Article: U.S. May Wage War on Islamic Militants

Summary

Washington is mulling over military options for retaliating against the most deadly terrorist strike ever on U.S. soil. Though a quick, surgical air strike against a defined target -- like those carried out after the bombings of U.S. embassies in 1998 -- could be cathartic for the nation, it would do little to stem the threat of similar attacks in the future. Ultimately, Washington is likely to take a broader approach: launching an unconventional war on fundamentalist extremism the world over.

Analysis

Washington has declared "war" on the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 hijackings that destroyed the World Trade Center towers and damaged the Pentagon. As the government debates how to define the responsible entity -- whether it is a person, group or nation-state -- planning is also under way to determine the best military response.

Three main options are on the table. First is a surgical air strike against the bases of those deemed responsible. Second is a broader, sustained aerial bombing campaign, possibly along with ground forces. The final choice -- toward which Washington appears to be heading -- is an unconventional global assault on threats to the United States from fundamentalist extremists. This tactic would be similar to the broad-spectrum war on drugs.

After ensuring the nation's security, Washington's first priority is to identify the people, group or nation that organized and carried out the attacks. President George W. Bush has already clearly laid out that Washington would hold any nation that harbored the attackers as accountable as the attackers themselves. Though this opens the door for military action against nations, the likelihood that multiple countries will be linked to the attackers potentially opens a bigger front that Washington is willing -- and capable -- of facing.

The first option likely raised in Washington -- limited air strikes against suspected terrorist bases -- offers immediate satisfaction and little risk, but little chance of success. Following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the United States waited just under two weeks before launching limited air strikes after tentatively linking the bombings to suspected international terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden.

Despite launching nearly 80 cruise missiles against a suspected chemical weapons facility in Sudan and training camps in Afghanistan, little harm was inflicted on the organizational or operational capabilities of bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida group.

Though a surgical strike offers a quick and nearly risk-free demonstration to the American people, it does little to effect a real solution. A more involved option -- particularly if the attackers are linked to a specific host nation -- is a sustained air operation, likely followed by ground operations. This would follow the pattern of U.S. coalition actions in Iraq or more recent operations in Kosovo.

This option, however, entails greater risks coupled with logistical and political challenges. The ramp-up time for such an extended operation is measured in months -- not weeks or days. Further, assuming the target nation is -- for example -- Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Algeria, Washington may find it difficult to find in-theater bases from which to launch the air campaign. During operations against Iraq in 1990 and 1991, the United States used logistics and combat support already in place in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, yet substantial ramp-up time was still required.

Further undermining the option of launching a sustained air strike is political instability among Arab allies in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. Washington has strategic relations with several Arab states run by moderate governments, but the attacks in New York and Washington are polarizing the regimes and more extreme political and religious populations in these nations. In the interest of their own stability, these moderate regimes may deem it untenable to allow U.S. forces to operate from their territory.

This accentuates a third problem: finding enough in-theater basing for an extended operation. If the United States finds Iraq, for example, to be the ultimate culprit, can Washington -- even with the support of its NATO allies -- create a supply line capable of sustaining an extended operation if regional Arab allies remain neutral?

Even more difficult would be an assault on landlocked Afghanistan. These operations would require basing assistance and overflight permission from Russia and India, as well as Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This substantially increases the complexity of such an operation while raising the odds of regionalizing the conflict.

Given these caveats, Washington may well be headed for a third option. Declaring a "war" on fundamentalist militants both avoids the problems of naming a specific national sponsor and allows Washington a broader mandate to tackle current and potential threats to the United States. And, similar to the "war on drugs," the war on terrorism would enlist the help of nations around the globe -- when convenient for U.S. policy interests.

Such a global war on potential threats would require the substantial involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies and Special Forces in defining foreign policy initiatives. During the Cold War, clandestine operations and support of democratically questionable regimes were tolerated in the interest of blocking the spread of Communism. Now, similar actions may well become more common against the widespread threat from extremists.

The threat of fundamentalism is global, stretching well beyond the Middle East through Africa, Central Asia and East Asia. It is expanding into Eastern Europe and Russia and may well take root on a smaller scope in South and North America. This gives Washington both a boundless battlefield and a wide range of potential allies. Countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia -- where Islamic militancy is rising -- will become more important to U.S. policymakers. Relations with Russia and India will also expand because both are combating Islamic militancy and possess necessary local intelligence assets.

This will not be a quick war nor one with a definite end point. Washington must be willing to accept greater influence in policy from intelligence agencies -- whose lapses may have allowed the latest attacks -- and from Special Operations forces, whose clandestine operations may not fit with current accepted norms. Further, the American people must be steeled against counter-strikes on U.S. soil. Given the limited choices available to counter future threats of terrorism against domestic targets, however, Washington will inevitably shift its counter-terrorism strategies to a more global -- and unconventional -- posture.

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