Three-hundred and sixty irradiated fuel rods were secretly shipped out of the nuclear reactor plant in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights on January 22.

The irradiated (or ‘spent’) fuel rods - vastly more radioactive than the original uranium fuel - are being shipped to France for reprocessing.

Despite the efforts of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) to keep the shipment secret, anti-nuclear campaigners and local residents were aware of the plan several days before it took place and had time to organise protests.

On the day of the shipment, Greenpeace activists chained themselves to the front gate of the nuclear plant in an attempt to prevent trucks entering to collect the fuel rods. Police unchained them.

In the evening, 200-300 people assembled in front of ANSTO, forcing the use of a dirt road to truck the waste out of the plant. Speakers at the protest included local residents and representatives from the Greens; the Construction, Forestry, Mining, Engineering Union; Greenpeace; People Against a Nuclear Reactor (PANR); and Sydney People Against a New Nuclear Reactor (SPANNR).

Shirley Collela from PANR said, "Despite the fuel transportation from ANSTO being driven out through an alternative exit, PANR was ecstatic about the demonstration. There was enormous, Sydney-wide attendance and growing support and enthusiasm to put a halt to the nuclear industry in Australia."

At Port Botany, Greenpeace had boats and swimmers to disrupt the shipment, and were met by at least six police boats. Six members of SPANNR evaded security to get within a few metres of the waste transport ship, the Bouguenais, before being arrested. Jim Johnston from SPANNR said this proved how lax security was.

The protests attracted plenty of attention from the establishment media, including a front-page story in the Daily Telegraph, and predictable pro-nuclear rants from conservative columnists Paddy McGuinness in the Sydney Morning Herald and Piers Ackermans in the Daily Telegraph.

New Zealand foreign affairs minister Phil Goff said Australia should give more notice when it ships nuclear waste, and that he would prefer that the waste was dealt with in Australia.

Reprocessing is legally prohibited in Australia, which begs the question why it is acceptable to reprocess irradiated fuel rods overseas. The 1993 Research Reactor Review (the last independent public inquiry into the proposal for a new reactor in Sydney) noted that "exporting an Australian problem is morally dubious."

Protesters have numerous concerns about the irradiated fuel shipments, including the complete lack of consultation about the shipment, lack of knowledge about the route of the truck transport, lack of knowledge about appropriate precautionary procedures, and the inadequacy of emergency plans and liability arrangements.

Many local residents are glad to be rid of the toxic radioactive waste, but they don’t wish it on any other community. Ironically, the reprocessing contract with the French company Cogema contains a "curie-for-curie" clause which means that wastes every bit as radioactive as the irradiated fuel rods will be returned to Australia.

Reprocessing wastes are destined for storage at Australia’s national store for intermediate-level waste, and eventual disposal in a deep geological repository. Australia does not have a store for intermediate-level waste, nor a deep geological repository, but such details have not deterred the federal government or ANSTO from pushing ahead with their plan for a new reactor at Lucas Heights.

The removal of waste from Lucas Heights is a grubby political exercise designed to buy time and to reduce public opposition to the plan for a new reactor. The proposed new reactor would generate another 1600-2000 spent fuel rods, each with twice the quantity of fission products as fuel rods from the existing reactor.

In addition, ANSTO documents reveal that between 1993-2025, downstream waste generation arising from the processing of targets irradiated in the planned new reactor would increase 4-12 fold depending on the waste category.

About 850 irradiated fuel rods remain at Lucas Heights awaiting shipment to France and the US.

If the best solution to Australia's spent fuel problem is to ship it overseas for reprocessing, only for equally-radioactive wastes to be shipped back for storage at a non-existent store and eventual disposal in a non-existent repository, it just goes to prove that there IS no solution. The first step in resolving this situation must be to cancel the plan for a new reactor.

The shipment of irradiated ('spent') fuel rods from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation's nuclear reactor plant in southern Sydney  to Cogema's reprocessing plant in France does nothing to solve address Australia's radioactive waste problems. It is a grubby political exercise designed to reduce public opposition to the plan for a new, larger reactor at Lucas Heights.

In the first instance the shipment of spent fuel means trucking this cargo through Sydney with no forewarning of Sydney residents. A 1998 spent fuel shipment showed what can go wrong. As the Sydney Morning Herald reported on 5/9/98, maritime workers were not told of the shipment until it arrived at Port Botany; they refused to load the dangerous cargo; the three trucks laden with spent fuel were driven aimlessly around Sydney because of a law which prevents such materials being stationary for more than two hours for security reasons; and eventually the spent fuel was loaded with assistance from the police, who later formally apologised to the MUA for breaching police protocols on industrial disputes.

Reprocessing operations in Europe pose major environmental and public health hazards - not to mention their contribution to weapons proliferation.  Moreover, the reprocessing contracts with Cogema contain a "curie-for-curie" clause which means that wastes every bit as radioactive (albeit less voluminous) as the spent fuel rods will be returned from France in 10-25 years.

The plan to store reprocessing wastes, along with other long-lived intermediate-level wastes, in an above-ground store in South Australia has hit a major hurdle: last year the SA Parliament voted to ban the federal government's plan to dump long-lived intermediate-level wastes in SA. Federal legislation prevents the ongoing use of Lucas Heights as Australia's de facto nuclear dump. So where will the reprocessing wastes be stored? Where will these wastes finally be disposed of?

Reprocessing has been legally prohibited in Australia (under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998), so why then is it acceptable for spent fuel from Lucas Heights to be reprocessed in Europe? Senator Minchin says “each nation should look after its own waste”, so how does the government justify sending ANSTO’s spent fuel overseas? The 1993 Research Reactor Review (the last independent public inquiry into the proposal for a new reactor in Sydney) noted that "exporting an Australian problem is morally dubious." (p.212)

The 1993 RRR (p.xv) said that a new reactor should not be contemplated until "a high level waste repository site has been firmly identified and work started on proving its suitability" and that (p.xiv) "It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site." Yet the federal government has not even identified a site to STORE reprocessing wastes let alone begun work on a repository for final DISPOSAL of the wastes!

The push to send spent fuel overseas for reprocessing is a grubby political exercise designed to buy time and to reduce public opposition to the plan for a new reactor. The proposed new reactor would generate another 1600-2000 spent fuel rods. According to ANSTO (Draft EIS, p.10-19), the quantity of fission products in the new reactor's spent fuel would be double that of of the current reactor.

If the best solution to Australia's spent fuel problem is to ship it overseas for reprocessing only for equally-radioactive reprocessing wastes to be shipped back for storage at a non-existent store and eventual disposal in a non-existent repository, it just goes to prove that there is no solution. The first step in resolving this situation must be to cancel the plan for a new reactor.

ANSTO’s Draft EIS states (p.10-2), "There are many precedents for the proposal as about 50 other research reactors of the same power as that proposed are operating worldwide and systems for the management of radioactive wastes exist at all these facilities."

This is a sweeping and misleading assertion, at odds with comments made by Iain Ritchie, from the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology (“Growing Dimensions - Spent Fuel Management at Research Reactors”, IAEA Bulletin, Volume 40, No. 1, March 1998):
.

“More than 550 nuclear research reactors are operating or shutdown around the world. At many of these reactors, spent fuel from their operations is stored, pending decisions on its final disposition. In recent years, problems associated with this spent fuel storage have loomed larger in the international nuclear community. Concerns principally focus on the ageing fuel storage facilities, their life extension, and the ultimate disposal of spent fuel assemblies. At both research and test reactors, spent fuel is being stored for longer periods than originally planned and in larger quantities.”

“The IAEA survey also addressed the concerns expressed by reactor operators about their spent fuel management programmes. Not surprisingly, the majority are concerned about the final disposal of their fuel. This is followed by concerns about limited storage capacity, and materials degradation.”

“The global picture that has emerged from the IAEA’s analysis of spent fuel management at research reactors underscores the need for greater international cooperation to resolve outstanding problems and issues. This includes broadening the awareness of the scope and urgency of concerns.”

According to Marinkovic, "The available possible solutions [for spent fuel] are: transport of spent fuel elements to the country of origin, long term storage, and reprocessing. Public acceptance of any of the possible solutions is uncertain. Some research reactors are already in a critical situation and an acceptable procedure for closing their fuel cycle cannot be found due to financial problems." (N. Marinkovic, Impressions from the 4th International Topical Meeting on Research Reactor Fuel Management, France, March 2000, International Nuclear Information System, Archive of Articles and Reports, <www.iaea.org/programmes/inis/ws/articles/colmar2000.html>)

INTRODUCTION

The Australian Labor Government of Paul Keating and Gareth Evans had a strong reputation as a champion of non-proliferation. In particular, its opposition to French nuclear testing, and the establishment of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons put it among the most activist of nations. However, at the same time as the Labor Government took a strong and principled stand on these issues, it was plotting to send nuclear weapons usable Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel rods to Dounreay, Scotland, for reprocessing. Incredibly, the concerns of the United States government that opposed reprocessing at Dounreay, are echoed in official Australian documents, submitted to the U.S. DOE in opposition to Dounreay.

This extraordinary act of hypocrisy is only now emerging on the eve of the arrival at Dounreay of 114 HEU fuel elements on board the general cargo vessel Condock. The question is: will the new Australian Government put a stop to the nuclear double-speak and repair the damage to Australia's non-proliferation reputation?

In testimony to the United States Department of Energy, the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that the reprocessing of HEU is considered 'contrary to sound non-proliferation principles'. The conclusion reached by Greenpeace International is that both in terms of combatting the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation the previous Australian government has completely contradicted itself.

As the arrival date of the MV Condock from Sydney nears, this paper seeks to highlight the deception of the Australian government and its failure to abide by earlier non-proliferation commitments.

AUSTRALIA'S NON-PROLIFERATION FAILURE

"Our approach to this issue is guided by the primacy of our interests in nuclear non- proliferation." (1) The Australian Foreign Ministry under Minister Evans considered nuclear non-proliferation to be one of the issues where its credibility was is higher than most other nations. On the issue of weapons usable HEU, it stated in June 1995,

"An important part of our shared non-proliferation effort entails ensuring the proper management, accounting, physical protection, safety and eventual disposition of nuclear material." (2) By taking the decision to ship HEU fuel elements to Dounreay for reprocessing, the previous Australian government abrogated nearly every guideline laid out in the above submission. This is not just the view of Greenpeace International, it also happens to be the opinion of the Australian government as laid out in government to government correspondence.

The damning evidence of the contradictions between what is said and what is done is contained within the submissions made by Australian government departments in Canberra to the United States Department of Energy, during the extensive public consultation process for determining what should be done with research reactor spent fuel containing HEU (the Draft Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel, 1995).

In the U.S. Draft EIS, the Foreign Affairs Department of the Australian government, notes that,

"Australia would be particularly concerned if a decision by the United States not to accept the return of spent reactor fuel were to lead to increased demand for reprocessing facilities in countries now holding U.S.-origin fuel." (3)

The shipment of 114 HEU fuel elements by Australia to Dounreay is a rejection of the principle policy objective of the Australian government, which is against reprocessing. By supporting the reprocessing of HEU fuel at the Dounreay MTR plant, Australia is directly supporting the continued operation of a facility that otherwise would be closed. By delaying the day of closure, the operators of the plant, Atomic Energy Authority - Government Division (AEA-GD) will be provided with more time to secure orders from other overseas clients. This runs counter to Australian policy of being opposed to decisions that 'lead to increased demand for reprocessing services...'.

Although the submission to the U.S. DOE relates to U.S. origin HEU, the proliferation threat posed by HEU of UK origin is not any less, pound for pound, than U.S. origin material. Even the Australian government would be unlikely to try and make such an artificial distinction. Thus the conclusion reached by Foreign Affairs in June 1995 as to what to do with U.S. origin HEU, ie. not reprocess, was overturned with the decision to ship UK origin HEU to Scotland.

"They lead us to the clear conclusion that our common interests in effective and sound non-proliferation policies and practices would be best served by the implementation of Management Alternative 1 (shipment of all U.S. origin HEU spent to fuel to the United States)." (4)

It is all the more regrettable that the Condock ever set sail from Sydney given the stated opposition to continued HEU use demonstrated by Australia at the NPT (Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) Review and Extension Conference in April-May 1995. Australia jointly submitted language for the final review document of the Conference that was strongly resisted by those countries determined to continue the use of bomb-grade HEU in reactors. Thus, Australia proposed that, "no new civilian reactors requiring high-enriched uranium be constructed," (5)

After what was one of the few heated exchanges at the NPT (at least in public) the countries opposed to such language, such as Germany, Japan, and Algeria, in the end forced a compromise, which however still maintained the important principle that conversion from HEU to non-weapons usable low-enriched uranium held significant non-proliferation benefits.

By providing Dounreay with desperately needed business, the Australian government has renounced its principles as annunciated in New York, and joined the same camp as those promoting the use of bomb-grade materials.(6) There is a further tragic irony in that a majority of Australia's co-sponsors in New York will shortly be on the receiving end of nuclear discharges from Dounreay containing Australian waste.

WILL DOUNREAY LOSE AUSTRALIA'S BOMB-GRADE MATERIAL?

The former policy of the Australian government in being against the commerce in HEU was wholly justified. The record of Dounreay over the years only goes to emphasise the error in judgement made by Australia in choosing to send HEU to the Scottish plant. Two examples of the mismanagement and proliferating practices of the site, highlight the fundamental mistake made by Canberra.

In December 1991, AEA Technology, announced that an enquiry had been established in an attempt to account for 10 kilograms of HEU. This amount of uranium is sufficient for over 5 nuclear weapons, each with a yield over 1000 tonnes TNT equivalent. (7)

The loss of the HEU occurred in the enriched uranium processing plant, D1203, which provides a service for the fuel fabrication and Dounreay's two reprocessing plants, including the MTR plant. Australian high-enriched uranium nitrate after separation in the MTR will be recovered at the D1203, the end product being oxide (or metal). The plant is the same age as the MTR, having begun operations in 1958.

As a result of the disclosure of missing HEU, the entire Dounreay complex was closed, including the two reprocessing plants. The seriousness of what the UK government described as an accountancy error, led to a European Commission investigation. The Commission reported that the discrepancy was "unintentional", and caused by "shortcomings in the operator's nuclear material accountancy and control system,". By the time of the Commission report, the amount of HEU missing had been revised on four occasions, with a maximum figure of 11.3, finally reduced to 1.8kg. Of the balance of 9.8kg: 2.89kg had been discharged to the sea via the waste pit, 1.99kg was an unrecorded transfer to solid waste, further measurement of the U-235 content of the residues found 0.4kg, and a more complete inventory found 0.7kg in tanks and 3.5kg in residues. (8)

The final result of the enquiry may have satisfied the official agencies and the Dounreay operators, but it gave little reassurance to those most concerned about the proliferation threat posed by Dounreay. As the Australian government know full well, one of the principle problems about reprocessing plants is that it is technically impossible to guarantee the detection of diversion of weapons fissile material. This is one of the reasons why the United States government is opposed to reprocessing of commercial plutonium and uranium. Since 1991, nuclear safeguards have not improved to the point where a repetition of events at Dounreay could not take place again. In fact in some respects the situation is worse. In the Final Report of a European Parliamentary Enquiry into the HEU incident, it was noted that one of the explanations provided by Dounreay to the Enquiry was, "... commercial pressures exacerbating the underaccounting". (9)

Since 1991, the facilities at Dounreay have moved almost entirely to private tender operation, including the MTR reprocessing plant. Although perhaps not the most important factor in increasing the probability of safeguards failure, it should still cause some alarm in Canberra. It would be interesting to know if prior to the decision to ship HEU Scotland, the Australian government raised with the UK authorities the inadequacy of safeguards as applied at Dounreay, and what degree of assurance they received in return?

A more recent example of the potentially serious implications for nuclear non-proliferation as a result of Australian HEU contracts with Dounreay, comes from the site Director, Mr John Baxter. In a public meeting on October 3rd 1995, Mr Baxter was asked to confirm Dounreay's commitment to meet U.S. non-proliferation objectives whereby any HEU reprocessed at Dounreay would have to be reduced in enrichment to non-weapons usable low enriched uranium (so-called downblending). The Director would not make such a commitment, in fact he stated that it would be a matter for the research reactor operator, 'if they wished to have HEU returned after reprocessing, then that is what Dounreay would supply' Mr Baxter stated.

Due the clear contradiction between the views expressed by Dounreay's Director and the United States government, the information was communicated to the U.S. Department of Energy. In response they restated that any HEU of U.S. origin sent to Dounreay would be under the condition that, "any high-enriched uranium that is separated would be blended down to low enrichment levels so the uranium could not be used in nuclear weapons." (10)

Again it would be interesting to know if the Australian government has requested that all of the HEU it sends to Dounreay is downblended to low-enriched uranium?

When the United States government finally issued its decision on the management of foreign research reactor U.S.-origin HEU in January 1996, it did not select Dounreay, despite expectations as late as December 1995 that it would. It has been communicated to Greenpeace that one of the principle reasons for denying Dounreay large U.S. sanctioned contracts was the refusal by the management to commit to downblending.

From Dounreay's perspective, it was an impossible situation, in that its most likely clients for reprocessing were primarily interested in the re-use of HEU separated at the MTR plant. It would hardly have been encouraging to potential clients for Dounreay to have had to state that it would not provide them with what they wanted - nuclear weapons-usable highly enriched uranium.

Regardless if Canberra has requested downblending, by shipping their HEU to Dounreay they have made it easier for Dounreay's MTR to remain open, and for AEA-GD to secure more contracts. The largest contract market if it exists at all, exists with those countries who are interested in receiving back HEU after reprocessing. That appears to be one reason why the Australian government was against Dounreay when concerned with U.S. origin HEU. Strange that such a convincing argument against reprocessing would be rejected less than six months later, when considering UK origin HEU?

"We particularly welcome the clear statement that the objective of the policy is to secure for the United States the non-proliferation benefits of reducing, and ultimately eliminating, HEU from civilian commerce. We believe that the proposed policy will produce real nonproliferation gains by reducing the quantities and locations of HEU holdings around the world." (11)

CONCLUSION

The decision to ship HEU from Lucas Heights to Dounreay is a non- proliferation failure of the highest order. Over many years successive Australian governments have striven hard to present their nuclear policies as being primarily influenced by the high ideals of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. Within the international community, deservedly or not, they have succeeded in securing a high moral reputation in nuclear affairs. The arrival this month at Dounreay of the first of perhaps 10 shipments of HEU should go some way to shattering the myth of Australian non-proliferation credentials. They may have welcomed U.S. policy objectives in 1995, but by 1996 for some reason they had rejected them. With 9 further shipments due, it is still not too late for the new Australian Government to recover Australia's position on non proliferation issues.

REFERENCES

1 - Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, letter to U.S. Department of Energy, 29 June 1995, see p. 2.6-62, Volume 3, Section 2 'Foreign Entities', of the Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel, EIS, 1996.

2 - Letter to Charles Head, U.S. DOE, June 29, 1995, from Assistant Secretary, Nuclear Policy Branch, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

3 - ibid, letter to Charles Head, June 29th.

4 - ibid.

5 - see, para 3, Working Paper on Article III - Physical Protection, submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, 21 April 1995, NPT.CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8.

6 - The proliferation threat posed by HEU was recently detailed in a briefing prepared for the United States Congress, see, Russian Highly Enriched Uranium and EURATOM, February 1996, Greenpeace International.

7 - see, The Amount of Plutonium and High-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons, T. Cochran, C. Paine, Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., April 13, 1995.

8 - For more information see the briefing prepared by North European Nuclear Information Group, NENIG, 'Dounreay's Missing Uranium' 1992.

9 - see, Adam, Gordon, IV/13, Special Report by Mr Gordon Adam, MEP, for the European Parliament's Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, 3/7/92, PE
201.597, as cited in NENIG, ibid.

10 - see, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy to Tom Clements, Greenpeace International, November 7th, 1995.

11 - see, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization, submission to the U.S. Department of Energy Draft Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel, see, p. 2.6.16, 164-8, Volume 3, of Final EIS, 1996.