The_Evidential_Arugment_From_Evil

The Evidential Argument From Evil Part 2

The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition
By William P Alston

In this article, Alston attempts to discredit William Rowe�s idea that an omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good being could not exist. Alston starts out by laying out the argument that Rowe uses.

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good being.

The first thing that Alston does is clarify statement 1, calling any case of intense suffering gratuitous suffering. For purposes of notation, gratuitous suffering is represented as E. For purposes of clarification Alston also refers to one who believes this inductive argument from evil as the critic.

Now that Alston has laid out Rowe�s argument, he presents his argument against it. Alston does this by trying to show us that we don�t have to necessarily accept Rowe�s argument. Furthermore, if we truly look at Rowe�s argument we find that it really doesn�t measure up.

One might ask how Alston shows this. Alston takes two specific cases that Rowe offers. The first of these two cases involves Rowe�s deer dying in a forest (henceforth called Bambi). The second is a case in which a young girl is brutally beaten, raped, and murdered (henceforth referred to as �Sue�). The focus of Alston�s argument lies around the premise that we are not in a position to judge God�s actions. Specifically, there are six requirements that we fail to meet.

1. Lack of Data- this includes, inter alia, the secrets of the human heart, the detailed constitution and structure of the universe, and the remote past and future, including the afterlife if any.
2. Complexity greater than we can handle- most notably there is the difficulty of holding enormous complexes of fact-different possible worlds or different systems of natural law-together in the mind sufficiently for comparative evaluation.
3. Difficulty of determining what is metaphysically possible or necessary- once we move beyond conceptual or semantic modalities (and even that is no piece of cake) it is notoriously difficult to find any sufficient basis for claims as to what is metaphysically possible, given the essential natures of things, the exact character of which is often obscure to us and virtually always controversial. This difficulty is many times multiplied when we are dealing with total possible worlds or total systems of natural orders.
4. Ignorance of the full range of possibilities- This is always crippling when we are trying to establish negative conclusions. If we don�t know whether or not there are possibilities beyond the ones we have though of, we are in a very bad position to show that there can be no divine reasons for permitting evil.
5. Ignorance of a full range of values- When it�s a question of whether some good is related to E in such a way as to justify God in permitting E, we are, for the reason mentioned in 4, in a very poor position to answer the question if we don�t know the extent to which there are modes of value beyond those of which we are aware. For in that case, so far as we can know, E may be justified by virtue of its relation to one of those unknown goods.
6. Limits to our capacity to make well-considered value judgments- the chief example of this we have noted is the difficulty in making comparative evaluations of large complex wholes.

To begin with we will first look at Alston�s approach to the problem offered by the situation of Sue�s murder. With this situation Alston offers several possible situations. In essence, he argues that Sue�s situation doesn�t satisfy these 6 criteria. Specifically he offers a couple of interesting arguments. First he offers the standard free-will defense. I will discuss the intricacies of this defense later. However, Alston also offers a couple of other solutions. One is the effect Sue�s death might have on others. This is a �martyr� effect. We are not in a position to judge the effect Sue�s death has upon the person committing the crime, or any possible witnesses. How can we be sure that the death will not have some drastic, life changing effect on others? We can�t be sure, so therefore we can�t dismiss it as a possible justification. Furthermore, how can we be sure that Sue is not going to be rewarded for her suffering? Pain and suffering are finite while the reward of heaven is infinite. This outweighs the finite pain of Sue�s death. Once again we can�t dismiss this as a possible justification. All of this said we also have to deal with the situation presented to us with Bambi�s horrible death. Alston suggests that God is not in a position to interfere with Bambi�s death. Bambi�s death is the result of a natural event, a forest fire, and a �natural evil�. It is something that occurs by chance. If God were to intercede he would be directly interfering with this situation. Even God needs justification for directly interfering in Bambi�s particular case. If God did interfere in Bambi�s case the He would need justification for not interfering in other cases. This is not the real problem though. The problem lies with this. Would the amount of good gained by God directly interfering with the natural processes of the world greater than just the natural world, or would the natural world �suffer� because of God�s interference?

This brings us to a very interesting point. Can the world be less good because of God�s interference? This is especially important with the issue of free-will. Alston argues that we lose something with God�s interference. Especially with free will. After all, what is free will worth if God interferes willy-nilly? Therefore, if God was to interfere then he would have to have a system so complicated that we could never recognize it. Alston argues that even this complicated system would undermine the free-will that God gave us. Therefore, God doesn�t interfere. This is true for both natural and man-made evils. This is not because God can�t interfere, instead it is because He won�t in order to preserve the natural good with-in the system.

As most atheistic arguments lie around the premise that God should and would interfere in the actions of the world, Alston argues that he has successfully defended theism. In essence, Alston has pulled the rug out from under atheists.

Rowe�s Noseeum Arguments from Evil
By Stephen John Wykstra

In this article Wykstra attempts to deal with the evidential problem of evil as presented by William Rowe. Wykstra uses CORNEA of the �Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access�. It is with this that he criticizes what he calls Rowe�s Noseeum Argument.

Rowe�s Noseeum Argument is as follows:

Rowe believes that the theistic God would allow suffering only if doing so serves some outweighing good. But is there some such good for every instance of suffering? Rowe doesn�t think so. He sys that there is much suffering for which we see no such goods; and this, he argues, inductively justifies believing that for some sufferings there are no such goods.

This is where Wykstra steps in with CORNEA. CORNEA says that we can argue form �we see no X� to �there is no X� only when X has �reasonable seeability�. What that means is that if it exists we can reasonably expect to see it in that situation. As an example he says �looking around my garage and seeing no dog entitles me to conclude that none is present, but seeing no flea does not; and this is because fleas, unlike dogs, have low seeability. Wykstra makes the claim that, because of the disparity between a creator�s vision and ours, that we should not expect to be able to see God-purposed goods.

Wykstra had originally used CORNEA in 1984 (this current article being a response to Rowe�s initial response). In Rowe�s response to Wykstra�s original article he accepted CORNEA�s seeability test; however he argued that his argument passed this test. Rowe uses the �principle of credulity� to lay his argument out. Letting e be the fawn�s suffering key moves are:

1. We see not good for which God would allow e.
To
1.9 There appears to be no good for which God allows e.
To
2. There is no good for which god allows e.

Later Rowe formulates this as an induction. A good has J, he stipulates, just in case obtaining it would suffice to justify God in allowing the fawn�s suffering. The key inference then is:

1. All goods we see lack J
To
2. All goods there are lack J.

Rowe in essence says the same thing that he said with the first example. Rowe doesn�t need the intermediate 1.9, because this formulation makes the argument a standard inductive inference of the sort we rely upon constantly.

This is where CORNEA steps in. Wykstra sees the key to stopping Rowe�s argument is to keep him from making the move to step 1.9. He makes an analogy of a doctor looking at a used needle that appears germless and from that inferring that it doesn�t have any germs. Wykstra�s CORNEA strategy takes the form of three stages.

Stage A: Cornea says that a situation of seeing no X justifies one�s claiming �it appears there is no X� only if it is reasonable for one to believe that X is something to which we would likely have �epistemic access�. Rowe�s Noseeum situation works only if it is reasonable for Rowe to believe that a God-justifying good for the fawn�s suffering would likely be �seeable�. Wykstra calls this the �reasonable seeability requirement�. For something to pass the �reasonable seeability requirement� it need not have any evidence or inferential justification. It just can�t violate any norms of reasonable belief.

Stage B: This stage puts a limit on what can be held as a reasonable belief. It says that if someone (in this case Rowe) has been made aware of good reasons for thinking a God-justifying good would not likely be seeable, then it will not be reasonable for that person to believe it likely would be seeable-unless he defeats these reasons with other considerations. This sets forth a principle that is independent of CORNEA, but is used to check whether the �reasonable seeability requirement� of CORNEA has been met. This principle is �the Adjunct Principle�:

If someone (in this case Rowe) is made aware of good reasons to think that a God-justifying good would not likely be seeable, then conditionally(i.e., unless they defeat these with other considerations), it is not reasonable for that person to believe that they likely would be seeable.
Stage C: With this stage Wykstra finally gives us a reason to think that a God-justifying good would not likely be seeable. He claims that this because of the disparity between God�s vision and ours. He suggests that it is similar to the gap between vision of a parent and a one-month old child. Like the child, we would have a hard time figuring out our parents actions. Since Rowe doesn�t explain why we would see them, his argument fails.

In condensed form, the three stages follow:

Stage A: Rowe�s inference from 1 to 2 only works if it is reasonable for Rowe to believe that if 2 were false, his situation would likely be different than 1 says it is.

Stage B: It will (conditionally) not be reasonable for Rowe to believe the preceding proposition if Rowe has reason to think that if 2 were false, then 1 would be expectable anyway.

Stage C: Rowe does not have reason to think that if 2 were false, 1 would be expectable anyway.

The next section of Wykstra�s article deals with the type of evidence Rowe�s argument provides for atheists. He distinguishes between two types. One type is supposed to lever a person from one stage of belief to another. The other type is supposed to tilt one�s belief from favoring one stage to another. The difference lies with the amounts of effect each type of evidence has on a person. It comes down to a matter of percentages.

Next, Wykstra lays out Rowe�s response to his CORNEA critique. Rowe says that, in essence, CORNEA has two steps. The first step says that we can go from 1 to 1.9 only if the requirement is met that:

R1. We have no reason to think that if the fawn�s suffering served a God-purposed good, then things would likely strike us in pretty much the same (Noseeum) way.

Rowe then argues that the second step in CORNEA is that this first requirement has not been met. However, Rowe says that there is another strategy for CORNEA:

R2. We have reason to think that if the fawn�s suffering served some God-purposed good, then it would likely strike us differently than it does (i.e. differently from a Noseeum way).

Of these two alternatives, Rowe claims that the first is CORNEA�s strategy. However, Wykstra disagrees. He says that the burden of responsibility in CORNEA lies with Rowe. His inference only works if it is reasonable for him to believe that if the fawn�s suffering serves some God-justifying good, it would likely strike us differently. Of the two strategies that Rowe presents Wykstra argues that the second one is closer to the truth.

Rowe sees CORNEA as being a �defeater� strategy for his Noseeum evidence. He distinguishes between two types of �defeaters�. �Rebutting defeaters� offer new evidence that outweighs your original evidence. �Undercutting defeaters� offers evidence that does not directly change your decision but instead makes it no longer reasonable to believe your original belief. Of these two types Rowe believes that CORNEA falls under the classification of �Undercutting defeater�. Wykstra agrees with Rowe on this. However, he disagrees with Rowe as to its impact on Rowe�s argument. Rowe feels that his inductive argument needs no further information to probe it because it is reasonable by itself. He also says that any method of defeating an inductive argument has to bring new evidence and try to just undercut the original evidence. This means it would have to be a �rebutting defeater�. Since CORNEA is an �undercutting defeater� it fails to disprove Rowe�s argument. This is where Wykstra disagrees with Rowe. He says that Rowe�s argument DOES need something extra. This extra this is:

�it must be reasonable for Rowe to believe the further proposition that if some good did have J (J being something that would justify God allowing evil to exist), then we likely would see it.�

Because Rowe�s argument does need something extra, it opens itself to �undercutting defeaters� like CORNEA.

In the last part of the article Wykstra talks about the differences between deep and shallow universes. Shallow universes are universes in which observable events are rooted in goods that are �close to the surface�. So when something happens we can almost always see the good it serves. Deep universes are just the opposite. Wykstra makes this distinction because next he claims that if God created our universe, then it is expectable that it is deep. Therefore, many of the God-purposed goods would be beyond observation. Rowe is not finished yet though. He next attacks Wykstra by arguing that Wykstra must defeat his argument by giving a reason that his Noseeum evidence is expectable relative to the claim of Core Theism alone (Core Theism being �the view that O exists, unaccompanied by other, independent religious claims-from expanded versions of theism, which ass to Core Theism further specific claims-about, for example, and afterlife, end times, salvation, and so on�). Rowe argues that Wykstra�s deep universe claim is based upon Core Theism. He questions this, asking why would God create a universe in which we could not see why bad things happen. Rowe feels that this claim is unjustified and therefore Wykstra fails to defeat his argument. Wykstra dismisses this by saying that this is a matter of divine choice.

Wykstra does admit that Rowe is right when he argues that, when it comes to explaining our inability to a purpose for much suffering, Core Naturalism has an edge over Core Theism. However, he argues that since this is expectable and it is �unbalanced� evidence. Here Wykstra brings back up the idea of �levering evidence�. He asks if this unbalanced evidence would be enough to lever solid theism (.95) to agnosticism (.5). Utilizing Bayes� theorem he concludes that if you held an agnostic belief before the unbalanced evidence the probability would fall to about .17, which would be solid non-belief, if not atheism. However, if you held a theistic view at the beginning (.99), then your probability would only fall to .96. The result is the less you believe the more unbalanced evidence effects you.

The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence
By Peter van Inwagen

Inwagen takes an interesting approach to the problem presented by William Rowe. Instead of trying to disprove Rowe�s argument by creating a direct defense, what Inwagen calls a Theodicy, Inwagen creates a parallel story in which he shows us that Rowe�s argument is defunct. The use of a parallel story to show the inconsistencies of arguments is a time-honored tradition. Inwagen sees the use of these stories as a better way of defending theism. The two stories that Inwagen proposes are the problem of silence and the problem of air.

To start off, Inwagen lies out the problem of that faces theists. Inwagen defines theism as �the proposition that the universe was created by an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being.� Inwagen claims that the evidential argument form evil is the idea that there is a serious hypothesis, inconsistent with theism, on which S is more probable that S is on theism. S is a proposition that describes in some detail the amount, kinds and distribution of suffering-the suffering not only of human beings, but of all sentient terrestrial creatures that there are or ever has been. So basically, an atheistic hypothesis can explain S better than theism. One might ask what this atheistic hypothesis is. It turns out that Inwagen uses Draper�s Hypothesis of Indifference (HI).

Neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons.

How does the theist respond to this? Inwagen sees that the theist has three choices:

1. The theist may argue that S is much more surprising, given HI, than one might suppose.
2. The theist may argue that S is much less surprising, given theism, than one might suppose.
3. The theist may argue that there are reasons for preferring theism to HI that outweigh the prima facie reason for preferring HI to theism that we have provided.

Inwagen continues by saying that the first of these options is just unappealing. The third is unreasonable since we have yet to come up with a really good argument of this type, save maybe the moral argument and the ontological argument, neither of which have many followers today. Therefore we are left with the second argument.

The theist may argue that S is much less surprising, given theism, than one might suppose.

However, what does this mean? With this line of defense philosophers must construct theodicies. A Theodicy is the conjunction of theism with some �auxiliary hypothesis� h that purports to explain how S could be true given theism. This can be shown using the terms of probability calculus. If a Theodicy is to be of interest, the probability of S on the conjunction of theism and h will have to be high-or at least not to low. However, whether a Theodicy is interesting depends not only on the probability of S on the conjunction of theism and h, but also on the probability of h on theism. In essence, one must find a hypothesis h such that P(S/theism & h) is high, or at least not too low, and P(h/theism) is high. In other words the theodicist is to reason as follows:

�Although S might seem surprising on the assumption of theism, this initial appearance, like many initial appearances, is misleading. For consider the hypothesis h. The truth of this hypothesis is just what one would expect given theism, and S is just what one would expect (would not at all be that surprising) given both theism and h. Therefore, S is just what one would expect (would not be all that surprising) given theism. And, therefore, we do not have a prima facie reason to prefer HI to theism, and the evidential argument from evil fails.�

However, as Inwagen points out, there is a problem with this. He says that an evidentialist would point out that the prospects of finding a Theodicy that satisfies these conditions are not very promising. As an example he uses the classic free-will defense (FWD). �Even if it is granted that P(FWD/theism) is high, there is every reason to think that P(S/theism & FWD) is low, since of all cases of suffering (a phenomenon that has existed for hundreds of millions of years), only a miniscule portion involved, even in the most indirect way, beings with free will.� Furthermore, no one has the faintest idea of how to find a proposition that is probable on theism and, in conjunction with theism, renders S probable. With this in mind we have to accept the fact that we have a good prima facie reason to prefer HI to theism.

If it was this easy though, the discussion would have stopped right there. However, Inwagen believes that one option was left out of the list for possible defenses of theism. He says: �Suppose that one were successfully to argue that S was not surprising on theism-and not because S was �Just what one should expect� if theism were true, but because no one is in a position to know whether S is what one should expect if theism were true.� In essence Inwagen refutes the evidentialist by saying that since we can�t assign probabilities to any of the variables than we can�t say that the probability of S on HI is higher than the probability of S on theism.

However, one is still stuck with the problem of not being able to make a Theodicy. Instead, Inwagen argues for the creation of a �defense�. A defense is really nothing more than a story that attempts to explain both S and the existence of God. In actuality, the probability of the story being correct would be low. If it were high it would be used as a Theodicy. Instead, a defense is a story which is true �for all anyone knows.�

One might ask what these defenses accomplish? There attack is quite subtle for they undermine the evidentialist cast that the probability of S is lower on theism than Hi. Of course these stories could be false for all anyone knows so they do not create a tendency to believe that the probability of S on theism is not lower than it is on HI. Instead the stories should lead a person to refuse to make any judgment about the relation between the probabilities of S on theism and on HI.

To give examples of defenses Inwagen proposes two problems for us to consider, the problem of air and the problem of silence. With the problem of air we are placed into the setting of ancient Greece. Here we find two men discussing the composition of air. One of the men, an atomist, believes that air is made up of tiny little solid particles. The other man, who we will call A-prime, presents the atomist with a problem. He believes that if air was made up of tiny solids then it would float down in a find dust. Instead he presents the evidential argument from air. �Let HI, the Hypothesis of Independence, be the thesis that there are four independent and continuous elements, air among them, each of which has sui generis properties that determine its characteristic behavior. Let S be a proposition that records the properties of air. The simple air-and-dust argument is sufficient to establish that S is not surprising given HI, but is very surprising given atomism.� He then goes on to point out that the atomist faces the same problem that the theist did. Of the three options available to the atomist the second is the best. He must create an atomodicy. However, the odds of creating an atomodicy that will fulfill the requirements are slim. However, the atomist is not defeated. He can still create defenses that would explain everything. Inwagen gives an example of such a defense: air atoms are spheres covered with long, thing flexible spike. The length of the spikes is large in comparison with the diameters of the nuclei, thus this keeps the nuclei far apart. Since, for as far as anyone knows this story is true, A-prime is left with no better argument than the following:

The probability of S on HI is high.
We do not know what to say about the probability of S on atomism.
HI and atomism are inconsistent.
Therefore, for anyone in our epistemic situation, the truth of S constitutes a prima facie case for preferring HI to atomism.

However, since no ancient Greek was in a position to define probabilistic values to the variables, this argument is invalid.

Inwagen continues on by laying out the problem of silence. In this problem we face the fact that we have yet to make contact with an intelligent species elsewhere in the universe. Once again, Inwagen goes through the same process that he went through with the problem of air. Once again we are brought to the same conclusion that there is no reason for preferring on option to the other.

In the last section of his work Inwagen returns to the problem of evil. He points out that evil does prove to be a difficulty for the theist. He also says that we can�t just ignore it. However, just because evil is a difficulty does not meant that it is evidence against theism. If this were true we would have to discount almost every interesting theory. The difficulty is just something that we have to work out.

In conclusion, Inwagen points out that he has successfully undermined the prima facie evidence in support of the Hypothesis of Indifference. Using a defense he shows that we can�t choose for certain one option or another. Instead it undermines the problem of evil by explaining the difficulty that evil poses for theism. By removing this difficulty Inwagen believes that the evidential argument of evil fails.

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