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Justin Chen Paper 1, Topic 1 A prominent dilemma that often confronts the literary critic is a natural unwillingness to interpret a text in ways that the author may not have intended. Various literary theories have attempted to resolve this problem, usually by downplaying the significance of the author�s original intent. W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley argue that the author�s intentions in writing a text cannot be accurately determined, and thus should not be considered during the process of literary interpretation, while Stanley Fish places great importance on the concept of the �interpretive community,� and as a result virtually ignores the author�s original intention in determining meaning. On the opposite side of the debate is E. D. Hirsch, who claims that �the interpreter should make an effort to go beyond his text wherever possible� (II, 241; 84) . It seems to me that the proper role of intent in literary criticism ought to lie somewhere between these two extremes�as a verification or rejection of a particular reading rather than as a base upon which to base criticism itself. In their essay entitled The Intentional Fallacy, Wimsatt and Beardsley begin by arguing that �the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art� (I, 749; 6). The first of these concerns, the availability of the author�s intent, is by far the weaker of the two because it is a purely practical one. If Dostoevsky had made his intentions and thoughts perfectly accessible to future generations of literary critics by keeping a detailed journal while writing Crime and Punishment, would the theory of the intentional fallacy have collapsed? Clearly, the mere availability of an author�s intentions cannot be the grounds for their rejection by the literary critic. Wimsatt and Beardsley defend their second point by stating, �We have no excuse for inquiring what part [of a poem] is intended or meant� (I, 750; 7). This argument implies that the text is an autonomous entity from the moment of its conception, divorced from the intentions of the author who produced it. Yet this seems to me a problematic claim as well, for central to judging the �success of a work of literary art� is the successful fulfillment of the author�s objective, for which the intent must again be considered. If a work is to be judged successful based on a literary critic�s interpretation in ways not actually intended by the author, then it seems that criticism itself must inevitably descend into the very �impressionism and relativism� (III, 1022; 16) that so trouble Wimsatt and Beardsley in their essay on The Affective Fallacy. In other words, it seems that the author�s intention does have an important role in literary criticism�as a regulatory feature of sorts, with the power to limit the otherwise enormous range of acceptable interpretations. Indeed, without such a limitation, a reader could make a �valid� argument for virtually any interpretation of a text, thereby engaging in the sort of solipsism that ought to be suppressed, not encouraged, by any serious, coherent theory of literature. A good example of this danger of relativism is the difficulty associated with the evolving nature of language. In The Intentional Fallacy, Wimsatt and Beardsley argue, �The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public� (I, 750; 7). What the essay does not address is the fact that although language may belong to the public, it is constantly changing. In his book, Validity in Interpretation, Hirsch cites a couplet from a poem by Marvell in which the poet uses the word �vegetable� with a view to its former definition as an adjective rather than its current definition as a noun. He argues, correctly in my opinion, that the fact that the word�s definition has changed over time does not license the reader to apply twenty-first century definitions to seventeenth century poetry. Perhaps such a reading may add to the reader�s enjoyment or liking of the poem, but it does not reflect the author�s intention, and is therefore not particularly useful in assessing the literary work�s success. Fish�s disregard for the author�s intention and emphasis on the �interpretive community� is even more insidious to literary theory because of its democratization of interpretation. In the introduction to his book entitled Is there a Text in this Class?, Fish argues that �the proper practice of literary criticism demand[s] the suppressing of what is subjective and idiosyncratic in favor of the level of response that everyone shares� (IV, 5; 104). In other words, a correct literary interpretation of a text is not dependent on the author�s intent, nor indeed the very words themselves, but rather the general reception of the text by one�s interpretive community. This theory, even more so than that of Wimsatt and Beardsley, is unsatisfactory because it provides no guidance to the literary critic. Once again, virtually any interpretation of a text is validated by Fish�s hypothesis, just so long as that interpretation is agreed upon by the interpretive community, for �it is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that produce meanings.� Hirsch, then, appears to be among the minority as a literary critic willing to emphasize the importance of the author�s intention for a correct interpretation of a text. As in the case of the Marvell poem discussed earlier, Hirsch believes that �the significance of textual meaning has no foundation and no objectivity unless meaning itself is unchanging� (II, 214; 71). This sentiment is one expression of the need for the author�s intent to be realized, in this case semantically speaking. Hirsch even introduces the idea that �the author�s meaning, as represented by his text, is unchanging and reproducible� (II, 216; 72), which can perhaps be seen as a response to Wimsatt and Beardsley�s charge that intention is not �available� to the reader. Hirsch also discusses the important concept of the �horizon,� which he describes as �an essential aspect of what we usually call context�an inexplicit sense of the whole, derived from the explicit meanings present to consciousness� (II, 221; 74). The notion of a horizon that �defines in principle the norms and limits which bound the meaning represented by a text� is important because it provides a sort of cap on the otherwise limitless number of possible interpretations of a particular text. Variable interpretations of the meanings of the words employed by the author are significantly reduced as a result. Yet whereas I have argued that intent should be used merely as a guideline for restricting the license with which a reader can critically approach a text�that is, as a sort of confirmation or verification of a particular interpretation, Hirsch goes one step farther and states that �the interpreter needs all the clues he can muster with regard not only to the text�s langue and genre, but also to the cultural and personal attitudes the author might be expected to bring to bear in specifying his verbal meanings� (II, 240; 84). This assertion matches another of Hirsch�s ideas cited earlier, namely that �the interpreter should make an effort to go beyond his text wherever possible� (II, 241; 84). While Hirsch at least acknowledges the role of the author�s intention in literary criticism, I would argue that he in fact places too much emphasis on it. The primary goal of literary criticism should not be historicization of the text. Though the anthropologist or the historian may dissect the societal or cultural impulses that led to the production of a particular work of literature, the literary critic must not focus on those circumstances but rather on the text itself. Hirsch�s emphasis on �going beyond the text wherever possible� is therefore incorrect because it shifts its primary emphasis to the author�s intent, while I have argued that intent should only be used to provide guidelines or boundaries for the entire range of possible interpretations�as an aide rather than a foundation. The point that I am singling out here may seem trivial, but it is in fact central to this topic. Hirsch�s demands for the literary critic suggest that he believes a text cannot be understood except in terms of its historicity, as the product of a discrete moment in the human timeline. This notion that we ought to view any text as the necessary product of a given set of societal factors resounds of the philosophy espoused by Marx in his treatise titled The German Ideology. Indeed, had Marx been a literary critic, he might have agreed with Hirsch on this point. But I would argue that a text represents more than simply an anthropological reflection of the society that produced it. Though the literary critic is of course concerned with the historical significance of a work, for the reasons outlined above, he or she is also interested in what the text can offer on a far grander scale�for the timeless issues that haunt humanity, such as love, honor, revenge, etc. Without these elements, �literature� becomes mere information, perhaps of scientific or historical importance, but certainly without any literary value. While these higher aspirations may well reflect the culture or Zeitgeist that produced them, they also represent a fundamental aspect of literature, its timelessness. Not historicization, then, but rather those transcendent aspects of art, should be the primary goal of literary theory. If the author�s intent should neither be rejected nor showcased, what exactly is its role? A Hegelian combination of the opposing theories suggests a compromise such as the one I have proposed earlier�that is, intention should be used in a verificative sense. The weakness of this assertion, I will readily admit, is that it cannot be absolute to the extent that Wimsatt and Beardsley are in their decree that the author�s intention should never be consulted during literary criticism. In any organic synthesis, one sacrifices absolute claims for more reasonable, middle-ground ones, and this is no exception. Yet the notion of intent-as-guideline does allow one to make certain assertions. To borrow Hirsch�s term, such a concept establishes a horizon of meaning beyond which interpretation cannot realistically be considered valid. That such a demarcation can be completely and comprehensively drawn for any artist is unlikely since we are not privileged with every detail of anyone�s life, but at least this allows the literary critic to avoid the horrendous multiplicity of interpretations that results from Wimsatt and Beardsley�s complete disavowal of the importance of an author�s intent. Along those same lines, the intention of the artist can be used to judge the relative correctness of one interpretation over another. That is, if a particular reading of a text is excluded by the horizon of the author�s intent, it can be deemed incorrect. An example of such an application is cited by Hirsch when he discusses two alternative interpretations of a poem by Wordsworth. In the end, he validates Bateson�s reading because, as Hirsch puts it, �He has tried to reconstruct the author�s probable attitudes so far as these are relevant in specifying the poem�s meaning� (II, 240; 84). In other words, because Bateson�s reading more closely matches what Wordsworth is likely to have intended, his is ultimately deemed the more accurate of the two. Thus the notion of a horizon established by the author�s intention does allow for judgment of a particular interpretation. In sum, a correct reading of a text often requires a proper consultation of the intentions behind it. The author�s intent should not be a priori rejected (as it is with Wimsatt and Beardsley), nor should it be simply ignored (as is the case with Fish), for these two tactics can be adopted only at the expense of any sort of normative standard for judging a particular interpretation�s correctness. But neither should we adopt Hirsch�s demand that intent become the primary focus of criticism, for then literary theory as we know it would dissolve into a form of anthropology without any attention to the vitally important timelessness of literature. In the end, the proper view of the author�s intent lies somewhere in between these two theories. Intention should be used to judge the relative correctness of various interpretations, not ignored or unduly glorified.
Sources Cited in this Paper I. Wimsatt, W. K. and Monroe C. Beardsley. �The Intentional Fallacy.� The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends (2nd Edition). Editor: David H. Richter. Bedford Books; Boston. 1998. II. Hirsch, E. D. Validity in Interpretation. Yale University Press; New Haven, CT. 1967. III. Wimsatt, W. K. and Monroe C. Beardsley. �The Affective Fallacy.� Critical Theory Since Plato. Editor: Hazard Adams. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.; New York, NY. 1971. IV. Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA. 1980. |