’s Union, and Revolutionary Women’s Assocition (Tekeli 1998: 342).

5. During the 1960’s and 1970’s Leftist organizations “looked at women’s problems from a most orthodox point of view and considered any inclination of women towards feminism as a ‘bourgeois deviation,’ and therefore as a prospective threat to ‘class solidarity’ and to their respective political forces. When these female members formed affiliated organizations to mobilize women, they tried to preserve the traditional image of the self-sacrificing ‘mother-wife-sister’ instead of giving them the opportunity to become aware of the oppression arising from this very role of women in Turkish society” (Tekeli 1986: 195).

6.The 1980 military coup came as a result of turmoil caused by the battle between Leftist and Rightist groups in Turkey. It had a great impact on the form of the government and political life. The Constitution was altered. The military government closed the political parties and banned their leaders from politics. Unions, associations, and youth and women branches of political parties were also closed.

7 Although the number of private schools at every level has been increasing fast, the education system in Turkey consists mostly of public schools. First eight years of education is compulsory. The Compulsory education had been for five years before 1997. After high school, students take a nation wide university entrance exam. Successful ones continue their education to graduate from a university. Universities give their own exams to students who wish to get a graduate degree.

8 Quoted in Kocali (2002: 74), Gulnur Savran, a feminist activist, calls the period after 1990 as the time of “institutionalization and project feminism.”

9 During late 1980s and the 1990s new women’s groups emerged identifying themselves as feminists. These women were also active in Islamist and Kurdish movements. A handful of Islamist women called themselves feminists. They were known in Turkey as Islamci feministler (Islamist feminists). These women wrote in journals such as Sena and Kadin Kimligi. Although there had always been Kurdish women among feminists, a separate Kurdish feminist activism did not emerge until 1990s. These women also began to struggle in mid 1990s to separate themselves from the larger Leftist-Kurdish movement. Kurdish feminists published two major journals: Rosa and Jujin. Rosa was the first Kurdish feminist journal, began its publication in 1996. Both journals are not in circulation anymore (Acik 2002). This paper mainly focuses on secular-oriented mainstream feminism in Turkey because feminists who constitute this group are the largest group who has been effective in politics. The reaction of Islamist and Kurdish women (feminist or not) to the European Union and Turkey’s membership deserve to be topics for separate papers.

10 In Ilkkaracan’s research (1998: 174) in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey with 599 women, 56% of married women described Kurdish as their mother tongue. The percentage of women who had Turkish as their mother tongue was 30.4. Rest of the women identified their mother tongues as Zaza (6.7%), Azeri- Turkish (2.6%), and Arabic (4%).

11 The relationship between EU and Turkey continues to grow. In the 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession the EC stated that “participation in Community programmes and agencies has accelerated. A framework agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Turkey was ratified by the Turkish Parliament in June. It allows Turkey to participate in all programmes and agencies open to candidate countries. At present Turkey participates in the European Environment Agency, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, IDA, Public Health, Combating Discrimination, Gender Equality, Combating Social Exclusion and Intensive Measures in Employment, and Customs 2007” (Commission of the European Communities 2003).

12 Feminist groups have just started a campaign called “we want [the fruit of] our economic labor” (ekonomik emegimizi istiyoruz) to eliminate the date limit.

13 The Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women was set up in 1990. The establishment of the Directorate at the state level indicated that the state recognized the woman question and was willing to work to solve the problems women encountered (Kardam and Ecevit 2002: 91).

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