The
Philippine Revolution, which started in Cavite province on August 31, 1896,
should not be confused with the Katipunan revolt launched by Andres Bonifacio
and his followers eight days earlier on August 23 in Pugad lawin, a forested
area in Balintawak. The revolt was purely a Katipunan affair, all participants
being KATIPUNEROS, which came to an abrupt ending the following Sunday, August
30, in the battle of San Juan del Bonifacio, leader of the revolt, escaped,
spending the next four months hiding in the jungles of San Mateo and Montalban
in Morong (now Rizal) province.
More
extensive and popular in character was the armed uprising in Cavite, which occurred
the following day, Monday. The tribunals (municipal buildings) of San Francisco
de Malabon (now General Trias) and Noveleta were taken by the Magdiwang about
10 o'clock in the morning and 12 o'clock noon, respectively, and the tribunal
of Cavite el Viejo (now Kawit), was captured by the Magdalo were two factions
of the Katipunan in Cavite.
Organizationally,
the two uprisings were separate and distinct from each other, although both
were led by Katipuneros. The San Juan battle was crushed by the regiment from
Manila headed by General Bernardo Echaluche. Had Bonifacio and his men fled to
Cavite, with Echaluche following them in a hot pursuit, there would have been
but one continuous battle, thus erasing the apparent dichotomy between the
fighting in San Juan and that in Cavite, both forming component parts of the
Philippine Revolution.
From
the end of August to December 1896 nothing was heard of Bonifacio and his
Katipunan. Bonifacio himself admitted that after the San Juan battle his
Katipunan in Manila had melted away. In contrast, the fighting started in
Cavite was continued by Aguinaldo and his voluntarios (not Katipuneros) for the
next five years with but two brief intervals; namely, from the Pak of
Biak-na-bato on December 15, 1897, to the resumption of the unfinished
revolution in May 1898, and from inauguration of the First Republic on January
23, 1899, to the outbreak of the Philippine-American War on the night of
February 4- a period of about two weeks- in San Juan del Monte, the same place
were Bonifacio's Katipunan revolt fizzled out.
The
Katipunan leader was all forgotten, a has been with no chance whatsoever of a
successful come back, when one day December be received and a letter from
Artemio Ricarte of the Magdiwang inviting him to visit Cavite already liberated
area. The Magdiwang revolutionists wanted to show him around in their
territory. The invitation was a purely fraternal, social visit.
Having
learned his bitter lessons from debacle of San Juan, Bonifacio turned down the
invitation, saying it would no be wise or proper for the leaders of the
revolution to be cooped up in one small place like Cavite. There was too much
risk of death or capture of all the leaders, and that would mean the end of the
revolution. Bonifacio's argument was an irrefutable. But later on Ricarte,
again at the instance of General Mariano Alvares, president of the Magdiwang
Council and uncle of Gregoria de Jesus, wife of Bonifacio, repeated his
invitation was dispatched to Bonifacio, most likely by a courier with some
secret verbal instruction, and Bonifacio finally accepted it.
What
made Bonifacio accepted the third invitation? This is a crucial question that
historians have not looked into, although upon it hinges the mystery of
Bonifacio's visit to Cavite. The invitation to Bonifacio at that precise stage
of the revolution has been described as a " sheer act of malice"
because it would serve no good purpose whatsoever. The victorious
revolutionists in Cavite had nothing to learn from Bonifacio, who had won no
skirmish with the enemy, much less a full-scale battle.
It
is alleged that Bonifacio went to Cavite to mediate the conflict, between the
Magdiwang and Magdalo factions of the Katipunan, but Ricarte himself asserts
that the two councils had been perfectly cooperating with each other.
However,
Bonifacio on the second day of his arrival in San Francisco de Malabon was
elected Haring bayan (king) of the
Magdiwang Council or government. He replaced the venerable Mariano Alvarez,
founder of the Council, who was demoted to pangalawang
haring bayan (vice-king). To a perceptive observer this fact alone which
has been glossed over by historians provides a clue to Bonifacio's in Cavite.
Bonifacio,
the Katipunan supremo, accepted the
invitation precisely the head of Magdiwang Council, and from that vantage point
he would try to wrest the leader-ship of the revolution from the young jefe abanderado (chief flag officer) of
the Magdalo Council, Emilio Aguinaldo, an ordinary Katipunero.
One
writer intimates that Bonifacio may have been offered a "kingdom" in
Cavite by the Magdiwang, which was perfectly feasible since the Magdiwang
territory was much bigger than that of the Magdalo. In fact the Magdiwang
Council was organized like an imperial cabinet, its members being called
"ministers" not department secretaries.
Moreover,
it will be called that at least of the two leaders of the more that one hundred
failed during the Spanish regime had shown imperial ambitions namely, Andres
Malong, who proclaimed himself "King of Pangasinan" (1660-1661), and
Pedro Almasan, " King of the Ilocanos". Certainly one cannot begrudge
Bonifacio, equally ambitious and energetic, if he should wish to become
"King of the Caviteños."
Bonifacio,
the Manileno, was already calling the shots for the Magdiwang when the Imus
Assembly hosted by the Magdalo proposal to establish a revolutionary government
that would carry on the struggle for the overthrow of the Spanish regime.
Bonifacio was firm on his stand that the Katipunan could well discharge the task,
being already constituted as a government. The Magdalo officials, on other
hand, claimed that the Katipunan had ceased to be a secret society, and
moreover a revolutionary government, not a mere society, could alone achieve
the common objective of crushing the Spanish regime in addition, the tens of
thousands of Caviteños involved in the struggle were not Katipuneros. They
joined the revolution out of love of country.
About
three months later, on March 22, 1897 during the height of the Spanish counter-offensive
led by General Jose Lachambre, the Magdiwang called a convention in barrio
Tejeros, deep inside the Magdiwang territory, to elect the officers of the
revolutionary government. It was a surprise move by the Magdiwang. For lack of
time to prepare for the convention, the Magdalo Council, then engaged in a
holding action to stem the Lachambre campaign, was able to send only eight
delegates. General Emilio Aguinaldo himself could not come because he was
pinned down in the seesaw battle of Pasong Santol, in Salitran, Dasmariñas. The
Magdiwang delegation, on other hand came in full force. Bonifacio, the haring bayan of the host council,
president over the convention. Ricarte acted as his secretary.
Three
candidates for the presidency of the revolutionary government were nominated.
Two (Andres Bonifacio and Mariano Trias) came from the Magdiwang and one
(Emilio Aguinaldo) from the Magdalo. The balloting was secret. It was Ricarte
who distributed the ballots before the opening the opening of the convention.
Much to the surprise of the Magdiwang, especially Bonifacio, who continued
presiding although he was a candidate, Aguinaldo was elected president in absentia. It was a stunning upset for
Bonifacio.
In
the election for vice-president Bonifacio was again defeated by Trias, a member
of his own cabinet. Then Ricarte, an Ilocano teacher in San Francisco de
Malabon, roundly defeated his own boss, Santiago Alvarez, for the position of
captain general. Santiago Alvarez, son of Mariano Alvarez, was a captain general
in the Magdiwang Council, and Ricarte was just his subordinate officer. Ricarte
tried to decline his election, as reason could be that Ricarte wanted to
sympathize with Bonifacio, his superior. As it was already getting dark, it was
decided to change the mode of election from secret to open balloting. Emiliano
Riego de Rios, another Magdiwang stalwart, was elected secretary of war,
Bonifacio already chafing at his two successive defeats, was finally elected
secretary of the interior. Under glaring eyes of the Katipunan supremo, who
should have given up the chair temporarily out of delicadeza because he was a candidate, the delegates had probably
no other choice.
But
like a bolt out of the blue, Daniel Tirona of Magdalo stood up and invited the
attention of the chair to the suggestion whispered by the delegates sitting
behind him that the post of secretary of the interior ought to be held by a man
with the proper educational credentials. Quiet indiscreetly, Tirona mentioned
the name of Jose del Rosario, a lawyer from Sta. Cruz de Malabon (now Tanza),
for secretary of the interior, Whereupon Bonifacio burst into a monumental rage
and forthwith drew his pistol, demanding that Tirona take back his offensive
words. Ricarte who was beside him, succeeded in holding back Bonifacio's hand,
and Tirona, in the ensuing pandemonium, lost himself in the crowd.
Bonifacio,
"frustrated and deeply wounded," according to the prize- winning
biographer, cried aloud: " I, as a chairman of this assembly and president
of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan... declare this assembly dissolved, and
I annul that has been approved and resolved."
Evidently,
could not take his defeat in good grace. He was not a good sport. He could have
ruled Tirona out of order, considering that the outset of the convention
everybody, at his instance, agreed that the rule of the majority would be
respected regardless of who was elected. Bit when losing his cool, he dissolved
the assembly, he alienated himself from some of his strongest supporters, especially
the Batangueño delegates. " Everybody knows," they said, " our
loyalty to the founder of the Katipunan and Magdiwang; but if, against all
reason, the result of the election so thoroughly agreed upon among all is to be
invalidated, we, the Batangueños, will impose it by force, and we will do it
alone if the sons of Cavite will not respect it."
Committing
one blunder after another, Bonifacio the next had the seditious Acta de Tejeros drawn and signed. The
document formally nullified the result of the convention, intimated that
Bonifacio had been cheated, and that he and his followers would separate from
the new revolutionary government under Aguinaldo. A few days later, in Naik to
which the Magdiwang had transferred their headquarters in the face of the
Lachambre offensive, Bonifacio and company approved the Naik Military Agreement
announcing that they would establish a separate army headed by General Pio del
Pilar. There was no doubt that the two documents were counter- revolutionary.
Emilio
Aguinaldo, who had also transferred to Naik after the fall of Imus, surprised
Bonifacio and his men in the Naik estate house shortly after they had signed
the treasonous Military Agreement. The Katipunan supremo and his followers hastily fled to Limbon, Indang while
Ricarte took a different direction, allegedly en route to Batangas to assist
General Miguel Malvar.
Aguinaldo
quickly dispatched a team to Bonifacio to convince him to return to Naik and
help the new revolutionary government. The mission of reconciliation under Col.
Agapito Bonzon failed. Bonifacio remained adamant. He would have nothing to do
with the Aguinaldo government. Returning to Bonifacio's camp after reconnecting
in the forest, the Bonzon partly was met with unexpected firing from Bonifacio's
men. In the ensuing skirmish Bonifacio's brother, Ciriaco, was killed, and
Bonifacio, himself wounded, was arrested together with his other brother,
Procorpio. The Katipunan chief was brought back to Naik where he and his
companion were tried by a Council of War headed by a General Mariano Noriel.
Bonifacio
had his day in court. He testified in the behalf. Convicted of sedition and
treason against the revolutionary government, Bonifacio and Procorpio were
sentenced to death. The Council of War, through appointed by Aguinaldo, was no
kangaroo court. Two members, Col. Mariano Riego de Dios and Col. Esteban
Yfante, abstained from voting because they believe the verdict to be too harsh.
They wanted a lesser penalty.
The
sentenced was forwarded to President Aguinaldo, but he immediately commuted it
to be banishment of the Bonifacio's brothers to Pico de Loro, a mountain range
in Maragondon. Whereupon two generals, Mariano Noriel and Pio del Pilar, who
had earlier signed the Naik Military Agreement, and the historian Cemente Jose
Zulueta, pressured Aguinaldo into withdrawing the commutation order, alleging
that the Bonifacio brothers, if allowed to live, would pose a serious threat
not only to his (Aguinaldo) life but also to the revolution. Persuaded by the
cogency of the argument, Aguinaldo withdrew the commutation. As a Spanish
troops were rapidly advancing toward Maragondon, where Bonifacio's trial was
concluded, Noriel ordered the implementation of the original verdict. Bonifacio
and his brother were executed on May 10, 1897, in Mount Nagapatong.
The
"Little Republic of Cavite" fell to the advancing Spanish juggernaut,
and Aguinaldo himself was pushed out of the province about mid-May 1887, but he
kept his revolutionary army intact. This was considered as a no mean feat by
the military observers. Then followed his strategic retreat to Biak-na-bato in
San Miguel, Bulacan province, at the invitation of General Mamerto Natividad,
commander in chief of the Departmental Government of Central Luzon.
In
the Battle of Puray, Montalban, about mid-July while he was enroute to
Biak-na-bato, Aguinaldo dealt a staggering blow on Spanish forces consisting of
two columns, one of which was commanded by Major Miguel Primo de Rivera, nephew
of Governor and Captain Genaral Promo de Rivera. The huge losses in men and
material suffered by a Spaniards might have convinced the governor-general to
accede to an offer of Pedro A. Paterno, well-to-do Manila-born maguinoo (gentleman), to mediate and
bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the Spanish
authorities in Manila, Paterno was able to bring about an assembly of widely
scattered revolutionary leaders on November 1, leading to the establishment of
the Biak-na-bato Republic.
The
creation of the Biak-na-bato Republic was a great tactical victory for the
revolutionists. With this republic, which the Spanish government under Primo de
Rivera recognized a possessing the "element of internal sovereignty,
"Aguinaldo was able to negotiate on the basis of equality. The subsequent
Pact of Biak-na-bato, signed on December 14-15, 1897, was therefore a pact
between equals.
The
pact was not a military victory for either side "says on
commentation"but it was a recognition of the fact that the leaders of the
revolution were man of honor, as honorable as the Marquis of Estella (Primo de Rivera)...In this regard, the
Spanish government treated them the revolutionary leaders better than the
American government was later to treat them. If the American government had
been willing to accept a negotiated peace, or if it had treated the Filipinos
not as inferiors but as equals, the blood of hundreds of thousands between 1899
and 1901 (the duration of the Philippines-American War-ABS) would not have
frowned.
In
accordance with the terms of the Pact of Biak-na-bato, Aguinaldo and some 26
revolutionary leaders, many of them Caviteños, left for exile in Hong Kong
about the end of 1897. The first indemnity installment of 400,000 (Mexican
currency) was deposited by Aguinaldo in two Hong Kong banks, using only the
annual interest of 12,000 for living expenses, a secretly reserving the rest
"for the ammunition for the projected resumption of the unfinished
revolution. It is to the credit of this handful of exiles headed by Aguinaldo
that they had not abandoned the revolution.
On
April 21, 1898, the Spanish-American War broke out over the Cuba question. The
Cubans, like the Filipinos, had risen in arms against Spanish rule. The war was
precipitated by the Americans who had large investments in Cuba. Commodore
George Dewey, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, then in Mirs Bay off Hong
Kong, was ordered to proceed to Manila allegedly to prevent the Spanish Far
Eastern Fleet from leaving Philippine waters to help the Spanish fleet in Cuba.
Of
course, this was just an American Ploy. The Washington government knew the
Spanish fleet in Manila, consisting of decrepit vessels, was not even capable
of crossing the Pacific. Consequently, Dewey's squadron made short shrift of
the Spanish fleet, sinking it on May 1,1898, in what has been described as the
most one-sided naval victory in the history of the world. But the real
objective of American Big Business, who controlled the McKinley administration
in Washington, was to conquer and colonize the Philippines as springboard to
the Asian mainland.
Dewey
and other top American officials in the Orient knew this imperialist plan all
along. Having no ground force to fight the Spaniards who were still masters on
land despite the sinking of the Spanish fleet, Dewey invited Aguinaldo in Hong
Kong to return to the Philippines and help fight a common enemy, the Spaniards.
Aguinaldo, as a leader of the revolution, had the land force Dewey needed to
bring Spain to her knees.
As
per verbal gentlemen's agreement, Aguinaldo came back on May 19, and five days
later, on May 24, he set up a dictatorial government upon the advice of the
Hong Kong Junta and of American Consul Rounseville Wildman in the British Crown
Colony. The dictatorial government was merely temporary. Aguinaldo informed
Dewey that the he would start a general offensive against the Spaniards on May
31. But Filipino revolutionists, having received arms from Aguinaldo, started
fighting the Spaniard even before D-day (May31). In the battles of Alapan (May
28) and of Binakayan and Bacoor (May 31), the revolutionists captured many
hundreds of Spanish troops. Dewey complimented Aguinaldo for his successive
victories. In a week's time all of Cavite province except the Spanish arsenal
now occupied by the Americans, came under Aguinaldo's control. So successful
was the bit campaign that Aguinaldo, on June 5, issued a decree fixing the date
and place of the proclamation of Philippine independence.
In
accordance with the timetable of Aguinaldo and the Hong Kong Junta, the
proclamation of Philippine independence in Kawit on June 12, 1898 and the
establishment of a free, independent, and sovereign government of Filipinos
weeks before the arrival of the first American expeditionary forces arrived on
July 17 and 31, respectively. Thus, Aguinaldo's military feat- the
establishment of a government of, for, and by Filipinos- removed any moral
justification whatsoever for the plan of conquest entertained by the "great
Republic of the United State, “a nation built of the proposition that all men
are created equal." In other words, McKinley administration could not
longer pursue its planned conquest of the Philippines without turning its back
on the American Declaration of Independence- without denying the very essence
of its nation existence.
Thorough
Dewey, the highest American official in the Orient, Aguinaldo had kept
Washington informed of the proclamation of Philippine independence. After
waiting in vain for American recognition of Philippine Independence, Aguinaldo
decided to abandon his quarters in Cavite and transferred the seat of
government to Bacoor on July 4. He wanted to show his disgust over the
Americans.
Aguinaldo
then sent two successive ultimatums to Spanish Governor and Captain General
Basilio Augustin offering "honorable terms of surrender" after laying
siege to Manila, but the haughty Castilian refused. He would not surrender to a
mere indio. The entire Spanish
officialdom and leading Spanish resident cooped up inside Intramuros, the
Walled City, had run out for supervision after two and a half months' siege by
Aguinaldo's forces. The last dispatch to Madrid sent by the governor-general
warned that unless reinforcements from Spain arrived on time they, the Spanish
government in Manila, might be forced to surrender.
At
this crucial point in the time of Americans entered the picture. Spanish
traditional arrogance and chauvinism compelled Fermin Jaudenes, the new Spanish
governor-general, to a sign secret agreement with Dewey and General Wesley
Merritt, the commander of American expeditionary forces, where by Manila would
be surrendered to the Americans would not allow Aguinaldo's troops to entered
to Walled City for fear of reprisal on the Spanish community. The agreement was
a plain American doublecross of their Filipino allies.
Manila
fell to the Americans on August 13,1898. This proved to be a turning point in
Filipino-American relations. Aguinaldo clearly saw America's colonial design on
the Philippines. For the second time he transferred his headquarters from
Bacoor to Malolos, Bulacan, far beyond to cannon range of Dewey's squadron in
the Manila Bay. He was getting ready for any eventuality. He realized that his
American allies could no longer be trusted. Aguinaldo convoked the Malolos
Congress on September 15, 1898.
In the Treaty
of Paris signed by the joint commission on December 10, 1898, Spain ceded the
Philippines to the United States, and the letter, in turn, paid Spain
$20,000,000 for alleged improvement made in the Philippines. Here was the
second American double cross of their Filipino allies. Agoncillo filed a strong
protest against the treaty. Spain, the maintained, already defected by force of
arms by the revolutionists, had absolutely no legal right to cede the
Philippines. More than twelve thousand Spanish prisoners of war in the
Philippines were in the hands of Aguinaldo’s revolutionary forces. By all rules
of common sense Spain could not give to another nation (United States) what she
longer possessed, having lost it by revolution. On the other hand, America, as
an ally of the Filipinos against Spain, had no oral right to accept the cession
of the Philippines.
Form December 10,1898, to the end of January 1899 the
Treaty of Paris could muster the two-thirds vote required for ratification by
the United States Senate. Many decent, thinking American senators denounced the
treaty as unjust to the Filipinos, their tested ally in the war against Spain.
The McKinley administration, already in the grip of American expansionists –
vested interests who wanted America to acquire colonizes and/or markets for her
bourgeoning industries – then took the third and fateful step: provoked the
shooting by an America volunteer of a Filipino soldier crossing the San Juan
Bridge on the night of February 4, 1899. The Filipinos retaliated and in a
matter of hours Filipino-American hostilities spread to all parts of Manila and
suburbs. The Washington government, having absolute control over American
media, made it appear in all American newspapers that the Filipinos had started
the shooting American senators, who had previously opposed the onerous Treaty
of Paris, voted for its ratification by the senate two days later. This was the
third American perfidy in Philippines–American relations.
What Washington war planners anticipated as a
two–month operation against Aguinaldo’s tin army of voluntarios turned
out to be a long protracted and costly guerrilla war, the first in Asia much
more improved and sophisticated tan its Cuban model. Aguinaldo proved to be no
picayune tribal chieftain that the American press. Painted him to be but one
more astute, Willy, and resourceful than any military leader the Americans had
known before.
The same puppet local government that the Americans
installed in every town they captured was used by Aguinaldo to promote the
guerrillas struggle. The American “puppets” soon became pro-Americas by day and
pro-Filipinos by night. Resistance to the American imperialists would have
continued indefinitely, with the possibility of finally arousing the moral
indignation of the civilized world against America, a giant republic employing
all its resources to crush the two-week-old Philippines Republic, struggling
merely to live in peace and freedom, when Aguinaldo, the incarnation of
Filipinos aspirations, was treacherously captured by the Americans with the aid
of Macabebe mercenaries in Palanan, Isabela, on March 23, 1901. Although
Aguinaldo’s capture did not immediately terminate Filipino resistance to
American colonialism, it nevertheless marked the end of the short-live Fist
Philippine Republic, the “first republic established by a brown people.”