Hood drove these forward elements rapidly back, giving chase with the two divisions on hand, but at Culp's Farm the pursuers came unexpectedly upon the enemy main body, stoutly intrenched, and were bloodily repulsed. A second assault, launched near sundown, only added to the carnage. Then at nightfall, while the graybacks dug in too along the line where the fighting stopped, Schofield and Hood sent word to their superiors at Big Shanty and Marietta of what had happened. (Foote 393)

Altogether the Confederates suffered about 1,500 casualties whereas the Federals lost no more than 250 men. Understandably, Hood did not so much as mention the fighting at Kolb's Farm in his memoirs. (Castel 27-28, nps)

But if Hood failed in his attempt to smash Sherman's right, the presence of the corps south of Kennesaw frustrated Sherman's attempt to get around Johnston's left. And Sherman already was feeling very frustrated. A month now had passed since he crossed the Etowah expecting to reach and perhaps pass over the Chattahoochee in a few days. Yet he still had not achieved that goal and there seemed to be no immediate prospect that he would. (Castel 28)

Johnston's anger at this loss of a thousand badly needed veterans, once more as a result of Hood's impetuosity, was exceeded by Sherman's when he received an out-of-channels dispatch that evening from Hooker, proudly reporting that he had "repulsed two heavy attacks" and calling urgently for reinforcements before he was overrun. "Three entire corps are in front of us," he added by way of lending weight to his proud cry for help. (Foote 393)

"Hooker must be mistaken; Johnston's army has only three corps," Sherman noted in passing the message along to Thomas, who, knowing only too well that Hardee and Loring were still in position to his and McPherson's front, replied rather mildly: "I look upon this as something of a stampede." (Foote 393)

Sherman agreed and next morning, still miffed, rode down to Culp's (Kolb's) Farm in a pouring rain to tell Fighting Joe he wanted no more of his boasts and misrepresentations. In reaction, Hooker went into a month-long pout; or, as his superior later put it, "From that time he began to sulk." (Foote 393)

Confronted thus with the probability of a stalemate--which was not only undesirable on its own account, here in Georgia, but might also give Richmond the chance to reinforce Lee's hard-pressed Virginia army from Johnston's, biding its time north of the Chattahoochee--Sherman reverted to his notion, expressed a week ago, "to feign on both flanks and assault the center."

The trouble was that the center now was Kennesaw Mountain, and Kennesaw seemed unassailable. But there, perhaps, was just the factor that might augur best; an attacker would greatly increase his chance for success by striking where the blow was least expected. Besides, continued probes by McPherson today showed that Loring's corps had been extended eastward to include a portion of the works abandoned yesterday by Hood when he set out westward to counter Schofield's flanking threat. That march, with its extension of the Confederate left while Loring spread out to cover the right, stretched Johnston's line to a width of about eight miles, exclusive of the cavalry on his flanks. It must be quite thin somewhere, and that somewhere was likely to be dead ahead on Kennesaw, whose frown alone was enough to discourage assault.

So Sherman reasoned, at any rate, in his search for some way to avoid a stalemate. Moreover, he explained afterwards, he conferred with his three army commanders, "and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to attack 'fortified lines,' a thing carefully avoided up to that time." (Foote 394)

Such a change in tactics, abruptly sprung, would also serve to increase the element of surprise, which figured largely in Sherman's calculations. But the outlook remained grim, if not downright awesome. "The whole country is one vast fort," he informed Halleck on June 23. "Johnston must have full fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. Our lines are now in close contact and the fighting incessant, with a good deal of artillery. As fast as we gain one position, the enemy has another all ready." (Foote 394)