Examine the Role of the Emperor in Japan
between 1868 and 1945

One of the few constant elements during Japan's tumultuous history between the Meiji Restoration and the end of the Second World War was the position of the emperor as the head of the nation.  Throughout the period he was obliged to accept a variety of roles and responsibilities.  He played a crucial part as a national symbol and political vehicle through which policies and reforms could be justified.  However, he also acted as an individual, ratifying policy, presiding at conferences and leading the military as its commander in chief.  During the period, Japan's economy and society were transformed.  It acquired a constitution and a modern political structure.  It signed alliances with Great Britain, defeated first China and then Russia, and began to create an overseas empire.  The emperor's standing benefited greatly from such successes, but was also tarnished by the turbulent years that marked the end of the period.  Japan became mired in a further war with China, saw its political life become increasingly reactionary and intolerant, and then embarked on a disastrous war against America and its allies that ended in defeat and humiliation.  Such policies had been carried out in the emperor's name and with his consent and support, and it was hard to see how he could avoid taking responsibility for the tragic consequences.

The role of the emperor also depended upon the character of the man who performed it.  Throughout this period the responsibility fell upon three men: Mutsuhito, who reigned as the Meiji Emperor until 1912, Yoshihito, the Taisho Emperor from 1912 to 1926, and Hirohito, who was the Showa Emperor from 1926 to 1989.  Each coped in different ways to the challenges that they faced, not always with success.  The Meiji Emperor allowed himself to be allied with the samurai reformers from Satsuma and Choshu who wished to bring an end to the Tokugawa Shogunate.  By acceding to their wishes, he was able to maintain a role for the imperial house as the Japanese political system underwent substantial reform.  His son, however, was unable to maintain a strong and consistent public presence and his illness and withdrawal from public life put the future of the monarchy in question.  When Hirohito became regent in 1921, and acceded as Emperor five years later, it was clear that great effort would be required to reassert his public and political responsibilities, whilst at the same time strictly fulfilling his obligations as laid out in the Constitution and the Imperial House Law.

The Emperor Meiji (still known as Mutsuhito at this time) succeeded to the throne at a time of great turmoil in 1867, following the sudden and suspicious death of the Emperor Komei.  The Shogun's position was looking increasingly untenable, particularly because of his failure to stand up to the aggressive attempts of the Western powers to penetrate Japanese society.  The new emperor was only fifteen years old, and therefore considered a usefully malleable tool by both his courtiers and the samurai nobles.  He would be the only recognised source of authority in the impending political turmoil, and decrees issued in his name could acquire an essential air of legitimacy.  For this reason, the capture of the Kyoto palace gates by Saigo Takamori's troops in 3 January 1868 was the essential victory in the campaign to oust the Shogun.  Quickly an imperial council was summoned and an imperial was issued that stripped Yoshinobu of his power.  "The text made it clear," wrote W.G. Beasley, "that responsibility for governing the country would now revert to the emperor."  The emperor's acquiescence to the reformers' objectives allowed an "imperial" army to be drawn up, which then pursued the Shogun and secured his surrender.

The "Charter Oath", proclaimed in name of the emperor on 6 April 1868, was a further demonstration that a new regime was now in place, although battles with the Shogun's troops continued in several parts of the country.  The statements were quite abstract, but sought to demonstrate that the reformers intended to behave in a reasonable and just manner.  Article four, "The evil customs of the past shall be abandoned and everything based on the just laws of Heaven and Earth", implied a return to traditional values, which were most visibly symbolised by the restoration of the Shogun's authority to the emperor.

The slogan of the reformers had been "Sonno Joi" (Respect the emperor and expel the barbarians), so it was vital to secure Meiji's co-operation, as a symbol of legitimacy and continuity with the past.  It was also important that he should now become more visible than his predecessors had been, to display his acceptance of the reformers' ideals and to act as their figurehead.  For this reason, he was encouraged to emerge from the palace, despite the misgivings of the courtiers that this would remove him from their influence.  It was therefore of great importance that, when the informal alliance between the courtiers and nobles showed the first sign of strain, the emperor was prepared to accede to the wishes of the samurai.  It was clearly a great benefit for reformers such as Okubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomei to "have as monarch someone who...was willing to preside over a drastic break with Japanese political, social and cultural tradition."  This break with the past was effectively symbolised by the emperor's transfer from Kyoto to Edo, now renamed Tokyo, where he took up residence in the Shogun's palace.  "A mighty imperial procession of 3300 attendants made the triumphal advance eastward," wrote Carol Gluck, "dramatising...the goal of conducting all state affairs by imperial decision."  This journey would become a model for a succession of imperial tours over the next two decades, where the emperor would inspect the kingdom, and his people could come face to face with their ruler.  Events such as these encouraged them to consider themselves, perhaps for the first time, as citizens of a united nation.

"In the 1870s," wrote Gluck, "both the formulation of direct imperial rule and the presentation of the emperor in his 'manifest ubiquity' promoted national unity against the obtrusions of a feudal power."  The emperor was promoted further through public notices written in the local vernacular, explaining his political and religious significance, and by government agents (senkyoshi) and by locally appointed priests (kyodoshoku) who encouraged patriotism, reverence to the emperor and the national gods.  By 1880 over 100,000 priests were apparently performing this role.  Further interest and reverence was encouraged through the creation or revival of rituals in honour of the emperor and his ancestors that were to be performed across the nation.   National holidays were also established to mark significant events within Japanese history and mythology, such as the accession of Emperor Jimmu, the first emperor of Japan, on 11 February, and a day to revere the previous emperor, beginning with Emperor Komei, on 30 January.

In modern terms, such rituals and holidays helped to establish the emperor as a trusted "brand" through which loyalty and patriotism could be encouraged.  The great focus on one individual also gave the reformers greater freedom to portray their policies as part of a restoration of the emperor's authority, even when this was not entirely true.  The imperial institution was to be a fusion of three elements - the ancient moral and spiritual authority of Japanese emperors, the formal powers held by the shogun and now returned to the emperor (including military authority) and selected theories of constitutional monarchy brought over from Europe.  The latter theories were the key to the reformers' intentions, for they wished to establish a centralised, bureaucratic government structure where ministers wielded power in the name of the emperor.  With this purpose in mind the emperor's feudal lords, the daimyo were first asked and then ordered to submit to the central government and put their lands, the han at the emperor's disposal.  Some of the lands were given directly to the imperial family, from which an income could be derived to ensure that they were financially independent from the government.  The money was also used to fund the court and imperial household, paying for the administration of the palace and the performance of rituals and pageantry that symbolised the emperor's moral and spiritual authority.  In time the emperor had his own bureaucracy (The Imperial Household Ministry) and legal code (The Imperial House Law).  The palace was thus beyond the reach of formal government, but the implication behind this was that the government was also freed from interference from the court.

"In our country," said Ito Hirobumi, "the one institution which can become the cornerstone of our constitution is the Imperial House...If there is no cornerstone, politics will fall into the hands of the uncontrollable masses, and then the government will become powerless."  It was clear therefore that when the constitution was ratified in 1889, the emperor's role within it would be fundamental, and the rest of the political structure would be built upon it.  Early articles emphasised the emperor's divine rights as the source of spiritual authority for the nation, stating that "The Great Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," and that "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable."  This invocation of Shinto mythology made the Constitution a unique political document, and it was clearly no coincidence that it was proclaimed on the apparent 2550th anniversary of the foundation of the imperial line.  The emperor was a pillar of the kokutai - the national polity - portrayed as the link between the spirits of the land and the Japanese people, and as a father figure who deserved the self-discipline and sacrifice of his subjects.

But although these phrases appeared to portray the emperor's authority as absolute, in reality it was much more limited.  He was granted executive and legislative prerogatives, but these were to be delegated to the cabinet and the diet.  He was granted supreme command over the military, but in practice this was passed down to the army and navy ministers and the chiefs of staff.  "The result," wrote Stephen Large, "was not a system of personal rule by the sovereign but a "bureaucratic monarchy" in which his principal function was to legitimise bureaucratic rule."  In some ways the role of the emperor had changed little from the days of the Bakufu.  He was a prisoner within a political system, unable to exercise his full authority, where his prerogatives had "become institutionalised in a government structure over which the emperor reigned but did not rule."

The 1889 Constitution and the Imperial House Law issued alongside it established a political structure that would remain in place until 1945, and the tensions between the emperor's public role as absolute monarch and the more limited political reality would never diminish.  The Emperor Meiji appeared to be satisfied with such an arrangement.  He built up a loyal and trusted set of advisers, and there were few changes of personnel amongst his senior palace officials during the reign.  "He consistently refrained from taking the initiative in handling state affairs," wrote Large, "although in private audience he did not hesitate to press ministers to explain specific policies when he was personally unhappy with their advice."

Although the constitution placed the Meiji Emperor "above politics" he played several other important roles within Japanese society.  He was portrayed as a public and enthusiastic advocate of modernity, "the symbol not only of Japan, but of Japan's capacity to propel itself energetically into the forefront of the civilised world."  He was happy to wear modern western clothes on public occasions and travel by train and later motor car.  He also issued rescripts marking important technological achievements, such as the opening of the railway service between Osaka and Kobe, for example.  The Meiji Emperor was also portrayed as a benefactor of education.  He appeared annually at Tokyo Imperial University to present awards to graduates and made a number of donations, including 30,000 yen to Wasada University in 1908.  This reflected his increased prominence in schools, which were obliged to encourage reverence for him in the Imperial Rescript on Education, published in 1890, and to display his official portrait.

His role as the "social paragon" of the nation was reinforced by other acts of benevolence.  Financial aid was provided (often in the name of the empress) for deprived areas following natural disasters - 40,000 yen was given to Tohoku in 1906 following a severe famine there.  Five years later 1.5 million yen was given to provide drugs and medical treatment for the very poor.  This donation was made shortly after the prosecution of left-wing activists in the "Great Treason Incident", and the message appeared to be that imperial philanthropy was more appropriate for Japan than the dangers of socialism.

The emperor's public appearances had been scaled back following the proclamation of the Constitution.  He was now firmly established within Japanese society and his image could be more tightly controlled through the publication of formal portraits and imperial rescripts.  However, following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 he returned to the public eye as Japan's Commander-in-Chief.  At his Imperial Headquarters in Hiroshima, he was portrayed as living in similar conditions to his soldiers, and ready to offer counsel to his commanders.  He was therefore closely associated with Japan's exciting victory, as he was also with the victory following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.  "The victory over Russia lent the emperor an expanded aura," wrote Gluck, "which fused the imperial image with the achievement of international prestige ...and simultaneously made him a symbol not only of progress but of empire."  On both occasions he avoided the controversies of the peace talks that followed.  Indeed in the riots that followed the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 the government was accused of "betraying" the emperor by accepting less than favourable terms.

The end of the Meiji era 1912 was marked with a lavish display of pageantry at the state funeral.  The emperor was now very much "public property", despite attempts to keep his personal thoughts and interests private.  However, his successor, Yoshihito, found it difficult to follow in the footsteps of his father, and was considered to be "physically weak, indolent, and incapable of making decisions."  His unwillingness to intervene in state affairs and a high turnover amongst his palace officials created gave more freedom in which the politicians and bureaucrats could manoeuvre.  His lack of charisma and manipulation by the genro became common knowledge at a time when more and more people were questioning the social order and asserting their views of the kokutai.  "He faded from public view," wrote Herbert Bix, "just when the ideological climate was most unsettled and the military was searching for ways to overcome its social isolation. 

His son Hirohito became regent in 1921 and realised that the image of the imperial house needed to be improved to make it appear to be more responsive to Japanese society.  He set out on national tours just as his grandfather had, and even visited Taiwan.  He was appointed Commander-in-Chief during the Kanto earthquake in 1923, issuing imperial edicts and touring the devastated areas on horseback, in a display of social concern that again harked back to the Meiji era.  However, anxiety over the future of the monarchy was also reflected in the Peace Preservation Law, passed in March 1925 which emphasised the sacred nature of kokutai and banned communist, anarchist and republican ideology. 

The Showa era began on 25 December 1926, and Hirohito promised that he would abide by the constitution and maintain the standards set by his predecessors, and particularly those of his grandfather.  He was prepared to accept the supervisory role required of him politically, and his palace officials were in general sympathetic to the ideas of a fully constitutional monarchy.  His Imperial Household Minister, Ichiki Kitokuro, had previously been a professor of law and tutor to Minobe Tatsukichi, the controversial author of "organ theory".  This asserted that although the emperor was the highest "organ of state", he could not act arbitrarily, and could only govern in co-operation with the other "organs", such as the Diet.  Hirohito took great interest in Minobe's work, privately describing it as "a restraint on the despotic tendencies of the monarchical sovereignty theory" and appointing Minobe to the House of Peers in 1932.  However, the emperor's support was not enough to protect Minobe as the right-wing and ultra-nationalist groups grew more influential and he was unable to prevent his works from being publicly discredited.  Hirohito had also done nothing to stop a revision to the peace preservation law several years before which made even the questioning of the emperor's divine origins an illegal offence.

Whatever his personal opinions, Hirohito believed that his intervention in the political process was out of the question.  This did not mean that he was unable to exert influence over important decisions.  "The system for resolving conflicts," wrote Titus, "remained based on verbal decisions and face-to-face relations centred on the imperial palace."  The court remained the final point for political negotiation before decisions could be ratified and the emperor ensured that his officers, particularly the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on political issues and his Chief Aide de Camp on military matters, kept him fully informed.  The ratification of the London Naval Treaty in 1930, for example, involved a particularly convoluted dispute, and in this case Hirohito's officers let it be known that the his sympathies lay in continuing amicable relations with America and Britain, despite some of the restrictions this would entail.

However, Hirohito felt less able to intervene in events following the Mukden Incident in 1931.  Although his prerogatives of supreme command had not been obeyed he felt he could not anger the military by ordering them to cease their activities in Manchuria.  Although fully aware of the jeopardy in which it placed Japan's international commitments, he did not criticise the rebellious officers for making a mistake, and indeed later praised the Kwantung Army in a rescript in 1932 for its action against the "Chinese Bandits".  Such action appeared to give encouragement to ambitious officers who believed the emperor could become the focus of a "Showa Restoration" that would remove the current government that had failed to stand up to the Western powers.  Such thinking was behind the rebellion on the 26 February 1936, which attempted to take over the government and remove the emperor's "tainted" advisers.  Saito Makoto, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was assassinated, and Suzuki Kantaro, the Grand Chamberlain, was injured.  However, Hirohito considered the harming of his advisers to be a gross affront to his integrity and ordered that every step be taken to quell the rebellion, forbidding the cabinet from resigning until all the rebels had been rounded up.  Such unusually decisive action helped to ensure that the coup ended in failure, but once peace had returned Hirohito forewent the opportunity to formally censure the army for its action and rein in their activity, choosing instead to send a message of regret over what had happened.

The Japanese political arena was becoming increasingly dangerous, and the emperor and his last surviving member the Genro, Prince Saionji, found their political views were increasingly out of step.  "While the palace became the main institution of political moderation," wrote Titus, "Japanese society and the government moved in the opposite direction - towards militarism, virulent ethnocentrism and bureaucratic fascism."  To preserve the "transcendence" of the monarchy, it was essential that the emperor appeared to be "in tune with the times" and appear sympathetic to the mood of the people.  The irony was that, as the war unfolded in China and Japan grew more isolated, the emperor's image and symbolism became the prime rallying point for Japanese nationalism, marking the uniqueness of the Japanese people and the kokutai, which had to be defended at all costs.  The only policy available therefore was one of silence and neutrality, which effectively appeared to confer the emperor's approval upon the increasingly extreme measures being adopted.

The emperor certainly hoped to deter a wider war with America and its allies if he could do so, but although he continued to state his preference for diplomatic resolutions, he found he was unable to prevent the military's determination to escalate the conflict.  Although he had been able to check them on occasion, such as when he rejected several of the Army's choices for the next minister in 1939 in criticism of the collapse of their proposals to ally with Germany, he was unable to prevent the general increase in military influence over Japanese society.  The best opportunities had already been missed, and all commitments had been made with the approval of the Imperial Will.  Both Konoe Fumimaro, who had promised to establish a new political structure along nationalistic and totalitarian lines, and Tojo Hideki, a consistent advocate of an aggressive military policy, had been appointed as Prime Minister with the emperor's consent.  Hirohito eventually accepted war as inevitable, and a policy that he had no right to reverse.  "If I were to have sanctioned it because I personally like it," he said later, "or if I had not sanctioned it because I personally disliked it, I would have been no different from a tyrant."

Japan's war against America and its allies began on 8 December 1941, following the bombing of Pearl Harbour, and Hirohito tried hard to mould himself as a war leader in a similar vein to his grandfather.  "His greatest strength during the war years may have been his ability to transform his natural reticence and inhibitions into a quality of leadership," wrote Bix.  "In many ways it was his stubborn persistence and determination not to fail as a monarch that helped him to survive the war."  However, despite the initial victories, it was clear that the war would not be the success that his officers had promised.  But once again Hirohito felt it was improper to interfere in the political process.  Indeed he remained one of Tojo's strongest advocates even when many around him (including Konoe) were plotting for his removal.  "Although the Emperor very much wanted to end the war, " wrote Large, "he depended upon Tojo to manage the war effort until such time as peace became a realistic opportunity."  There was also the fear that such intervention could antagonise the military into carrying out a coup that could threaten the imperial house.  Hirohito was eventually persuaded to withdraw his support and Tojo resigned soon after in July 1944.  The feared coup did not materialise but Japan was no closer to ending the war.

A year later and the situation had grown desperate for Japan.  Germany had surrendered and Japan was completely surrounded by allied forces.  The destruction of the Imperial Palace by allied bombing on 25 May 1945 symbolised the urgent need for reform.  The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, calling for unconditional surrender or face terrible consequences, appeared to place the initiative in Japanese hands but for several crucial days nothing was heard from the emperor or his government.  One reason for this was the concern from the cabinet was that "unconditional surrender" would entail the removal of the imperial institution and the compromise of the kokutai.  The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August, and the concurrent entry of the Soviet Union into the war shocked them out of this intransigence.  During a deadlocked Imperial conference on 10 August, the emperor considered the situation to be suitably extreme to justify his intervention.  "I have given serious thought to the situation now prevailing at home and abroad," he said, "and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and the promulgation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world."  However even this extreme departure from precedent was not decisive as the council still wanted a guarantee of the emperor's continued sovereignty.  Although the American reply continued to underline unconditional surrender, it stated that the future of the monarchy would be "determined by the Japanese people."  The ambiguity still left the conference deadlocked, and the emperor felt it necessary to intervene for a second time.  "It is my desire that you, my Ministers of State, accede to my wishes and forthwith accept the Allied reply."  The government therefore agreed to notify the allies of the terms of surrender, and the next day the emperor announced Japan's defeat in a radio broadcast.  It would have been the first time that many citizens of Japan would have heard his voice.

The period considered in this essay therefore ended with the emperor taking a highly unusual and unprecedented act in order to save his country and the monarchy from certain destruction.  Such a bold move gave the allies sufficient confidence to co-operate with Hirohito and allow him to maintain his position, ensuring that, once again, the monarchy remained the element of continuity as one regime was replaced with another.  It is hard to say whether Hirohito could have ended the war earlier or even prevented it from taking place, but the conclusion has to be that this was very unlikely.  Hirohito, like his predecessors, felt restrained from political intervention by a constitution that presented him as the embodiment of the Japanese nation but also ensured that he was powerless to alter its destiny.  The situation at the end of the war threw up a unique set of circumstances where the political establishment was in deadlock, and the emperor was personally invited by the Prime Minister to deliver his judgement.

Mutsuhito, Yoshihito and Hirohito were three individuals trapped within the image of the emperor.  As the personality cult around them grew ever larger and more devoted, they felt disinclined or unable to take any steps to alter it.  They believed it was their responsibility to honour their ancestors, serve the people and abide by the constitution.  If this required keeping a dignified silence when the "Imperial Will" diverged from their own personal opinions, then that was the price they had to pay.  Certainly Hirohito felt he should take full responsibility for Japan's actions and admitted this in his first meeting with General MacArthur on 11 September 1945.  Historical opinion has varied considerably over the amount of blame he should carry, but it is clear that the entire political system had been unable to cope with the demands placed upon it by increasing popular nationalist feeling and the growing ambitions of elements within the military.  A constitution that portrayed the emperor as a divine being on one hand, and yet restricted his political and legislative authority, would clearly create tension and disillusionment.  On 1 January 1946 Hirohito took one of the first steps to correct this imbalance by publicly denouncing his divinity.  "We stand by the people," his rescript stated, "The ties between us with our people...do not depend on mere legends or myths."  The rescript also commended the articles of the Charter Oath that had been sworn by his grandfather in 1868.  It was hoped that by returning to such basic principles, the role of the emperor could be redefined once more, as the guide for his people into a secure and democratic future.

Bibliography

Beasley, W.G.	The Rise of Modern Japan (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Third Edition, 2000)

Bix, H.A.	Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (London, Duckworth, 2000)

Fujitani, T.	Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996)

Gluck, C.	Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985)

Jansen, M.	"Monarchy and Modernisation in Japan", Journal of Asian Studies Vol.36, No.4 (August 1977) 

Large, S.S.	Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London, Routledge, 1992)

Sims, R.	Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000 (London, C. Hurst and Co.,2001)

Titus, D.A.	Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York, Columbia University Press, 1974)

Tsuzuki, C.	The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000)

Ward, R.A.(ed)	Political Developments in Modern Japan (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968)