What were the Main Reasons for the 
Collapse of the Guomindang in 1949?

In the Autumn of 1936, "a new sense of optimism and national unity" appeared to be settling upon China.  The recent suppression of the revolts of  Guangdong and Guangxi allowed Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi) and the Guomindang (GMD) to declare that China was now finally united under the Nationalist government.  The country appeared to be emerging from the economic depression that had gripped it since 1931 and a bumper harvest that was 45% higher than the previous year meant that many peasants could enjoy an improved standard of living.  "In a period of the last few months," wrote the Ta-kung-pao, China's leading independent newspaper, "the people's confidence seems as though it were revived from the dead."  Thirteen years later, that confidence had collapsed.  Chiang and his party were forced to make a humiliating retreat to Taiwan as the Chinese population turned against them and allowed Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) to establish his People's Republic on 1 October 1949.  This dramatic reversal of fortune could not simply be explained by military incompetence on the battlefield. It was caused by a sequence of errors made over several decades, caused by the Nationalists' failure to address China's fundamental problems.

The guiding philosophy of the Nationalist Party were the "Three People's Principles" of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixiang) which he declared to be "Nationalism", "Democracy", and "Livelihood".  However, it became clear that despite the worthiness of these values, Sun still had much work to do to develop a detailed philosophy that encompassed them.  With regards to "Democracy", Sun believed that although a constitutional government would be of great benefit to China, it could only occur after the nation had been fully unified.  Furthermore, an appropriate period of "tutelage" would have to take place to instruct the Chinese on how to behave as citizens within a democracy.  This therefore gave the GMD carte blanche to retain a monopoly on political power during an extended period of "tutelage".  Sun's death in 1925 ensured that he was unable to complain that his ideas were being misinterpreted.  The Nationalist government was inaugurated in Nanjing within a week of a violent clash in Shanghai between the GMD-backed "Green Gang" and suspected Communists that left many people dead.  It seemed clear from the very beginning that the Nationalists' claim to be concerned for the "Livelihood" of every citizen was deeply dubious.  The government structure was established along the lines that Sun had recommended, and split into Five "Powers" (Yuan) but little attempt was made to progress towards a more constitutional arrangement.  "From the start the Nanjing government interpreted tutelage to mean dictatorship by the GMD over the rest of the nation," wrote Lucien Bianco.  "The party's grip on the nation tightened steadily until no meaningful distinction existed between the party and the government." 

In an uncertain political environment, the GMD's primary concern was survival.  Once the regime had been established, the Nationalist leaders felt it was essential to strengthen their position and eliminate potential enemies.  Events in Shanghai had demonstrated that they regarded the Communists as the greatest threat, and so all possible left-wing sympathisers and advocates of reform were targeted.  "The obvious result," wrote June Grasso and her colleagues, "was that those people who would reach out to the Chinese masses, for whom the GMD under Sun had promised a programme of "People's Livelihood", were eliminated from the party by 1930."  The Nationalists' potential base of support therefore diminished immediately, and there were fewer opportunities for social and democratic reforms to be considered.

"The great need of society in China is an integrating force," wrote Chiang Kai-shek in the early years of the Nanjing regime.  He believed it was essential for the Guomindang to extend its authority across China and eventually unite the country, and his Northern Expedition appeared to achieve great success as his army defeated troublesome warlords.  However the massive scale of the task put severe strain upon the GMD and forced it to make uncomfortable compromises.  To make rapid progress he had been obliged to enlist the support of co-operative warlords who then assisted him to pick off their rivals.  This meant that once the campaign was complete, several warlords remained, who were nominally sympathetic to the Nationalist cause but retained great power and could threaten the regime's stability.  Yan Xishan, for example, continued to rule his old province of Shanxi as he had done since 1912, but also increased his influence in Heibei and Suiyuan.  It was therefore essential for the Guomindang to retain its military strength in order to meet these potential threats.  This meant that a substantial proportion of the government's expenditure, never less than half, was devoted to the army, and the organisation of the party became increasingly dominated by the military.   Half of the party membership in 1929 were members of the armed forces, and by the mid-1930s 40% of the Central Executive Committee were military officers.  The dominance of the army was of course most clearly demonstrated by Chiang himself.  Following the "March 20 Coup" of 1926 he had established himself as the de facto leader.  His personal influence within the GMD was so strong that on the occasions when he was forced to relinquish his leadership, such as his resignation in 1932 and kidnap in 1936, the party found it impossible to continue without him.  Certainly Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei, his two nearest political rivals, proved unable to lead the party in his absence.  "When the Guomindang succumbed to military dicatorship," wrote Pichon P.Y. Loh, "the way was opened for a personal government that, in the end, was to weaken the sinew of the party.

The military influence over the GMD, its mandatory alliance with the warlords, and the character of Chiang himself ensured that the party would grow increasingly conservative.  Repression and censorship became favoured tools of removing sources of dissent, and any attempt to promote social reform, such as the establishment of the Chinese League for the Protection of Civil Rights in 1933, was swiftly crushed.  The "Blue Shirts", a political movement clearly modelled on fascist organisations, acted as Chiang's personal police force and "liquidated" anyone who opposed the state. "Inevitably," wrote Sheridan, "such repression spawned indignation, alienation and bitterness."

The party's divorce from its reforming principles and its harsh methods of political control could have been overlooked if it was able to deliver genuine improvements to people's standards of living, and here its record was mixed.  During the "Nanjing Decade" the most prosperous cities along the coast were transformed as modern buildings were constructed, electricity, water and drainage were installed, and the wealthiest citizens paraded in the latest fashions and motor cars.  A modern economy was clearly in development.  A standard currency had been introduced across the Republic and industrial growth averaged 6% a year during the decade.  The railway network doubled between 1926 (7,700 miles) and 1949 (15,500 miles) and many new roads were constructed.  However, it should be noted that many of these improvements were extremely superficial and affected a very limited proportion of the population.  The GMD could not necessarily take all the credit for their success, either.  Some projects were already under way - 30,000 km of roads were constructed between 1920 and 1926, in an era that was supposedly the "depth of warlordism".  The expansion of the railway network, on the other hand, included track laid in the Japanese-occupied areas of China.  This is not to say that little was accomplished during the Nanjing Decade, but the achievements should be placed in the proper perspective.

Certainly few of the Nationalist's achievements were noticed in the countryside, where the 80% of the population lived and two thirds of the economy was generated.  Here, although agricultural life was more stable than it had been, conditions remained harsh.  The peasantry continued to suffer from high rents and taxes, uncertain tenure, and a lack of access to cheap credit.  They held grievances against the government which regularly subjected them to forced labour, and failed to provide assistance or financial aid after natural disasters such as the flooding of the Yangzi in 1931 and droughts in Szechwan in 1936.  Some specific projects were carried out, such as the Lohui Canal in Shaanxi to assist irrigation, but no general attempt was made to alleviate the basic conditions of rural poverty.  This was because the government, who depended upon the local land-owning gentry in the remote provinces to exercise authority on their behalf, were cautious about carrying out anything that might be a source of resentment.  Furthermore, as the party was almost entirely urban-based, it was a matter to which it gave little thought.  "The GMD was the party of the bourgeoisie," wrote Sheridan, "who were simply not informed about nor very interested in the problems of the countryside."  This attitude extended beyond the party members.  The few from rural areas who had received an education had no inclination to return home, preferring to take well-paid careers in government or business.  Even graduates from agricultural colleges appeared unwilling to take their skills back to the countryside.

As the Nanjing decade came to an end all hopes of political and social reform had faded, and GMD initiatives such as the "New Life Movement", which attempted to foster a Confucian-influenced discipline amongst the general population, served mainly to underline the hypocrisy and corruption of many senior officials.  Chiang's reputation had also been tarnished by his handling of the increased Japanese aggression towards China.  The GMD army had had no chance to stop the Japanese taking full control of Manchuria following the Mukden incident of 1931, and Chiang had been forced to the agree to the humiliating terms of the Danggu Truce of 1933.  Further treaties followed, such as the "Goodwill Mandate" of 1935, where Nanjing agreed to punish all those who made provocative speeches against "friendly nations".  These agreements were considered an insult and embarrassment by many, especially as it appeared that Chiang preferred to make deals with the Japan so that his troops could pursue campaigns the Communists.  In December 1935 8000 students, twice as many as there had been during the original "May Fourth" demonstrations, displayed their anger with the concessions in Peiping.  The movement spread across China, calling for anti-Japanese boycotts and demonstrations, viewed with great suspicion and concern by the Guomindang.  Following his kidnap in Xian, Chiang appeared to reverse his policy towards Japan and arranged a second United Front with the Communists.   This appeased most of the demonstrators, but did not fully remove the stigma that the GMD considered protecting China against foreign invaders was less important than protecting itself.

So, although there was an atmosphere of optimism and national unity in China in late 1936, it was built upon uncertain foundations.  However, despite resentment and disappointment from some quarters, the GMD did not appear to be in any danger of collapse.  "Certainly the overthrow of the regime was not inevitable," wrote Eastman. "The fact that it survived the depression of 1932-1935 shows how an inefficient, corrupt and unpopular regime could muddle through."  However, it was all very well to "muddle through" during a time of relative stability, but the regime's time was about to run out.  The war with Japan would place it under extreme pressure, and expose its failure to establish a more substantial plan of political, social and administrative reform.

Despite plenty of advanced intelligence, the Nationalists were caught unprepared when hostilities with Japan reopened following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937.  The Japanese captured all the major coastal cities and forced the GMD to flee eastwards, to the relative safety of Chonqing in Sichuan.  Here the nationalists had to cope with a drastically reduced income (especially as the Japanese had taken control of the lucrative customs revenues of Shanghai) whilst maintaining an army to both resist the Japanese and maintain blockades on Communist-held territories.  The party found its political authority much reduced, in territory far away from its traditional base.  It attempted to organise and mobilise the people for the war effort through its "new hsien" administrative structure, but these units were badly let down by a lack of qualified personnel and an absence of money to fund them.  It was never able to unify or standardise the local tax arrangements.  "In many cases," wrote Hsi-Sheng Chi, "when the local tax agents realised they could not share certain taxes with the central government, they simply lost interest in collecting them."  Against these vested interests, the GMD could only maintain the status quo, and the greatest burden of tax fell disproportionately upon the peasantry.

The Nationalists' reputation was also badly tarnished by its attempts to keep its armies supplied with men and materials.  Its conscription programme was a great source of grievance.  Families were broken up, often permanently, and unreasonable demands were put upon communities, often at crucial times of the agricultural year.  Peasants were forced to work as porters and construction workers whilst their crops rotted in the fields - 400,000 were deployed to construct an airbase in Chengdu with little more than their bare hands. "Conscription comes to the Chinese peasant like famine or flood," wrote the American General Albert Wedemeyer in 1944, "only more regularly - every year, twice - and claims more victims."  Attempts to collect sufficient food to supply the armies were also a source of dissent.  The interior provinces that made up "Free China" grew 50% of the nation's produce, but much of this was claimed to feed the armies in the field.  To assist this, the government reclaimed the right to collect land tax in grain rather than rice, forcing the farmers to travel often long distances to the collection depots with their heavy sacks, which ran the risk of being stolen or "lost" by the corrupt officials.  Storage and distribution facilities were often inadequate, and some soldiers and civilian populations were unable to receive any food at all.  For example, a study in 1945 reported that 78% of the conscripts in one particular area had been killed by dysentery caused by malnourishment.

"The poverty of the farming population, which is today very real," wrote an American military report in 1944, "arises chiefly from the inordinate demands of the officials, and the poor and oppressed farmers have been pressed almost to the point of desperation, and uprisings may result."  When Japanese troops began a new campaign in Henan, few local Chinese bothered to assist the GMD troops as the Nationalists had "pressed the starving people ruthlessly for taxes" whilst the region suffered a severe famine.  The discontent felt towards the Nationalists' arrogant and incompetent treatment of the rural population was heightened by the knowledge that it seemed unnecessary.  Chiang and his officers to have gone into hiding in Chongquing, waiting for the war to end, squandering Chinese troops and foreign aid, and abdicating their responsibilities as national leaders.  At the same time, a viable alternative to the Chiang and the GMD was now available, Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  "Modern armies and foreigners with new ideas penetrated China's countryside as never before," wrote Grasso and her colleagues, "and broke traditional bonds that held the Chinese peasantry in place, creating new opportunities for those who wanted to overthrow the GMD."

Whilst the Guomindang struggled to continue old policies in drastically reduced circumstances, the CCP used the opportunity of the United Front and war against the Japanese to develop and grow.  The United Front gave it some "breathing space" after it had faced near-extinction during the Long March period, and also compelled it to moderate its proposals, extendeding its support from beyond its traditional peasant base.  It also gave it an opportunity to infiltrate Nationalist military units and organisations and to concentrate on its most pressing priority, increasing its popularity and territory.  It did this with great success by presenting itself as an effective means of resistance against the Japanese, and a provider of social reforms that offered genuine improvements to the rural standard of living.  Both qualities were attractive, although many peasants felt they had little alternative when confronted with the uncompromising violence of the Japanese occupiers.  The CCP supplied weapons for participation in guerrilla warfare - by 1945 2.2 million Chinese would have joined the Communist militia - and their regular troops impressed with their strong discipline and benevolent treatment of the local people.  The breaches within the United Front also allowed the Communists to claim the patriotic high ground, using episodes such as the "New Fourth Army Incident" of 1941, in which 9000 Communists were killed by a GMD division.

Under the Communists the peasants enjoyed reduced rents and interest rates, and often benefited from sharing the land confiscated from those who had fled.  They were given political powers that they had never experienced before - the opportunity to participate within local government and have their voice heard through a "mass association".  The CCP even offered a basic education programme where possible - every possible effort was used to secure peasant support.  "In order to rouse the masses to support us," said Mao in 1937, "we must improve their own livelihood.  We must abolish heavy taxes, and lighten the economic burden of the masses."  His strategy proved to be a great success.  In 1937 the Communists were responsible for 1.5 million peasants, by 1945 90 million people were under the CCP's authority.  The Communists succeeded because they better understood the needs of the people than the GMD, appealing to the nationalist emotions and desire for social reform.  "True," wrote Lucien Bianco, "the Communists were on the whole more determined and effective than the GMD against the Japanese, but more important, they were a government and army of the people."

As the war ended, the GMD was presented with a final opportunity to adapt its behaviour or face political disaster.  Chiang enjoyed the prestige of being associated with the allied victory, and the increased assistance from the American government.  However, the any good will the Chinese felt towards the party was swiftly dissipated by the behaviour of its officials as they returned to the Japanese-occupied territory.  An undignified scramble took place amongst them to appropriate the most valuable properties abandoned by the Japanese.  They made little attempt to address any of the disorder created by the war, such as the unemployment of factory workers without adequate relief following the suspension of industrial production.  Rural areas that had struggled over the last eight years, or had enjoyed enlightened government under the CCP, were forced to accept the return of the landlords who, with the backing of the GMD, immediately returned to their old methods of revenue extraction.  Within the liberated "Border" Regions, the local officials and landlords began a systematic campaign of extortion and revenge against suspected Communist sympathisers.  "Voluntary surrender and repentance" programmes led to the deaths of many peasants and were a source of intense anger.  The Guomindang appeared to be utterly bereft of any sympathy for the plight of the rural and urban lower classes, and seemed bankrupt of any new reforms that could improve its image.  This was clearly demonstrated by its treatment of collaborators.  Many troops who had served the Japanese were employed by the GMD, and discredited officials were appointed by the party in order to quickly establish its authority and revenue-raising ability, "their acts of treason conveniently overlooked for the more pressing task of defeating the Communists."  What political respect the GMD had managed to retain after eight years of war was thus swiftly destroyed in a frenzy of corruption and incompetence.  

Further ineptitude was demonstrated by the GMD's handling of the post-war economy.  Even before the war had begun the party had had to come to terms with a widening gap between its income and expenditure, and the situation worsened markedly when it lost its major sources of revenue during the Japanese occupation.  It failed to make sufficient reductions on its financial outlay and so was forced to adopt the only option it had left - the printing of more money.  "The urgency of war expenditure and the nature of the tax system left the government with little choice especially during the early years of the war," wrote Chi-ming Hou. "But inflation, when started, had its own way of getting out of control."  The end of the war against Japan provided an opportunity to cut back, but instead the Nationalists continued to spend heavily on its army to match the military threat of the Communists.  Inflation then began to spiral rapidly out of control, assisted by the government's agreement under pressure to provide automatic wage increases for government workers.  Truly believing it could achieve a swift victory over the Communists in the anticipated civil war, it again resorted to printing more money.  "The result was a political regime with neither the will nor the capacity to do anything but preside over the deterioration of the urban economy," wrote Suzanne Pepper.

A consequence of this was that a reasonably secure segment of support for the Nationalists, the middle classes, saw their savings rapidly wiped out.  It also denied any opportunities for investment and reconstruction to repair war damage.  The party appeared to be humiliatingly dependent upon foreign aid.  The intellectual community also grew increasingly impatient with the party.  It questioned Chiang's motives in doggedly risking war during American-backed negotiations with the Communists, placing the reputation and privileged status of the party before the desire of the weary Chinese population for peace.  Calls were made once again for political reform but these went unheeded.  Much of the blame for this should be levelled on Chiang.  "If it were Chiang's intention to take a concrete step toward pluralistic democracy," wrote Pichon Loh, "and if he were convinced of the efficacy of anchoring his leadership role on a new foundation of massive political support, he should have acted decisively immediately after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War when his popularity was at its zenith."  Chiang did not act.  He was unwilling to reduce his reliance on conservative elements within the party and was simply unwilling to take such decisive and bold action.  He was thus forced by the Communists to take an extremist position, demonstrated by its outlawing of the liberal wing of the GMD, the "Democratic League", which compelled many of the league's members to desert to the CCP.

The passage of the war confirmed the political reality.  All confidence in the GMD had collapsed.  Although the Nationalists were able to make credible progress at first, as they possessed a greater number of troops and financial support of the Americans, they were not able to sustain the momentum.  It was significant that first defeats took place in Manchuria, as this area had seen substantial Communist activity during the Japanese occupation and had witnessed the worst excesses of GMD behaviour following that war.  The sympathy of much of the rural population lay with the Communists, and the hundreds of thousands of Chiang's best troops deployed to the region found themselves encircled and trapped.  This collapse led to a string of defeats worsened by exceedingly poor leadership from the Nationalist officers and terrible morale amongst the troops.  Chiang's pride and inflexibility meant that he refused to consider any political compromise with the Communists until his position was untenable and retreat to Taiwan was the only option left.

The Communists had been able to enjoy a rapid string of successes because of superior tactics, well-motivated troops and, most significantly, a strong network of popular support.  Land reforms were already under way in areas that it had recovered, encouraging the peasants to participate in the struggle against the GMD to protect their achievements.  Furthermore, this structure provided them with an efficient structure to raise money and provide recruits and supplies for the war effort, and its military continued to treat the peasants well to retain its reputation as a genuine "people's army".  As the Nationalists collapsed, the CCP moved swiftly to fill the vacuum they left behind, reinforcing success.  It is therefore fair to argue that, although the Civil War was the scene of the GMD's political disintegration, the Communists earned and deserved their victory.

Not every Chinese looked forward to a new Communist regime, but those merchants, students, intellectuals and middle classes were also glad to see the back of the discredited Nationalists and did nothing to obey or support it during the final phase of the collapse.  The discrediting of the GMD and its eventual destruction in mainland China therefore has a certain feeling of inevitability about it.  From its early beginnings, it failed to grasp some of its basic shortcomings - the lack of a full political and social programme, the lack of understanding of the basic and urgent needs of the Chinese population, the lack of discipline amongst its officials and soldiers, and its reliance on military strength within its leadership and policy-making.  None of these problems were addressed during the relative period of stability it did enjoy, and no attempt was made to resolve them or consider alternative policies during the war with Japan and its aftermath.  The integration of China under Guomindang rule was an impressive achievement, but it may also have led to the party's undoing.  The task of administering such a vast area with limited resources forced it to make unfortunate compromises and rely on increasingly conservative policies.  By concentrating on protecting his position and defending the Republic against constant internal and external threats, Chiang had little time or money left to consider social reforms and projects that might begin to improve the standard of living of the general population, not just the urban rich.  The collapse of the Guomindang is thus a story of good intentions and missed opportunities that steadily grew into an unstoppable juggernaut heading for certain disaster.  The war against Japan and the rise of the Communist Party were undoubtedly catalysts that quickened this process, but without fundamental reform of the basic elements of its administration, Nationalist rule in China would have been doomed.

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