The Role of Antagonism in Kant’s Metaphysic of Morality

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Kant claims that self-seeking inclinations and their resultant antagonism in history are the only means to give birth to universal peace and moral society. All culture, art, and the finest social order which man creates, Kant argues, are the fruits both of man’s self-seeking inclinations—envyingly competitive vanity and insatiable desires for possession, honor, and power—and of their inevitable resultant antagonism—wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress. For Kant, evil antagonism is indispensable to educate morality; in other words, evil generates morality. This conception of education is opposite to our common sense of the education of children. We do our best effort to lead children to avoid selfish and evil things and not to commit selfish evil-doings, before children’s morality grows enough to reject them. That is to say, we commonly think that good generates morality and that evil generates immorality.

Such Kant’s conception also constitutes a main premise of the dialectics of history of his descendants, Hegel and Marx. For Hegel, the inevitability of evil in history is the invisible working of the cunning of reason for the realization of reason itself. An evil stage in history, for Hegel, gives birth to both a universal social class and a rational social order—the bureaucracy and a state. Similarly, for Marx, capitalism is an evil but necessary stage to bring about two conditions of socialism—the development of production force and the emergence of a new agent, the proletariat. Does antagonism really educate man? In other words, does evil really generate morality? Different from Hegel’s claim, the interest of the bureaucracy has not been universal and a bureaucratic state has become one of sources of the suppression of man. Similarly, far from Marx’s claim, we witness that the interest of the proletariat has been neither universal nor

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1 For Hegel, “what is actual is rational” (10), not only because evils are indispensable means for the realization of reason, but also because it is the cunning of reason that assigns evils in man’s history for its own realization.
revolutionary and that production force in capitalism has become a main threat of human life—for example, global warming, the hole in the ozone layer, and the decline and destruction of natural resources. In the front of historical evidences, can Hegelians and Marxists still repeat a magical word—‘dialectics’?

Also, Kant’s similar claim that self-seeking inclinations and their resultant evil antagonism generate morality seems not persuasive in the front of historical evidences. Kant argues, “The antagonism of [men’s] hostile attitudes will make them compel one another to submit to coercive laws, thereby producing a condition of peace within which the laws can be enforced” (“Perpetual” 113). However, historical evidences in modern times, especially, the first and second World Wars, have showed that a regulation of the antagonism of hostile attitudes in a society entails a more increased hostile attitude against neighbor societies. In fact, it is one of the main reasons why the concept of progress is not easily applicable to international relations even if some societies attain some progress within their social systems. The historical evidences have showed that the constitutional development of one society seems to presuppose to magnify the conception of external enemies, that is, the threat of other societies. Thus, the concept of citizenship—being a member of a constitution—has been always related with the concept of security: “security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from citizens of other states” (Krause and Williams 43). World peace seems to mean the non-existence of external threat, that is, the destruction of the presupposition of the constitutional development of one society. And thus the constitutional development of one society seems adverse to world peace, contrary to Kant’s claim. In fact, even though Kant provides empirical evidences to prove the claim, he basically argues that “it is quite irrelevant whether any empirical evidence suggests that these plans [Nature arranges and plans that antagonism educates man’s morality]...may be
unsuccessful” (“Theory” 89). As Kant insists, the fact that something has been unsuccessful does not justify that it will be also unsuccessful in the future. But this Kant’s proper insistence does not declare the irrelevance of empirical evidence to a theoretical claim.

This paper examines why Kant adopts antagonism as the main means for completing morality in human history. The paper will provide two overall reasons. First, antagonism is adopted to solve one of the most difficult problems, the problem of moral motivation—how reason, a pure and formal concept, lacking all material grounds for attracting man’s action, can *interest* man. The problem is intrinsic in Kant’s metaphysics of morality which presupposes the dichotomy between pure formal and conceptual ‘reason’ and material ‘desires’ or ‘inclinations’ and which seeks the ground of morality solely from reason. Second, his world view shared with the mainstream of modern thinkers, for example, Newton, Darwin, and Marx—that antagonism, rather than cooperation, is the main source of natural or social order—seems to lead Kant to claim that antagonism generates morality.

I. Antagonism as a Way for Formal Reason to *Interest* Material Inclinations

The problem of moral motivation—how morality or reason motivates man—occurs when it is assumed that moral judgment is never grounded upon moral sentiments or feelings. From this conception of moral judgment, there occurs a possibility that moral judgment does not give rise to actions, that is to say, that a person can accept a moral principle without any tendency to act in accordance with it. To the question of how morality or reason motivates man, in his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle argues that the *habituation* of virtuous actions moulds a person’s special state of character, moral virtue, in which his emotions in connection with pleasure and pain are responsive to reason. For Aristotle, the truth of moral judgment has a ground from reason which is totally distinct from emotions and desires, which are non-rational and thus
interrupt the working of reason. But for Aristotle, man always acts in accordance with certain desires and emotions, and thus conflicts between desire and reason must be solved. Man’s emotions or desires and moral principles become harmonious, Aristotle argues, when he obtains a right state of character, virtue, by the repeated performances of virtuous actions. Here, Aristotle *merges two totally different things*, emotions and rational moral judgment, into a moral disposition, moral virtue: a virtuous person has an emotional motivation, pleasure, in acting in accordance with moral principles. And during the mergence, good generates morality.

Kant distinguishes duty from virtue. For him, the moral worth of an action lies entirely in its being done out of a sense of duty. For Kant, the moral worth of an action has nothing to do with what kind of the state of character a person has: for Kant, “we can do our duty without loving, and even whilst hating, humanity” (Körner 131), as long as we totally submit our inclinations to reason and duty.\(^2\) Kant accepts Aristotle’s distinction between desires and reason but does not accept his virtue theory.

For Kant, morality and its basis, reason, and inclinations are totally different: while morality and reason are purely formal and abstract, priori to concrete experiences, and thus do not set any material and concrete objects as their ends, inclinations has concrete contents as their ends. And for Kant, they belong to totally different worlds: while morality and reason belong to the noumenal world, inclinations belong to the phenomenal world. How totally different two things, belonging to totally different worlds, influence each other? It is the same question as Aristotle’s

\(^2\) Kant says, “If we ask: What is the aesthetic character of virtue—so to speak its temperament—is it courageous and so joyous, or anxious and depressed? Then an answer is hardly necessary (qtd. in Körner 131).
Kant insists that reason and morality have the capacity to immediately stimulate a moral sentiment for letting man, a dual being belonging to the noumenal world and at the same time to the phenomenal world, act in accordance with moral principles. As Kant says,

In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone prescribes the “ought”, it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty, and thus there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with its principles (“Groundwork” 106).

Kant calls the moral feeling, which reason stimulates, ‘respect’ for moral laws. He says, “[L]awgiving reason…forces from me immediate respect. Although I don not yet see what this respect is based upon… (“Groundwork” 58). But As Körner says, Kant’s statement that respect for moral laws is a motive for adopting them may seem incompatible with his central thesis that moral laws determine the will immediately (163). According to the central thesis, as long as the will is affected by emotions or desires, the will loses its autonomy; and thus, “the will of every rational being imposes upon itself, without having to put underneath it some incentive or interest as a basis” (“Groundwork” 93). If it is assumed that the feeling of respect is the effect of the will’s determination of adopting moral laws as one’s principle of action rather than its effect, the incompatibility disappears. Thus, Kant says, “This [moral] feeling is therefore not the cause but the effect of the will’s determinant” (“Theory” 68). However, we have been looking for the motive and cause of the will’s determination of adopting moral laws as one’s principle of action. If respect is not the cause but the effect of the will’s determinant, the Kant’s notion of respect still cannot give a satisfactory answer to our search for the motive and cause. If so, let us assume that the feeling of respect is the cause or motive of the will’s determinant. Since the will must not

3 In fact, the whole tradition of materialism and idealism, which assumes the metaphysical dichotomy of idea and matter, has to face this question, but seems to fail to successfully respond.
lose its autonomy and since the feeling of respect originates from the presence of pure formal moral laws, the feeling of respect must be different in kind from all desires and inclinations which set material objects as their ends. Thus, Kant argues:

The will...must have motives. But these are not objects of physical feeling as predetermined ends in themselves. They are none other than the absolute law itself, and the will’s receptivity to it as an absolute compulsion is known as moral feeling (“Theory” 68).

If the moral feeling which moral laws stimulate is different in kind from all physical emotions and desires, the problem of moral motivation—how morality, an purely ideal and formal concept, interests or stimulates the physical desires and emotions—still remains unsolved. In fact, in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant argues the impossibility of explaining the problem: “for us human beings it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as law and hence morality interests us” (“Groundwork” 106). Because “where determination by laws of nature ceases there all explanation ceases as well, and nothing is left but defense” (“Groundwork” 105) and because the noumenal world is beyond determination by laws of nature, Kant argues, it is impossible for us to explain how reason and morality interest man’s inclinations. Thus, in the work Kant argues that he defends, rather than explains, the fact that reason and morality interest inclinations.

However, in his political writings, for example, *Perpetual Peace* and *Idea for a Universal History*, Kant explains, rather than merely defends, how reason interests inclinations. He argues that reason makes use of man’s self-seeking inclinations as an instrument to realize itself in history. Universal violence and distress, which are cause by men’s inclinations, Kant argues, eventually make people decide to submit to reason. Kant’s argument is as follows. Men’s self-seeking inclinations aim to benefit material ends, such as happiness, money, glory, and honor. When antagonism caused by men’s inclinations reaches a certain degree in which antagonism
between men’s inclinations render almost null and void the aim of men’s inclinations, men are compelled to give reason a free hand to master self-seeking inclinations.

As said, Kant does not accept Aristotle’s virtue theory. A problem in Aristotle’s virtue theory is that as long as reason and morality are purely formal and abstract concepts, morality is not be a disposition which can grow through the repeated performances of virtuous actions; and as long as reason and morality are totally different from desires and emotions, morality cannot be harmonized with desires and emotions. In Kant’s explanation of how reason interests inclinations, antagonism can serve as a means for generating morality without referring to man’s moral disposition or moral virtue. Kant says:

And as far as reason is concerned, the result is the same as if man’s selfish tendencies were non-existent, so that man, even if he is not morally good in himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen (“Perpetual” 112).

Adopting inclinations and antagonism as a means for realizing reason, he no longer claims that reason immediately interests us. Even if Kant expresses that reason ‘uses’ antagonism between self-seeking inclinations as a means, reason does not immediately force inclinations subject to moral laws; rather, inclinations submit to the control of reason by themselves because the unlimited pursuit of inclinations becomes reverse to the aim of the inclinations. Differently from his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in his political writings Kant tends to highlights that reason lacks the capacity to realize itself in practice because it is a purely formal concept, saying that reason is “so admirable in itself but so impotent in practice” (“Perpetual”

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4 As said, the relation between idea and matter is one of central problems intrinsic in the whole tradition of materialism and idealism, which assumes the metaphysical dichotomy of idea and matter. As said, Aristotle challenges to Plato: how matter and idea influence or have a relation with each other if matter and idea are totally different? Aristotle seems to fail to solve the problem, and in his moral theory he argues that formal reason and material emotions can successfully have a harmonious relationship.
To sum up, as long as reason and morality are purely formal and abstract, priori to concrete experiences, and thus do not set any material and concrete objects as their ends, morality cannot be a man’s disposition or man’s character: it should exist externally to man’s character as coercive duties or laws. And as long as reason and morality are totally different from desires and emotions, morality is not something which can be harmonized with desires and emotions. Thus, as long as it is assumed that reason and morality are purely formal and abstract concepts, the Aristotelian explanation of the growth of morality by virtue of character seems logically inconsistent. Kant’s moral theory maintains its logical consistency, when he argues that morality exists as coercive duties or laws, externally to man’s character, and when he argues that inclinations submits themselves to reason rather than get harmonized with it. Thus, Kant defines morality as “a collection of absolutely binding laws by which our actions ought to be governed” (“Perpetual” 116). For Kant, the completion of a constitution is the completion of morality. And the evil antagonism of men’s hostile selfish-doings compels men to establish a constitution and submit themselves to it.

However, it is very doubtful whether the completion of a constitution will give birth to moral man and moral world society. As said in the introduction of this paper, the historical evidences seem to show us that the complete development of morality in Kant’s meaning—the complete development of a constitution—is adverse to world peace: although evil-doings and

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5 Hegel permits reason to have the capacity at the end of its dialectical development. Mere conceptual reason at the beginning eventually transforms itself into the Absolute Spirit by dialectically contradicting itself with its opposite, the passion, and by overcoming the contradiction. At the beginning the mere conceptual reason could not attract or control its opposite, the passion. But because the simple fact that mere conceptual reason stands against the passion allows a dialectical development, from the standpoint of the Absolute Spirit at the end of dialectical development all fruits of the dialectical development are eventually proved to be the cunning of reason.
antagonism generate morality in Kant’s meaning, they do not seem to bring about true world peace and true morality. It seems that morality can earn its true dignity when it pervades in a society which does not have external coercive laws and legal systems.6

If morality is grounded on moral feelings, the problem of moral motivation will not occur. Why morality should not be grounded, for Kant, on moral feelings? Essential to morality is, for him, universality with which moral principles are to hold for all rational beings without distinction and thus with which moral principles give the clear distinctive judgment between virtue and vice to an action. “Without it[universality], there can be no justice” (Kant, “Perpetual” 125). Kant argues that all empirical principles, which are grounded on special constitution of human nature or on contingent circumstances, cannot furnish the universality. The universality can be discovered, for Kant, only a priori within reason. By the same logic, the reason why morality should not be grounded on moral feelings is, for him, that moral feelings “cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil” (“Ground” 91), because they are subject to a

6 Also, consider art or technologies. Can we assume that technology developed under antagonism constitutes a proper condition of man’s moral life? Mumford’s view is very interesting and thought-provoking: he regards the industrial revolution not as a development but as a transformation of the character or spirituality of technology from polytechnics, which is not easily expressed in terms of abstract formulas within a textbook, into monotechnics, which is easily formulated in abstractive terms. According to him, modern mechanical technology is a perverted way of manipulating and dominating concrete life-process by continuously reducing concrete qualities of life into a simple quantity. The mechanization of the production process seems the product of a peculiar habit of thought or attitude toward nature and society. As Daniel Bell argues, “Industrialization did not arise with the introduction of factories, it ‘arose out of the measurement of work. It’s when work can be measured, when you can hitch a man to the job, when you can put a harness on him and measure his output in terms of a single piece and pay him by the piece or by the hour, that you have got modern industrialization’” (qtd. in Marcuse 29). The nature of modern mechanical technology is a reflection of human aggressiveness, according to Mumford: mechanization from the outset has always accompanied warfare; in fact, warfare had given rise to mechanization and hastened the pace of it (Look Mumford 145-53). And the aggressiveness of modern mechanical technology against Nature has been clearly revealed by an active response by Nature. So, if we follow Mumford’s argument, we can expect that for the age of universal peace the character of technology should be changed and that thus the significant part of the existing technology should be replaced with new polytechnics. Mumford’s argument refutes Kant’s claim. Peace, rather than antagonism, seems to have been a main necessary element in human history allowing man to observe and learn how nature works and to adopt it to develop various polytechnics.
subjective interpretation. Moral sentiments, he argues, cannot bring about justice. For Kant, justice must be grounded on the universality capable of being equally applied to everybody and independent of subjective interpretations and empirical experiences. And inclinations, desires and emotions, because they are subject to a subjective interpretation, cannot become disinterested and cannot have the universality, and thus they inevitably bring about evils.

Kant’s notion of the universality of social laws has the same image as the Newtonian universality of the laws of nature has. Kant argues:

The validity of the will as a universal law for possible actions has an analogy with the universal connection of the existence of things in accordance with universal laws, which is the formal aspect of nature in general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed thus: act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature (“Ground” 86).

According to Kant’s universal laws, like the Newtonian natural laws, there is no exception to causality, that is, “everything which takes place should be determined without exception in accordance with laws of nature” and with laws of society (“Ground” 102). Thus, for Kant, freedom is not an exception to causality; rather it is a special kind of causality which leads man to be free from the laws of desires in phenomenal world and to impose on man himself the immutable laws of reason which allow no exception. That is to say, freedom is an autonomous ability to give oneself moral immutable laws which man ought to obey without exception and without distinction.

However, modern physics, especially, quantum physics, disputes the Newtonian universality of the laws of nature: it finds that the laws of nature are statistical and that in a limited way each atom has its own freedom enjoying an exception to external causality. Here, Kant’s analogy of his laws of morality with the laws of nature breaks down. However, Körner argues that the
statistical conception of natural law cannot dispute Kant’s universality of moral laws because social order requires all men to do their duty simultaneously and continuously, that is, because social laws cannot allow an exception and distinction (155) and because social order requires an absolute distinction between virtue and vice regarding an action. However, it seems doubtful whether a moral code strictly holing for everybody without distinction and exception is truly moral in every circumstance. For example, if everybody refuses to give a food to a young boy who has not eaten anything for ten days and if thus the boy steals an apple, he would be judged, according to the Kant’s universality of the moral law “Don’t steal others’ possession”, that he commits evil-doings and would deserve to be punished. Do we have to apply the moral law to the boy without exception and distinction?

And the meanings of moral universality for oneself and against others seem to have to be different. As Kant argues, when a person applies morality for oneself, he must strictly go beyond mere his selfishness and earn universality. But when a moral code is applies against others, we should not claim the same strictness of universality: the spirit of compassion and generosity seems to have to be prior to the spirit of justice. Strict but minimal universal laws are sure to contribute to establishing and managing a huge social mega-machine like a modern nation; but it seems doubt whether the laws and their resultant social mega-machine are truly moral.

And Kant’s universality does not admit the possibility of more than one system of morals. He insists that every country must be founded upon a republican constitution for perpetual peace and that only the republican constitution is pure in its origin, springing from the pure concept of right (“Perpetual” 99-100). However, the clam to universalize and impose a certain type of political form on the inside and outside of western countries has caused one of great historical
violence, one of greatest immoralities.\(^7\) 

Moral acts must obtain universality; but the meaning of the universality seems to be different from that of Kant’s universality. It seems that the meaning of universality in morality must be ‘universal’ and at the same time ‘particular’, even if this claim sounds strange. Here, unconscious and vague moral feelings can be reconsidered as a ground of morality. A Chinese Confucian Mencius (孟子) argues that morality comes from our deep and vague moral feelings or mind. An instantly reflective moral act well reveals these moral feelings. As Mencius exemplifies, when a person rescues a child who is about to fall into a well, he does, not because he consciously knows that to rescue is in accordance with the universal moral principle, but because he has a instant feeling flowing from inner deep spirituality, a feeling which is too vague to give a rational description in a human conscious level and too instant to give the person conscious reflection for matching his maxim with universal moral laws. Psychologist Jung finds that man has collective, \textit{universal} and \textit{impersonal} unconsciousness, \textit{identical in all individuals} (43). And he finds that when it reveals it is not merely universal but also particular obtaining a specific form of revelation in accordance with a specific circumstance and in connection with the nature of the person’s consciousness.\(^8\) It seems that psychological development gives us an opportunity to reconsider Kant’s claims about moral feelings—that moral sentiments cannot

\(^7\) It is surprising that the war against Iraq is backed and justified by the firm belief in the universality of a certain type of political form, republics or democracy. When Bush said he planned to back democratic movements around the globe in his inaugural speech, his nation was fighting in Iraq for democratic freedom. He said in the speech: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands … the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world … so it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (\textit{The Globe and Mail}, Jan. 21).

\(^8\) The realization of morality grounded on the collective and universal unconscious moral feelings in history is a difficult task. Great religions, for example, Buddhism, have been still trying to realize this difficult task.
furnish universality; that moral sentiment is not the cause of will’s determinant but its effect; and that all physical sentiments inevitably bring about evils.

II. A World View that Antagonism Rather Than Cooperation is the Main Source of Order

A world view that antagonism rather than cooperation generates order in nature and society has held sway in modern times. For example, one of the most popular scientific revolutions in biology, Darwinism, assumes that the universe is a scene of perpetual struggle and suffering and that natural selection, a harsh and purposeless process, is driven by the perpetual struggle. And one of the most acknowledged scientific revolutions in physics, Newtonian physics, assumes that the struggles, that is, actions and re-actions of counter-forces which universal gravity entails produce perturbations but eventually reaches to an order, the universal laws of gravity. And one of the most well-known scientific revolutions in social theories, Marxism, assumes that class struggle is the historical driving force which leads human society to the most developed and peaceful stage. Also, Kant is among them. He writes:

If I look at the rancor, at the violence, at the riotous scenes in a drop of matter and then lift up my eyes to behold the vastness of space, teeming with worlds as with grains of dust—no human language can express the feelings which this thought evokes in me, and the subtlest metaphysical analysis must yield to the peculiar majesty and dignity of such a view (Pre-critical writings 117 note).

Kant sees the dignity of order through struggles, violence, rancor, and riots. For him, they are neither mere chaos nor leads to a mere disaster; rather they produce the dignified order of nature. This world view seems to be one of the reasons why Kant claims that self-seeking inclinations and their resultant antagonism generate morality. Kant furthermore argues that self-seeking inclinations which is the cause of struggles, violence, rancor and riots in human history are good themselves because they realize the purpose of nature, as he writes: “[T]he very impulses which
are blamed as the cause of vice are good in themselves, fulfilling their function as abilities implanted by nature” (“Conjectures” 228). He introduces a concept of equilibrium to his moral theory. As antagonistic energies of matter—actions and reactions—are ceaselessly at work and reach to equilibrium, Kant argues:

The resultant evils [coming from hostile wars between states] compel our species to discover a law of equilibrium to regulate the essentially healthy hostility which prevails among the states and is produced by their freedom…a principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions of these energies (“Idea” 49). It only remains for men to create a good organization…in such a way that their self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby neutralizing or eliminating the destructive effects of the rest (“Perpetual” 112).

Beside the question whether the equilibrium which antagonism brings about is morally good order or not, the process of reaching to the law of equilibrium, that is, the process in which men are compelled to give reason a free hand to master self-seeking inclinations, entails the difficulties of the first imposition of the law. Because the process of transforming from self-seeking inclinations to a submission to the law of equilibrium, for Kant, must nullify the energies of self-seeking inclinations overflowing beyond the laws of equilibrium, the process is necessarily forceful and requires an additional unifying cause which forcibly imposes the laws on people. As Kant argues,

Since an additional unifying cause must therefore overrule the differences in the particular wishes of all individuals before a common will can arise, and since no single individual can create it, the only conceivable way of executing the original idea *in practice*, and hence of inaugurating a state of right, is by *force*. On its coercive authority, public right will subsequently be based (“Perpetual Peace” 117).

The additional coercive unifying cause cannot help being a person or persons. Because the imposition of universal moral laws does not benefit the self-seeking inclinations of the imposer,

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9 Kant’s justification of nature’s purpose within antagonism is another form of Christian theodicy. Christian theodicy tries to reconcile the goodness and justice of God with the existence of evils in the world.
the imposer must be himself purely just transcending his self-seeking inclinations. Kant argues, “Man is an animal who needs a master. For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. …Yet the highest authority has to be just in itself and yet also a man” (“Idea” 46). Because the highest authority also has his self-seeking animal inclinations with which he exempts himself from the laws and misuses it, he cannot be just in itself. Kant continues that thus the process is “the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea” (“Idea” 46-7).

In fact, the idea that life is a constant struggle for existence is in itself very problematic: it ignores that all struggles in nature take place within a wider context of cooperation; and it ignores that when struggles and conflicts take place beyond a wider context of cooperation their resultant seemingly dynamic development is eventually proved to be harmful to life as we witness in disasters which modern technology and modern territorial national states bring about. Also, in reality, the idea that life is a constant struggle for existence has constituted the psychological reason for the dramatic increase in the aggressiveness of modern men—See a figure attached at the end of this paper. Someone might argue that the dramatic increase of aggressive in modern times proves the idea to be right. But this argument ignores that man’s aggressiveness above all depends on the psychological interpretation of otherness which has almost nothing to do with the objective characters of otherness. When someone interprets otherness as full of struggles and threats, his attitude against otherness takes either of two extreme forms—extreme passive submission or extremes aggressiveness.

As we examined why Kant argues that antagonism generates morality, we have tried to briefly look at some problems in his arguments—whether antagonism really has generated or
will generate morality; whether the completion of a constitution will give birth to moral man and moral world society; problems of the universality of social laws; a problem of Kant’s claim of physical moral feelings as the source of evils; and difficulties of the first imposition of the laws. Similar problems seem to exist in different forms and with different importance within all the traditional metaphysics of morality which presupposes the dichotomy between pure formal and conceptual ‘reason’ and material ‘desires’ and which seeks the ground of morality from the pure formal and conceptual reason. Among the traditional metaphysics of morality, the logical consistency of Kant’s moral theory seems remarkable. I think that it is the reason why Kant’s moral theory worth reading: reading Kant seems a door to look at the possible whole picture of a moral theory. Also even if I briefly suggested that unconscious and vague moral feelings can be reconsidered as a ground of morality, this brief suggestion—also our brief examinations of some problems in Kant’s arguments—was a mere means for our deeper reflection on Kant’s moral theory.


As you see, the index of the European bellicosity has dramatically increased since around the 12th century. And the index of the European bellicosity in the 20th century has increased by 171 times that of the 12th century. Aggressiveness seems to be the trade mark of the modern world.

*Figure 5.1 European Bellicosity Index*

* Number of wars weighted by duration, size of fighting force, number of casualties, number of countries involved, and proportion of combatants to total population.
** Data for the twentieth century cover the period until 1938 only.
SOURCE: Sorokin (1962) reported in Wright (1964: 56).