Justin Chen
TA: Jake Boswell
December 8, 2000

Paper 3, Topic A
On the Utility of Man

Kant’s Principle of Humanity requires that any rational being “treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself” (Kant, 101). (i) In this paper, I will first argue that the point of this principle is to forbid the utilization of any rational human being as a mere tool or object, and that Kant holds that we must instead respect rational will above all other considerations. I will then argue that a legitimate criticism of Utilitarianism is that it allows people to be treated as a mere means in the Kantian sense, and I will discuss the example of sacrificing one person to save the lives of many. Next, I will raise an objection to this assertion, namely that Utilitarians such as John Stuart Mill actually forbid those actions—including the sacrifice in question— which violate certain so-called “moral requirements” (such as justice) that are “paramount” on the scale of social utility. Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate that despite the introduction of these overlying moral requirements by Utilitarian apologists, it is still legitimate to criticize Utilitarianism as a moral philosophy that allows people to be treated as a mere means. I will first criticize the necessarily relativist nature of Mill’s proposal of justice, and then propose an example that demonstrates the Utilitarian treatment of people as mere means without infringing on that notion of justice.

First, it is important to understand what Kant’s formulation of the Principle of Humanity actually entails. The vital distinction to notice in Kant’s requirement that every rational creature “treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself” (Kant, 101) is that of means and mere means. The reason a Kantian would permit the countless interactions that occur on a daily basis between people on a transactions level is precisely because they involve the use of humans as means but not as mere means.

For instance, when I go to McDonald’s and the cashier takes my money in exchange for an extra value meal, I am certainly treating her as a sort of tool for obtaining food. But the point is that I am not treating her as merely a machine—that is, as a mere means—because we are both engaging in this transaction as dictated by our own rational wills. The cashier is only carrying out her job because she will later be paid a salary by the restaurant for her work. If I were instead to, say, walk into someone’s house and force him at gunpoint to cook me a meal, I would be disrespecting his rational will and treating him as a mere means to satisfying my own hunger. Thus, my actions would be considered immoral from the Kantian perspective. According to Kant, the fact that we are members of the “union of different rational beings under common laws” that he refers to as “a kingdom of ends” (Kant, 100) is the reason behind the Principle of Humanity. In other words, although we as rational beings make universal laws, we are also by the same token subject to them. Kant goes on to say that the “duty [of acting on the Principle of Humanity] is in no way based on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as making universal law, because otherwise he could not be conceived as an end in himself” (102). Thus, from the Kantian view, it is the very status of humans as rational beings, rather than any sort of emotion or desire, that necessarily requires that we act in accordance with the Principle of Humanity. This is what is meant by the phrase “end in himself.”

In assessing Utilitarianism on the basis of Kant’s means-ends stipulation, we must also examine its definition more closely. John Stuart Mill wrote, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill, 7). (ii) Mill goes on to explain that “by happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure” (Mill, 7). Based on these definitions of the Principle of Humanity and of Utilitarianism, it seems to me that Utilitarianism can indeed legitimately be criticized for morally allowing people to be treated as mere means because it places its ultimate emphasis not on inherent human worth, but rather on overall human happiness. Thus, there must exist situations in which Utilitarianism would endorse using a rational human being as a mere means to achieving happiness.

For example, in the now infamous example of chopping up one innocent student and distributing his organs to save the lives of five others, the most literal interpretation of Mill’s definition of Utilitarianism yields the somewhat unsettling notion that chopping the student up in such a situation is morally permissible insofar as it “tend[s] to promote greater happiness.” That is, by saving the five students in desperate need of organ transplants, you are maximizing all the total potential happiness in store for the rest of those particular people’s lives at the expense of just one person’s potential happiness. The sum of all these considerations of happiness, using the Utilitarian arithmetic outlined by Mill, is sufficient to declare chopping up the innocent student morally acceptable. Indeed, a Utilitarian might even argue that the sacrifice is required under the circumstances because it is the action that leads to the greatest overall happiness. Incidentally, this notion that all human beings are under a moral obligation to always maximize happiness is one of the primary reasons that Utilitarianism has been criticized as too demanding a moral philosophy.

In any event, the fact that chopping up one student to save several others is permitted by the Utilitarian framework at all seems troubling. The Kantian response to this dilemma is that in sacrificing the unsuspecting student, you are treating him as a mere means to promoting happiness. That is, you are disrespecting the student’s rational will to stay alive and treating him simply as a tool (in fact, as some sort of living organ bank) with which to accomplish the objective of maximizing happiness. Strictly speaking, it does not matter whether killing the person will save five, a hundred, or even a million lives; as long as he is an innocent bystander whose rational will is being disrespected, the Kantian Principle of Humanity absolutely forbids the sacrifice on moral grounds. Thus, we appear to have come across an example in which Utilitarianism can be criticized for permitting the treatment of people as a mere means for happiness.

An objection that might be raised by Utilitarians such as John Stuart Mill is that there are certain “moral requirements” that must also be addressed when determining the overall happiness that may result from a particular action. Specifically, Mill states that “justice is a name for certain moral requirements which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others” (62). In the case of the organ-sacrifice situation, then, it could be argued that the high degree of unhappiness prompted by the injustice of killing an innocent bystander outweighs the happiness of the people that are saved.

Despite this consideration, however, I would still maintain that it is valid to criticize Utilitarianism from the Kantian perspective for allowing people to be used as mere means. The invocation of justice as some sort of higher standard is certainly valid, and it does help address many of the problematic situations that a moral philosophy based only on maximizing happiness would be unable to reject. But thoughtful modifications to the Utilitarian framework are nevertheless and insufficient to completely address the criticisms of its Kantian detractors for the following two reasons: First, while Mill decrees that justice “stands higher in the scale of social utility” than other moral requirements, he fails to specify the degree to which justice ranks higher. This is unfortunately an important omission, for if we are to judge the morality of all actions by the happiness that they engender, how are we to know when, if ever, justice’s value on the “scale of social utility” is eclipsed by other considerations? In other words, the danger with the Utilitarian’s proposition of some sort of relative happiness scale is that one can easily propose a situation so extreme that the relativist theory breaks down.

For example, Mill states that justice is a moral requirement that is of “paramount obligation,” yet he hastens to add that “particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice” (62). He goes on to argue, “Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal or take by force the necessary food or medicine” (62). Given this second declaration, it becomes much less clear exactly which standard we should be obeying. Perhaps a Utilitarian could argue that killing one innocent person to save two lives is ethically forbidden because the injustice of such an action outweighs the net happiness of the two rescued people. But if we “raise the stakes,” so to speak, and imagine that perhaps a thousand or even a million people could be saved by killing one innocent victim, the Utilitarian prohibition falters. Now we must take into consideration the collective happiness of the thousands or millions people that could be saved.

As I argued earlier, the Kantian Principle of Humanity is not at all concerned with the number of lives that could be saved by the sacrifice of the innocent victim, because such a sacrifice disrespects the victim’s rational will and is therefore always immoral. Unfortunately for Mill, Utilitarianism does not have any such absolute standard to invoke. As we have seen, the immorality of an action depends on various relative factors, and in dire circumstances such as those outlined above, the Utilitarian conception of morality can change. It seems, then, that certain cases do indeed exist in which Utilitarianism allows the treatment of people as a mere means.

Second, even if we don’t want to quibble about the scale of happiness or what the exact form of the Utilitarian equation is, we can simply attempt to find an example that does not specifically violate justice, but which nevertheless involves the use of a person as a mere means. It seems to me that logically speaking, not even John Stuart Mill himself could possibly come up with enough specific stipulations—such as his provision for justice—to completely satisfy Kant’s demand that any rational being “treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself” (Kant, 101). Indeed, the only way to accomplish this sort of perfect philosophical overlap would be for Mill to actually come out and state that treating people as ends in themselves is the ultimate goal of Utilitarianism, a position that is in obvious contradiction with the actual goal of Utilitarianism. But the point is that we must be able to imagine an example in which Utilitarianism allows people to be treated as a mere means, which moreover is unable to appeal to the grand notion of an overarching justice invoked by Mill.

One such example is a situation in which a person who is not very bright is used by others as a source of amusement. That is, the unfortunate victim’s tormentors treat him as nothing more than some sort of game or diversion by capitalizing on his stupidity for their own entertainment. Precisely because he is not very bright, however, this person does not realize that he is being used in this manner. Furthermore, he himself is happy in his situation because, as far as he can tell, his actions create pleasure for his “friends.” What he fails to realize is that they are laughing at, rather than with him. The situation outlined above is an extreme example of using someone as a mere means toward greater happiness. By treating the unsuspecting victim as nothing more than a tool for deriving pleasure, his friends are violating Kant’s Principle of Humanity. This is because if the person, no matter how dense, were to discover that his antics were only appreciated for their stupidity, it is no longer plausible to believe that he would still be happy with his situation. Thus, not only is he clearly being treated as a means, he is also being treated as a mere means because his rational will is being disrespected. In Kant’s view, then, this scenario is morally unacceptable, just as one would hope it would be.

Yet when we view this same situation through the lens of Utilitarianism, we are simply unable present such a strong denunciation. Perhaps one could argue that the maltreatment of the unfortunate victim is unjust, and therefore immoral, but I find this to be simply too large a stretch. It is difficult indeed to argue in this situation that the unwitting victim’s rights are being violated, for he has not been harmed per se by his interactions with those who mock him. Furthermore, we should not attempt to inflate Mill’s justice into some sort of absolute, all-encompassing standard that applies even to those situations that do not deal with fundamental rights, for we will then no longer be faced with Utilitarianism as defined by Mill, but rather an entirely new moral philosophy with extremely vague absolute guidelines that need to be worked out more precisely. Thus, the invocation of justice is useless in this example, and Utilitarianism once again morally permits the victim to be treated as a mere means.

In this paper, I have argued that a legitimate criticism of Utilitarianism is that it allows people to be treated as a mere means in the Kantian sense. To do so, I have first explored the fundamental concepts at stake in Kant’s Principle of Humanity, and described the important distinction between means and mere means. Next, I outlined the Utilitarian approach to moral philosophy and explained that the main reason Utilitarianism can legitimately be criticized as disregarding the Principle of Humanity is that it places its ultimate emphasis not on inherent human worth, but rather on overall human happiness. To strengthen my argument, I proposed the example of the unwilling organ “donor” situation. I then raised an important objection, namely that there are in fact certain “moral requirements” which Utilitarians such as John Stuart Mill would argue are of relatively greater important on the “scale of social utility,” especially justice. I presented this argument in order to demonstrate that under Utilitarianism, the preservation of certain moral laws is vital to maintaining happiness. Finally, I attempted to describe two counter-objections to the justice argument. First, Mill’s very definition of justice is a relativist one—that is, while he asserts that justice is more important than other moral requirements, he does not provide the Utilitarian equation with any sort of indication of how much more. I used this argument to propose that if justice is indeed only a component of happiness, then under Utilitarianism it can and must be overlooked when greater threats to happiness are at stake. Second, I asserted that regardless of quibbling over the scale of utility, we can still imagine situations in which Mill’s theory of justice is not violated, which nevertheless allow people to be used as a mere means. Overall, then, it appears that because Utilitarians hold happiness as the ultimate standard by which to judge the morality of an action, Utilitarianism iteself can be legitimately criticized by Kantians as permitting the treatment of people as mere means.

i) Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. New York, NY. 1964. Citations are referenced with page numbers.

ii) Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism (Ed: George Sher). Hackett Publishing Company. Indianapolis, IN. 1979. Citations are referenced with page numbers.