“The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 holds an even more important place in the development of Japanese foreign policy than the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5” Discuss

The fifty-year period from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to the end of the First World War witnessed the transformation of Japan from an isolated and unsteady kingdom into a global power, the champion of Asia, and an ally of Great Britain.  By 1918 its empire included Korea, Taiwan and the southern half of Sakhalin, and it governed territories such as South Manchuria and the Marshall Islands in the Pacific.  The transformation had not been sudden, but had taken place slowly as part of a plan to modernise and strengthen the country, so that it could guarantee its security within Asia, and eventually become the equal of the great global powers.

The Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War certainly stand out as crucial events during this period.  Others include the revision of its “unequal” treaties from 1894, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, and the annexation of Korea in 1910.  When reviewing the contribution that these wars made to Japanese foreign policy, it must be considered whether they were symbols of the progress Japan had made up to that time, or whether they were significant turning points in their own right.  It will also be important to study the immediate consequences of the wars – the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 and the subsequent Triple Intervention, and the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 and its disappointing reception with the Japanese public.

One reason why the Meiji Restoration had succeeded was that many in Japan felt that the Tokugawa Bakufu had allowed their country to be humiliated at the hands of foreigners.  Between 1853 and 1868 it had been forced to end its policy of isolation and sign the so-called “unequal” treaties that opened up ports, agreed to low tariffs and allowed foreigners to settle, immune from Japanese law.  Outbursts of violence against foreigners had led to western retaliation, including the bombardment of Kagoshima, and the Bakufu had been forced to pay an indemnity.

These incidents, and the humiliating experiences of China at the hands of the west, convinced the leaders of the new Meiji government that Japan must take steps to ensure that it would never be in such a weak position again.  “Even when foreigners who live in our country violate our laws,” said Iwakura Tomomi in 1869, “we are forced to stand by while agents of their governments exercise jurisdiction over them.  Our country has never before known such shame and disgrace.”  Iwakura was a member of the Imperial Council and would become foreign minister in 1871.  He realised that the only way Japan could overturn such shame was by becoming an equal of the Western powers, which would require a policy of “Fukoku Kyohei” (Enrich the nation, strengthen the army), developing Japan’s economy and military resources so that it would be treated with respect.

“For the next twenty years,” writes W.G. Beasley, “Japanese governments approached questions of foreign policy in a manner which was calculated to avoid serious conflict with the powers.”  Until Japan reached parity with the West, it would have to remain cautious.  It could not afford to antagonise anyone and risk a violent reaction.  So, for the time being, it would have to remain within the treaty port framework and learn its lessons from the West on how to rebuild itself as a modern state.  Iwakura’s embassy to Europe and America from 1871 to 1873 gathered plenty of information and established useful contacts, but upon his return he was forced to intervene to prevent an expedition to Korea that he thought that Japan could ill afford.  Although Korea had caused offence by refusing to recognise the new Restoration government, Iwakura believed it was far too soon for Japan to embark on a costly mission that could attract the attention of the other powers and leave it open to further exploitation.  Okubo Toshimichi, recently appointed to the Imperial Council, reiterated Iwakura’s point of view when he wrote in October 1873, “It is said that we cannot endure Korean arrogance, but this is an insufficient reason and it would be very bad to open fire without thinking of our security and our people’s welfare.”

The defeat of the “Seikan Ron” (Conquer Korea) movement, led by Saigo Takamori, allowed Iwakura and his allies to continue their more cautious approach to foreign policy, whilst the programme of domestic reforms, such as the introduction of conscription in 1873, got under way.  Further evidence of this policy included the exchange with Russia of Sakhalin for the northern Kuriles in 1875 and Japan’s moderate behaviour in Korea after the Kangwha Incident in the same year, when some of its ships had been fired upon.  The subsequent Kangwha Treaty was achieved without resort to violence, inaugurating diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea and opening three ports to Japanese ships.  As Hilary Conroy notes, “It indicated precisely how a carefully balanced and cautiously pursued programme of action diplomacy could achieve the limited objective of recognition, trade, and an apology.” 

During the 1880s this policy of caution continued.  In 1883, France requested Japanese aid in its conflict with China for control of Tongking and Annam.  Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru considered the Chinese threat to be still too dangerous and urged that any warlike support of France against China be refused “as soundly as possible”.  The threat to Japanese security had been illustrated the year before when its legation in Seoul was attacked and up to 4000 Chinese troops descended upon the capital to restore order.  Again the government had responded mildly.  At the Treaty of Chemulpo Japan was given permission to station troops around its legation and paid an indemnity, of which it only accepted two thirds, cancelling the final payment as it considered Korea to be “poor and weak”.

Some Japanese wished their country would intervene further than this.  Liberal extremists provided support for the Korean activist Kim Ok-Kiun, whose attempted coup failed in December 1884, largely because it received no support from the Japanese government.  This did not prevent the subsequent violence against the Japanese legation and its citizens, and yet once again the Japanese reacted leniently, receiving an apology and compensation.  The policy was reinforced by the Treaty of Tientsin with China in the following year, which arranged for the mutual withdrawal of troops from the Korean peninsula.

Throughout all of these incidents Japan had acted consistently and discretely.  Not only did it wish to avoid antagonising the Western powers for the sake of its own security, but it also wished to preserve good relations with them in the hope of securing favourable revisions to the treaties signed under the Tokugawa Bakufu.  It looked for Western co-operation within its reform programme, appointing advisers to train and equip its army, develop its industries, and draw up its legal code.  It also hoped that its moderate and reasonable foreign policy, conducted whilst wearing Western suits and ties, would convey to the powers that it was a modern and respectable nation, that could be treated as an equal.

Japan’s policy of caution came to an end in 1894, when yet another outburst of violence in Korea finally led to war.  This time it did not seem prepared to accept either the murder of Kim Ok-Kiun in Shanghai or the intervention of Chinese troops in Korea to put down the Tonghak Rebellion.  What had changed?  Its military forces were now much stronger, with conscripted troops, Western-trained officers, and new equipment and ships.  Its economy had grown sufficiently to fund such a campaign.  Its political reforms, particularly the creation of the Diet in the 1889 Constitution, allowed more opinions to be heard.  The greater availability of newspapers meant that people were better informed of their country’s affairs and would be disappointed if they felt Japan’s rights were being ignored.  An important example of this occurred in 1887 following the publication of plans to include foreign judges in the Japanese legal system in the latest round of treaty revision negotiations.  The popular outcry against it and the West’s general obstruction of the negotiations was so great that the conference had to be adjourned.  “It is significant that the threat in 1887 was relatively slight,” writes Delmer M. Brown, “…but a popular press, a national army, a universal education system, and a strong central government had created a far deeper sense of national unity, and the danger, slight as it was, was sufficient to arouse a tremendous upsurge in national resentment.”

It is also possible that the government was deliberately misled by those who desired a more aggressive stance from Japan.  Richard Storry notes that Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, well known for his cautious approach, may have been deceived by Mutsu Munemitsu, his foreign minister, and General Kawakami Soroku, the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff.  They underestimated the number of Japanese troops prepared for deployment, describing them as a “combined brigade”, which suggested considerably fewer troops than the 7000 men eventually deployed.  This was certainly more than Otori Keisuke, the Japanese Minister in Seoul, had asked for, which he said in his telegrams were causing a “state of crisis” as they arrived.

Japan’s more aggressive tone was seen during its negotiations with China, when it proposed a joint venture between the two countries to impose reforms on Korea.  It was clear that China would find this unacceptable and Japan was already preparing for war, probably drawing confidence from intelligence reports that suggested Britain and Russia had little interest in intervening at this time.  It declared war on 1 August 1894, and fought a successful campaign in Korea, South Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula, and on the Yellow Sea, much to the surprise of the rest of the world.

Japan’s success, and the speed at which it had been achieved, brought confidence to Japan’s military, its government and its people.  No longer could it be seen as subservient to China, the “Middle Kingdom”.  Japan was now the champion of Asia, and there was excited talk in the press of creating a suitable empire to match its ambitions.  “Against this background,” writes Beasley, “what had begun as a war over Korea developed into the first stage of Japanese imperial expansion.”  It is unclear whether the government had any imperial ambitions when the war began, but their demands at the Shimonoseki peace talks were suitably bold, demanding the Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa and the Pescadores, improved commercial rights and a substantial indemnity.  China could do little but submit and the treaty was signed on 17 April 1895.

Mutsu’s inclusion of equal commercial rights for all trading nations in the treaty showed that he was quite aware that Japan’s victory could only be sealed with permission from the Western powers.  He had to gamble that they would not be prepared to intervene in Asian affairs, but he was proved wrong.  The subsequent “Triple Intervention” of Russia, Germany and France, forcing Japan to give up its claim to the Liaotung Peninsula, was considered a public humiliation by the Japanese people.  It showed that the government was still very much aware of its shortcomings, with neither the military strength nor the money to continue the campaign.  Mutsu knew the policies of realism and caution must return until the country was strong enough to take on a greater power than China.  The empty promises of help from the French minister Harmand, promising to intervene with Russia and Germany on Japan’s behalf, demonstrated that no Western power could ever be fully trusted.  “Gashin shotan” (Suffer privation for revenge) became a popular slogan after the Triple Intervention, a highly significant development, according to Shumpei Okamoto.  “It began the rise of a frankly chauvinistic nationalism directed at one country, Russia.”

Further humiliations came quickly.  The German occupation of Kiachow Bay in November 1897 so soon after the intervention smacked of hypocrisy, and the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in the following month was outrageous in Japan’s eyes.  Russian’s ambitions in the region were clear.  It had attempted to occupy Gensan in Korea in 1885, looking for a suitable ice-free port, but was warned off by the British, who briefly kept a coaling station on the island of Kommundo (Port Hamilton).  Russian influence over the Korean royal court was increasing and the situation was worsened by the murder of Queen Min in 1895, undoubtedly at the instruction of the Japanese Minister in Seoul, Miura Goro.  This frightened the rest of the royal family into the Russian legation, where they remained for a year, despite Japanese denials of official involvement in her death.

The Sino-Japanese War had brought Japan both victory and humiliation.  It brought new territory and a useful indemnity.  It had revealed new threats, in the form of Russia, and possible allies, such as Great Britain, who had refused to join in the Triple Intervention.  It should also not be forgotten that it was a catalyst for the conclusion of one of Japan’s original policies – the revision of the unequal treaties.  Britain had signed a new treaty in July 1894, one month before war had begun, and the other powers followed suit in the following years.  “The first task to which the diplomacy of the new Meiji government set its hand had been achieved after three decades of effort.” Ian Nish writes, “This was due partly to the great strides which Japan had made and partly to the growth in her reputation which resulted from her victory in the war of 1894-5.” 

Freed from the humiliations of the treaties, Japan now had to decide what the priorities of its foreign policy should be.  Clearly its greatest concern would be its own security, and the greatest threat to that came from Russia.  Prime Minister Ito’s proposal of separate spheres of influence for Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korean (Man-kan Kokan) was an attempt to hold off Russian ambitions (further demonstrated by the rapid construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway) while Japan rebuilt its forces.  However, although Japan’s position in Korea improved after the signing of the Nishi-Rosen protocol in 1898, no mention was made of Manchuria and Russia had made no commitment to withdraw fully from the peninsula.  Its continuing interest in Korea was demonstrated the next year when it attempted once again to take control of a Korean harbour, this time at Masampo.  An agreement was reached in April 1900, just as a new crisis was unfolding in China.

The crisis created by the Boxer Rebellion began a chain of events that would eventually lead to the Russo-Japanese War.  The death of a member of the Japanese legation in Peking in June 1900 forced Japan to consider intervention in a crisis it had previously considered to be of only marginal interest.  The memories of the Triple Intervention ran deep, and it had no intention of committing itself to a foreign enterprise unless it had the support of all of the great powers.  Although Great Britain was vocal in asking for Japanese support, offering one million pounds towards the costs of an expedition, the other powers were less convinced.  However, when it was clear that more troops would be needed, they grudgingly gave their support.  The despatch of the Japanese Fifth Division encouraged the force to move on to Peking and on 14 August 1900 the siege was lifted.

Japan’s contribution to the relief force had impressed the Western powers, in particular Great Britain and the USA.  All three nations, however, were greatly concerned about the continuing presence of Russian troops in Manchuria, where they had been deployed to protect Russia’s considerable investment in the railway line and now seemed reluctant to depart.  By the time the Boxer rebels had been driven out of Mukden in October, Russia had 173,000 troops deployed and argued that many should stay whilst instability continued in the region.  A private agreement between the Chinese and Russian commanders in November 1900 appeared to guarantee the continued Russian presence in exchange for the return of territory.  This had been arranged without consultation with Russia’s former allies, who were furious at the snub.  “In their first trial,” writes Nish, “the Open Door powers – United States, Britain and Japan – had failed.  Russia had moved into Manchuria and, despite honeyed words and unspecific assurances, clearly intended to stay.”

The continuing Russian presence in Manchuria left Japan increasingly frustrated.  Kato Takaaki, Japan’s foreign minister, believed Russia’s behaviour was unacceptable, as did Komura Jutaro, the Japanese minister in Peking.  Yamagata Aritomo, the former prime minister, founder of Japan’s modern army and respected Genro, was more thoughtful, arguing that “relations between Japan and Russia have not yet suffered a major upset but sooner or later a serious collision is inevitable…If we are to prevent war, we must secure the help of other powers to arrest Russia’s southward advance.”  

The signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in London in January 1902 was an important step forward.  Great Britain was prepared to recognise Japan’s interests in Korea and China, remain neutral if Japan became involved in a war, or come to her aid if a third power declared war against her.  The alliance was clearly a great boost for Japanese prestige, a further of example of the progress it had made.  Britain aided Japan’s military expansion, particularly by building ships.  Twenty-seven out of the forty-four built between the wars came from British dockyards.  The alliance allowed Japan to follow a more active policy.  Its demands were more likely to be noticed now that Great Britain was guaranteeing them, and it could act with less fear of any “Triple Intervention” stifling it later.

Clearly most of Japan’s efforts would be focused on Manchuria.  Russia finally agreed to withdraw its troops, in three stages, in April 1902, but on the agreement that this timetable might slip if disturbances occurred.  Japan’s fears proved to be correct, as the deadlines for the second and third stages passed with no sign of troop movement.  Russia appeared to be daring Japan to react to their intransigence.  In 1903 new troops were sent eastwards, ostensibly to test the railway line, and the facilities at Port Arthur were improved to cope with greater naval activity.  This was grist to the mill for Japan’s nationalist societies such as the Kokuryukai (Amur River Society) and Taigaiko Doshikai (Comrade’s Society for a Strong Foreign Policy) who declared that only war could resolve the crisis in Manchuria.  Yet Russia continued to believe that Japan would not fight her, perhaps because its generals believed that the Japanese army was incapable, through either inferior physical strength or organisation, of fighting a European army.

The rounds of negotiations continued.  Ito Hirobumi worked hard to prevent conflict, still pursuing his Man-kan Kokan policy despite the misgivings of Komura, now Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister Katsura Taro, and the huge groundswell of anti-Russian popular feeling.  Eventually, even Ito lost his trust in the Russians, and admitted that Korea’s security could never be guaranteed whilst Russian troops occupied Manchuria.  The only way that the threat to Japan’s security could be removed was by force.  All agreed, despite the protests of the navy, that it would be essential to act quickly to pursue any advantage that they had.  “The oligarchic decision-makers therefore decided unanimously,” notes Shumpei Okamoto, “that Japan, however poorly prepared, should go to war at once, because further delay could only be detrimental to Japan.”  They were well aware that such a conflict would test its resources to the limit.  “I will take care of the fighting in Manchuria,” Field Marshal Oyama is reported to have said to Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, “but I am counting on you as the man to decide when to stop.”

War was declared on 10 February 1904, although Japanese naval activity had already begun in earnest.  The campaign was considerably tougher than it had been against China.  Despite winning a series of engagements, the Japanese army was enduring high casualties and the Russian army was able to escape and regroup.  The military planners had also underestimated the rate at which the Russians could reinforce their troops through the railway, sending fourteen trains a day through to the front instead of the planned eight.  It was clear that further delay might lead to disaster.  The defeat of Russia’s Baltic fleet in the Straits of Tsushima in May 1905 encouraged the belief that Japan should quite whilst it was ahead.  “Once the Russian navy was crippled and South Manchuria cleared of the Russian army,” writes Richard Storry, “Japan’s basic war aims were achieved.  For Japan to have persisted in continuing the struggle could only have involved a growing risk of ultimate defeat.”

A Genro conference had decided even before Tsushima to sue for peace, using President Roosevelt as a mediator.  Its challenge at the subsequent peace conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was to negotiate the best possible position without revealing that it had been stretched to its limits.  Komura was instructed that it was essential to demand the continuing independence of Korea and territorial integrity of Manchuria and press for the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.  Its demands for the return of South Sakhalin and a suitable indemnity were considered less essential, and, despite Komura’s hard bargaining, the indemnity was eventually lost from the final treaty, signed on 5 September, 1905.

It appeared as if Japan had secured an impressive victory, so why was news of the Portsmouth Treaty greeted with such dismay in Japan?  The public, having been given a diet of positive stories from the war in the national press, knew little of the pressure its military and economy had endured.  It seemed inconceivable that their government should have made such modest demands, and that even these could be slighted by the supposedly vanquished Russia, refusing to pay something as routine as an indemnity.  It appeared as if Japan had been humiliated once again.  The sense of outrage was so strong that rallies were held across the country, with many, such as the assembly at Hibiya Park in Tokyo, resulting in riots so violent that martial law had to be declared.  “Blinded by chauvinism and ignorant of the actual military and diplomatic situation,” says Okamoto of the rioters, “they were incapable of viewing Japan’s predicament realistically.”

Two immediate consequences of the Russo-Japanese War were the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August 1905 and the downfall of Katsura’s government in 1906, finally succumbing to the turmoil that had begun in Hibiya Park.  These symbolise two consequences of the war; the growth of Japan’s international influence, including the expansion of its empire, and the development of its people’s nationalism and ambition for their country, including the desire to seek revenge for the wrongs inflicted upon it by outsiders.

The alliance confirmed Japan’s position as the dominant regional power in Asia.  It had taken on a seemingly mismatched opponent and emerged as the victor.  Russia may not have been completely defeated, but its territorial ambitions in the East had been halted, and it had considerable internal problems to deal with.  Japan could move unimpeded into Korea and take much greater control of its affairs.  It had already established a “de facto” protectorate in 1905 but probably did not intend annexation at this stage, the appointment of the conciliatory-minded Ito as Resident-General in 1907 being good evidence of this.  However, even Ito appeared unable to prevent the continuous swell of Korean resentment against the Japanese, which led to continued violence and chaos.  When he resigned in June 1909 he probably already thought annexation was inevitable, and his assassination in October sealed Korea’s fate.  Japan formally annexed the peninsula in August 1910, having gained the agreement of both Great Britain and Russia to do so.

Japan’s activities in Manchuria were likely to cause greater concern, although in the immediate aftermath of war it had few funds with which to embark on expensive projects.  Attempts to work with foreigners in some areas, such as maintenance of the railway, met resistance from the army, which was stubborn to let go of possessions it had fought for.  In September 1906 the government appointed a governor of Kwantung (formerly Liaotung) who, although a general, was answerable to the foreign office.  This appeared to resolve the argument for the time being, but many in the army continued to regard the region as their personal property.

Japan’s more confident direction in foreign policy would be given several chances to demonstrate itself in the years after the war.  The overthrow of the Manchus in 1911-2 offered plenty of opportunities to intervene in China’s affairs.  The confusion left its policy in disarray as it offered money to Sun Yat-sen at one time, and Yuan Shih-kai at another.  Japan’s leaders could not decide whether they wanted a strong leader back in charge of China, who might eventually rival their own ambitions, or whether they should tacitly encourage a policy that left China divided and weak.

The First World War marked the end of Japan’s first fifty years since the restoration, and was an opportunity to reflect on what had been achieved.  In 1914 it had declared war on Germany and confiscated its assets in China and the Pacific, allowing it to expand its empire still further.  It took advantage of the Western powers’ preoccupation elsewhere to consolidate its position in China, presenting its “Twenty-one demands” in 1915 that imposed Japanese advisers and acquired economic privileges in a manner suggestive of its initial handling of Korea.

The Sino-Japanese War had clearly played an important part in the development of Japanese foreign policy.  It was Japan’s first foreign conflict since the Meiji Restoration, and marked the first time it felt ready to put its caution to one side in order to defend its interests.  However, although the war was a success and demonstrated what had been achieved since the Restoration, it was not as significant an event as the Russo-Japanese War.  For a brief moment, the Japanese thought that they had carte blanche in East Asia, but the Triple Intervention reminded them that this was not so, and forced Japan to return to its familiar policy of caution and realism for the next few years.  Indeed, the Intervention was perhaps more important to the development of foreign policy than the war itself as it emphasised that Japan still had much to achieve before it could operate independently of the powers.

The Russo-Japanese War was a symbol of the progress Japan had made within ten years, but it was also a crucial turning point for the nation.  Although the public had been disappointed with the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, for the first time Japan had defeated one of the Great Powers”.  This was a shock to world opinion, and gave the Japanese people greater confidence in their country and what it could achieve.  The defeat of the Russians was suitable revenge for the Triple Intervention and gave Japan the freedom of movement in East Asia that had been so conspicuously lacking after the Sino-Japanese War.  It was able to secure the Korean Peninsula against external threats (although the internal stability of Korea would continue to cause concern), move on into Manchuria, and for the first time consider a much greater policy of intervention within the main body of China.  It had also earned the respect of Great Britain, who were quick to re-sign the alliance after the war and have Japan as an ally in the First World War.

The days of caution might be over, but there were new challenges ahead.  Japan had to decide how its newly found prestige and freedom of movement could best be exploited.  Its people and military were pleased and proud of the progress that had been made, but the events in Hibiya Park showed that further humiliations would not be tolerated.  The two wars, defeating first China, and then Russia, showed that Japan’s rate of progress had been phenomenal.  What was uncertain was for how long this rapid pace could be sustained, and in what direction Japan might be taken, before the journey ended in either triumph, or disaster.

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