Justin Chen
Lit 300—Paper 2
TA: Patricio Boyer
3/21/01

Post-Structuralism’s Hermeneutical Bent

The structuralists’ empirical search for patterns in literature has yielded, among others, the concept of the binary opposition—that is, a pair of opposite terms that both complement and contrast with one another. As Derrida observes in Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, many of these binary oppositions arose gradually during the course of human history and are therefore inherited from our literary predecessors. Indeed, structuralist theory contends that these oppositions have been so deeply ingrained that they now define much of literature as we know it, and even meaning itself. Yet post-structuralists like Derrida began to question the validity of these historically-imposed dichotomies in order to draw attention to flaws in the traditional approach for understanding literature. In deconstructing accepted notions of binary opposition, Derrida essentially mimics Gadamer’s hermeneutical agenda of rethinking human prejudices in order to utilize them on the journey toward an ultimately greater philosophical and literary understanding.

Derrida begins his discussion of binary oppositions in Structure, Sign, and Play by considering, rather cryptically, the concept of the “center” in literature. He states that structure is produced by its center, which he defines as a fixed point of presence, or origin. That is, the center is what lends a particular concept any sort of substance—and logically so, for although a rather large set of descriptors or characteristics may be valid for a particular concept, it is in the end only a small, difficult to define subset that constitutes the center. Derrida goes on to revise his definition, adding that although the center governs the structure, it manages at the same time to escape structurality. Thus, there is a sense that the center is displaced, and that although it defines the structure, it does so only from a distance.

Although this introduction to an essay ultimately about the human sciences seems abstract and even vexing at first, Derrida quickly begins to focus his consideration of the center by stating that the very essence of structure is a series of substitutions of center for center—that is, one’s understanding of any concept is based solely on a chain of deferral. Derrida tempers the bleakness of this proposal, which could be taken as a radical extrapolation of the structuralist notion of the arbitrariness of the sign, by acknowledging that “all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated the constant of a presence” (Derrida, 879; 162) , examples being essence, existence, substance, consciousness, etc. Derrida’s mention of “the constant of a presence” is significant because it implies finality, concreteness—intrinsic substance.

Derrida nevertheless notes that there is a constant search or desire for the elusive constant center, that “central presence which was never itself, which has always already been transported outside itself in its surrogate” (Derrida, 879; 162). Derrida’s phrase “always already,” used to describe the center’s state of dislocation from the structure itself, is significant because it implies a static state reminiscent of the “constant of a presence” discussed above. But since the vast majority of concepts do not deal with such a constant state, and indeed lack any sort of absolute transcendental signified, Derrida eventually concludes that the interplay of signification is extended ad infinitum, which is just the same conclusion he had drawn at first.

It is at this point in his essay that Derrida provides the crucial tie-in between the absence of the center and the concept of binary oppositions. He states, “There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics” (Derrida, 880; 163, his emphasis). Thus, Derrida makes it clear that certain essentially flawed literary structures must, ironically enough, nevertheless be utilized as agents of their own destruction. This central component of Derrida’s theory of deconstruction is clearly reminiscent of Gadamer’s hermeneutical theories.

Specifically, in his essay The Elevation of the Historicity of Understanding, Gadamer addresses the tension associated with “the play between the traditionary text’s strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended, distanciated object and belonging to a tradition,” stating that “the true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between” (Gadamer, 295; 60, his emphasis) . The parallel between hermeneutics and Derridean post-structuralism, then, lies in the two theories’ valuation of the old and incorrect as fundamentally necessary for progress. Gadamer’s approach toward this literary objective involves reevaluating the concept of prejudice, or the “familiar,” which he stresses should not necessarily bear a negative connotation. Rather, he argues, prejudices are necessary for their roles as starting-points for the hermeneutical “in-between.” After all, without the prejudice of tradition, there could be no interplay between the novel and the unfamiliar, and therefore no progress under the hermeneutical schema.

Derrida, on the other hand, begins by discussing the concept of the center at length, and then concludes that the sign is nothing more than a series of deferred centers. But the nihilistic inclination of this line of reasoning forces him to assert that the concepts of metaphysics must necessarily be used in order to attack metaphysics. Derrida’s notion of the metaphysical sign, then, is analogous to Gadamer’s revised definition of prejudice—not necessarily positive or negative, but simply necessary.

Surprisingly enough, although it has not yet been directly invoked, the concept of the binary opposition has already crept into Derrida’s discussion—in the form of the center. For as Derrida has elucidated (or perhaps only further obscured) at some length, the notion of center necessarily implies an accompanying totality—it governs structure while escaping structurality. Thus, Derrida has already dealt rather exclusively with one type of binary opposition, and has shown it to be invalid, and yet at the same time necessary, for further progress (for, he says, metaphysics must be combated on its own terms).

But Derrida now chooses to invoke a particular literary dichotomy—that is, the opposition between nature and culture—to further expand upon his topic. After offering some background about this opposition, which he insists is even older than Plato, he suddenly introduces the troubling concept the “incest taboo,” which he decides to refer to as a “scandal” because it transcends the nature/culture opposition. He states, “the incest-prohibition is universal; in this sense one could call it natural. But it is also a prohibition, a system of norms and interdicts; in this sense one could call it cultural” (Derrida, 882; 165). Because the unacceptability of incest is a common feature of every species on earth, it can be considered a natural law. But at the same time, humans have developed societal condemnation of incest, and in that sense the taboo is cultural.

The binary opposition presented by Derrida is not quite as simple as it appears. It could be argued, for instance, that it is the innate and overwhelming abhorrence of incest represented by the “nature” pole of the opposition that gives rise to the cultural interdictions against it. In that sense, then, the nature/culture opposition is not applicable, and there really is nothing troubling or scandalous about the incest taboo. But that is exactly Derrida’s point. He states, “From the moment that the incest-prohibition can no longer be conceived within the nature/culture opposition, it can no longer be said that it is a scandalous fact,” adding, “The incest-prohibition…escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them” (Derrida, 882; 165). Thus, it is evident that Derrida chose to discuss the incest taboo precisely because it comes prior to, and is therefore autonomous from, the duality of nature/culture. The binary opposition in this case, then, is invalid.

Derrida uses this discovery as a jumping-off point for extrapolation, arguing that once one has discovered the peculiar limitations of the nature/culture opposition, one must examine the historical precedent for all binary oppositions. Yet, in an exact parallel to his discussion of the center, Derrida is perfectly aware of the danger inherent in this line of reasoning. Just as he stated that “there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics,” he now asserts that we must use “all these old concepts, while at the same time exposing here and there their limits, treating them as tools which can still be of use… they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong” (Derrida, 882; 165). Thus, binary oppositions, flawed though they are, represent a necessary tool, or starting point, for the work of the literary theorist or philosopher.

I have purposely phrased Derrida’s conclusion in this manner to imply a parallel to the hermeneutical conclusions drawn by Gadamer, who states that “the concept of ‘prejudice’ is where we can start” (Gadamer, 271; 48). Both theorists seem to maintain that binary oppositions or prejudices are necessary, despite their flaws, precisely for their value as starting points—and it is this necessity that removes strips the two concepts of their negative connotation.

Indeed, the neutralization of the concepts of prejudice and binary opposition represents a second parallel between post-structuralism and hermeneutics. Both theories merely stress the importance of recognition of the flawed nature of these “tools,” but certainly do not require that they be rejected. Gadamer asserts, “The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings” (Gadamer, 269; 47). In other words, according to hermeneutics, a prejudice is not necessarily negative. Rather, prejudice must be recognized as a given set of beliefs which, through interaction with new and unfamiliar ideas, will necessarily be revised and strengthened (in a decidedly Hegelian manner).

Similarly, Derridean post-structuralism recognizes that binary oppositions have a value despite their fundamentally flawed nature. Derrida cites the following quote: “The opposition between nature and culture which I have previously insisted on seems today to offer a value which is above all methodological,” and comments, “This methodological value is not affected by its ‘ontological’ non-value” (Derrida, 883; 166). Thus, post-structuralism recognizes the necessity of using binary oppositions as means or tools, and is willing to overlook the problems inherent in the nature of these structures.

Despite its complex wording and the introduction of new vocabulary, then, Derrida’s post-structural treatment of binary oppositions is essentially another version of Gadamer’s hermeneutical discussion of prejudice. In both theories, the structure that is under attack is revealed to be invalid—in the case of binary oppositions, because the impulse in question can be shown to always already precede the distinction, and in the case of prejudice, because we automatically possess a misguided preference for thoughts that have already been established. But at the same time, both Derrida and Gadamer argue, those invalid structures must nevertheless play a crucial role in the progression of theory. For Gadamer, prejudice represents fully one half of the hermeneutical equation—without a starting judgment, there can be no Hegelian interaction and synthesis. And for Derrida, binary oppositions represent the means to “reintegrate culture into nature, and finally, to reintegrate life into the totality of its physiochemical conditions” (Derrida, 883; 166). Thus, although the two theories may seem to differ in their starting and concluding points, they both agree on the organic intervening process that can best be attributed to hermeneutics.

i) Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (Tr: Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato). Structuralism, Semiotics, and Deconstruction. Citations are (Author, Page in original text; Page in course reader).

ii) Gadamer, Hans Georg. “The Elevation of the Historicity of Understanding to the Status of a Hermeneutic Principle.” Truth and Method, 2nd Ed (Tr: Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall). New York; 1989. Citations as listed above.