There have been at least three fatal nuclear research reactor accidents:

• Yugoslavia (Boris Kidric Institute) - 1958 - research reactor overheated - six scientists were irradiated and transported to France for treatment, with one death. (Vallentine, 1992.)
• USA (Idaho) - 3 January 1961 - a power surge accident occurred at the 3 MW research reactor (SL1) - three operators were killed. (see below)
• Argentina - 1983 - accident during refuelling of a critical assembly reactor - one death. (Research Reactor Review, 1993, p.13)

The Research Reactor Review (p.13) referred to a 1980 report by the US Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) which listed nine serious accidents involving prototype power reactors or experimental reactors, and a further three involving multipurpose research reactors (Bertini et al., 1980). The multipurpose research reactor accidents were two accidents involving Canadian research reactors (discussed below), and a fuel element melting at the ORR reactor at the ORNL in 1963. None of these three accidents resulted in immediate deaths but the longer-term effects are disputed. The Research Reactor Review (p.13) went on to say that there has been only one further report of a research reactor accident since 1963 - the above-mentioned fatal accident in Argentina in 1983.

ANSTO (RRR Submission) claims that: "Excluding experimental and prototype reactors, only four accidents designated as serious have occurred in multi-purpose research reactors. No off-site consequences were identified in any of the four cases."

This discussion is somewhat complicated by semantics. ANSTO claims that there has never been a fatal research reactor accident (part of its broader lie that no research reactor has ever adversely impacted its community). ANSTO's argument rests on a sharp distinction between research reactors and test/training/prototype reactors. But ANSTO (1993) is itself on record defining research reactors as encompassing a range of facilities from subcritical assemblies to prototype power reactors.

The argument was put to the RRR that accidents are more common in multipurpose research reactors than in power reactors because there are more frequent start-ups, shut-downs, fuel and rig movements, and more opportunities for human error. These arguments were drawn from industry literature and so could not easily be refuted. On the other hand there is no dispute that, in general, accidents involving power reactors pose a far greater risk to the general public because of the far greater volumes of fissile material used to fuel power reactors. (RRR, 1993, p.228.)

CANADIAN ACCIDENTS

Two accidents in Canadian reactors warrant mention. The National Research X-perimental (NRX) reactor was built in 1947. It was essentially a pilot factory for the production of plutonium, which was supplied to the US until 1963. NRX was involved in an accident in 1952. A power excursion destroyed the core of the reactor, causing some fuel melting. The core of the reactor was buried as waste. Hundreds of US and Canadian servicemen were ordered to participate in the clean-up. (Edwards, n.d.) According to ANSTO (1993B, pp.3.16-3.17), the accident led to a significant release of radioactivity, but there were no reported injuries. Given the acknowledgment that there was a significant release of radioactivity, ANSTO's claim that "no off-site consequences were identified" should by no means be taken as meaning that there were no off-site consequences.

The Canadian National Research Universal (NRU) reactor first went critical in late 1957. In 1958 there was a fire in the reactor which badly contaminated the inside of the reactor building with some release of radioactivity outside the building. (ANSTO, 1993B, pp.3.16-3.17.) Several fuel rods overheated and ruptured, one catching fire. The ventilation system was jammed in the open position, thus allowing the spread of radioactivity down-wind from the reactor site. The burning fuel rod was extinguished by a relay team of scientists and technicians running past the maintenance pit and dumping buckets of wet sand on it. Over 600 men were involved in the clean-up. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) claims that very few men were exposed to radiation doses exceeding the then permissible levels. It also claims that no adverse health effects were caused by the exposures received. The methodology for this second conclusion appears to have been the ostrich technique: no follow-up studies were carried out, the men involved in the clean-up were told to observe strict secrecy about the operation, claims that adverse health effects were linked to the clean-up were vigorously denied, and AECL has refused to supply information that would assist in the location of men involved in the clean-up and thus facilitate follow-up studies. (Edwards, n.d.)

REFERENCES

ANSTO, 1993, Submission to the Research Reactor Review, Attachment A, Working Paper 3, p.3-2.

ANSTO, 1993B, Submission to the Research Reactor Review, Attachment A: "Research Reactors: Local and International Experience", Working Paper 3: "International Experience with Research Reactors".

Bertini, H.W., et al., 1980, "Descriptions of selected accidents that have occurred at nuclear reactor facilities" Springfield: NTIS.

Edwards, Gordon, (Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility), n.d., Reactor Accidents at Chalk River: The Human Fallout, <http://www.ccnr.org/paulson_legacy.html>

Research Reactor Review, 1993, Future Reaction: Report of the Research Reactor Review, Sydney: Wentworth Press.

Vallentine, Jo, 1992, Let the Facts Speak: An Indictment of the Nuclear Industry, Perth: Office of Jo Vallentine, Senator for the Greens (WA).

Dr. Greg Storr from ANSTO describes this fatal research reactor accident, which happened on January 2 or 3, 1961:

"Three operators died. It was a research sized reactor. It was caused by what was called a reactivity excursion. It was caused by one of the operators deliberately withdrawing one of the control rods - that is one of the pieces of material which controls the neutron reaction - and that action sent the reactor to what they call superprompt critical. When it went superprompt critical, there was a large increase in the temperature in the reactor core, the water boiled and it caused a water hammer effect which accelerated the slug of water above the core up in to the pressure vessel. The pressure vessel broke and it accelerated up and hit the roof, pinning one of the operators to the roof. The two other operators died later from radiation exposure. That is the SL-1 accident. It was in the 1960s in Idaho." (Senate Select Committee for an Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, public hearing, 25 October 2000, Cronulla.)

Daniel Hirsch, a US nuclear expert, says: "A worker had been told not to pull a control rod out more than 14 inches. No-one told him why. The reactor was down. They were doing maintenance. It had a habit of sticking. He pulled it up 18 inches. The reactor went supercritical. The fuel melted, then vaporised. There was a steam explosion that lifted the nine-tonne reactor vessel nine feet in the air. It impaled him on the roof on the control rod when it came down, and the three workers were killed from intense radiation fields." (Senate Select Committee for an Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, public hearing, 30 October 2000, Canberra.)

According to John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, three weeks after the SL-1 accident, the hands and heads of the three victims were still so radioactive that they had to be severed from their bodies and buried separately as radioactive waste. (John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, "Spin Doctor Strangelove, or How We Learned to Love the Bomb", PR Watch, Vol.2(4), 1995.)

Lots more on SL-1 at <www.ans.neep.wisc.edu/~ans/point_source/AEI/jul96/AEI_Jul96.html#highlight>

According to a 22/9/98 press release from the US Department of Energy (DOE), titled "Energy Department Investigation Finds INEEL Fatal Accident Was Avoidable":
- an accident took place on July 28, 1998, which involved the accidental release of carbon dioxide, a toxic and potentially lethal fire retardant, during maintenance operations at the Experimental Test Reactor Building, a non-defense facility, at the DOE's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
- the accident caused "one death and several life-threatening injuries"
- the DOE's investigation determined "that numerous deficiencies in areas such as safety requirements, system design, emergency preparedness and management systems contributed to the accident."

The DOE press release says:

"The board found many serious deficiencies that contributed to the accident in the following five areas, including:
* Inadequate work planning and control - There were failures to analyze, communicate andappropriately control the hazard. Procedures that would have prevented inadvertent operation of the carbon dioxide system were not followed.
* System design was deficient and not in accordance with code - A monitoring circuit that would ensure a pre-discharge alarm and a shutoff valve for the carbon dioxide system were not installed.
* Inadequate worker safety controls and emergency preparedness for accidental carbon dioxide discharge - There was a failure to ensure that the carbon dioxide system was shutdown. Clear exit pathways, breathing apparatus, training and oxygen supplies were not provided to ensure safe escape or immediate rescue in the event of an emergency.
* Failure to institutionalize safety requirements - Applicable industry safety requirements were not implemented or institutionalized through safety policies, procedures or training.
* Inadequate management systems - Corrective actions to previous accidents and investigations were inadequate. Safety infrastructure was reduced in an effort to save money and there was a failure to ensure an integrated, disciplined and consistent approach to the control of work and hazards."

TOKYO, May 23 — An experimental nuclear reactor in northwestern Japan has been leaking radioactive material since January, but the fault has had no impact on the environment, local officials said on Wednesday.

The small leak of tritium had been detected at the facility operated by the government-funded Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute in Fukui prefecture, about 300 km (185 miles) northwest of Tokyo, officials said.

"A small leak tritium is natural. But this leak was slightly over the normal amount," a Fukui prefectural government official said.  "But there is absolutely no impact on the surrounding environment because the leakage was so small."
The operator has temporarily stopped the facility and inspections will be conducted this week, the official said.  "We know where it leaked from but not why," he said.

The facility has been operating since 1979 and is used for development of new fuel and research for plutonium usage.

A string of nuclear accidents in recent years has eroded public faith in Japan's nuclear industry. In the country's worst nuclear accident, two workers were killed at a uranium processing plant in 1999 when staff used a bucket to mistakenly load nearly eight times the safe amount of condensed uranium into a mixing tank, triggering a self-sustaining nuclear reaction that took 20 hours to bring under control.

Information about a leak in the coolant system of the Norwegian research reactor at Kjeller (near Oslo) which occurred in April 1992 has only recently come to light.

(386.3787) WISE-Amsterdam Norwegian authorities say they had not released the information because they didn't want to "frighten the public". During the accident half a litre of heavy water seeped away. It occurred while the research reactor was shut off.

Although the Norwegian authorities often protest against the UK reprocessing-plant at Dounreay and transports of nuclear material, they are directly responsible for some of them. Last year, for instance, Norway licensed a transport by sea (in a 'normal' freighter) of 36 fuel pins containing low-enriched uranium from Dounreay to Halden in Norway. Environmentalists called it hypocritical. Authorities, however, claim that these transports are not a danger for the environment even if an accident were to occur, but that large shipments of plutonium are. Environmental activist Björn Bore, spokesperson for Natur og Ungdom (Nature and Environment) reacted: "Radioactivity is radioactivity. Whether it comes from a nuclear power plant, a plutonium factory or a research reactor".

Kjeller is one of two research reactors in Norway. Both are state-operated facilities, mostly used for lucrative research contracts with, for example, Finland, Sweden, Japan, Germany and the US. The facilities were established in the '50s at a time when Norway thought nuclear power would be the source for the future. Halden, its other reactor, was established in cooperation with Holland.

The radioactive waste from both facilities is stored at a concrete bunker at Halden. At the beginning of 1991, a government-appointed committee recommended that Norway's low- and medium-level waste be stored in the unused Killingdal mines. But the plan was met with strong protest from the local population. The district council had previously voted unanimously against accepting the facility.

In an earlier accident at the Kjeller facility, on 2 September 1982, a 62-year old scientist was severely contaminated. He had walked into a "radiation-room", due to a combination of technical and human errors. The radiation destroyed his white blood cells and caused major chromosome damage. His bone marrow stopped producing new white blood cells, despite major blood transfusions. Two weeks later, on 16 September, he died.

Sources:
* Die Tageszeitung (FRG) 20 Jan. 1993
* Trouw (NL), 17 Sept. 1982
* NENIG Briefing, Aug/Sept 1992
* Power In Europe (UK), 14 March '91

Contact: Naturog Ungdom, Torggata 34, 0183 Oslo 1, Norway; tel: +47-2-36 42 18; fax: +47-2-20 45 94.

Criticality Safety Information Resource Center: http://www.csirc.net
See especially: http://www.csirc.net/10_Library/00_Reports/13638/index.html