Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (1995)
Notes, Questions & Answers #13: "The Public Sphere"

This essay continues investigating topics identified in #11, which offered 4 very large or inclusive discourse communities: politics/law; religion; business/money; & Romantic/aesthetics/style. "What is a public sphere?" 259. This can be answered from the perspective of each of the four discourse communities, but T.'s answer moves in the direction of the community of art/fashion/style/self-definition. "The public sphere is a central feature of modern society. So much so that, even where it is in fact suppressed or manipulated, it has to be faked. Modern despotic societies have generally felt compelled to go through the motions. Editorials appear in the party [censored] newspapers, purporting to express the opinions of the writers . . . demonstrations are organized. All this takes place as if a genuine process" of public expression was at work, 259. Consider the analogues in the other 3 realms. In law, claims by Marxists of historical inevitability and proletariat justice. In religion, of God/Allah's will in Iran, Afghanistan, Rome. In money/consumerism of nonconvertible currency.

1. Each of the above 4 examples is characterized by the fact that it is a "monological" expression announced (by loudspeaker, no doubt) from the head office (i.e., top-down) to the rest of us who are expected to follow orders & not ask questions. In contrast, how does T. define "public opinion"?

"Public opinion, by contrast, is meant (1) to be the product of reflection, (2) to emerge from discussion, & (3) to reflect an actively produced consensus.

2. Identify some of the requirements necessary to produce public opinion.

• Argument: "It is also crucial that they be carried on as arguments," not as passively repeated orders from a sacrosanct authority, 262.
• Mutuality: like Socratic dialectic, points of view are "understood by the participants as forming part of a single discussion proceeding toward a common resolution," 262.
• Public: "the modern public sphere relied on 'print capitalism' to get going," 262. Electronic media (TV news) & Internet foster public space.

3. T. follows Rousseau to offer a formula for social contractual democracy. Identify its elements.

• "The Public sphere is the locus of a discussion potentially engaging everyone," 263
• "so that the society can come to a common mind [General Will] about important matters"
• consensus/the General Will "is a reflective view, emerging from critical debate"
• the General Will "has a normative status: government [esp. if it is an instrumental means & nothing more] ought to listen to it"

4. T. claims that the Rousseau-ian public sphere he defines is fundamentally different from what goes on in the discourse community of law/politics. How so?

Authority resides in two incommensurable places. In the Rousseau-ian model, mere popular opinion constitutes sovereignty (meaning there is nothing more authoritative). I say mere because "it was not defined as the will of God or the law of Nature," 265. As defined above, the General Will requires public, critical argumentation. But when that is done, the General Will can only claim to be popular opinion. In contrast, authority in the law/politics discourse community is codified in rules, regulations & professional standards. People do not directly speak to us. Court justices put on wigs & black robes & speak down to us from elevated court benches. Mr. Congressman and Ms. Senator tell us the law. And if we don't like we are advised to work within the system to elect someone else or to seek legal council. The historical rise of public opinion outside the walls of a clearly demarcated institution "was seen as forming a society outside the state," 266.

5. Consider Plato's assessment of democratic government. He thought it was the grumble & caprice of the mob. By definition it lacks theoretical pith & direction. Why should anyone listen to mere public opinion? By what authority? If the discussion is religious, I can pretty quickly trace the authority to some claim of self-evidency or ultimacy. If the discussion is fiscal & economic, we know how to authoritative measure the claims. In the discussion is legal, we know where the authority resides. But when people are expressing mere opinions, where is the authority? What, if anything, obligates you to listen or consider their claims?

T.'s answer - you should expect this by now - moves in the direction of pragmatism: "this kind of secularity [i.e., authority] is modern. * * * But prior to the modern day . . . people could only see themselves as constituted into . . . [authoritatively grounded communities] by something action-transcendent [i.e., an agency beyond the actions of common life], be it God or a chain of being or some traditional law. So the 18^th c. public sphere represents an instance of a new kind . . . an agency grounded purely in its own common actions," 269. The authority is entirely pragmatic. No one, in principle, can claim to be a prophet or to transmit some putative transcendental authority. In fact, the inversion is so total that claims of transcendental knowledge are tolerate publicly as private fantasies or tastes that cannot be publicly defended. They are claims that have had a public hearing (such as absolute religious claims) & failed. The General Will is against them. This the meaning of the Enlightenment & secularism.

6. If the authority for the public sphere is pragmatic & consequently rejects all transcendental claims, doesn't this produce anarchy? The question comes up again, why should anyone feel obliged to listen to anyone else?

The answer/s are fairly long-winded because they must be pragmatic. Moreover, T. is not assured (& as a pragmatist cannot be assured) that the Rousseau-ian social formula will continue to work. He lists dangers to the public sphere:

• crypto-transcendentalists: radical feminists, ecologists (280), racists (black as well as white)
• realpolitik power which technically delivers the goods by any legal means & consequently feels progressively feels alienated from consensus (284): "citizen efficacy consists in being able to get your rights, whatever the consequences for the whole society," 285.

7. Looking at 277, how do communities #1 (law) & #4 (public sphere) relate in American theory? Does #4 entirely replace #1; or should it? Is #1 inimical to #4 such that we really believe that lawyers & politicians are unprincipled parasites?

"But democracy is not just like the public sphere," 277. The two communities overlap & are mutually dependent. "In a modern democratic polity, the boundary between political system & public sphere has to be maximally porous," 280. The sovereign authority for #1 is located in #4. But to achieve the goals/ends articulated in the public sphere requires the technical means possessed by #1. (This mutuality is interestingly paralleled in Herbert Marcuse's thinking between the mutually dependent societies of aesthetic dreamers & technical institutions of business and engineering.) T. is very clear about the priority: "A flourishing public sphere [in which normative judgments are made] is essential to democracy," 278. A perfectly oiled legal machinery (community #1) cannot produce democracy. Perfect law & order produce a fascist state, not a democracy.

On to #12: "The Politics of Recognition"
Oct. 96