Summary

The Commonwealth Government and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) plan to build a new nuclear reactor in the Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights. This is Australia’s largest ever scientific investment, with profound implications for foreign policy and the direction of future Australian science, as well as significant health and property risks for the population of Australia’s largest city. Yet the design and approval process for the reactor has been shrouded in extraordinary secrecy and unaccountability, with the effect of blocking public debate and Parliamentary oversight.

Vital documents and studies have not been made public or do not exist:

• No detailed costings or economic analysis have been released
• No reactor design has been prepared
• No credible accident scenarios appear to exist
• No alternatives have been seriously considered
• No independent analyses apparently exist
• The waste processing contract with France is "Cabinet in confidence" and cannot be viewed, even by Parliament.
• The alternative sites study is "Cabinet in confidence".

Many more issues could be added to this list of concerns. Above all, two recurring themes have prompted this demand for a Royal Commission:

• secrecy, so pervasive that even the President of the Australian Nuclear Association has recently complained about the "culture of secrecy" at ANSTO; and
• dishonesty, which prompted a former ANSTO engineer with over 25 years experience to write last year, "It is an unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer's money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information. I thought governmental agencies are there to serve the public - not just to perpetuate themselves."

We therefore call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission into the nuclear reactor proposal and the licensing process which has accompanied it.

A saga of deception

The Government ignored the 1993 Research Reactor Review's recommendation for a Public Inquiry to investigate any future proposal for a new reactor. More recently the Government ignored the recommendation of the Senate Economics References Committee for a public inquiry into the proposal. The Senate committee said the decision to build a new reactor was "premature and open to ongoing controversy" because of the failure to carry out a public inquiry into the proposal, to properly investigate alternative sites, to take into account community views, and to resolve
radioactive waste management issues.

Instead of a public inquiry, ANSTO prepared its own Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which was duly approved by the federal government. The government refused a request from the Sutherland Shire Council to appoint an independent auditor to oversee the Environment Impact Assessment. The EIS was neatly, though generously, summarised by a former head of Engineering and Reactors at ANSTO: "If it is normal for the proponent (of an EIS) to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO's presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable."

A senior government bureaucrat said on ABC Radio National on March 29, 1998, that: "The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that it could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because the government couldn't win it on rational grounds ... they decided, right, we'll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don't write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely."

Such comments on the public record, yet the Prime Minister stated last year that the government has been "open and honest" in its handling of the reactor controversy.

Both ANSTO and the government have sought to cloak rational discussion about the costs and benefits of a reactor under a dishonest claim that the reactor is vital for nuclear medicine. In fact medical isotopes can be easily obtained from a global market which already supplies many Australian hospitals.

Peter McGauran, then science minister, began his press release announcing the decision to build a new reactor with the words, "The construction of a replacement research reactor at Lucas Heights will build on Australia's life-saving nuclear medicine capabilities." McGauran said on ABC radio on March 29, 1998, that "There's no doubt that health issues concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever."

It has indeed been a dishonest argument according to a senior government bureaucrat who was quoted on the same ABC radio program saying: "The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people. ... So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it".

When Dr. Geoff Bower, head of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, was asked if it would be a "life threatening" situation if Australia did not produce medical isotopes locally, he said, "Probably not life threatening. I think that's over-dramatising it and that's what people have done to win an argument. I resist that."

The medical isotope rhetoric has become so implausible that the government is itself backing away from it. The parliamentary Public Works Committee produced a bipartisan report in August 1999 which said: "A number of organisations and individuals challenged the need for a research reactor based on a requirement to produce medical radiopharmaceuticals. ... The Committee recognises that this issue has not been resolved satisfactorily."

Over two years have passed since the government's decision to build a new reactor, $300 million has been committed to the project, a sham Environmental Impact Assessment has been completed, the tendering process is underway. Yet we now observe the government acknowledging that the debate over medical isotope supply - the issue which "concluded the matter beyond any doubt whatsoever" according to the former Science Minister - has not been resolved satisfactorily.

Nor was the Department of the Environment and Heritage prepared to accept this rhetoric when required to examine the EIS produced by ANSTO. It said that "a combination of alternatives, such as funding for 'suitcase science', importation of radioisotopes, and possible development of spallation and other technologies, could substitute in part for not constructing a new reactor." A further reflection of the Department's unwillingness to parrot the rhetoric was its statement that, "The Department's assessment concludes that the need and justification for the proposal is ultimately a matter for Government, particularly in defining how best to meet national interest objectives."

A blank cheque

The proposal requires spending over $500 million of Commonwealth funds in the short term, with well over a billion dollars committed for on-going expenditure during the 40-50 year life of the reactor.

The absence of financial honesty in the proposal is astonishing - neither the public nor Parliament have been provided with detailed costings or a credible cost-benefit analyses. At a time of acute financial accountability and restraint in Commonwealth expenditures, ANSTO is apparently being handed a blank cheque.

ANSTO’s claim that the reactor will cost taxpayers $286 million. This is a 1993 figure which does not take cost escalations into account. It is a deceptive figure which fails to take into account obvious foreseeable costs. Here is a more honest accouting:

Cost of reactor - up to $400 million (1)
Instrumentation - up to $150 million (1)
Decommissioning old reactor - $70 million (1)
Spent fuel reprocessing - $120 million (3)
Isotope processing - $13 million p.a. (2)
Reactor operating costs - $20 million p.a. (1)

Total likely costs = over $500 million

Plus ± $20 million Commonwealth subsidy per year for 40-50 years.

(1) McKinnon Research Reactor Review 1993
(2) ANSTO Annual Report 1998-99
(3) ANSTO EIS 1998

To these costs must be added the unknown cost of a waste repository for long-lived intermediate level wastes (ie. spent fuel when returned to Australia from reprocessing overseas).

The costs of such a waste repository are likely to be immense. The US government plans to spend US$30 billion on a high level waste repository in Nevada. The cancelled Nirex intermediate waste facility in the UK was to cost £2 billion. Pangea Ltd’s high level waste proposal in Australia was supposed to cost US$6 billion.

Does the federal government intent to hand ANSTO a blank cheque? It certainly seems so.

A key task for the Royal Commission would be to obtain credible independent assessments of the likely costs of the reactor proposal, so that an informed debate can occur.

A failure of science policy

As with the rhetoric about medical isotopes, claims that a new reactor is required for "world-class" scientific research are also questionable. The reactor, if built, would be the single largest investment in a science facility in Australia's history yet the government failed to consult its science advisers - the Office of the Chief Scientist, the Australian Science, Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC) and the CSIRO - before making the decision. The CSIRO said in 1993 that "more productive research could be funded for the cost of a reactor."

There is little scientific or medical support for a new reactor beyond those individuals and organisations with financial and/or career interests in reactor technology. Needless to say alternative technologies - such as cyclotrons - have not received such enthusiastic and uncritical support; indeed the development of alternative technologies has been impeded because of the push for reactor technology.

Distorting Australia’s foreign policy

So why does the government want a new reactor? The Public Works Committee said that the "national interest criterion forms the cornerstone of the need for a replacement research reactor". ANSTO said in its Draft EIS that national interest issues were addressed "comprehensively" by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Safeguards Office in their submission to the Senate Nuclear Reactor Inquiry - but that submission was just seven pages long and it was unreferenced.

It appears that a seven-page, unreferenced document on "national interest" issues forms the principle justification for the new reactor.

In fact, a nuclear reactor is likely to commit Australia decisively to the "nuclear club" by ensuring a seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA regulates the world’s nuclear industry and is also the world’s biggest promoter of nuclear energy.

It is unclear how our national interest is served by participating in the global spread of nuclear energy with its associated risks and waste problems. Professor McKinnon, who carried out the government’s 1993 Reactor Review, agreed, stating: "There may be national advantages in not being so closely associated with IAEA stances."

The serious accident in September 1999 at Tokaimura, Japan, suggests a far more sensible ‘national interest’ for Australia might be to encourage regional countries to adopt safer non-reactor technologies.

(Note that on page 38 of the 1998-99 Annual Report, ANSTO boasts a 14 year collaboration with Tokaimura on the management of waste!)

These ought to be vital matters for Parliamentary, and public, discussion.

A culture of secrecy

ANSTO’s operations are shrouded in secrecy. Some of the issues of concern include the following:

• the Federal Government claims to have evaluated alternative sites but refuses to release the site selection study report, claiminig it is "Cabinet in confidence".
• ANSTO has refused to release copies of the spent fuel reprocessing contracts between ANSTO and the French nuclear agency Cogema to the Senate Economic References Committee, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, and the Sutherland Shire Council.
• progress on a Community Right to Know Charter has been stalled. In 1998, ANSTO rejected a Charter put forward by the local community group involved in these negotiations. More recently, the Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, has refused to facilitate the introduction of a Charter despite his agreement that the establishment of a Charter should be a "high priority" before the reactor is built.
• several accidents took place at ANSTO's Lucas Heights plant in February 1999 with one worker taking contamination home. Local residents and schools were not informed, nor was the NSW Health Department, nor was the Sutherland Shire Council. The information only came to light when released by a concerned ANSTO employee. One accident involved a spent fuel rod falling from its container, where it remained for a period of months. Four ANSTO staff members were exposed to radiation. On two other occasions, radiation releases above routine levels required closure of ANSTO's radioisotope processing plant. Discussing one of these accidents, an ANSTO employee said, "ANSTO have covered this incident up and have not even told the staff that this incident occurred. Many staff believe that a site emergency should have been declared." ANSTO management claims that the radiation releases posed no environmental or health risk. Who is to be believed? The February accidents require detailed investigation. A Royal Commission will also have the power to determine if there have been other accidents and other cover-ups.

Radioactive waste - where is the promised solution?

A major increase in radioactive waste production is projected by ANSTO if a new reactor is built. In the words of a senior bureaucrat quoted on ABC radio, waste management is "an issue for another generation", "someone else can worry about it".

Of particular concern is the government's failure to develop a strategy to manage spent fuel from the Lucas Heights reactors.

ANSTO plans to send most of its spent fuel for reprocessing in Europe by the French nuclear agency Cogema. But where will the long-lived intermediate-level wastes arising from reprocessing spent fuel be stored when returned to Australia?

In 1997, the Commonwealth/State Consultative Committee on the Management of Radioactive Waste decided that "co-location" of an interim, above-ground store for long-lived intermediate-level wastes with the planned underground dump for low-level waste "should be considered as a first siting option." The Government plans to establish a low-level dump in South Australia. ANSTO said in the Draft EIS in 1998 that it is "expected" that long-lived intermediate-level wastes will be stored adjacent to the proposed nuclear dump in South Australia.

However, South Australian Premier John Olsen said in state parliament on November 19 that while the SA Government supports a low-level dump: "the storage of long-lived intermediate-level waste, such as reprocessed fuel rods from Lucas Heights, is an entirely separate issue. ... I wish to make it very clear that I am opposed to medium- to high-level radioactive waste being dumped in South Australia."

Will the Government attempt to co-locate a store with the dump in the face of opposition from the South Australian Government? Will any other State or Territory Government accept spent fuel wastes originating at the Lucas Heights reactor plant? Or is ANSTO's Lucas Heights site destined to remain a de factor nuclear dump?

No progress whatsoever has been made towards establishing a deep underground dump for long-lived intermediate-level wastes. The Government and ANSTO claim that the volume of existing long-lived intermediate-level wastes is insufficient to warrant construction of a deep underground dump. What volume would justify a deep geological dump? The Department of Industry, Science and Resources says that no decision has been made on what "magical volume" would trigger moves to establish a deep underground dump. Will the deep geological dump be sited in South Australia? What are the environmental and public health implications?

With so many waste management issues unresolved, it is irresponsible for the government and ANSTO to proceed with a plan for a new reactor which will generate another 1500-2000 spent fuel rods and which will also result in a 12-fold increase in the production of intermediate-level liquid wastes and a four-fold increase in other wastes according to ANSTO documents.

These ad hoc, politically-expedient waste management plans fly in the face of the 1993 Research Reactor Review's statement: "A crucial issue is final disposal of high-level wastes, which depends upon identification of a site and investigation of its characteristics. A solution to this problem is essential and necessary well prior to any future decision about a new reactor. ... It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site."

Nuclear waste is just one issue that needs to be tested by public debate - a debate which cannot occur in the present atmosphere of secrecy and deception.

For the above reasons we call upon the federal government to establish a Royal Commission to independently investigate the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor proposal with the aim of returning public confidence and trust, encouraging informed public debate, and making possible Parliamentary oversight of the proposed project.