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LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT
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Having been informed by the Criminal Operations Branch of the Lord Chancellor's Department that enquiries had been made in relation to my complaint against Judge Simpson and that the situation had been clarified, I was left disappointed, because there was no mention about what action, if any, was going to be taken regarding the complaint now that all had been made clear, so I decided to try to find out what I believed to be the case; that Judge Simpson had made his corruption known and had perhaps attempted to justify himself by explaining why he had altered the evidence.

With that in mind I sent a letter to the Lord Chancellor's Department on the 27th of May: twelve days after the trial in York had been halted. The letter informed the Department that I intended to start civil proceedings against the Lord Chancellor's Department, sued as the 'Crown' and that I expected the department's comments and in particular its response to the question of liability within seven days. I didn't really expect a response to the effect, "yes, the Judge has made his corruption known to us" although I believe there would have been an answer to that effect if the department had been open and honest.

I did expect a response of some kind, possibly some sort of an attempt to defend the Judge as a result of their enquiries now that everything had been clarified, but no defence of the Judge came.

I'd made everthing clear, but no explanation: no denial that my complaint was true, or that it was ill founded, or frivolous.

The situation had been clarified; yes, it had been clarified and as a result of that clarification the Department knew that Judge Simpson had indeed acted corruptly by altering evidence given by Police witnesses out of the criminal trial over which he had presided.

Because there was no response from the Department I commenced proceedings against it in the High Court on the 8th of June 1995, by serving upon it a writ and Statement of Claim, following which: eight days later, a Defence document was served upon me by Mr. H.O.J.R, Shepheard: legal Officer; on behalf of the Treasury Solicitor; instructed for the Lord Chancellor's Department.

Mr. Shepheard acknowledged service of the writ at the Royal Courts of Justice and had the case transferred there from the Kingston upon Hull District Registry on 15 June, where it was subsequently struck out by a Master on the 31 July 1995.

I had believed that the Lord Chancellor was responsible for the conduct of his Judges, but after hearing and reading the Master's judgement, I understood that I was quite wrong in that belief, because the judgement makes it clear that vicarious liability does not apply where it is alleged that a Judge commits a corrupt act outside of his judicial capacity and plainly Judge Simpson had not acted within his judicial capacity when altering the evidence given by the two Police witnesses.

Although I had made complaints to the Lord Chancellor's Department about the conduct of Judge Simpson, no action had been taken against him following his corrupt act, which had not been denied by the Lord Chancellor, or his department.

I believed that the department knew that my allegations were true and were deliberately ignoring that fact.

It seemed to me that the Lord Chancellor, or officials within his department, were intent upon protecting the Judge, which in my book, also made them conspirators in perverting the course of justice.

The Master had struck out the action against the Lord Chancellor's Department because he had held that vicarious liability does not apply, but if the Lord Chancellor or his officials had joined the conspiracy for Judge Simpson's protection then, that would be corrupt and liability most certainly would apply, but I accept that when striking out the action, the Master could not assume that the Department had joined the conspiracy.

Upon hearing the Master's judgement, it became obvious to me, that I would have to commence civil proceedings against Judge Simpson and his accomplice: Mrs. West.

I was disappointed after the Master had delivered his judgement and as I rose to leave the room, I allowed my frustration to get the  better of me by turning to face the Master and informing him that Judge Simpson would get away with it over my dead body, but there was no response to my outburst.

Having regard for my blunder in starting proceedings against the Lord Chancellor's Department, I commenced proceedings against Judge Simpson on the 7th of August, which was one week after the action against the Chancellor's Department was struck out, by serving on him, care of the Chancellor's Deparmment, a Writ issued out of the Kingston Upon Hull District Registry, claiming
damages for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and the subsequent fabrication of notes of evidence and I also served an identical Writ upon Mrs. West, at her place of residence, both
Writs were served with identical Statement of Claims.

Thirteen days later: on the 2Ist of August, Mrs. West, on her own account, acknowledged service of the Writ in the Hull District Registry, giving her place of residence as the address for service of documents and stating her intention of defending the action, therefore it was evident from the reading of the acknowledgement that she hadn't instructed a Solicitor to act on her behalf.

It was on the 29th of August, which was eight days after Mrs.West had acknowledged service of the Writ on her own behalf, that the Treasury Solicitor, relying on the Rules of the Supreme Court: Order 77 rule 2, acknowledged service in London, on behalf of Judge Simpson and also, apparantly in anticipation, acknowledged service on behalf of Mrs.West, albeit without
having received any instructions from her. The Treasury Solicitor having been instructed by the Lord Chancellor's Department to act for her.

It was on the 2nd of September that I sent a letter to the Royal Courts of Justice enclosing an application for a Judicial direction relating to the unjusifiable and possibly unlawful transfer of
proceedings to that Court and my application cited these grounds for the application :-

I) That the rules of the Supreme Court, Order 77 rule 2, may be invoked only in proceedings against the "CROWN".

2) The "CROWN" is not a party to the proceedings as the Writ cleary shows.

3) That paragraph 4, of the acknowledgement of service signed Treasury Solicitor (wrongly) makes application for the transfer of proceedings to the Royal Courts of Justice for the two reasons stated in that paragraph which are:

a) The Writ is not indorsed that the cause of action arose in the District Registry named on the Writ, but:
a) the Writ is so indorsed ;
and

b) The defendant's residence is not within the district of the District Registry ;
but
b) the second defendant's residence is within the District Registry:

Four days after having submitted the application I received a sealed Notice dated the 6th of September from the Action Department of the Royal Courts of Justice, informing me that the
action had been transferred there pursuant to the Order dated 29th of August, so despite my application sent two days before the Notice was sealed, the action was transferred, but the two strange things about it is firstly, that the Notice doesn't state that the action had been transferred under order 77, which affidavit, sworn by Mr. Shepheard states, was relied on in the acknowledgement of service in London and secondly, no acknowledgement has been made
of my application made on the 2nd of September, but I did receive a letter dated I9th of September from the Royal Courts of Justice, acknowledging a letter with enclosures dated 8th of Semtember, which states that they are receiving attention and that may be significant because I didn't send a letter with enclosures on the 8th of September, nor even a letter without enclosures on that date and that infers that the Notice transferring the action was sealed two days before the receipt of my application when in fact it was sealed four days after I'd sent the application.

On the 22nd of September Mr. Shepheard sent a letter to the Chief Clerk of the Central Office of the Queens Bench Division of the Royal Courts of Justice, which letter commenced "Dear C", informing "C" that the action had been transferred erroneously and the letter went on to ask for an assurance that Judgement would not be entered in alleged default of Defence should I ask for it and
ended "Huw Shepheard".

An identical letter was sent to the Chief Clerk, Kingston Upon Hull District Registry on the same date.

The Order made by the Master on the 26th of September reads thus :-
"Upon reading a notice of application from the Plaintiff and a letter from the Solicitor for the first and second Defendant's and by consent it is Ordered that this action be re-transferred to the
Kingston Upon Hull District Registry."

I didn't quite know what to make of Mr. Shepheard asking for "Cs" assurance that Judgement would not be entered in my favour should I ask for it, because I'd been of the opinion that if a Summons is issued applying for Judgement, the application would be bound to be heard by a District Judge, or District Registrar and I just couldn't understand how "C" could give that assurance and I didn't see how a Chief Clerk could refuse to issue a Summons, but I took
Mr. Shepheard's request to be an all pals together act, Huw it seemed, believed himself capable of pulling a few strings.

A month after Mr. Shepheard's request that Judgement shouldn't be entered in default of defence, he did serve a purported Defence dated 12th of September, on behalf of both Defendants', although it had been eight weeks since the service of my Writ had been acknowledged and eleven weeks since service of the Writ itself, so his concern about Judgement in default of Defence
being entered against the Defendant's was understandable: he was well out of time normally allowed for service of a Defence.

I knew that all Defences must be pleaded and that the known facts relied on in a Statement of Claim must be answered and Mr. Shepheard, being a legal officer certainly knows that. the Defence document prepared by him and served on the I2th of September did deny the allegations yet despite that, not even one of the known facts that I relied on had been answered, the allegations had been denied with not even one particular being offered to answer the allegations and known facts. In short the purported Defence prepared by him is not a Defence.

Ten days earlier Mr. Shepheard must have requested "C" and the Chief Clerk for assurance that Judgement would not be entered against the Defendants' knowing full well that he would be
serving a Defence on their behalf that wouldn't satisfy the requirement of the Supreme Court.

On receiving the Defence I did briefly consider aplying for judgement to be entered against the Defendants', not so much because it had been served well out of the time allowed, but because the document doesn't demonstrate a defence of any description, but I discounted the idea, because my objective was to show that the transcripts had been tampered with and that couldn't have been done if judgement had been entered in my favour, so Mr. Shepheard didn't really need to have bothered to approach "C" for his assurance.

It was as clear as daylight that no material had been provided by either Defendant for the preparation of the Defence, therefore and as I had always believed, they hadn't personally denied my allegations and in that case, if they hadn't, denied the allegations, those who instructed the Treasury Solicitor to act on the Defendants' behalf knew of their corruption, it isn't difficult
to come to that conclusion.

As is my entitlement under the rules of the Supreme Court, I requested Further and Better Particulars on the I3th September, not that I expected the known facts to be answered, but I had to have confirmation that the Defendants' hadn't personally denied the allegations, in other words, the purported Defence served wasn't the defence of Judge Simpson and Mrs. West and although I was certain that it wasn't, as I say, I needed that confirmed.

The purported Further and Better Particulars of the purported Defence was served on the 24th of October, one day short of six weeks after I'd made the request and not one of my requests
asking if the Defendants' had personally denied each specific allegation had been answered.

No innocent person who is required to answer allegations would blatently refuse, because an innocent person would have a defence and would have no reason to withhold the particulars requested.

No innocent person would prefer to have the adverse inferrence taken that would result from refusing to say that they personally deny the allegations, so in that respect the purported Further and Better Particulars that was served, was helpful, because they wouldn't and couldn't personally deny the allegations.

"The defendants refuse to answer any requests, or questions the answers to which would tend to expose them to criminal penalties."

 That's the reason given in the purported Further and Better Particulars of the purported Defence by Mr. Shepheard as the

 Defendants' excuse for not answering the allegations and requests and if that isn't an admission of liability~ it's as near to one

 as it's possible to get and must be interpreted as :-

"They didn't do it, but if they have to answer your allegations (which they are required to) they will, in the process inevitably

 demonstrate that they have been corrupt."

I thought exposure to criminal penalties a ridiculous excuse to give for not answering the allegations and known facts and it

 would have been laughable had not the matter been so serious. Whether the excuse is considered to be a legitimate one, or not,

 to me it's an admission of liability.



The Further and BetterParticulars didn't provide one iota of information relating to the allegations and from that  I

realized that the information that could be gleaned from that very fact amounted to an abundance of circumstantial evidence

relating to the case:

a) The Defendants' didn't and couldn't personally deny the allegations ;

b) they didn't instruct a Solicitor to act for them. The Treasury

    Solicitor was instructed to act for them upon instructions from Lord Chancellor's Department ;

c) they clearly didn't provide any material for the preparation of the purported Defence as demonstrated by that document ;

d) they clearly didn't provide any material for the preparation of the Further and Better Particualars as that document

   demonstrates ;

e) they were concerned about exposing themselves if they answered the allegations :

On considering the facts revealed by the two documents I felt sure that they would provide a Jury with something to think about when

considering the balance of probabilities, but there was much more

evidence yet to be revealed.

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Chapter Six