Urgent transmission from C.I.A. headquarters. . .
    Standby. . .

    Re: Operation Drescada
    Validation: Carry-OD-49-geCri-PL5-430026184U45u23

    Forty-two hours ago two data disks were reported missing from a C.I.A. data storage library in Houston, Texas. One disk contains codes and the other disk contains protocol and information for specialized operations units within the C.I.A. On the surface the disks may seem like an unlikely pair, and at first it was believed that they may be used to study the structure of the C.I.A. and coding algorithms that are used. The reasons speculated for this were counter-intelligence, advancement in technology for some other organization through research and development or possibly even future deployment in the form of social engineering, theft and various other hostile actions resulting from the utilization of data contained on the disks. This theory, however, is non-explanative of the whole for this incident because, these disks actually complement each other in other ways. In addition to algorithms for codes, disk one also contains key codes that unlock hidden data stored within disk two. Disk two is actually only a decoy disk, though. The hidden data on the steganized disk is unimportant, however, the first disk contains not only algorithms, but the key codes that would unlock other important disks and systems. Only a privileged few know that the disks even correlate to each other. It is also very likely the disks were sold and have changed possession at least once. It is believed that the disks were transported out of the country only several hours after their removal from the library.

    One disk was equipped with a small homing device by the C.I.A. prior to its theft. The second disk containing the hidden data was unequipped with a device, so as to appear inconspicuous. Instead of trying to hide the keys. . . hide the locks. The homing device attached to the "key" disk containing code algorithms was either stripped or became disabled moments after its theft and is not transmitting. The two disks were apparently still together before the signatures disappearance based on a slight frequency differential that two bundled disks might transmit. Extensive efforts to track the disks have been made. Broad spectrum activity scans for encrypted strings were commenced on the Internet and tapped intranet systems to locate the disks and a global alert to C.I.A. offices abroad was issued.

    Recently, as in about forty-five minutes ago, someone inside Hadjar Academy loaded a disk which sent a verified signal to C.I.A. headquarters that it had been accessed. A discussion between C.I.A. officials resulted in a plan to retrieve disk one, the "key" disk, as quickly and efficiently as possible. Disk two may not contain anything as intrusive as a homing device, but integrated into its core is a microchip capable of reading and writing transmitted data up to a 2200 foot range when inside a disk drive. The microchip appears to have been undetected, thus far and the contents of disk two show to have been downloaded several times. This microchip is also on disk one and disk one is needed to access the microchip on disk two. The microchip on disk one was accessed shortly after its theft and write access has been disabled. Continuous scans are being run on both disks and it is only a matter of time before someone discovers the embedded microchips. The microchip on both disks may still remain undetected to whom they were probably sold, however, and efforts must be made to cover disk two's access up so to appear that knowledge of only one disk's disappearance is known.

    The "lock" disk has been deemed compromised as it shows to have been copied several times. The information contained on disk two is non-critical and will be left inside the Academy to surveil its usage so as to comprehend the nature and scope of the security breach which allowed the disks to be taken. Disk one, however, is very important to retrieve, so as to verify its history over the last 48 hours and understand how much the information has been exposed and to stop further exposure of that information. The only simple way of decrypting lock disks is to use the data stored on the key disk in conjunction with it's microchip, meaning that a downloaded copy of disk one is almost worthless without the original disks built-in microchip. Only the key disks microchip is needed, however, to easily decrypt lock disks, making the retrieval of disk two even more unimportant, as the key disk could almost just as easily decrypt a downloaded copy of disk two. The information on disk one is critical, however, and much data would need to be purged and re-encrypted if the data is found to be compromised. In addition, it is the key to finding the moles suspected of infiltrating the library division that could steal other important "lock" disks or may already have access to those disks and be attempting to break the code or sell those disks. Both disks are believed to be located somewhere within the Computer and Media Sciences Complex of Hadjar Academy.

    Your objective is simple. Recover disk one through any means possible and falsify access information on disk two using the access codes on disk one while disk two is in a disk drive. The C.I.A.'s resources in this area are limited and there is not enough time for reinforcements. This lack of resources results in less gear and weaponry. Other agencies may already know of the location of these disks, particularly, SD6 which may have an office within a thirty mile radius and may have been the purchaser of the disks. Do not allow any other agency to escape with disk one or disk two before you have the chance to transmit the falsified access log. Stick close to your commanders, if possible. Good luck!

    Transmission terminated.

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