Article: The Limits of Solidarity

Summary

The United States has experienced much success so far in forming a broad international coalition to fight terrorism following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. But frictions with vital countries such as Germany, France and Egypt could hamper America's ability to wage covert war.

Analysis

In some ways Sept. 17 was a bad day for American strategists. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and others have made it clear the United States intends to prosecute the coming campaign against terrorism as it did in the Kosovo and Iraqi wars: with a broad, international coalition's backing.

Following the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., the spirit of most of the world, and certainly most American allies, was one of solidarity and willingness to strike back at the enemy. Yesterday, however, there was a subtle but important shift that may impact America's ability to wage covert war.

Several key countries, including Germany, France and Egypt, made it clear that although they condemn the attacks and support a strong American response, they would not welcome a campaign that costs massive civilian casualties. With Germany and France taking such a position, the rest of NATO will also likely follow suit.

Germany's Social Democratic government, whose leaders were shaped by the anti-Vietnam war movement of the 1960s, are viscerally opposed to broad bombing campaigns and remain uneasy about the air campaign against Kosovo. The French are unwilling to write a blank check to the Americans under any circumstances, and after a graceful interval, are making clear the limits of their support.

Equally important were statements by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who cautioned the United States against broad attacks on civilians. For Mubarak, the native Islamic movement simmering beneath the surface of Egypt's secular society represents a constant threat. Some of the Sept. 11 attackers were Egyptians; Mubarak understands there are limits to what he can commit his country to do.

The views of these countries carry enormous weight in the war the United States is planning to wage. A critical part of that war will be the covert operations that will be virtually global in scope and will rely heavily on cooperation from the intelligence and security services of other countries. The wholehearted cooperation of Germany, France and Egypt are indispensable for such an intelligence war.

It is clear Germany has served as a staging area or transit point for the attackers. German police have been rounding up suspects during the past few days. France itself has a huge Arab population that must be monitored. It also maintains important intelligence capabilities in much of North Africa, where the attackers undoubtedly drew support. As for Egypt, its intelligence on its domestic Islamic movement will be absolutely critical for tracking the attackers' network.

The covert war will require not only the official cooperation of these countries but also complete and genuine cooperation for an extended period. Therefore, when these countries tell the United States there is a threshold beyond which the violence of reprisals shouldn't go, the United States is going to have to listen. America's commitment to coalition warfare has put the punishment phase of the war -- striking countries that supported the terrorists directly -- and the counterattack against the terrorist network in tension.

Such a situation will pose less of a problem in regard to Afghanistan. There really isn't a serious option for a massive ground attack in the country, and it is difficult to imagine a sustained, large-scale air attack. Pakistan is the only country from which such an attack could be launched.

Whatever the Pakistani government finally agrees to do, force security in Pakistan represents a huge challenge. Securing ports, roads and air bases during the buildup and air campaign will require a massive presence of ground forces, and even then security will be difficult to maintain.

Iraq is another matter altogether. Baghdad has fallen out of the equation during the past few days, even though early after Sept. 11 the Israelis worked aggressively to get the Americans to focus on Iraq as one of the key facilitators of the attacks. It is likely that at least some of the attackers can be shown to have ties to Iraq and the Iraqis might well have provided support.

Suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden and his people are prepared to work with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, but they are no great fans of his. Hussein's roots are in secular, socialist, Arabist movements from the 1950s while bin Laden's roots are in religious, traditionalist, Islamic movements from the 1980s. If there was help, it did not stem from a particularly warm relationship.

Nevertheless the United States would like to settle the Iraqi situation once and for all. The ability to demonstrate Iraqi culpability in the attacks would set the stage for massive military action against Baghdad by the United States. Although the warnings issued by France, Germany and Egypt have little meaning in the context of Afghanistan, they have very real significance in the context of Iraq.

In effect three coalition members told the United States they would not be willing to participate in a massive attack on Iraq if it costs substantial civilian casualties. Unstated but implicit was the threat that something America badly wants -- intelligence cooperation -- would be limited, if not withheld, if the United States goes too far.

The United States wants many things. It wants a strong coalition. It wants to punish nations that harbored or helped bin Laden's forces. It wants to destroy the global operational capabilities of those forces. These are complicated goals for a war.

We are now seeing the beginnings of friction within the planned coalition. Because the coalition is critical to the United States, these limitations will likely shape U.S. strategy and may be one of the reasons why such a tight lid is being held on the emerging U.S. military strategy. Partly, the secrecy is for operational security. But partly it is because the Bush administration prefers to have its allies shape strategy in private, rather than in public.

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