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Kupchan in his book The End of The
American Era purposefully paints a cautionary picture of the future. The main
theme of his book is set to highlight particular parts of what makes America
the dominant force on the planet and how those parts are changing with the
times or eroding from within, beneath, or above. “Industrial capitalism has
begun to give way to digital capitalism. Liberal democracy is still going
strong, but civic disengagement and social inequalities are already providing
mounting challenges. And the nation-state is under attack from below by
demographic change and regional fragmentation and from above by globalization
and transnational integration.” For the most part as Kupchan walks the reader
through the book he/she can become blatantly aware of how much research went
into each chapter. It is easy to get caught up and give yourself in to the
books stunning conclusions. However, his book is not made to scare people (or
to demonize these changes), but, instead, his goal is to make people aware of
these changes and prepared for the future that he believes is inevitable.
In the first chapter, Kupchan mostly
focuses on how America
deals (or doesn’t deal) with foreign relations. He focuses this chapter on
our strategy or lack thereof. By looking at how others and we have dealt with
foreign relations good and bad, he tries to get the reader to recognize a
pattern. He then points out several lessons in what went right and what went
wrong. Then, he uses those patterns and constructs an image of the future;
then he tells the reader unless we use the lessons we have learned that image
we have may turn out much worse. By doing so, however, he claims he doesn’t
give himself in to strict realism or make believe idealism. Instead, he says
he looks at opposing arguments given by other authors on the topic, and he
tries to find the middle ground. In the end, however, he concludes that America’s
time as the dominant force has come. He does so in a way very much like
telling children there is no Santa Claus, and, then, while they’re crying,
walking them through step by step the reasons why just to make sure that that
knowledge sinks in and doesn’t get repressed.
Be it that he presents this
information in such a formulaic way, it leads one to hope that maybe he might
have just been reading the wrong books. So, on that note, there are six
authors Kupchan reviews: Fukuyama, Huntington, Mearsheimer,
Friedman, and Kennedy/Kaplan. The last two authors Kupchan kind of just
clumps together. I will explain each of them, in accordance to how Kupchan
described them, and along the way I will critique Kupchan in his descriptions
and solutions to the problems they present.
First, there is Fukuyama. Now, as Kupchan breaks down
Fukuyama, his main theme is that at the end of the Cold War, as the world
realizes the greater strength of Capitalist democracy over that of Communist
socialism, all the world’s nations will turn democratic and history as we
know it will end. What Fukuyama means by “end”, is that as countries go
democratic there will no longer be a need for war, thus, history as we know
it, based on events, crisis, and so forth, will stop, and we will move into a
more peaceful world order more focused on the economy and free trade. Kupchan
sees this as wrong in the sense that he says not all democracies bring peace.
He states that nationalism will trump trade every time. He states this by
pointing out incidences in history where this has happened, like the
democratic rise of Adolf Hitler in the late 30s.
Huntington’s
main point on the other hand, according to Kupchan, was that culture and
religion will be the biggest factors in shaping the world’s policies. People
in Huntington’s eyes will always band and group together based on their
ideologies, and as such will create a situation where if you threaten or
clash with one culturally grouped civilization you also bring about a clash
with all the others of that same group, the “clash of civilizations.”
According to Kupchan, this idea is folly. He makes this claim by pointing out
incidences where during the struggles between Palestine
(the Arabic nation) and Israel
(the Jewish nation), other Arabic nations didn’t do a thing to help the Palestinians.
They were more concerned with their own self-interests. He also talks about
how the EU is forming together on the basis of a common currency, so culture
couldn’t possibly be what groups people together. However, by simply going
through history and picking out a few instances where the cases are not
right, Kupchan runs the risk of being statistically invalid. In this way,
Kupchan can claim whatever he wants and never be wrong.
In the way Kupchan breaks down Fukuyama, then breaks down Huntington, Kupchan runs a problem with
seeming somewhat contradictory. In Kupchan’s analysis of Fukuyama
he concludes that nationalism wins out over trade and international cohesion;
in Kupchan’s analysis of Huntington
he concludes that international cohesion and trade win out over nationalism.
In this way, Kupchan seems not as much interested in finding the
commonalities or basic solutions between the two views as much as he seems in
just wanting to be contrary. In the case for Fukuyama, in an article, on the globalist,
titled, “Does trade promote democracy?” by Daniel Griswold, Griswold states
that,
“The most economically open countries are
three times more likely to enjoy full political and civil freedoms as those
that are economically closed. […] Free trade and globalization do not
guarantee democracy and respect for human rights, but they do provide a more
favorable trade wind for achieving these goals.”
In the case for Huntington,
in an article, on the globalist, titled “Europe’s productivity problem” by Stephan
Richter, Richter states that, “Europe's
productivity numbers are hiding a serious problem. In Europe,
young and low-skilled workers are simply frozen out of the job market.” He
also talks about how since there is no common language or culture amongst
European nations, this makes it harder for Europeans to go where the jobs
are, even though they share a common coin and it’s easier to cross borders.
Culture and language are still a factor. Also, in another article, on
the globalist, titled “Britain
and the Euro—just say no” by Uwe Bott, he states,
“The adoption of the single European
currency has much greater costs than benefits — and that will continue to be
the case for years to come. […]The overriding rationale for the Euro was
political […] It is not advisable for countries that have so far stayed out
to join at this point especially when their economic structures are modern
and competitive.”
All of
these men are renowned economists and political scientists who study the
present by focusing on the present, not by simply pointing out
inconsistencies in the past. They rely on statistical scientific studies to
back them up as opposed to pure opinion. By this what I am getting at is
under the EU’s glamour there are still problems, and Kupchan’s pretty breakdown
is inaccurate.
Mearsheimer’s main point, according to
Kupchan, preaches the cause for realism in accordance to the logic of power
politics. To Mearsheimer what constitutes positions on foreign policy and who
does what falls in accordance with who has the most, be it money, weapons,
nuclear bombs...etc. Mearsheimer also states that there needs to be an enemy
in the same sense as there had been with the USSR during the Cold war to align
countries together. He also warns against mutipolarity as only weakening
foreign policy positions. The only way
to deal with foreign policy is to only have one nation dealing with it.
According to Kupchan Mearsheimer is wrong. He points out how the EU has been
strengthening foreign relations not weakening them. In the Rise of the EU
Kupchan speaks of how the future will be dominated by not one but many
different nations who will make decisions that better suit every one and not
just the self-interest of the one. Kupchan describes the United States much like the big
kid or sometimes as the bully on the playground. Whether we are just the
bigger kid or the bully we get our way whenever it suits us. However, though
when the other nations need help we do nothing unless it affects us. In much
of a way the other kids eventually get sick of the big kid, and so form up
(much like the EU) to then become the dominant force on the playground. He
also claims that through Mearsheimer’s logical approach he fails to take into
accounts irrational opponents to the US position and the ability of
people (individuals) to confront policy positions as opposed to nations as a
whole, in terms of rebellion and terrorism.
Kennedy and Kaplan’s main points,
then, according to Kupchan, fall in line with how the world functions in accordance
to poverty inequality. According to them terrorism and political strife
happen because rich countries, or the North, let them happen by allowing poor
countries, or the South, to remain in Poverty. They also claim that as far as
foreign policy matters should be concerned then the disparities between
countries will only grow larger and the problems will only continue to mount.
Kupchan refutes these claims basically by stating that while the problems may
grow the North will be able to successfully quarter off the South, containing
them mostly to themselves. He also states that terrorism will not be a major
issue, as it only happens occasionally, and as such should be looked at more
closely resembling the war on drugs than an actual war between nations.
In describing and critiquing Mearsheimer, Kennedy, and Kaplan, Kupchan
once again contradicts himself. Besides all the points I’ve made already
against the all mighty power of the EU, if terrorism and individual actions
are the main flaw in Mearsheimer’s plan, then why is it in Kennedy’s and
Kaplan’s plan they then become insignificant? Kupchan once again comes off
seeming simply contrary and not so compromising. In defense of Mearsheimer, Kennedy, and
Kaplan, in an article, once again on the globalist (by the way all my quotes
come from the globalist), titled “Just who is violating the Washington
Consensus” by Guy Pfeffermann and Bernard Wasow, they state that
“While the emerging countries gag as the
Washington Consensus is shoved down their throats, the world’s richest
countries neglect to apply it to themselves. […] The United States, EU and Japan are increasing their
already massive subsidies to uncompetitive industries — notably agriculture.”
By
this I refer that the US
is not the only bully out there. All the problems that the US has, either it
be as depicted by Kupchan in accordance to unipolarity (at least in regards
to how it affects other countries not included) or poverty, the EU and other
countries have it too. Kennedy and Kaplan pick up on this; that’s why they
state the problem as being the North versus the South. Now, while Mearsheimer
may be wrong in the sense that there should be only one dominant force
keeping peace throughout the world, he is correct in regards to the means by
which some countries are regarded as being more significant than others, in
terms of power. Even in a WTO or internationally cohesive setting, the
countries with the most influence will still get the most “bang” for their
“buck.” So, in a way both Kupchan and Mearsheimer are wrong, but Kupchan is
wrong more so by saying the EU is the solution. If you think about it, the EU
functions much like the US
does, though instead of a united group of “states” it’s a united group of
“nations”, which unfortunately, unlike the US, don’t possess a common
culture or language. Now while the US may have its problems, the EU
has the same and other problems, only more so. So, it certainly doesn’t pose
a bigger challenge or possess any hope of usurping the US from its current dominant
role.
Finally, Friedman’s main point,
according to Kupchan, is that the world Foreign policies will become more
integrated and interconnected due to technology and the ever changing effects
it forces onto the world. Friedman takes people through all the different
components of the information age which basically flattened the world, making
it all the same. Friedman claims that this doesn’t have to bring about total
assimilation and decimation of cultures into the economy, just so long as
policies are set into place to prevent this. Friedman, like Fukuyama, also believes that globalization
will bring about peace as countries will be more occupied with “surfing the
web” than fighting wars or dealing in geopolitics. Kupchan claims that
Friedman’s position is too optimistic and too set in the present. He states
that Friedman doesn’t focus on the trends and patterns of history. Kupchan
then claims that Globalization will not last forever. However, he doesn’t
know quite why, and so he makes the same argument he did against Fukuyama; however,
instead of democracy, he says globalization will not bring about peace.
Kupchan, in regards to Friedman,
downplays the information age and globalization too much. Globalization and
the information age may be cast to being a temporary phase, but, in defense
of Friedman, they still have their advantages. In an article, on the globalist, titled
“The practical limits of globalization” by Alan Greenspan, he states that
“The
consequent significant additions to world production and trade have clearly
put downward pressure on domestic prices […] Moreover, the pronounced fall in
inflation, virtually worldwide, over the past two decades has doubtless been
a key factor in the notable decline in world economic volatility. Globalization
and innovation, far more than in earlier decades, appears to explain the
events of the past ten years better than other conceptual constructs.”
However, back in defense of
Kupchan, he also states that,
“If
this is indeed the case, because there are limits to how far globalization
and the speed of innovation can proceed, the current apparent rapid pace of
structural shift cannot continue indefinitely. […]Full globalization — in
which trade and finance are driven solely by risk-adjusted rates of return
and risk is indifferent to distance and national borders — will likely never
be achieved. The inherent risk aversion of people — and the home bias implied
by that aversion — will limit how far globalization can proceed. But because
so much of our recent experience has little precedent, we cannot fully
determine how long the current globalization dynamic will take to play out.”
In this way the very ambiguous
and unprecedented nature that globalization has played itself out over the
past decade has undoubtedly reshaped how economists think about the economy;
so, it is easy to see why Friedman, more so a reporter than an economist,
could see this trend as being more than just a temporary phase. However,
where Kupchan didn’t know why globalization would end Alan Greenspan at least
hints to it. It is the people themselves, in the same way as they had after
World War I, their aversion to foreign empowerment over that of their own
country, and the inherent risks imposed economically that will end
globalization. This type of end won’t weaken the US however, because, if in
the case globalization does end, it will be because Americans as Americans,
bringing in some of that nationalism, which Kupchan believes both does and
doesn’t matter, would have started to invest more into America and less into
other nations. Our past historical patterns of being isolationists and
nationalistic could be our salvation, at least in regards to our current
position in the global pecking order; that is until we turn back towards
globalization again once it suits us, again.
In this way, throughout the book,
highlighted in his missed insights (or off-sights) regarding Friedman,
Kupchan looses sight on what makes democracy so great, the people. In the end
Kupchan has or displays little faith in the people. He claims that civic
disengagement makes it so that people will no longer care about our future,
about our role as a nation, about how we should deal with relations with
foreign nations in the present and future. To him the only people who make it
to the top are corrupt nasty people, and that those are the types of people
we will continue to elect. However, his outlook isn’t exact and our future
isn’t completely laid out already. In speaking about our youth he states,
“Polling data are not yet picking up striking differences across age groups
on questions related to America’s
role in the world. But initial survey data and common sense suggest that
Americans raised after the Cold War will pay less attention to geopolitics
than their elders and be less attuned to the importance of multilateral
engagement in global affairs. Most Americans are poorly informed about
current events...” This statement may be founded in some ways (the books he
reads and the news he pays attention to), but in reality he is wrong. I am
willing to bet Kupchan has never watched the Daily Show or been on
Youtube.com. In the 2006 mid term election there were 2 million more youth
who voted than ever before. Today’s youth are not less informed they’re more
so than their elders. Kupchan downplays globalization and the information age
so much he tries to make their positives non existent. Well, maybe the
positives are diminished, but diminished doesn’t mean extinct.
Kupchan by summing up everyone as he
does paints a bleak outlook of the future forcing one to stop believing in
the pacifying nature of both globalization and democracy. However, he mostly
focuses on the worst-case scenarios and the negatives. And he never quite
comes about creating a whole cogent global policy. He leaves it broken up
throughout the book, and each chapter only highlights more so the problems
than the solutions. And, in the end, what solutions he does come up with are
slightly skewed and misguided due to the nature of his own befuddled
intellect, over inflated ego, and somewhat un-common common sense. America’s
role in the future should be looked on with hope, not despair. It is too easy
to look on the problems in the world and only point out the negative, but
true polity and peace can be achieved. The path is and always will be harder,
but harder doesn’t mean impossible. America’s role in the future may
be a more diminished one, but that doesn’t mean we will lose our place in
dominance. We may someday no longer be the bully on the playground, but
neither will the EU. In order to fix some of the problems, poverty,
terrorism, and economics wise, we need to garner sympathy for our cause and
promote global cohesion. But in order to keep ourselves from being pummeled
economically or physically by the growing forces in the world (be them EU, India, China,
or Russia)
we can’t exactly drop off the global market. However, we will also need to
start working with them, aid assistance when the time calls (whether or not
it benefits us), enforce rules based on a consensus (not self-interest), and
promote equality on a realistic platform (not block it off by building bigger
walls). We may find our position more confined and restricting, but we will
at least be on more stable footing. It is time we stop running our nation on
fumes and politics as if we’re pitching ourselves off as stock. On a minimum,
we need to take a close look at our policies to raise our profits by which
they actually derive successful solutions and catch our underlying self worth
up to meet the hype we claim ourselves to be. As we do this, we also need to
keep our ambitions and nationalistic pride in check and ensure that the road
ahead of us is at least a humble one, or other nations won’t buy it. This
isn’t impossible or improbable; in fact, I’d like to believe that we’re
already on our way there. I may not personally know how we might do all this;
that’s not exactly my specialty. However, in regards to the plans I just laid
out, as the future unfolds, none of this may even be necessary. There are too
many endless possibilities taking place in the present to predict anything,
as Kupchan tries, that far ahead into the future with absolute certainty.
This doesn’t mean you shouldn’t make plans for the long term, but it does
mean you shouldn’t make it your primary focus; because, if history is clear
about anything, it’s that history is never clear about anything.
Bott, U. (Mar 3, 2003). Britain and the Euro – Just Say No. The Globalist.
November 28, 2006, from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3239
Greespan, A. (May 20, 2004). The Practical Limits of
Globalization. The Globalist.
November 28, 2006, from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3936
Griswold, D. (Jan 23, 2004). Does Trade Promote Democracy. The Globalist.
November 28, 2006, from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3714
Hurtubise, C. (Nov 9, 2006). Young voters turn out in record
numbers across the
country. Daily Pennsylvanian. November 28, 2006, from
http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2006/11/09/
News/Young.Voters.Turn.Out.In.Record.Numbers.Across.The.Country-2449596.shtml?norewrite200611291341&sourcedomain=www.dailypennsylvanian.com
Pfeffermann, G., & Wasow, B. (Apr 23, 2004). Just Who Is Violating the
“Washington
Consensus”. The
Globalist. November 28, 2006, from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2989
Richter, S. (Mar 3, 2003). Europe's Productivity Problem. The Globalist.
November 28, 2006, from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2989
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