Justin Chen
Intro Ethics
TA: Jake Boswell
11/4/00

Paper 2, Topic A
The ‘Victimless Crime’

The reason that the dilemma faced by the paramedic at the scene of the accident is so troublesome is because to all appearances, lying to the distraught woman would be a so-called “victimless crime.” That is, because the falsehood would never be exposed, some of the ethical pressure to tell the truth is apparently lifted. I believe, however, that a Kantian must still maintain that lying is the morally incorrect action in this case.

In this essay, I will begin by discussing two major arguments a Kantian might cite against lying. First, because the maxim of lying to promote happiness cannot be universalized, it also cannot pass the Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Second, by lying to the woman, the paramedic would be treating her as a means to greater happiness rather than as an end in herself, a prospect also forbidden by Kantianism. Next, I will consider some major objections that a Kantian might cite, especially the notion that the woman suffers from temporary irrationality and thus does not have to be afforded the same treatment as other rational beings. Finally, I will explain why I believe that although this objection is a valid one, it is only valid in a short-term sense, and that in the end, a Kantian must instruct the paramedic to tell the woman the truth once she has regained her rationality.

In Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (i), he argues for the existence of a “categorical imperative” that must conform to the test of universality. In Kant’s words, “There is…only a single categorical imperative and it is this: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’” (Kant, 88). When we then apply Kant’s reasoning to the situation at hand, it becomes clear fairly quickly that we cannot universalize a maxim that states that we should deceive someone for the sake of promoting happiness. If this were so, people would no longer be able to believe the statements of others, for the possibility would always exist that everyone was uttering falsehoods in order to promote what they believed to be greater happiness.

Kant himself outlines a similar argument against making a lying promise, precisely because it “can never rank as a universal law of nature and be self-consistent, but must necessarily contradict itself” (Kant, 90). He goes on to argue that “the universality of a law that every one believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams” (Kant, 90). In other words, because the universality of a maxim permitting any sort of a lie would ultimately defeat the very function of lying, one cannot will that maxim to be universal, and it is therefore ethically incorrect.

The second principle that a Kantian might invoke in attempting to convince the paramedic not to lie is the notion that a rational being should “treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself” (Kant, 101). The question that immediately follows, then, is, “As a means to what?” The most likely answer is that by lying to the woman, the paramedic would be treating her as a means to greater overall happiness. The implication of this line of thought is that the paramedic would be adopting a semi-Utilitarian stance, insofar as he would be elevating happiness or utility above humanity as the greatest ultimate ends. Furthermore, not only would he be treating the woman as a means, he would be treating her as “merely as a means” (Kant, 101). This is because the woman desires to know the truth concerning her husband’s death, but by lying to her, the paramedic ends up disregarding her goals and desires. Thus, to lie to the wife would involve treating her merely as a means, rather than an end in herself, exactly the sort of treatment of other rational creatures that Kant forbids. A Kantian would therefore have to counsel the paramedic not to lie to the woman.

There are of course several important objections that could be raised against the arguments outlined above. A Utilitarian, for instance, might simply reject the notion of a Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative entirely. He might contend, in true Utilitarian fashion, that as long as lying produces a better overall result—i.e. greater happiness—and no one is directly harmed by the falsehood, it is ethically correct to hide the truth from the wife. In fact, one does not even need to venture into Utilitarianism at all in order to find objections to the prohibition from lying. A major objection that might be raised while still under the auspices of Kantian ideology concerns the essay topic’s description of the wife as “very upset.” Perhaps a Kantian might interpret this so as to argue that the wife is, at least temporarily, not fully rational; that is, she is not “grounded in the faculty of reason rather than sensibility.” (ii) Because her emotions (sensibilities) are dominating her actions, she is not a fully rational being.

According to this supposition, the paramedic would not be required by a Kantian to tell the woman the truth. That is, because the woman’s rational will is temporarily overpowered by her grief, she does not belong to the “union of different rational beings under common laws” that Kant refers to as “a kingdom of ends” (Kant, 100). Continuing with this line of reasoning, it seems to me that although a Kantian might permit the paramedic to initially lie to the wife about the circumstances of her husband’s death, he would eventually have to tell her the truth. This sort of temporary falsehood would be permitted because at least part of the purpose of not telling a lie, as described in the preceding discussion, is to respect the rational will of the woman—we are required by Kant to treat “every rational agent as an end in itself” (Kant, 98). In the case of the distraught and not wholly rational woman, however, a Kantian could convincingly argue that this requirement is inapplicable, for the woman does not belong to the kingdom of ends touted by Kant. Thus, a temporary lie would be morally permissible. It might even be argued that lying is actually required of the paramedic insofar as telling the woman the truth would cause her even greater distress and separate her yet more from those rational faculties that are so central to Kant’s theories. In any event, so the argument goes, a Kantian would not require that the paramedic tell the woman the truth.

In response to this argument that lying is morally permissible, I would point out that that the permission granted by a Kantian for the promotion of this mistruth is extremely guarded. In fact, my formulation of the hypothetical objection contains the vital condition that the lie be temporary, implying that the falsehood must eventually be revealed. This is because although the paramedic may have been justified in citing the woman’s irrationality as grounds for lying, as soon as she has again regained her rationality, he is required by Kant to once more respect her as a member of the “kingdom of ends.” By allowing the lie that he himself fabricated remain as truth in the now-rational woman’s mind, he has in effect lied to her. Even if the woman never asks him again about her husband’s death, the fact that she still believes the paramedic’s lie is actually the truth implies that the paramedic is at fault for the misinformation.

If we think about this situation in terms of the Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, we can at once see parallels to the arguments offered previously about the more general case of lying. That is, we could not rationally will a maxim to be universalized that allowed people to lie to a rational creature who is temporarily irrational. If such a maxim were universalized, then no one could trust any statements that were made to them during periods of severe emotion, for fear that those statements were—in Kant’s words—nothing but “empty shams.” Thus, the point of the lie itself would be defeated. As before, because the maxim cannot be universalized, it is ethically forbidden by Kant. In light of all these considerations, it appears to me that in the long run, a Kantian would maintain that the paramedic should tell the woman the truth, agreeing with the thesis proposed in the introduction of this essay.

Note that the Kantian never said that the paramedic must lie to the distraught woman. Rather, he would deem it permissible to lie to her, given her temporary irrationality. It seems to me that another extremely viable alternative, acceptable to Utilitarians and Kantians alike, would be to postpone telling the woman anything at all until she had regained her composure. This avoids the problem of dealing with a person who has lost her rational faculties, and it also sidesteps the issue of lying to her, at least temporarily. Of course, if the woman were to regain her rationality at a later time, and then repeat her query, the paramedic would be obligated by Kantianism to tell her the truth, as discussed earlier.

In summary, the Kantian interpretation of this situation must inevitably conclude that lying is the ethically incorrect choice. Firstly, a maxim stating that lying is permissible in situations such as this one could never be universalized, and therefore fails the Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Secondly, by lying about the husband’s death, the paramedic would fail to take into account the wife’s desire to know the truth, and would therefore be ignoring her goals as a rational being. In designating the woman’s happiness more important than her rational will, the paramedic would violate the Kantian idea that members of the “kingdom of ends” should never be treated as mere means. A strong Kantian objection to these arguments is that the woman is not rational because she is dominated by emotion rather than reasoning, and that it is therefore permissible, even from a Kantian perspective, to lie to her. However, I have argued that although a temporary lie of this sort might be permitted, the paramedic would eventually be obligated to retract his falsehood when the woman regained her rational faculties. Because of all these complications, the better choice might simply be to postpone telling the woman anything at all until she is no longer irrational, and then tell her the truth if asked again. In the end, though, the Kantian response to this situation must inevitably be to tell the truth.

i. Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. New York, NY. 1964. Citations are referenced with page numbers.

ii. Palmquist, Steven. The Lexicon of Kantian Terminology. From the webpage “Ethical Theory; Ethics; Kant; Deontology.” http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html.