How Far do you Agree that the 1911 Revolution was a Political rather than Social Revolution?

The 1911 Revolution was not the consequence of the efforts of one particular organisation or social group, but was instead the result of the brief alignment in the interests of several different parties, notably the revolutionaries, the constitutionalists, and the military.  Although they shared some common ideals, their backgrounds and motivations differed considerably, and for this reason, the unity required to provide stability after the revolution was sorely missing.  Because the backgrounds of each group differed so much, their common aims focused on immediate and political issues, whereas their ambitions regarding long-term strategy and social reform varied considerably.

All those that wanted reform in China, of whatever sort, agreed that the Middle Kingdom was now a shadow of its former self.  In the past fifty years it had been continuously humiliated at the hands of the foreign powers, in the Second Opium War in 1860, against France in 1885 and Japan in 1895.  Its weakness was underlined further by the Boxer Uprising in 1900, when foreign troops occupied the capital and demanded a humiliating indemnity.   Meanwhile foreign merchants and businesses continued to enjoy economic and legal privileges in the treaty ports, which appeared to give them an unfair advantage over their local competitors, and caused hardship for the peasants and artisans who were unable to match the prices of their products.  All of these developments appeared to reveal that China was out of step with the modern world, and its imperial government was failing to take the appropriate action to catch up.  In the spring of 1911 persistent rumours spread that the foreign powers were planning to partition the country and increased British and French interference in Yunnan province at the time seemed to confirm this.  All agreed that China had to provide more determined resistance against the foreign encroachment.  To do so it needed to reorganise itself into a strong, modern nation state, which required the reform and perhaps even the removal of the existing governing structure, dominated by the Manchu imperial family.

The constitutionalists in China mainly consisted of those gentry who had become increasingly disappointed in the Manchu government’s failure to deliver its promises.  The Self Strengthening campaign following the Second Opium War had brought about only piecemeal improvements in limited areas.  The “Hundred Days Reform” of 1898 had promised modernisation over a wider area, including education, the legal system and the bureaucracy, but it was unable to achieve much in the short period before conservative opposition launched a coup against it.  However, two of its main instigators, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, established themselves in exile in Japan where they continued to advocate their ideas and became a focus for the reform movement.

Ironically, many of the reforms proposed by Kang and Liang were put in place by the Manchu court only a few years later.  The reactionary element of the court was in disgrace following the Boxer Rebellion, and the Empress Dowager realised that reforms were essential to ensure the survival of her dynasty.  The early reform programme, sketched out between 1901 and 1905, concentrated on education and bureaucracy and limited social reform.  “Though purportedly instituted in voluntary response to a changing social and political order,” wrote Immanuel Hsü, “the programme was actually a shrewd effort on the part of the dowager to disguise her shame over her role in the Boxer catastrophe.”  But, the changes were still significant.  Foreign travel and education were now allowed.  Foot binding was no longer considered mandatory for women and opium was prohibited.  The most notable step was the abolition of the traditional exam system in 1905.  No longer was a detailed understanding of the Chinese classics and an ability to write an “eight-legged essay” necessary to secure a career as a bureaucrat.

The government’s first, hesitant, steps set in train a movement that proved impossible to stop.  For example, although some official schools were established, a large number of private foundations quickly appeared, offering a more modern and popular curriculum which paid less devotion to the traditional Confucian ideals.  For this reason, wrote Jack Gray, “a new generation sceptical of the old values, trained in Western ideas, impatient for results, and indifferent if not hostile to the Manchu court, began to appear.”  The victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 was further evidence of the need for change.  Japan, as a constitutionalist nation, had demonstrated that it was now possible to defeat a European, imperialist power if sufficient reforms were put in place.  The Manchu court could no longer ignore the demands that China should match Japan’s political achievements, and in 1908 it issued the “Outline of the Constitution”.

This edict was still very cautious, proposing a nine-year period of tutelage prior to establishing a constitutional monarchy, but its first achievements were still a satisfactory step forward.  Elections took place in 1909 which filled Provincial Assemblies across the country which in turn provided half the delegates for the provisional National Assembly.   It appeared as if China was about establish a more representative, democratic system, but this was not necessarily the case.   Less than 1% of the population could participate in the 1909 elections, and the remaining half of the provisional National Assembly members were chosen by the Imperial court.  The guiding principle behind the reforms was to strengthen and centralise the authority of the royal family.  “The court set out to restore imperial power by adapting the methods of government to the new necessities.” wrote Jean Chesneaux and his colleagues, “Reform was intended to create a modern state by developing centralisation, specialisation and information.”  An example of this determination to preserve power could be seen in the appointment of the “Royal Cabinet” on 8 May 1911.  Members of the Manchu imperial family filled five out of the thirteen positions available, and only four places were given to Han Chinese.

However, as with the education reforms, the establishment of the assemblies set off events that were soon out of the Manchu government’s control.   Whereas previously the Emperor had only been informally answerable to his bureaucracy, his accountability now extended to the provincial and national assemblies.  The assemblies soon demanded greater autonomy as representatives of local “public opinion”, so that they could have a greater say in local administration, with sufficient authority and financial control to support this.  By allying with the provincial governors, who were also looking for greater financial support from central government, and with their vocal allies in the national assembly, the provincial assemblies were able to make the Manchu court feel increasingly isolated from the rest of the polity.

Although nearly 90% of the assembly members had received degrees under the old examination system, half of these degrees were at the lower level.  These members of the “lower gentry” had less of a stake preserved in traditional society and were more prepared to question and criticise it, especially when campaigning for local issues and on behalf of their assembly.  Many of these lower gentry were developing interests in new, non-traditional areas, such as commerce and industry, so these were also likely to feature in provincial debates.  Criticism of local unfair taxes expanded into a demand for a more co-ordinated national monetary and taxation system.  Objections to the visit of a British river patrol, in Kwantung Province led to questions on the validity of the treaties between the government and the western powers.

The provincial assemblies, local chambers of commerce and associations were the arena for members of the gentry and well connected bourgeoisie to address their mounting criticisms at the central government.  However, although the “rights of the people” (minquan) were often discussed in this context, it is clear that this referred to the right of the gentry and their interests.  “The practical reality of ‘citizenship’,” wrote Min Tu-ki, “was in turn realised by protecting local interest against central government.”  An example of how the gentry gave priority to their financial interests can be seen in the railway disputes in the last years of the Qing dynasty.  The “railway boom” in China had been funded with a mixture of foreign investment and domestic capital, much of which had been provided by the gentry.  When it became clear that these projects would require further support from foreign loans and central government intervention, the gentry organised and led protests against such measures.  In Zhejiang (Chekiang) for example, the Anti-Loan Association was formed in October 1907 at a meeting attended by 200 members of the gentry which called for the collaboration of all members of society.  Mass rallies in neighbouring Shanghai and Jiangsu (Kiangsu) province proved popular and saw even the lowest classes such as “peddlers, servants, women and young boys” signing petitions and subscribing to railway stocks.  “The movement now became more than purely a railway problem,” wrote Min Tu-ki, “and began to represent a growing conflict of interest between the central government and the local populace within a context of growing nationalism.”  The gentry whipped up nationalist feelings within the local population by focusing on one emotional aspect of the dispute – that the province’s railway might be “stolen” by central government or foreign powers.  This simplification ensured broad local support, but removed the possibility of broadening the campaign into one for wider social reform.  The anti-loan movement was able to tap into growing concerns about provincial independence being eroded by government centralisation and foreign encroachment, but it remained primarily driven by the financial and political interests of the gentry.

Another example of gentry-driven protest were the three petitions organised by the conference of provincial leaders that demanded an early convocation of Parliament.  The tone again played upon growing “nationalist” fears, citing concerns about foreign interference, financial incompetence, and the unsatisfactory performance of the central government.  These were all largely political concerns, and yet apparently 25 million people put their signature to the third petition in October 1910.  The only response from the imperial court to this was a promise to shorten the constitutional programme by three years and a demand that further petitioning should cease.  The petitions were able to collect so many signatures because of the commitment of many local associations integrated into their society, and also the rising influence of the press, spreading news of the movement and whipping up nationalist excitement.  “The press as a whole played a vital role in exposing the growing urban audience to political issues,” wrote Mary Backus Rankin, “and infusing elite participation in local affairs with nationalistic and political purpose.”

The outcry over railway nationalisation in Sichuan (Szechuan) in 1911was again over an issue that primarily concerned the gentry.  The government’s refusal to pay full compensation to investors led to uproar in the provincial assembly and the creation of the Railway Protection League.  However, this financial dispute was transformed into a more general protest with the encouragement of the gentry and the involvement of the press, the secret societies and the revolutionary organisations.  The strength of feeling was demonstrated at a rally in August 1911 where violence led to the deaths of 32 protestors, and the Imperial government was forced to call in the army from neighbouring Hubei province to quell the dispute.  The gentry were certainly not looking for violence – such disturbances could threaten their local standing and interests – but this unrest suggested for the first time that events were moving out of their control.  “Although the Szechuan gentry agitated against the court,” wrote Immanuel Hsü, “they did so to protect their own interests without any idea of overthrowing it.”

However, although the majority of the gentry wished to avoid violence at all costs, other groups within China, and particularly the revolutionary organisations, believed that this would be the only means by which change could be effected.  Revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian) had believed that an uprising would be necessary since he had formed the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui) in 1895.  However, his efforts met with little success until he joined forces with groups led by Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren to form the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui) in Tokyo in 1905.  This included a much broader spectrum of ideas and individuals, including those students who had been inspired by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.  But, the focus of the alliance remained resolutely political.  Their numbers were still very small, and to make progress they needed the sympathy and support of influential figures and the general population.  The encouragement of nationalism and anti-Manchu sentiment appeared to be the most effective way of uniting people around a single grievance.  “They were activists and agitators first and theorists second,” wrote Michael Gaaster. “To acquire power they had to arouse anti-Manchu sentiment and discredit constitutional monarchy.”

The diversity of opinions within the alliance also made it difficult for Sun Yat-sen and his associates to apply a universal manifesto, particularly as local operations within China continued under the organisation of the continuing groups.  Sun’s famous declaration of “Three Principles” attempted to provide a general outline of the alliance’s ideals.  The principle of nationalism was the primary tool to unite people in opposition to the Manchus and foreign interference.  The principle of democracy covered his aim to establish a republican constitution that assured “equal rights for all” and a revision of the bureaucracy and judiciary.  His principle of “socialism” (often translated as livelihood) was more vaguely defined.  When explaining this concept further in 1906 he proposed fixing land prices and transferring any profits from rising value to government.  This, and a proposal for a “single tax” for all were ideas he had acquired whilst studying in the West but very little emphasis was given to them until after the revolution had taken place.  His advocacy of social reform was something he felt he ought to be doing as a revolutionary, and it placated some of the more radical members of the alliance who had become attracted to socialist and even anarchist ideas whilst studying in Japan.  However until the first two, political, principles had been fulfilled, it could receive little attention.

This caution has attracted criticism from some quarters.  Jean Chesneaux and his colleagues described his principles as an “astonishing programme” that “ignored all the basic problems facing the country; the agrarian question, peasant unrest, the threat from abroad, and the resistance put up by the traditional structures to all necessary change.”  However, others are more charitable, believing that this resistance in particular made it difficult for the revolutionaries to advocate particularly radical policies.  “While we may stress the shortcomings and limitations of the leadership of the 1911 Revolution and its aftermath,” wrote Chün-tu Hsüeh, “one should also fully realise the tremendous and almost insurmountable historical, social and political forces that confronted the revolutionary leaders.”

The Revolutionary Alliance attempted to mount a dozen uprisings in the years preceding 1911, mainly in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi where their contacts were strongest.  However, due to poor organisation and co-ordination they all failed.  An uprising in Zhejiang failed in 1907, for example, because the radicals sent in by the Alliance lacked the background and temperament to understand the discontent of the lower classes.  “They were too urban, too oriented toward the life of “student circles” to find a long struggle in isolated areas congenial,” wrote Mary Backus Rankin.

The revolutionaries required two things – the backing of at least some of the constitutionalists who could give their ideals some legitimacy and nation-wide credibility, and the support of an organised and numerous body to give the initial uprising the momentum it needed to become a national movement.  The most effective body for this task was the army.

The involvement of the National Army in the Wuchang Uprising on the “Double Tenth” (10 October 1911) is well known as the beginning of the 1911 Revolution.  However, the Revolutionary Alliance’s contribution to the uprising was limited.  The reasonable degree of literacy and education amongst the soldiers encouraged a variety of societies for the common soldiers to form between 1904 and 1911.  Their common aims were to redress military grievances, such as low pay and corruption, and to seek the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.  “The soldiers did not have to be republican fanatics to join the revolutionary societies,” wrote Edmund Fung. “They had many grievances, as well as expectations whose fulfilment the overthrow of the dynasty seemed to promise.”  The most popular society amongst the troops was the Literary Society (Wenxueshe), which continued to be concerned with immediate grievances.  It was suspicious of outside influences, including the members of other societies, and there was little discussion of political reform or social transformation.

Despite their misgivings, the revolutionary societies in Wuchang agreed to merge in September 1911, bringing total membership to about 6000, about a third of the New Army based in the region.  With another third ambivalent towards the fortunes of the Manchus, this gave the revolutionaries the tactical advantage they needed when the uprising began on 10 October.  The rapid flight of the Viceroy Ruizheng and his commander Zhang Biao allowed the troops to press home their advantage and by the next day they had occupied the city.  Having achieved their initial aim, the rebel leaders’ next decision is of particular significance, as it revealed their long-term aspirations.  They asked Li Yuanhong, the brigade commander who had previously opposed the societies (and had killed one of their messengers during the fighting), to become their leader.  The reasoning behind this was to find a well known figurehead under whom they could be united and, more importantly, who could provide the rebellion with the respectability and credibility it needed to gain the support of the provincial leadership and the general population.  The most important aim for the time being was survival – a reform programme could be drafted later. “They were not thinking in terms of a social revolution,” wrote Vidya Prakash Dutt, “but only of the ousting of the hated Manchus.  They believed that any Chinese would do, whether he believed in the Revolution or not.”

Despite his misgivings, Li agreed to become military commander.  This decision may have persuaded Tang Hualong, chairman of the Hupei Provincial Assembly and constitutionalist, to lend his support to the revolutionaries.   He provided financial aid, persuaded foreign consuls to remain neutral, and organised an administrative body that began contacting the other provinces to persuade them to declare independence.  This gave the uprising the durability it needed.  However, the reluctance of the radical members of the society to lead and the concentration on the anti-Manchu aspect of the struggle ensured that the revolution’s aims would remain restricted.  Many provincial assemblies did declare their support for the rebellion and denounced the Manchus, but their aims remained unchanged – the greater assertion of their own, political, rights.  “In this way,” wrote John King Fairbank, “they broke free of Peking’s control and maintained their political and economic dominance at the local level.  They were far from interested in social revolution.  No masses were involved to speak of and any peasant disturbances were quickly suppressed.” 

This lack of mass involvement was perhaps one reason why the revolution was unable to maintain its momentum and do more than remove the Manchus and establish a republican government.  Although China had undergone great social changes during the preceding decades, the new classes that emerged had not yet reached a size where they could be of significance.  The urban bourgeoisie may have sympathised with the rebels but their first concern was the protection of their livelihoods.  In Hankou, the day after the revolution, the merchants organised a local security organisation to “preserve peace and order”.  Their relationship with foreign importers and bankers meant they would also be reticent about speaking out.  The role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution, including the lesser merchants and businessmen financially tied to their seniors, remained an auxiliary one. 

This was also the case amongst the industrial and urban working classes.  Although working conditions may have been poor, they were usually less harsh than their previous lives they as peasants.  The strikes that occured were often for political rather than social reasons.  For example, dock workers refused to unload Japanese goods in 1908 during the nationalist reaction to the Tatsu Maru affair, when the Chinese authorities were believed to have given in too easily to Japanese demands following the seizure of its ship.  Sun Yat-sen did believe that reforms would be necessary in the future to improve the social conditions and injustices the working classes faced, and indeed several parties, such as the Chinese Socialist Party and the Chinese National Workers Party, were founded to address these issues in 1912.  However, although these grew quickly in certain areas (The Chinese Socialist Party had 20000 members by late 1912) the size of their membership was still insignificant on a national scale, and pressure from Yuan Shikai forced them to disband by the end of the next year.  Sun believed that the Chinese economy had not developed sufficiently for these issues to become serious, but he hoped to address them in time to avoid the social deprivation and instability he had witnessed in the West.

A Chinese National Peasants Party was established in 1913 but the peasantry played little role in the Revolution.  This is not to say they had no sympathy for it.  Natural disasters such as the flooding of the Yangzi and a sequence of bad harvests had made conditions difficult for many in the years preceding 1911.  Taxation remained unfairly concentrated on those least able to pay.  News of foreign embarrassment and the Manchus’ incompetence filtered back to the villages from those who had left to work in the cities or join the army.  But a sense of unease and dismay did not necessarily translate into a desire for fundamental reform.  Although many of the alleged 25 million signatures on the parliamentary petition came from peasants, these would have undoubtedly been made at the instigation of the local gentry.  It was unlikely that many would have been able to contemplate such a bold step as the removal of the Emperor.

The 1911 Revolution was undoubtedly political in nature.  Social elements within it were minimal.  The central issue at this stage was pragmatism.  The abdication of the Qing dynasty on 12 February 1912 ensured that the primary goal of the Anti-Manchu campaign had been met, but there was bound to be little agreement between the revolutionaries, the constitutionalists and the army about what steps to take next.  All were pursuing their own interests and were keen to strengthen their own positions.  Long-term radical change could not be contemplated until stability had returned.  In many ways, the selection of Yuan Shikai as provisional president of the Republic on 10 March 1912, echoed the motives behind the Wuchang rebels’ choice of Li Yuanhong in October 1911.  He seemed the only man available who could unite the disparate elements, bring legitimacy to the revolution, provide experience to guide it through uncertain times and guarantee its primary, political, aim – the establishment of a republican government.  He could oversee the period of “tutelage” that Sun Yat-sen believed was necessary to educate the Chinese people on the merits of a democratic state, and in time provide foundations for the social reform that was desired and anticipated by many.

Of course, his selection proved to be an unwise choice.  Yuan quickly began to abuse his privileged position and to increase his own power at the expense of others.  The 1911 Revolution successfully achieved its first goal but it had not had the time to establish deep enough roots within Chinese society to weather the confusion and chaos into which China would now be thrown.

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