ith a know-it-all smirk broader than Oswald’s, the late Belin was the biggest whipping boy critics had prior to Gerald Posner. Though dedicated and sincere in his arguments, Belin clearly lacked Posner’s engaging style, and failed to reach a broad audience. Belin’s work on the Commission, two books on the subject (November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury was published in 1973) and a few articles are all that remain.

In Final Disclosure, Belin fails to contain his animosity, which runs through the book, at times tiring while at other times intriguingly spicy. Belin condemns the conspiracy critics (rather, the published authors) for operating an “assassination scam.” But later, in the 100 pages devoted to his work on the Rockefeller Commission, Belin acknowledges that the only “scam” involving actual assassination came from the CIA.

Final Disclosure begins with an overview of the assassination, in which Belin gives credence to Howard Brennan’s observations and latter justification for not immediately identifying Oswald. Others who saw a gunman or rifle in same window include Amos Lee Euins and Dallas Times-Herald photographer Robert Jackson.

At 12:36, police begin sealing off the Depository, where evidence is soon found on the sixth floor. Lt. J.C. Day photographed the rifle, noted the serial number and scratched his name on the stock. Without picking up the rifle, Boone speculated it looked like a Mauser. Oswald’s palmprint is found on the inner surface of the rifle, and a print ties him to the paper bag used to sneak the rifle into the building. Workmen Norman, Williams and Jarman heard cartridge cases hitting floor above them.

Along with Joseph A. Ball, Belin investigated the WC’s Area II: Identity of Assassin. Belin reassures the reader: “Assassination sensationalists…pick and choose a few strands here, a few strands there, and make a seemingly convincing story—particularly since their evidence is ignorant of the mass of evidence.”

As an example, Belin shows the hold taken by Epstein’s claim that JFK spoke after the first shot. Whereas Epstein cites only Kellerman, Belin counters the claim with Greer, Nellie and Jackie. But in the end, Anson adopts the Epstein claim. “This pattern of half-truths,” writes Belin, “…started with the biggest money-maker of all, Mark Lane.” Coming from the likes of Belin, the charge of being overpaid for dubious work reads like magisterial miscarriage.

In his acknowledgements, Belin notes his manuscript wasn’t reviewed by assassination experts, and some errors crop up. “Flanking the rear of the presidential car were two motorcycle policemen” (there were four); Frazier’s “mother” saw Oswald on the 22nd (it was his sister); “negative of the picture was found as was Oswald’s camera” (neg of CE399 not found); and “Robert Grodin” is better known as Robert Groden.

Belin’s errors, however, have no impact on his central thesis that Oswald acted alone in the assassination of JFK and Officer Tippit, whose murder Belin terms the “Rosetta Stone” of the case. Well, why else would Oswald kill Tippit if he had nothing to do with the assassination? Belin notes Domingo Benavides witnessed the murder and called it in on the police radio. Scoggins identified Oswald at a line-up, as did Callaway, Guinyard, and sisters-in-law Barbara and Virginia Davis. Callaway took Tippit’s gun and, in Scoggins’ cab, tried to find the gunman.

Belin discloses that Lane and Hurt call Helen Markham a “star witness” while downplaying the other witnesses. Anson and Summers mention Scoggins, but omit his trip to the lineup; the two omit altogether the Davises, Callaway and Guinyard. David Scheim is faulted for ignoring Scoggins, Callaway, the Davises and the cartridge evidence.

“Omission of available evidence,” Belin charges, “is the besetting sin of the assassination sensationalists’ books.” (Note: Then, as now, Republican ultra-cons take comfort in dividing the world into convenient all-encompassing labels).

Belin notes Anson (a “purveyor of distorted information”) infuses Oswald’s arrest with some mystery: “a man sitting near the front spoke up” to ID Os, as Johnny Calvin Brewer “could not pick out the man.” The truth is that Brewer did, but only after the lights were turned on. Sylvia Meagher employs the same dipsy-doodle, never acknowledging that Officer MacDonald found out the “man sitting near the front” was Brewer standing. Lane, Belin reveals, “refuses to acknowledge Brewer’s existence in his book or film.”

Belin argues “irrefutable ballistic evidence proved that the cartridge cases found at the Tippit murder scene…came from the revolver that Oswald pulled out in the Texas Theatre.” O’Toole contends “the spent shells seemed to have been put deliberately where they could be found after a brief search.” But, Belin counters, Benavides saw Oswald himself toss the cases away. “The most vivid demonstration of how…sensationalists attempt to rewrite history,” concludes Belin, “involves the murder of Tippit.”

In the Ruby chapter, Belin relates the insights of Dallas Rabbi Hillel Silverman, collaborating a WC conclusion that a newspaper article contending Jackie might have to return to Dallas for Oswald’s trial motivated Ruby. When Ruby reached the site, he thought Oswald was already transferred; but his departure was delayed by the unforeseen attendance of Postal Inspector Holmes at the last interrogation. At Belin’s request, Silverman persuaded Ruby to seek a lie detector test, taken in July of 1964. The polygraph supported Ruby’s denial of conspiracy.

The chapter titled “Mistakes Inside the Warren Commission” is really a litany of regrets. “Perhaps the biggest blunder,” charges Belin, “was to yield to the desires of the Kennedy family” (not to enter the autopsy photos and X-rays as exhibits). Belin hoped “various false theories…could have been demolished” if the autopsy images were shown; in years to come, they were, but theories continued.

Belin viewed the autopsy images when he served as executive director of the Rockefeller Commission. “Conclusions of the autopsy physicians…supported by every panel of physicians that has examined the materials since then.” Well, it’s true that the salient facts were upheld, but the panels took issue with several minor issues (the HSCA also criticized the autopsy’s procedure).

Belin thought results might have been better had Warren allowed Hubert and Griffin (counsel assigned to Ruby aspect of WC investigation) to participate in Ruby’s interrogation. Marina was questioned by Rankin, rather than the two lawyers assigned to Oswald’s background or the two assigned to possible conspiracy. Belin urged a “two-volume report that included the bedrock of testimony and evidence.” Belin concedes the “commissioners were politically oriented…not devoid of government influence.”

The chapter “Trying to Prove Conspiracy” relates Belin himself once thought he had found evidence of two gunmen in the Zapruder film, based on the nearness of the Connally hit to JFK’s neck wound. Ultimately, the Single-Bullet Theory “was developed by a brilliant commission lawyer, Arlen Spector.”

Belin argues Connally “was in a position from frame 207 to frame 225 to receive a bullet that would have caused the wounds he suffered.” This would seem to counter the critics who purport WC defenders eagerly adopted the HSCA first-hit scenario at approx. Z190. Here’s Belin arguing, as he has since 1964, for the Z207-225 span.

Belin notes “the limousine was moving directly away from the line of fire,” describing a line shot with minimal panning rather than a more difficult cross-shot. If caused by a pristine bullet, Belin argues Connally’s “wrist would have been shattered.” The wrist showed fractures with all bone present, unlike a direct strike at full velocity that would have taken large pieces of bone with it.

Belin writes he “personally reconstructed the time sequences” of Oswald’s flight from the Depository, finding Oswald’s movements “feasible.” For first time, Oswald made a visit to Irving on a Thursday, and for first time, did not take lunch to work. His clipboard was found ten days after the assassination; its orders dated 22nd were unfilled.

Belin speculates on the ramifications of certain decisions. Bad reference denied Oswald a job at Padgett Printing, blocks from the parade route. Ruth Paine heard of possible work at Depository during lunch with neighbors. After demand for schoolbooks fell, Truly kept men on by having a new plywood floor laid; cartons were temporarily disarranged.

Marina pretended to be angry with Lee on the 21st, refusing his attempts at reconciliation; next morning, he quietly left wedding ring and $170. behind. If Jackson has alerted police to rifle seen in window, Oswald might have been sealed inside, thus saving Tippit. Curry’s promise to the media forfeited a secret transfer of Lee to the county jail.

Some 100 pages of the book concern the CIA and Belin’s role as executive director of the Rockefeller Commission. Following a 1974 Seymour Hersh story on improper CIA domestic ops, Pres. Ford appointed the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, with Vice-President Rockefeller as chairman.

Belin was given the summary of a 693-page report resulting from an internal investigation done by the CIA in 1973. Belin thus learned of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders during peacetime, an area he assumed responsibility for investigating. Belin justified it a part of the Rockefeller Commission’s mandate since “a group within the CIA had conspired [with organized crime] within the United States.” Belin determined that CIA director Allen Dulles in 1960 approved a plan to poison Castro. Hoover briefed RFK in May 1961 as did a CIA official in May 1962. As plot evolved, crime figures Maheu, Rosselli and Giancana brought in.

Phase II plans began when CIA case officer William K. Harvey discussed with Richard Bissell (deputy director for plans) a request from the White House to develop an “executive action capability.” A “Special Group” (including RFK) authorized ops directed at Castro’s demise. Richard Helms (the new deputy director for plans) and Harvey did not brief new CIA director McCone (he learned about it from Belin in 1975). Hiding the facts from McCone signified “an agency out of control.”

Special Group members McNamara, Lansdale, Bundy and Taylor deny to Belin they knew of authorized plots, but 1962 memorandum says they did. Belin claims the “highest officials in the Kennedy administration were intimately involved in the discussions of CIA plots to assassinate Fidel Castro,” including RFK and possibly President Kennedy.

The Phase III plans were born of frustration, leading to some wild, imaginative schemes. One high-ranking Cuban official opposed to Castro (known as AM/LASH) met in Europe with Harvey’s replacement, Desmond Fitzgerald. On the day of JFK’s assassination, AM/LASH was offered a poison pen, but the Cuban instead requested a cache of weapons, which were later placed into Cuba. Contact with AM/LASH broke off in late 1964; in March 1966, a Cuban official was arrested and “confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sights from the CIA” for use on Castro.

Belin determined that Director Helms lied to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the CIA was not involved in plots to kill Castro. The denial concluded years later; chairman Rockefeller (at request of Henry Kissinger) demanded the chapter on assassination plots be deleted from the report. Outraged, Belin turned his investigation over to the Senate Select Committee. However, the Rockefeller Report led to the 1976 executive order that included more accountability and the “prohibition of assassination” by federal agencies.

Belin claims the CIA, FBI and Dept. of Justice withheld from the WC that plans were being implemented against Castro, and that Castro was likely aware of the source of those plans. Belin laments the revelations would have been “relevant to the investigation of the Warren Commission” and, at the time, publicly requested Congress reopen the assassination inquiry.

Under Senior Counsel Robert B. Olsen, the Rockefeller Commission also investigated CIA involvement in the Kennedy assassination. During a meeting with Olsen and Belin, Robert Groden presented his work showing “assassins” captured in Zapruder frames 413 and 454-78. The book argues it would have been impossible for a head and rifle to appear for just a frame, much less be wearing an “army-type helmet.”

Analysis by FBI photo expert Lyndal Shaneyfelt demonstrated the “sheer illogic of Grodin’s [sic] assertions.” The so-called “assassin” was not hidden in heavy bushes, but in the open beyond a small tree between the head and Zapruder. The “assassin” at Z454-78 was “clump-type shrubbery.”

Olsen assembled experts to review autopsy materials at the National Archives; that panel concluded the materials showed no evidence of shots from the front.

Belin asserts Time Inc. returned the Zapruder film to his heirs because it was a “hot potato.” He is critical of the company for not donating the film to the National Archives. (Note: Time never purchased the actual film, just certain exclusive rights. In returning marketing rights to the family, Time retained rights for its own use. By agreement, the original film remains in protective storage at the National Archives.)

Belin claims erroneously that Dan Rather was the first to contact Zapruder, expediting the film’s processing. Belin and Rather seems to have developed a cordial friendship over the years, with Belin appearing on several CBS productions. Belin reveals he proposed in the 1970s a film project to PBS to interview witnesses while they were still alive. Though rejected, the notion was undertaken with phenomenal results by Nigel Turner in 1988 and Frontline/BBC in 1993.

The end-potion of the book deals with the HSCA, its “flip-flop,” Oswald’s motivation, and faults of the committee process. The HSCA’s acoustics findings supported the “conspiracy bias of Blakey and his subordinates” who got Committee majority to accept fourth shot.

Belin argues the Ramsey Panel disproved the HSCA acoustic experts. Steve Barber discovered “that portion of the tape analyzed for gunshots contained words spoken a minute after the assassination.” Belin is on-point with view that secrecy and over-reliance of committee staff led the HSCA astray.

Belin contends the “real question” is not who killed Kennedy—but why Oswald killed him.

Belin accepts notion that Oswald’s wrist-slash was “an apparent suicide attempt” (note: it was timed so he could be found in time). Belin contends Oswald missed Walker because Walker moved (note: shot deflected after striking window sash). Dismissed are notions that Oswald was a CIA agent or that the agency was “directly involved” with the assassination. Belin speculates that Castro’s threat of retaliation in Sept. 1963 gave Oswald the idea that he could be a hero to Cubans if he killed Kennedy.

Belin goes into a unique idea he developed for the WC but rejected. Because Oswald asked for a transfer when he left the bus, it could mean he was headed for a transfer point when stopped by Tippit. “It is likely,” contends Belin, “Oswald was fleeing to Mexico City.” In the Marines, Oswald told Nelson Delgado that, if the need should arise, he would escape to Mexico and from there to Russia via Cuba. From the bus boarding point at Jefferson and Marsalis, the southbound bus left Dallas at 3:15, stopping at Lisbon (reachable by transfer on Oswald). Belin offers the possibility that Oswald would meet a “Castro agent” in Mexico City who offered “financial and other support.”

Belin suggests the WCR rejected by public “because all our investigative work was undertaken in secret,” a process compounded by the withholding of the autopsy images (only Earl Warren saw the images). Commission member McCloy believes academics took “doctrinaire approach” by endorsing the likes of Mark lane as “courageous independent investigators.” It became “illiberal” to believe the WCR.

Belin contends that “when the press investigates, it makes a difference. Watergate is proof of that.” (Note: There were major TV investigations by CBS in 1967 and 1975, and by PBS in 1988.) Belin claims he “had more firsthand, direct contact with the key witnesses to those two murders and with the physical evidence than anyone else in the world.” Be that as it may, Belin lacked what the successful critics had: the knack for getting a viewpoint, however lacking in fact, out to a broad audience.

The rise of accessible media has seen most folks go from doing primary research to trusting a “talking head’s” interpretation. Fox News Network no longer has a grasp on reality; it’s wildly-popular in the US because most Americans are comfortable with its “spin.” Same with the conspiracy authors.

Final Disclosure ends with an Appendix titled “Anatomy of the Cover-up Technique of Assassination Sensationalists.” It’s mostly a critique of David Scheim’s Contract on America, a book on organized crime and Jack Ruby. Belin tellingly reveals how Scheim takes Ruby’s testimony out of context; in its full glory, Ruby comes off as a madman.

Was the madness infectious? At one point, Sparrow quotes Wilde’s take on Hamlet: “Are the critics mad, or they pretending to be mad?“