Iraqi Missile Test (7/6/00)

QUESTION: Could we pick up on Iraq a little bit? Since
yesterday, I wonder if the US has any better idea now
whether Iraq conducted the reported missile test of a
short-range missile? And the baleful comment by the State
Department that without inspection it is hard to know what
Iraq is up to, I wonder what positively the US might be
doing to try to get those inspections going again? Are you
simply back up against the wall?

MR. BOUCHER: Were we baleful?

QUESTION: Well, it's sort of -- what's the word? I don't
know what the word would be.

MR. BOUCHER: All right, let me try to fill you in -

QUESTION: But, you know, gee, without inspections, how could
one ever hope to know what's going on? For sure. So what are
you doing about it or can you do anything about it.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, first of all, Barry, this is a situation
we follow closely. And, obviously, having inspectors there
is one way of determining the exact status of various Iraqi
programs and is one way particularly for Iraq to try to
justify their statements that they are no longer developing
things.

We also have other ways of knowing what's going on and we
follow these developments very, very closely. But, you know,
it's not our practice to comment on stories that purportedly
relate to intelligence information. What I can say, though,
is we are concerned about activity at Iraqi sites that are
known to be capable of proscribed activity, including sites
that are capable of producing weapons of mass destruction,
long-range ballistic missiles and also by Iraq's practices
regarding procurement activity that can include dual-use
items that are useful in weapons of mass destruction
applications.

In the absence of UN inspectors on the ground who should be
carrying out the UN Security Council mandate, uncertainties
about the significance of these activities will persist. As
time passes, obviously our concerns increase.

In the end, the best means for the international community
to know whether Iraq is taking steps to reconstitute its
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles is with
the United Nations inspectors and monitors on the ground
with the right to visit any site they wish at any time.

QUESTION: You referred to long range. Is there a short
range? Is there a short-range threat and is it a larger
threat now?

MR. BOUCHER: On the short range, I can say that the majority
of Iraq's permitted short-range missiles were obtained in
pre-Gulf War acquisitions. Since then, Iraq has made its own
modifications to the missiles. The US, as a member of the
sanctions committee, can and does stop Iraq from importing
items that we believe might be used for weapons of mass
destruction or prohibited missile systems under cover of the
Oil For Food Program. So it is something we do watch and we
do try to prevent developments of missiles in Iraq.

QUESTION: Does the US have the capability without on-site
inspection to determine, even if the State Department
doesn't want to share it with the public, whether Iraq has
tested successfully a new short-range missile or new tests
of a short-range missile?

MR. BOUCHER: That gets a little too specific into the kind
of intelligence capabilities we might have. All I can tell
you is we are concerned about activities at places that
proscribed activity has occurred in the past.

QUESTION: Richard, am I correct in thinking that the short
answer to Barry's first question was, no, you're not in a
position to say anything more than what you read which was
basically what you had to say yesterday or the Department
had to say yesterday?

To the first question, are you now more in a position to say
whether Iraq has tested - actually tested --

MR. BOUCHER: I am not in a position to say more. I am in a
position to say that we are concerned about activities at
proscribed locations.

QUESTION: Richard, are you any closer to getting the
inspectors back in than when the resolution was passed
creating the new agency?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I can go through the whole history
of this, but I think you know it, that Hans Blix was asked
to provide for approval of the Security Council with a plan
for verification and inspection. He has taken a serious
approach to organizing this process, he has set up a
structure. His plan would provide a UN monitoring and
verification committee, the tools it needs to implement the
Council's mandate. He is in the process of hiring
international staff that would be used for UN monitoring. We
think that he needs to get -- he should have the space, he
does have the space to get his operation up and running. But
in the meantime, if Iraq wants the benefits of sanctions
suspension that are outlined in Resolution 1284, they are
going to have to avail themselves of this opportunity and
let him and his team come in and do their work. That's where
we stand. And we are getting prepared to go do it.

QUESTION: But, Richard, it used to be that President Clinton
and everybody else would demand that inspectors be allowed
back in and use almost every public occasion to say that.
You're not demanding it. That's not even in the guidance
anymore. Has there been a change and, if so, why aren't you
as emphatic about it as you once were?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we're trying to signal some kind
of shift here. The fact is that Iraq is under a Security
Council obligation and that we think that they need to abide
by the Security Council resolutions. I think we've made that
quite clear. But I don't want to say that this is the only
way we have of constraining Iraqi programs. We obviously
have capabilities to monitor, to watch, and to take action
as necessary if we need to. So Iraq should, by all means,
abide by the UN Security Council resolutions and allow the
inspectors in.

QUESTION: Are you suggesting the cutting edge is Iraq being
motivated to get out from under sanctions, as if this
problem, the best way of resolving this problem is for Iraq
to suddenly become aware that it is being deprived
economically by not admitting inspectors. That's quite a
shift from the original aggressive position. And, secondly,
you keep easing the sanctions anyhow. So what would motivate
them? They can wait for the next easing.

MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I don't think that's true. And what
we're trying to make clear here is that if Iraq has any hope
for any kind of suspension or easing or any other shift,
that they are going to have to cooperate with the UN. They
are under a UN Security Council obligation, they should
fulfill that obligation. They should let the inspectors in.
Our position on that has not changed.

But they do sometimes make these arguments that somehow
that, you know, they deserve to be treated better. What we
are saying right here and right now is if they want to be
treated better, first and foremost they have to comply with
all the UN Security Council resolutions. And not until then
would we ever consider it.

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