Article: Pakistan Key for Afghan Attack
 

Summary

The United States is looking increasingly likely to strike Afghanistan for its harboring of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in this week's terrorist attacks on the United States. But to do so cooperation with Pakistan will be the key.

Analysis

The United States has, with reason, decided to hold Saudi militant Osama bin Laden responsible for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Since Afghanistan's ruling Taliban has provided bin Laden with at least refuge, it follows that the United States will hold the Afghan government as responsible as well.

Washington clearly intends to punish the Afghan government, although whether this directly affects the ability of the attackers to continue operating is moot. Afghanistan must be attacked decisively for both psychological and deterrence reasons.

Psychologically, it is essential that the U.S. government assure its own public it is acting decisively. From the deterrence standpoint, it is useful to demonstrate the risks that conspirators against the United States face.

It is not clear that Afghanistan is the only state deliberately providing aid and comfort to the attackers, nor, as stated, is it clear that there is a direct correlation any longer between Afghanistan and the terrorists' warfighting capabilities. Nevertheless, Afghanistan must be attacked.

Direct attacks on bin Laden depend on accurate, real-time intelligence concerning his location and that of his infrastructure. Without such intelligence the attacks fail and become counter-productive. They appear to be acts of impotence, symbolic strikes designed to cover a lack of resources and commitment: a gesture rather than a strategy.

What is clearly needed is a sustained and devastating attack against Afghanistan, coupled with attempts at killing bin Laden. But here geography conspires against the United States. Afghanistan is a land-locked country, and cannot be reached without the cooperation of a third party.

Among the countries whose cooperation is needed, Iran and Pakistan are the only two that provide naval aviation with access to Afghanistan. One of them must open up their airspace for U.S. aircraft not only transiting the countries, but also carrying out mid-air refueling. Whether the attacks come from carrier-based aircraft or long-range bombers from the United States or other bases around the world, they cannot reach Afghanistan without passing through one of these countries.

The internal dynamics of its politics make the prospect of Iran as a U.S. ally most unlikely. The thought of U.S. troops on Iranian soil remains unacceptable. Therefore, if the United States is going to throw its forces into a sustainable war, Pakistan is the key.

The United States wants a number of things from Pakistan's government. First, U.S. forces must have the right to overfly Pakistani territory in attacking Afghanistan. Second, to make the air campaign effective the United States must have the right to base aircraft and logistical support at Pakistani bases.

Third, Pakistan must permit the basing of American ground troops, and allow a massive buildup of air power in the country. The U.S. troop force will probably consist primarily of special operations forces that will be used in strikes inside of Afghanistan, but it will also involve regular Army units whose job will be to protect the approaches to air bases from Afghan ground counterattack.

Fourth, the United States must have the use of Pakistani port and transportation facilities to facilitate and support the build-up. Finally, the United States is asking for intelligence cooperation from Pakistan, including sharing real-time information about targeting and about bin Laden's global capabilities.

The latter is the most critical and difficult resource for Pakistan to provide. A U.S. force based in Pakistan will be the target of attacks by forces in Afghanistan and currently in Pakistan. One needs only remember Beirut and Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia to see the vulnerabilities.

Unless Pakistani intelligence is working with the United States, a situation could easily develop in which the Pakistani government is simultaneously a strong ally and a facilitator of attacks on American forces. Pakistani intelligence knows a great deal about what the Taliban and bin Laden are thinking and doing. If they are not prepared to transfer that knowledge, or worse if they collaborate with Kabul, the U.S. position in Pakistan can rapidly become untenable.

The Pakistani government's dilemma is two-fold. First, it is not clear that it wants or can survive a massive American presence in Afghanistan. Second, even if that were possible, it is not clear that it could impose enough controls on its own intelligence services that they would become part of the American security apparatus.

The willingness of Pakistani operatives to play this role and the ability of the government to force them to do so are highly questionable. The United States could find its bases under intense attack at the very moment it launches its air campaign. The line of supply from Pakistan's ports to American forward bases will be highly vulnerable, and the government's ability to guarantee security is highly dubious even with the best intentions.

The Pakistani's have been under tremendous pressure over the past few days from extremely high-level U.S. officials with long ties to the Pakistani government. The government has indicated a willingness to cooperate with the United States, but these commitments have both contained ambiguities and are of somewhat doubtful value. They are, nevertheless, positive signs.

For example, according to the Pakistani News Service, Pakistan froze the bank accounts of 300 Afghani nationals yesterday, including senior government and military officials. PNS also reported that the government has withdrawn senior diplomatic officials from Kabul, including the ambassador.

According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the action was taken to assure the safety of their officials in Afghanistan, indicating that Pakistan is planning to cooperate with the United States. At the same time there is a report out of Islamabad that a Pakistani delegation will be going to Kabul Sept. 17 in a last-ditch attempt to persuade the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. Pakistan is walking a desperate tightrope.

The government has a tremendous opportunity in making itself useful to the United States, and its demands for Washington will be high. At the same time the military-dominated government is trying to deal with a wave of pro-Islamic sentiment. If it appears to be the willing puppet of the United States, it could be torn apart in internecine violence between three factions: those who want closer relations with the West for economic relations, those who feel deep affinity for the Taliban, bin Laden and Islamic militants and those who are primarily opportunistic and looking for safe harbor.

There is one glue in that these factions hate India, and the fear that the United States might align with India against Pakistan could be a pressure point. But whether it would tie together the wounds in the various ministries and intelligence and security services sufficiently to provide the United States with the kind of security it needs is doubtful.

Musharraf is planning diplomatic moves before committing himself. Apart from the delegation to Afghanistan, he is going to visit both China and Saudi Arabia this week. His goal is to inform these two important Pakistani allies of his intention, whatever they are, and to enlist them in an effort to get Pakistan off the hook. He knows that the United States is very sensitive to Chinese actions in Asia during this time of crisis, and he understands that the U.S. is dependent on Saudi Arabia for any strategy evolving toward Iraq.

In the meantime, the Times of India is reporting rumors that early contingents of U.S. troops have already landed in Islamabad. There may be some truth to the report, and it would fit into Pakistani strategy. They are going to cooperate with the United States as far as necessary while searching for a solution that does not require a massive U.S. presence or deep cooperation.

For the United States, this is the essential problem. It badly needs whole-hearted Pakistani cooperation, as anything less may pull U.S. troops into a dangerous trap in which the price for operations in Afghanistan is extreme insecurity in Pakistan. Pakistan is the key to the United States strategy against Afghanistan, but it is a very weak reed to hang that policy on. U.S. pressure to strengthen Pakistani might succeed in winning over the senior leadership in the government, but it might at the same time undermine their ability to deliver what they are promising.

Thanks to:

(c) Strategic Forecasting L.L.C. All rights reserved.