Response to Dan Barker's Cosmological Kalamity
Dan's words are in blue; mine are in black. His essay is divided into three sections, each dealing with a specific argument, and so is my response.
I. Does the kalam argument beg the question?
The curious clause "everything that begins to exist" implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE)�If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then BE is merely a mask for the Creator, and the premise "everything that begins to exist has a cause" is equivalent to "everything except God has a cause." As with the earlier failures, this puts God into the definition of the premise of the argument that is supposed to prove God's existence, and we are back to begging the question.
If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then the universe must have begun to exist, which means that it must have a cause. Thus, for Dan to refute the kalam argument, he must admit the existence of a Creator.
Where do theists obtain the idea in the first place that there is such a set as NBE? By what observations or arguments is the possibility of beginningless objects warranted?
There cannot be an infinite regress of causes and effects, for that would not explain how anything could exist in the first place. Plus, an infinite regress of causes and effects would be analogous to an infinite regress of events in time, which, as the kalam argument shows, is impossible.
Since most theists' definition of God includes personality, NBE might be open to an impersonal force as well as a personal force--or a number of impersonal and personal forces. This would not necessarily lead to polytheism, deism, or violate the principle of economy--it might be true that only the personal agency actually exists from the set of possibilities.
Okay, I'll grant that NBE is open to more than just God.
Have theists successfully eliminated all but one candidate for NBE? By what criteria have they concluded that an impersonal force cannot cause a universe? After all, experience within the universe shows us that many impersonal causes "create" many natural effects.
Impersonal causes within the universe do not bring things into existence. Plus, an impersonal (and therefore unintelligent) cause cannot create a universe with intelligent beings.
Craig appears to be justifying the hypothesis of a personal external force via the fact that the natural universe contains complex intelligence and free personal agency--humans, for example--and a creator must be at least as complex as the thing it created. Otherwise, the creation would have been greater than the creator, which is impossible.
Well, it's not a matter of complexity per se. An effect cannot have something that its cause doesn't, regardless of which is more complex.
But is it impossible? What exactly does "greater" mean?
Yes, it's impossible. You cannot get more than you started with.
In this case, "greater" means having more than the cause. For example, a glucose molecule (C6H12O6) has atoms that a water molecule (H2O) doesn't have, both in number and kind. So, no matter what you do to water, unless you add some carbon to it, you will never get glucose. Plus, even if you do add carbon, you will never turn any number of water molecules into an equal number of glucose molecules (unless, of course, you add other types of molecules) because glucose has more atoms.
Flowing water created the Grand Canyon: which is greater?
Flowing water didn't do it alone. Friction, gravity, and the mass of rock from which the Grand Canyon was formed also helped create it.
Loose pebbles start avalanches.
Again, loose pebbles alone don't cause avalanches alone. Snow and gravity are also involved.
We build machines that are "greater" than ourselves: forklifts, jet airplanes, bombs. We create machines that think better than we do--witness the defeat of World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov to IBM's "Deep Blue."
We don't bring these things into existence from nothing. We put existing matter together that already has the potential to do things that we can't.
A man and a woman who are both of average intelligence can produce a child who is a genius.
Well, for one, since intelligence is immaterial, it probably does not come solely from the parents, so their levels of intelligence don't matter. In addition, the potential for high intelligence is already there in the parents' genes and the matter from which the child is formed.
If we are allowed to draw an inference, as Craig does, from one world to the other, then we cannot rule out the possibility of the universe (or God) having arisen from simpler causes.
Yes, the universe theoretically could've arisen from simpler causes, but that's irrelevant. No matter what, the kalam argument proves that the universe (or whatever simpler things it came from) must've had a beginning.
You cannot simply say that since an effect has certain properties, so must its cause. We know that the Creator must be personal only because intelligence cannot come from non-intelligence. However, something that arose from simpler causes did not necessarily come from something else that also evolved.
If theists such as Craig think we can infer anything from natural observation about the characteristics of a transcendent creator, then we naturalists could be justified in playing the same game: we might "infer" that the creator (if it exists) evolved from a less complex, non-personal source.
No, you cannot infer that. Intelligence cannot come from non-intelligence, so God must be personal. Plus, as I said before, while there's a reason why we must (not merely can) infer that the Creator is personal, there is no reason to infer that He evolved from a non-personal source.
Some theists dismiss biological evolution from simpler origins (some discard only macro-evolution, and some only the evolution of DNA), but even if they are right, this would not help them: complex/simple does not necessarily translate to personal/impersonal.
As I said before, it's not a matter of complexity per se; rather, it's a matter of whether or not an effect can have something that its cause doesn't. No matter how complex an impersonal source may be, if it doesn't have intelligence, neither can whatever it creates.
Who is to say that personality could not have arisen from an impersonal cause? The impersonal might be more complex. If this is impossible, theists must explain why.
As I said, it's not a matter of complexity; rather, it's a matter of an effect not being able to have something that its cause doesn't.
Even if it is wrong, in spite of a wealth of evidence, that complexity arises from simplicity, in order for the cosmological argument to hold, theists must at least acknowledge the possibility of one or more transcendent forces that is not personal. They must ontologically contend with something else "out there" that is not God: they must define it, and then eliminate it.
Intelligence cannot arise from non-intelligence, so everything that's not intelligent (and therefore not personal) must be ruled out as a possible creator, which leaves only one possible candidate, God.
II. Is the kalam argument self-refuting?
Theists regularly talk about a place "beyond" the universe, a transcendent realm where God exists "outside of time."
The kalam argument shows that time, space, and matter must have had a beginning, so the Creator must transcend both time and space.
Of course, if you live "outside of time," whatever that means, then you don't need a beginning in time. A transcendent being, living "beyond" nature, is conveniently exempt from the limitations of natural law, and all complaints that God himself must have had a cause or a designer (using the same natural reasoning that tries to call for his existence) can be dismissed by theists who insist that God is outside the loop, unaffected by natural causality, beyond time.
Right.
Yet theists continue to describe this "timeless" being in temporal terms.
As temporal beings, we cannot understand anything that's outside of time, so the best we can do is describe timeless events with temporal terms to help us catch a glimpse of understanding.
Phrases such as "God decided to create the universe" are taken by us mere mortals to be analogous to such natural phrases as "Annie Laurie decided to bake a pie." If such phrases are not equal or analogous to normal human language, and if they are not redefined coherently, then they are useless. We may as well say "God blopwaddled to scrumpwitch the universe."
No, they are not useless; they are analogous to normal human phrases. The only difference is that when we talk about God, we understand that there is no before or after.
The word "create" is a transitive verb. We have no experience of transitive verbs operating outside of time (how could we?), so when we hear such a word, we must picture it the only way we can: a subject acts on an object.
Right. And if the creating happens outside of time, our picture will be inaccurate but still helpful.
Considering the point at which an action is committed, there must be an antecedent state "during" which the action is not committed, and this would be true either in or out of time.
No, there doesn't have to be a state "during" which the action is not committed. Outside of time, all events take place from all eternity. If there is state "during" which an event has not yet occurred, then that state would be a period of time.
To say that "God created time" is not comprehensible to us. But if he did it anyway, in spite of our lack of imagination, then it couldn't have happened "after" the decision to commit it, because there was no "before." However, we might still imagine the act of creation as "following" the decision to create. Or, to avoid temporal terms, the creating succeeds the deciding in the logical order. (In logic we say that a conclusion "follows," though we do not mean this happens in space or time. Craig writes that "the origin of the universe is causally prior to the Big Bang, though not temporally prior to the Big Bang.")
Saying that God created time is not totally incomprehensible to us. We can understand that he did it but not how he did it.
Either in or out of time, the decision of a personal agency to commit an action happens antecedent to the action itself. Even if the deciding and the acting happened simultaneously, it would still not be true that the acting was antecedent to the deciding. Imagine God saying, "Oh, look! I just created a universe. Now I'd better decide to do it."
The decision to create is logically and causally prior to the act of creating but not temporally prior.
In footnote 12, Dan writes: Simultaneous creation is not only non-intuitive, but problematic. Without temporal succession, there is no way to determine the order of cause and effect. If creation happened simultaneously, we cannot eliminate the possibility that the universe created God. (Don't some atheists say that "God" is a human creation?)
Since the kalam argument shows that the universe must have a cause, it cannot be the cause in the causal relationship between it and God. Besides, even if the universe did create God, it would still need to have a cause, and that would be God.
This means that there must exist a series of antecedent causal events in the mind of a time-transcendent creator, if such a being exists. Since the Kalam argument claims that "an actual infinity cannot exist in reality," it shoots itself in the foot: although Kalam deals with temporal succession, the same logic applies to non-temporal antecedent events, if such things are a part of reality. If the series were infinite, then God never could have traversed the totality of his own antecedent mental causes to arrive at his decision to say "Let there be light." Therefore, sticking with Kalam, there must have been a "first antecedent" in the mind of an actual God, which means that God "began" to exist. (This means "began causally," but theists have conceded the appropriateness of expressing non-temporal actions in temporal language.)
Who says that a first antecedent means that God began to exist? Since events outside of time take place from all eternity, this first antecedent would be enough to fill all the "time" (for lack of a better term) "before" (again, I can only express these ideas in temporal terms, even though they're not totally accurate) God decided to create the universe. Thus, even though God has existed for all eternity, there's no need for Him to have crossed an infinite series of events in His mind.
III. Does the kalam argument compare apples and oranges?
"The universe," to philosophers (or "the cosmos," to cosmologists), is the set of all things. A set is a collection of items. A set can be a member or subset of another set, and it can be considered a subset of itself, but a set cannot be a member of itself.[14] Yet the cosmological argument treats the universe as if it were an item in its own set. The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe" as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.
Granted, the universe is generally considered to be the set of all things, but it can also be viewed as a thing in and of itself. My body is made up of organs, which are made up of cells, which are made up of molecules, which are made up of atoms, which are made up of sub-atomic particles. If a thing such as my body can be made up of a number of different things, which are in turn made up of a number of different things, then why can't the universe be considered as one whole system, one thing?
Even if the universe can't be viewed as one thing, Dan's argument still fails because the kalam argument can be construed in such a way as to mean that each individual thing in the universe, and therefore the universe as a whole, began to exist. Thus, the syllogism can be put this way:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2) Everything in the universe, and therefore the universe as a whole, began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
To illustrate, consider a faulty argument that uses the word "began":
This is illogical because the "Alliance of All Nations" is not an individual nation, and the word "began" means something entirely different when it is applied to the set as a whole. Likewise, in the cosmological argument, the clause "begins to exist" should not mean the same thing when applied to "the universe" that it means when applied to individual "things" within the universe.
1. Every nation began with a revolution.
2. The Alliance of All Nations began ten years ago.
3. Therefore, there was a revolution ten years ago.
The Alliance of Nations is an artificial set that was arbitrarily created after its members were. However, the universe has always been the set of all things (in the physical realm), so you cannot separate the beginning of the universe from the beginning of the things in it. Therefore, whatever can be said about the beginning of the objects in the universe can be said about the beginning of the universe itself because they were the same event.
Explaining the Kalam cosmological argument, Craig writes:
The logic of the argument is valid and very simple; the argument has the same logical structure as the argument: 'All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.' So the question is, are there good reasons to believe that each of the steps is true? I think there are."
But this is not right. The "All men are mortal" argument does not have the same logical structure as the Kalam. Socrates is a man, but the universe is not a "thing." The argument would have the same logical structure as the Kalam if it said: "All men are mortal; the human race is made of men; therefore, the human race is mortal." It is easy to spot the illogic when phrased in this manner.
"1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
First of all, as I said before, the universe can be viewed as a thing, so the kalam argument does have the same structure as Craig's Socrates syllogism.
Secondly, even if you take the universe as the set of things rather than a thing itself, it is still valid. Granted, you can't apply the characteristics of the members of a set to the set itself, but saying that the universe began to exist is not applying the characteristics of things to the set of all things. Being brought into existence is not a characteristic of a thing, but something that happens to it, and if something happens to all the members of a set at the same time, it can be said to have happened to the set itself.
Bertrand Russell, in his 1948 debate with Copleston, touched on the matter:
"I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all. . . . I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother--that's a different logical sphere."
As I said before, being brought into existence is something that happens to a thing, not a characteristic of it, so Russell is comparing apples to oranges.
A "thing" is something distinguishable, and to be distinguishable is to be limited. To say that I ate a strawberry is to say that what I ate was not a watermelon or a peach. To say that my daughter is a redhead signifies that she is not a blonde or a brunette. To say that my friend is from New York means that he is not from Chicago, Paris, or any other city. In order to be considered a "thing," an object must be a part of a larger context within which and by which it can be limited. The object must be able to be "pulled away" from other objects.
To be a thing something must either be distinguishable from other things or be the only thing in existence (in which case there would be no other things from which to distinguish it). If something (such as the universe) were the only thing in existence, it would not need to be distinguishable from other things because there would be no other things. For example, if the only thing in existence were the Empire State Building, it would still be a thing despite the fact that there would be no other objects from which it can be pulled away.
Is the universe a "thing"? When the cosmological argument moves to its second premise--"The universe began to exist"--we are being forced to view the universe as a particular item in the set of "things." But is the "set of all things" a "thing" itself? How is the set of all things distinguished from other things or other sets? In what context does the universe exist within which it can be identified as a distinct object?
If we view the universe as a thing, then it is not the set of all things. Granted, for most practical purposes we can view the universe as the set of all things, but we must understand that this is not entirely accurate (if we view the universe itself as a thing).
If we even suggest that the universe (cosmos) is a discrete "thing" (not just a concept), we are implying a realm above and beyond the universe within which it is contained, limited, and defined; and this amounts to simply assuming transcendence. Theistic philosophers hope no one will notice that the language they are using effortlessly conjures the existence of a realm beyond nature, portraying "the universe" from a distance, as if "it" had an environment. It is easier for nontheists, who are not tempted to mix logical spheres, to avoid such question begging.
Modern big bang cosmology tells us that the universe (including space itself) is expanding, so there must be some transcendent space into which it is spreading out. Secondly, since an actual infinite cannot exist, the amount of matter in the universe must be finite. Thus, we can say that the universe, the thing composed of all the matter in the universe, exists in physical space. Consequently, there is no need to postulate a transcendent realm in which the universe must exist. Thirdly, we can just say that the universe (including space itself) is all of existence (assuming, for the sake or argument, that nothing exists outside of it) and doesn't need to be contained within some sort of transcendent space.
What statements can we make about the universe that show us what it is not? The Grand Canyon is not in New Jersey, the Egyptian pyramids were not built in the 20th century, baseballs are not made of jelly beans.
The universe contains x number of atoms. Therefore, the statement, "The universe is not a set that contains less than x atoms," tells us what it is not.
Where does the universe not exist?
If you include space itself as part of the universe, then it encompasses all of physical reality. If you just mean the objects in space, then the universe does not exist past a certain line (actually, it's more like a closed figure) past which there is no more matter.
Of what is it not made?
As far as I know, no atoms with 1,000 protons exist, so the universe is not made of those.
How does it differ from a non-universe?
Just as my brain is a part of me yet different from me at the same time, I am part of the universe yet different from it at the same time. In addition, our universe is different from other possible universes that theoretically could exist, such as one that contains more protons and less neutrons.
Such questions are meaningless when asked of the "set of all things."
No they're not. Besides, they're irrelevant; we can still view the universe as a thing.
