The United Nations in Post-War Bosnia

The United Nations In Post-War Bosnia

By Jason Meade
MA in International Political Economy
21 May 2001
6,500 words

I. The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War
   A. Srebrenica
   B. The End of the War and the Dayton plan
II. Problems of the UNTA
   A. Politics
      1. the logic of ethnic cleansing
      2. the illogic of UN administration
   B. Economy
      1. the effects of politics on economics
      2. the question of state-owned assets
      3. the UN’s economic stewardship
      4. the UN’s “hot money” problem
   C. Security
      1. Brcko
      2. foreign forces
III. Conclusions
   A. Summation
   B. Recommendations for Bosnia
   C. Broader Implications

This essay will look at some of the problems associated with the United Nations transitional administration in Bosnia. It will begin with an overview of the UN’s involvement in Bosnia from the time of the first war of Yugoslavian succession. The first section will give a brief description of the UN’s wartime involvement in Bosnia. The role of the UN in Srebrenica will then be explained. Finally, the end of the war and the structure of the transitional period will be outlined. The second section will examine some of the most important problems associated with the UN’s administration in Bosnia. This section will be divided into three parts, each looking at a particular aspect of post-war Bosnia in light of the UN’s actions and inactions. The final section will sum up the information given in the paper. It will make some specific recommendations for the UN in Bosnia. It will also point out some of the broader implications of UN transitional administrations in general.

I. The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War
The UN’s involvement in Bosnia began with the collapse of communist Yugolsavia in 1991. This precipitated a series of wars of which the Bosnian war was one. It was initially a war between the predominantly Muslim government of the seceding republic, and rebel Serbs who wished to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Subsequently the war widened to involve fighting between rebel Croats who wished to become a part of Croatia, rebel Serbs, and Bosnian government forces. The driving ideology of the Serb and Croat armies was the concept of “ethnic cleansing.” In Bosnia this was an attempt to forcibly separate the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural population of Bosnia into homogenous ethnic enclaves.
Into this situation stepped the UN, which imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia in 1991 via UN Security Council resolution 713 (covering all of Yugoslavia, including Bosnia). The effects of the embargo fell largely upon the legitimate government forces in Bosnia. The UN also sent in peacekeeping troops and set up refugee safe areas in several parts of Bosnia. But, as Edward Luttwak points out (1999), “(UN peacekeeping) Unit commanders…habitually appease(d) the locally stronger force” which did not make strategic sense, but only reflected a determination to avoid conflict and casualties among their own personnel.

A. Srebrenica
The stand-out event of the UN’s involvement in the Bosnian war is the fall of the safe area of Srebrenica in July of 1995. The safe areas were designated as refuges for non-combatants and locations for the distribution of humanitarian aid. “The inhabitants (of Srebrenica) believed that the authority of the UN Security Council, the presence of peacekeepers, and the might of NATO airpower would ensure their safety. (Office of the Secretary General, 1999)” However, when Serb forces entered the town they met no resistance from the UN peacekeepers. The Serbs then depopulated the town within 48 hours. Reports of a massacre involving at least hundreds and possibly thousands of non-combatant deaths at the hands of Serb forces surfaced within days and are still under investigation. The following quotes from a United States Congressional inquiry into the events surrounding the fall of the safe area give an idea of the UN’s behavior:

Mr. SMITH (Congressman from New Jersey). Let me ask just one final question. Why do you believe the U.N. peacekeepers and the UNHCR did not insist that the Muslims be evacuated through their good offices or on their trucks and buses rather than allowing the Serb captors? I mean, did they just trust Mladic, that somehow he was going to act benignly toward the Muslims, or was it just incompetence, or worse?

Mr. Hasan Nuhanovic (former translator, U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Srebrenica). I think that they just didn't care. According to what I have seen there, I can give you many details but it would take a long time. The Dutch soldiers, the representatives from MSF who were there, and also UNHCR representatives who were there for maybe 1 or 2 hours while this was happening in Potocari didn't show an interest in protecting the civilians at all. I mean no one has shown any interest at all. Everybody just waited to pack up his things and leave. That's all. And leave that hell on earth.

Ms. JAGGER (Executive Director's Leadership Council, Amnesty International). ….But more extraordinary than that is the Dutchbat transferred 30,000 liters of fuel to the Bosnian Serbs in accordance with Mladic demands. The Dutch were fueling the very vehicles that Mladic used to bring the executioners to Potocari and the buses that brought the victims to the killing fields simply because General Mladic demanded it. “The Bosnian Serbs held 55 Dutch personnel in Braternag,'' wrote General van der Wind. That is the excuse that he gave why they were cooperating with the Serbs in such a way.
(Subcommittee on International relations, 1998)

B. The End of the War and the Dayton plan
    The war came to an end when a combination of factors, including a Croatian counter-offensive against Serb positions in eastern Croatia, and a campaign of NATO airstrikes against Serb positions in Bosnia, finally convinced the Serbs to come to the bargaining table. A peace plan was adopted by all sides in Dayton, Ohio, USA on November 21, 1995. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords mark the end of the shooting war in Bosnia and the beginning of the United Nations transitional administration.
    Under the terms of the agreement Bosnia remained a single state within its pre-war boundaries. The overall government of the country was given over to a rotating, three-person, ethnically based presidency, a parliament, constitutional court, and central bank. The central government was given very limited authority. Most powers were reserved to the two sub-state governments known as the “entities.” These are the Muslim-Croat “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the Serbian “Republika Srpska”. The Muslim-Croat federation covers 51% of the territory of Bosnia, and the Serbian Republic covers the remaining 49%. Each entity retains its own army, although in practice the Muslims and Croats both maintain separate forces. However, the highest power in the country belongs not to any of these governing bodies, but to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (or SRSG). The SRSG and his Office of the High Representative are vested with the powers to legislate by decree, and remove from office any Bosnian officials at his discretion. Likewise the highest enforcement body in Bosnia is not a Bosnian institution, but the IFOR/SFOR NATO-led peacekeeping force. Together the OHR and SFOR form the United Nations transitional administration for Bosnia ("The General Framework Agreement", 1995). Other United Nations transitional administrations include the current operation in East Timor (UNTAET), and past operations in Cambodia (UNTAC) and Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) in Croatia. A transitional administration essentially acts either as a government (as in the case of East Timor), or performs some governmental functions (as in the case of Bosnia) in areas where the indigenous population is temporarily unable to perform the actions required of it.
    The transitional administration was originally authorized by the UN Security Council via Security Council resolutions 1031 and 1035 in December 1995, and is currently authorized through June 21, 2001. The UN’s mission in Bosnia is to implement the Dayton Peace Plan which has nine essential goals:
1. Create a new multi-cultural, multi-ethnic country on the territory of the old Bosnian state
2. Establish democratic elections
3. Abide by international human rights standards
4. Allow freedom of movement throughout the country
5. Return displaced persons and refugees
6. Establish joint public corporations
7. Protect national monuments
8. Arrest war criminals
9. Evict foreign soldiers
("Is Dayton Failing?", 1999)

In addition, the UN appears to have taken on the tasks of:
1. Restoring peace and the rule of law
2. Assisting in reconstruction and self-government.

II. Problems of the UNTA
The United Nations transitional administration in Bosnia has been beset with problems over the half decade of its existence. This section of the essay will describe some of the most pressing of these problems under three main headings: A. Politics, B. Economy, and C. Security.
A. Politics

   1. the logic of ethnic cleansing
   The overriding political problem is that the UN has accepted the logic of ethnic cleansing as a given. The evidence for this is clear. As David Campbell points out in his book National Deconstruction (1998, pg. 226), “(The international community), by reducing all combatants to equivalent ethnic factions and proposing settlements on the basis of cultural and territorial separation, have been equally dominated by the ethnic-nationalist exclusions they are seeking to ameliorate.”
    This fundamental conceptual problem has colored all the actions of the UN in Bosnia. The multi-ethnic communities the UN is charged with recreating came into being under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system of governance, wherein the basic governing unit was non-territorial and based on communities of faith, rather than ethnicity. However, viewed through the prism of ethnic nationalism, plans to mimic such communities become much more difficult to conceptualize and implement. Again quoting Campbell (1998, pg. 229), “Thus Germany, one of the Contact Group members to have witnessed the Dayton agreement, began forcible repatriation of some 300,000 Bosnians from Munich, on the grounds that they can return to “Muslim” areas in the federation regardless of whether they ever lived there.” This policy is non-sensical from the perspective of recreating Bosnia’s ante bellum social environment. But it makes perfect sense to a policymaker who accepts the ideas of ethnic exclusivism.
    The second problem is that the both the Dayton plan and the subsequent UN implementation of that plan have served to entrench ethnic divisions in Bosnia. The Dayton plan itself was deeply flawed in its acceptance, via article III and article V, of ethnic divisions wrought during the war. Over the past several years the UN’s interpretation and implementation of the Dayton plan has served to magnify these flaws many times over. For example, the UN has acquiesced to a virtual abandonment of annex 7 of the Dayton plan, concerning refugee return. An International Crisis Group report writes that “it appears that some international agencies responsible for implementing DPA, such as SFOR, have chosen the path of least resistance and distanced themselves from playing a role in its implementation….thus playing to the ethnic cleansers. If the current slow pace of return continues, the last Bosniak will not return to the Republika Srpska until the year 2117. ("Is Dayton Failing?", 1999)” This has helped to maintain a very unstable situation throughout the country for the past half decade. Frustration and anger with the effects of ethnic cleansing and UN administration continues to simmer. As this example shows, the UN and agencies acting under its aegis are working counter to their own stated goal of recreating a multi-ethnic state.
    The third problem in this area is the Bosnian constitution. The constitution was adopted as part of the Dayton agreement (annex 4), and signed under Western and UN pressure. This document not only enshrines many of the basic tenets ethnic cleansing, it creates permanent incentives for ethnic separatism. The upper house of the Bosnian parliament is required to contain 15 delegates: five Croats and five Muslims from the Muslim-Croat federation, and five Serbs from the Republika Srpska. The Muslim-Croat federation is awarded twice as many seats as the RS, based on the fact that it has twice as many (recognized) ethnic groups. The lower house of the parliament also awards the Muslim-Croat federation twice as many members as the RS, although the ethnic composition is not specified here. Finally, the presidency is also ethnically based, with one representative from each of the main ethnic groups.
    It is difficult to overrate the destructiveness of this constitution. In the first place, it effectively disenfranchises every other ethnic group living in the country. According to the U.S. Bosnian Embassy webpage (2001), this amounts to 7% of the total population (see figure 1).
Figure 1

(source: Bosnian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 2001)

It further effectively disenfranchises anyone from a major ethnic group who happens to reside outside his or her designated area. A Serb can never be a federation president, nor can a Croat ever be a RS president. The constitution creates an institutional dynamic for maintaining ethnic divisions. This dynamic is reinforced by the extreme weakness of the central government. Most important functions of government are reserved to the sub-national governments, referred to as the “entities.” These entities owe their existence to the idea of ethnic exclusivity. And yet, they are given control over the armed forces of the country, and control substantial powers of taxation. Article III.2.a of the constitution explicitly grants to the entities “the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states…” This is a partial legitimization of the original goal of the ethnic separatists: union with either Serbia or Croatia proper. So, it is clear that the vision of bringing back Bosnia’s multi-ethnic past has yet to find many real supporters in the UN or the international community at large.

    2. the illogic of UN administration
    The second set of political problems concern the UN’s method of promoting a democratic environment. Among the transitional administration’s goals are to create a democratic state and assist the Bosnians in building capacities for self-governance. However, one of the most noticeable features of the UN’s civilian administration is its reliance on rule by decree. As noted previously, the SRSG was vested with the highest level of governing power in the country. Over the years, different SRSG’s have used this power to fire presidents of Bosnia and ban political parties, to impose a currency on the country, and to impose a privatization plan. On one day in December 2000 (Besson, 2001), the SRSG issued eleven new decisions either amending or imposing an array of laws on economic matters.
     While such actions may be expedient, it is hard to see how they are useful in the promotion of democracy or self-government. For example, to quote from the “Decision imposing the Law on the Flag of BiH- 3 February 1998”, the SRSG writes “the Delegates have shown themselves lacking in the courage to take a binding decision on the important and sensitive issue of a common flag for Bosnia and Herzegovina…. I hereby decide that the Law on the Flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina… shall enter into force with immediate effect.(Westendorp, 1998b)” This same formula is found throughout the SRSG’s body of decisions. It is part of a very simple cycle. First, Bosnian legislators either refuse to cooperate, or else can not reach an agreement. Second, the SRSG imposes a solution to the problem. Then the cycle repeats. The Bosnians do not learn how to co-operate or run their own government, and ultimate authority is exercised by an unelected UN administrator.
     Finally, there is the issue of creating a settled, predictable political environment. Although the SRSG has not been averse to stepping in to the day-to-day affairs of various aspects of Bosnian government, his actions have not tended towards any particular goal. While some government administrators are removed from office for corruption, others are left in place. It is not clear who will remain in office and who will be removed, or when this will happen. Furthermore, the SRSG is often unable to enforce his removal orders due to the lack of assistance from SFOR. This further clouds the situation. Parallel administrations are also a problem. It is true that the SRSG has taken action in at least one case, when he abolished the Serbian Municipality of Skelani, which had been carved from Srebrenica during the war (Petritsch, 2000a). But again, there is no way to predict when an administration, or an entire municpality may be abolished or altered in terms of governing structure, responsiblities, or even geographical extent. Such circumstances work against the UN’s goal of contributing to the reconstruction of the country.

B. Economy
Bosnia today has an unemployment rate of around 50%. The number of displaced persons is also about 50%. According to a UN survey 60% of young people want to leave Bosnia (Country Profile, 2001). Corruption is rampant among Bosnian government officials. The level of economic activity is very low, and the country relies on monetary inflows from international organizations and foreign governments. The transition from a communist economic structure is still in its early stages ten years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. The Bosnian Embassy’s webpage (2001) reports that per capita GDP is $880. In short, the Bosnian economy is in a shambles.

1. the effects of politics on economics
Over the past six years under the UN, Bosnia has made very little progress on economic matters. The reasons for this can be traced directly to the unsettled state of politics in the country. Without a predictable form of government, foreign investors are extremely reluctant to become involved in the country. In a recent report (EBRD, 2001), the EBRD wrote in regards to the investment climate in Bosnia that,

The institutions both at state level and at Entity level leave much to be desired.
Administration, law enforcement and judiciary are marked by a lack of impartiality,
accountability and transparency. Arbitrariness of conduct seems to be the general
rule. Political interference in court decisions is rife. The lack of effective inter-entity
legal co-operation between law enforcement, administrative and judicial authorities of
both Entities constitutes a serious impediment to advancement [of private investment].

2. the question of state-owned assets
The question of formerly state-owned assets is the second major economic issue facing Bosnia today. Under the SRSG’s decision of 28 July 1998 (Westendorp, 1998a) which imposed a privatization framework on the country he wrote that the OHR “expressly recognises the right of the Entities to privatise non-privately owned enterprises and banks located on their territories.” However, under the decision on the re-allocation of socially owned land of 27 April 2000 (Petritsch, 2000b) he declared that most state-owned property could not be “be disposed of, allotted, transferred, sold, or given for use or rent, by the authorities of either Entity or Bosnia and Herzegovina” without a written waiver from his office. This stop-and-go approach to privatization has done little improve the economic climate in the country.

      3. the UN’s economic stewardship
     As these decisions demonstrate, the UN, as the highest legal authority in Bosnia, has played an integral role in keeping the Bosnian economy in a state of flux. The uneven application of these decisions adds even more uncertainty to the economic environment. Other aspects of the SRSG’s economic stewardship of the country are also questionable. For example, in the last two months of 2000, the SRSG imposed a package of economic reforms designed in part to “meet the demands of the international financial institutions working in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Besson, 2001)” The IMF is explicitly mentioned as one of these institutions. While the IMF is apparently well intentioned in its policy recommendations for economic reform, it has drawn growing criticism for lack of success of many of those reforms.(Ivanovich, 1998) The decisions imposed by the SRSG appear to rely more on the “one size fits all” advice of international creditors like the IMF than on any in-depth consideration of the needs of the Bosnian people or economy.
    It is morally questionable for an unelected UN administrator to obligate a poor country to foreign debt, and alter the economic landscape in accordance with the wishes of international creditors, not just without the input of the population, but in opposition to the actions of the population’s elected representatives. Again this problem harks back to the political problems in the country. If the elected representatives of Bosnia do not pass legislation which the SRSG wishes to see enacted, he enacts it anyway. But, at least one alternate interpretation of the Bosnian failure to enact legislation desired by the SRSG is that they do not want it. In addition, the lack of Bosnian action on the SRSG’s prescriptions may not signify a “lack of courage” on the part of the Bosnians. It is at least conceivable that the Bosnians have genuine concerns with the substance of the UN’s economic reforms.

4. the UN’s “hot money” problem
Finally, the UN’s sudden and disproportionate infusions of funds into the local economy create a problem similar to the “hot money” flows which led to the East Asian financial crisis. Relatively large amounts of money can flow both into and out of the economy without warning and seemingly without reason. The UN frequently pays above market rates for local goods and services, as well for the salaries of foreign personnel. This creates immediate distortions in the market. This problem was also reported in the UN’s operations in Cambodia in the early part of the decade (Findlay, 1995). SFOR has also played a part in this process. According a report from the International Crisis Group ("Is Dayton Failing?", 1999), “SFOR is paying rent to local authorities for properties which, under the DPA, they should be able to use for free.” And not just any rent, but hard currency paid in cash to local officials. The growth of illegal activities and services has also been attributed to the presence of highly paid international workers and soldiers. The most notorious of these “services” is prostitution. Madeleine Reese (McGhie, 2000) of the UNHCR has explicitly made this connection by stating that the presence of the international community “creates the market” for trafficking in women and prostitution in Bosnia. Taken together all of these activities appear to have a significant, if localized, effect on the economy and society of the country. And there is one last problem with these cash infusions. There is no guarantee they will continue. Local economies that have begun to settle in around the international community’s funds are liable to collapse whenever the international community decides to pull out of the country. This may very well leave some areas in positions little better than the ones they occupied at the close of the war.

C. Security
Many of the problems mentioned in the first two sections represent different expressions of the same underlying dynamic at work in the country- flux. The economy is in flux, the laws are in flux, the forms of government are in flux, the status of displaced persons is in flux. Everything seems to be up in the air. Very little has been resolved since the war. Again quoting Edward Luttwak (1999),

“The Dayton Accords have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps. With combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely. Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies.”

The truth of these words can be easily verified. As mentioned in section II.A, each of the main combatants from the last war continues to maintain its own separate standing army. Most of the refugees of 1995 remain refugees today. Many of the gains of the ethnic cleansers are still in place and opposed by moderates on all sides, and yet ethnic extremists are still not satisfied with the situation. And the fixed assets of the state have yet to be distributed to the population.
Part of the blame for this rests with SFOR which has been very reluctant to put the full weight of its authority behind the SRSG. Following the tradition of the war-time peacekeepers, SFOR has frequently declined to put itself in harms way to enforce the Dayton plan. This has been noted by the authors of the International Crisis Group Report ("Is Dayton Failing?", 1999 and "Turning Strife to Advantage", 2001), and is obliquely acknowledged by SFOR itself which considers that part of its mission to “provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities. (SFOR Informer Online, 2001)” This selective support has certainly done nothing to make the SRSG’s already selective interventions any more effective.

    1. Brcko
    The Dayton plan and the UN administration seem to epitomize the erroneous idea that a successful compromise is one in which no one is happy. Indeed, this conception of compromise seems to have been the guiding principle behind the UN’s arbitration of the status of the city of Brcko, potentially one of the most explosive security problems in the country today. The city of Brcko is located at the “pivot point” of the Republika Srpska. The two arms of the republic narrow down to a small corridor around the city before widening out to the northwest and southeast. A glance at a map of the region (Figure 2) is enough to show the vital strategic position of the city in RS calculations. Without access through Brcko, the northwestern half of the republic would be cut off from the southeast and squeezed between the Muslim-Croat federation on the south and Croatia on the north. This is clearly not in the interests of the Serb government (Anonymous, 1999a). On the other hand, the Muslim-Croat federation, wary of renewed Serb aggression would like to see the RS made as weak as possible. Serbs claim the city by right of occupation, by virtue of its proximity to Serb held areas, and because of its strategic position in the RS. The Muslim-Croat federation claims the city on the basis of its ethnic make-up which is primarily Muslim and Croat.
    Under the terms of the arbitrators decision ("Statute of Brcko", 1999) the city was made a condominium of the two entities. The decision calls for joint control of the city. The city and its surrounding area are made a demilitarized zone. Unlike the central government, the government of Brcko is not divided up according to ethnic considerations. And yet Brcko remains a problem. Most importantly, in military terms the RS has been nearly split in two. Both sides are prohibited from stationing forces in or near the city, and the movement of military forces through the area is under the discretion of the municipal government and the central government, where the Muslim-Croat federation has been given twice the representation of the Republika Srpska. These restrictions weigh much more heavily on the RS than on the federation. It is likely that the situation will remain under control for the duration of the UN administration, but once the international community leaves conflict may to break out again. The UN’s apparent strategy of preventing open conflict and waiting for the passage of time to repair the wounds of war is unlikely to work in this case. Given the on-going regional tensions and the unresolved conflicts in Bosnia, threats to the integrity of the RS are not going to be dismissed any time soon.

Figure 2.

(source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, The University of Texas at Austin, 1997)

2. foreign forces
Adding to the potential security problems in the country is the presence of outside military aid and foreign forces. Despite the fact that the Dayton plan called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces by the beginning of 1996, many foreign soldiers remain in the country, and outside military aid has remained a major source of training and equipment for Bosnia’s various armed forces. One rather blatant example of foreign soldiers remaining in Bosnia came to an end only in March of this year (Kroeger, 2001b). The Serb village of Bocinja, inside the Muslim-Croat federation, was occupied at the end of the war in late 1995 by foreign Mujahideen fighters working with the Bosnian government. They took over the village and lived there unmolested until last July. Upon being informed of their impending eviction from the village, they blocked the roads into the area and vandalized the buildings they had been occupying. Following their eviction in March of 2001, many of the soldiers moved to nearby areas, while others remain in the village legally even today. This is not an isolated episode and the continued presence of foreign extremist soldiers is not a factor contributing to the reconciliation of the various Bosnian communities.

III. Conclusions

A. Summation
    This essay has recounted a number of low moments over the course of the UN’s involvement in Bosnia. During the war, the UN placed an arms embargo on the country which prevented many people from defending themselves against military aggression. The UN also sent in peacekeepers to protect the civilian population. But as the Secretary generals own report concludes, “the problem, which cried out for a political/
military solution, was that a Member State of the United Nations, left largely defenceless as a result of an arms embargo imposed upon it by the United Nations, was being dismembered by forces committed to its destruction. This was not a problem with a humanitarian solution. (Office of the Secretary General, 1999)”
    In the post-war period, the UN took on the roles of implementing the Dayton plan and helping Bosnia become a normal member of the international community. However, as this essay has shown, the UN has been at the helm of an erratic and aimless administration for half a decade. The war’s legacy of economic and security problems has become entrenched under that same administration. The Dayton plan remains largely unimplemented and Bosnia still seems far from having a robust capability to order its own affairs.
    These issues have been enumerated, not to denigrate the UN, but to point out that they are not isolated incidents. The UN has been consistently unable to effectively fulfil the role of crisis manager and transitional administrator in Bosnia. A recognition of this deficiency on the part of the UN is vital to crafting more effective responses to similar challenges in the future.

B. Recommendations for Bosnia
The Bosnian experience highlights some obvious areas for improvement of UN operations. First of all, the UN needs to have a clear plan of action, particularly when it is taking on a task as vital as national administration. In the future the UN should have an explicit, identifiable goal for its activities. As a transitional administration, it must have something towards which it is transitioning. Even on paper the Dayton plan lacks this key element, since there is no criteria by which to judge whether or not the mission has been successful or not and no timetable for its completion. The UN must also devise a set of specific, publicly declared milestones. These will help to keep the administration focussed and will allow both the UN and the world at large to judge the performance of the UN. In addition, the transitional administration should have a set of guiding principles, a systematic method of operation to help it resist the fleeting demands that buffet every administration in its day-to-day operations.
In general, the UN needs to be more consistent. It should limit its supervision to a narrower range of subjects and supervise those subjects more thoroughly. The current method, which resembles spot-checking more than supervision is clearly not working. The transitional administration should also be firmer and more constant when it exercises authority. This requires a greater degree of co-operation between the OHR and SFOR which can provide the enforcement power which the Office of the High Representative alone lacks. Finally, the UN administration needs to be much faster in its work. These kinds of glaring problems must be solved more quickly if the transitional administration is to lead to the creation of a peaceful and responsible country.

C. Broader Implications
    These observations about the UN transitional administration in Bosnia provoke some broader philosophical questions, which I would like to mention in parting. One is the question of accountability, the other that of obligations. On the question of accountability, my primary concern is: “Who does a transitional administration work for?” Does a transitional administration work for the host country, and pursue its interests even if those interests might not coincide with the interests of the international community? Or, does it work for the UN? If this is the case, then whose interests should prevail when there is a conflict- those of the host country or those of international community? A more specific question, already broached in a previous section (II.B.3) looks at foreign debt. Can an unelected UN administrator take on foreign debts on behalf of a country that will very likely have problems paying back those debts in the future? This leads to the final accountability question. Where can the citizens of a host country go to seek redress if they disagree with the actions of the UN administration? Using the example of international debt, what could the people of Bosnia do to oppose these actions?
    Regarding obligations, the most important questions seem to fall on the obligations of the UN towards the host country. Exactly what obligations does a transitional administration have towards the people it assumes authority over? Must the UN fulfil the obligations it originally accepted? In the case of Bosnia, the parties to the Dayton plan ceded a great deal of power to the UN with the expectation that it would use those powers to implement the peace agreement. But what happens when the UN can’t fulfil its obligations, or when the goals it has agreed to work towards prove unrealistic and unattainable? Finally, what happens when the UN starts to create new problems? What happens when, as Madeleine Reese pointed out, the UN’s presence creates a market for human bondage? Or when the UN’s actions cause an increase in turmoil and strife? What obligation does the UN have to protect people from itself?
    These are questions that have come to the surface in the course of the research for this essay, but I have found few answers. Like the concept of the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group, many members of the international community appear to have taken the concept of international administration as a starting point, rather than a point of contention and study. But the utility and the morality of transitional administrations has not been proven, and needs to be explored more fully if these governing bodies are to be forces for peace and progress in the world.

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11. Besson, Daniel; (January, 2001); “Economic Reform and Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)”;
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Economic Newsletter of the Office of the High Representative Volume 4, Issue 1;
http://www.ohr.int/newsletter/eco-0401.htm

12. Bolwby, Chris; (1 August 2000 ); “Bosnia’s curious currency”;
London; BBC News;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/from_our_own_correspondent/newsid_859000/859819.stm

13. “Bosnia and Herzegovina (political map)”; (1997);
The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection;
Austin, Texas; University of Texas at Austin
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/europe/Bosnia_Herzegovina_pol97.jpg