A firm alliance
Marked in the personal life, the emperor tried to make the good of his country.
Austria, beaten by Prussia in 1867, had lost large part of its own international
prestige and above all it was surrounded by hostile nations. To South, Italy and
the Ottoman Empire, to East Russia, to West Germany. Yet, Francis Joseph succeeded
in uniting, denying his political detractors that painted him as an incompetent,
really with the two nations that had defeated him in 1866. It is useful to speak
first about the alliance with Germany.
The pact of alliance with the uncomfortable neighbor was more a matter of personal
liking than of political reason. In effects, until Bismarck and the King of Prussia
William were in life, Germany was seen as a harsh enemy. Only with the death of
the Prussian sovereign and the succession of his child William II, the things
completely changed.
This man was very younger than Francis Joseph was, yet the old emperor saw
in him the prototype of the good sovereign. He embodied the three principles,
which, according to the Hapsburg's thought, imperial dignity was founded on: austerity
of the person, respect of the traditions, straight and correct government of the
people. William II possessed, in effects, such qualities and Francis Joseph was
irresistibly attracted from him. The accord of friendship and mutual defense involved,
however, some serious consequences on international level. Indeed, the enmity
between Germany and Russia could not bear an alliance with Austria, therefore
the czar himself refused to renew the not aggression pact that existed with Vienna
reviving the danger to the Austrian oriental frontiers. Besides, Germany and Austria
had contrary affairs for that that it pertained to the foreign politics. While
William II was pushing for a widening of the frontiers in Alsatia and overseas,
in Africa, Francis Joseph didn't have any interest in the colonial expansion because
the limited Austrian navy power let the emperor slant for a strong continental
power, to earn against the Ottoman Empire.
From the moment that the Austrians and the Russians had an enemy in common,
the Turks of course, a wise line of foreign politics would have advised to maintain
good relationships with the boundless Muscovite state. Instead, a similar behavior
was completely avoided. To entangle the relationships with Russia the Russian-Japanese
war of 1905 came. The czar in his run of conquest toward the Pacific Ocean had
met with the dawning military power of the nation of the Rising Sun and he was
defeated. The let-down immediately limited for some years the actions of Russia
and this fact let Austrian diplomats believe that the alliance with Germany had
revealed the correct way to safeguard the affairs of the Hapsburg's empire. Nevertheless,
after that brief period of inside and outside discomfort, czarist Russia returned
to dream a new expansion, not more toward East, where Japan had shown itself stronger,
but toward West against the Turks and, indirectly, the Austrians.
William II was seen by the world as a man sure of the strength of his own nation
and ready to let hear his voice anywhere he thought that German affairs could
exist. Was it a real knowledge of the potentialities of Germany or entirely a
bluff? Truth could reside in both answers. Germany was economically and militarily
less strong than the couple of allies France-Great Britain and it needed an external
support to sustain the challenge launched from Paris and London. An ally that,
however, it was neither too strong nor too intrusive.
Austria was the ideal, because it was in a phase of decadence, but he preserved
a great military force and, besides, the scarce interest for the colonial conquest
removed a competitor in the hoarding of the African raw materials. The liking
that Francis Joseph felt towards the Kaiser was, therefore, only an advantage
that added it self to the precise wish of William II to maintain the alliance.
The weakness either of the Austrian empire either of its emperor was shown for
several times on diplomatic level in every occasion of crisis that there was since
1905, year of the Conference of Algesiras, when in Vienna they were slavishly
followed the decisions that had been taken in Berlin. The destiny of the two central
powers was indissolubly tied.
A strange alliance
Of other kind, they were the relationships with the other nation included in
the Triplex Alliance that is to say Italy. It was inserted in the agreement of
friendship with Austria and Germany for a motion of resentment towards the traditional
ally that was France. The Italian government in the last two decades of the nineteenth
century had undertaken a politics of colonial expansion in Africa, choosing Tunisia,
that is few hundred kilometers far from Sicily, as privileged territory of political
infiltration. In 1881, taking advantage of some serious financial crisis of the
Sultanate of Tunis, the transalpine state succeeded in imposing its own protectorate
on that state. Italy felt itself betrayed and, after having cooled the relationships
with Paris, it had decided to sign in 1882 a pact of defense with the Central
Powers that would have been more times modified and undersigned.
This way, Austria and Italy were technically allies. Nevertheless, the relationships
between the two nations were always few friendly. Francis Joseph had personally
met Umberto I and Vittorio Emanuele III an only time and straight for that that
it concerns the latter one, the meeting had happened during Empress Elizabeth's
funerals. The Austrian emperor had never returned the visit in Italy for motives
of foreign politics. According to his thought, a Catholic emperor would never
have been able to visit Rome, the capital city of the Kingdom of Italy, but also
the Pontiff's center, without outraging the Vatican, still enemy of the Italian
laic state. Despite these premises, Francis Joseph and Vittorio Emanuele III repeated
their own mutual trust in the respective allied, either publicly either privately,
at least according to what is told from Margutti. If the same feelings had driven
the actions of the two governments, probably part of the errors that would have
conducted to the First World War they would have been avoided.
On one side, the Prime Minister Giolitti wove contacts and meetings with France
and Great Britain, on the other, Aehrenthal did not lose occasion to create attrition
with Italy. It is just the figure of this man to rise, in negative, above all
his contemporaries. In only five years of power, from 1906 to 1911, he succeeded
in alienating every friendship for Austria and to damage that only good that it
still preserved on international level: the respectability. From a man of recognized
intelligence and diplomatic acumen it would be due to wait well other, but so
it was not. We see in synthesis what his errors were.
The Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the 1878 Berlin agreement was
occupied by the Austrian troops. Formally, sovereignty was of the sultan, but
the direct control of the territory was in hand of Vienna. In 1907-08, Turkey
was crossed by great political changes with the ascent to the power of the Young
Turks that pretended to bring the Ottoman Empire to the past memorable deeds.
To get these, the jurisdictions that the foreign states had on their own citizens
in Turkish territory and the control that those same nations had on cities and
regions Turkish traditions had to be eliminated. To try a reapproaching with the
new Turkish rulers, Aehrenthal proposed a plan of economic helps that foresaw
the construction of a railway line that crossed the province of Novibazar in the
Kossovo and it continued then up to Istanbul. It was enough to make public the
project (that was never completed) to instigate an uproar. In the agreement of
alliance with Italy, in the paragraph 7, it was expressly anticipated that the
two nations cannot do actions of expansion in the Balkans and the construction
of the railroad was seen as an encirclement of Serbia in sight of its subjugation.
Of the same opinion of Italy, Russia also was. Aehrenthal had been ambassador
of Austria in that country and he believed knowing the mentality of the czar and
particularly of his foreign minister Izvolsky.
The two men met on September 15 1908 in Buchlau, during a Conference of which
written documentation doesn't exist. From some testimonies can be deduced that
Aehrenthal offered free transit to the Russian fleet through the Dardanelles in
exchange for the permission of the czar to commit a clearly illegal action according
to the Agreement of Berlin and that is the official annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
to Austria. Izvolsky denied more times to have given his consent, neither unofficially
neither officially, but It is a fact that Russia didn't move a finger to prevent
the transfer of Bosnia to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
The violation of two international agreements (the 1878 Berlin agreement and
the pact of alliance with Italy), it put in crisis diplomatic relationship with
Italy. Only the lack of true alternative avoided the denunciation of the pact
of mutual defense. If possible, the affront done to Italy in 1911 was still greater.
It was in a war against Turkey to take possession of Libya, considered the only
valve of outlet for the Italian commercial overproduction. During the whole conflict
that was long and hard for both contenders, either the German ambassador in Istanbul
either the Austrian one instigated the sultan to extend the war with every mean,
arriving to the point to forage the Turkish military restocking. Francis Joseph
affirmed more times in public not to understand for which reason his government
had such a behavior towards an ally, but his contrariety stopped to the words.
Italy that had never borne friendship with the old enemy in its lower classes
of the population, was estranged from it in a definitive way.
A missed alliance
Between 1905 and 1908 and in small measure between that year and 1910, for
Austria was also opened the street of a third alliance that would have changed
deeply all continental equilibrium. In 1901 Queen Victoria of England had died,
with whom Francis Joseph had had formal relationships only and her son Edward
VII had gained the throne. The intelligence and the political sagacity of the
new sovereign fascinated the Austrian emperor in the same measure, which William
II had succeeded in. Until 1904, this “elective” affinity between two
rulers had limited to an exchange of courtesies as the request of military suggestions
that the English king, younger and respectful of the experience of his interlocutor,
submitted with more and more frequency to Francis Joseph. Starting from the remembered
date Edward VII took habit to spend the summer in Austria, in the famous thermal
place of Marienbad. The visits were always in private form and they were repeated
for some years. Every time that Edward came in Austria, he required an interview
to Francis Joseph in his summer residence of Ischl. We know, thanks to the testimony
of Margutti that in 1905, during the Russian-Japanese war, the two sovereigns
spoke lonely, without any retinue, for a whole afternoon.
The matter of their long talk was the same one of other informal meetings:
the possibility of an Austrian-English alliance. Indeed, in that year the situation
was looked out upon favorable to a similar hazard, because Russia had been sonorously
beaten from Japan and therefore it didn't constitute a serious threat. Which were
the advantages that Great Britain could get from an alliance with Austria-Hungary?
Substantially only one, but of vital importance. If Francis Joseph had surrendered
to the flatteries of Edward VII, Germany would have found again completely encircled
and reduced to a more difficult position. The accord had great possibilities to
verify until 1908, when Aehrenthal with his rashness, succeeded in the difficult
assignment to transform to the English eyes the docile Danubian monarchy in an
expansionist and colonialist nation. In addition, in the moment of the Bosnia's
crisis, Germany never abandoned the ally, showing itself as a trusted friend.
Francis Joseph saw in that behavior the confirmation of his personal trust in
William II.
Some doors remained still open until that Edward VII was in life. To his death
in 1910, the successor George V interrupted every attempt to attract the Austrian
emperor from his own part. This way the positions were crystallized, on one side
France and Great Britain tied by the cordial etente (cordial agreement) to which
Russia would be added soon, on the other one, the Triplex Alliance, lame for the
hostility of Italy.
Sarajevo: the fatal hour
The Balkan's equilibrium, precarious for nature, were irreparably broken during
the wars that in the period 1912-13 saw firstly the small Slavic nations of that
region to unite against the Ottoman Empire and then to fight among them for the
division of the territories conquered to the Turkish enemy. From the chaos of
the war a nationalistic and strong Serbia was born thanks also to the support
of Russia. In the years before the first world conflict, the politics of the government
of Belgrade was not very dissimilar from the behavior of Italy. It supported with
every mean the irredentism of the populations of Slavic language that lived inside
the Hapsburg's empire, to concretize that dream of Great Serbia that would have
stain with blood good part of the twentieth century. If Vienna could also bear
a light interference in its own inside business originated from an ally as Italy
was, nobody would ever have borne a similar behavior from the intrusive Serbia.
The personal relationships between Francis Joseph and Peter Karageorgevic, become
king of Serbia after the assassination of Alexander Obrenovic, would not have
been able not to be worse even in time of war. The emperor considered the Serb
sovereign as an adventurer without scruples. Yet, it was necessary to cohabit
with the uncomfortable neighbor.
It was really to damp the ardor of the Slavic irredentism that it was organized
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand's trip to Sarajevo, in occupied Bosnia. The heir
to the throne had never been very nice to the old uncle Emperor. Certainly, they
shared same conservative ideas, but Francis Ferdinand exposed them with a slowness
that irritated the illustrious relative. To increase personal antipathy, there
was also the obstinacy with which the Kronprinz had pretended to marry the countess
Sophia Chotek who, although of noble origins, didn't belong to that entourage
of ruling or princely families that preserved the right to unite in marriage with
the House of the Hapsburg. The imperial dispensation at the end had arrived, but
Sophia would never have been able to get the title of Archduchess, neither of
Empress. However, there was not this need, because his husband was murdered in
the Bosnian city during that official visit.
The organization and the improvement of the attack have some grotesque characters.
The assassins, six men, had the opportunity quietly to catch the train from Belgrade
to Sarajevo, without anybody searching them at the frontier. Princip, he, who
would have materially completed the assassination, already brought with himself
the gun that would have shot.
This was not necessary, since the first attempt to kill the archduke was done
with a bomb. One of the components of the armed group, Cabrinovic, in the morning
of June 28 1914, took the advantage of the Francis Ferdinand's habit to stay among
the crowd without escort to launch against his car a bomb that miraculously missed
only its target destroying another vehicle that followed it. The terrorist before
being lynched by the furious crowd, chose the death through a capsule of cyanide,
preventing the questioning that would have disclosed the presence of other anarchists
(or presumed such) ready to everything.
His personal fear and that of his wife Sophia didn't prevent Francis Ferdinand
to continue his own visit as programmed with a discourse to hold in the Town hall
of Sarajevo. It was the last time that he spoke in public. The good sense would
have advised to abandon the city as hurry as possible once dispatched his official
duty, instead it was agreed to change the itinerary of the crossing of the city
center. Here we can find the second farcical element of the tragic circumstance.
It was not told to the personal driver of the archduke about the change of the
program and to the exit of the Town hall he took the road programmed in the morning,
bringing back the unaware prince toward his destiny. Yet, Francis Ferdinand would
have been able to be saved, because the speed of the automobile was too elevated
to allow to shoot with precision, but the driver, once warned of the error, stopped
the auto to return back, just in front of the assassin Princip. Either the archduke
either his wife were shot to death, with marksman precision.
The Austrian nemesis
The consequences of the terrible act were not immediate. The Austrian-Hungarian
investigation revealed that some of the conspirators belonged to the Serb army,
but there was no way to connect the fact with a direct order deriving from the
high spheres of the government of Belgrade. Incredibly, the attack compacted all
populations of the Hapsburg's empire including those of Slavic origin that still
identified themselves in the figure of the emperor and so also in the Kronprinz.
In Vienna, the situation was very confused. After the funerals of the archduke,
it was summoned an extraordinary conference of the Ministers of Austria and Hungary.
In it two streams of thought were formed. The former considered absolutely necessary
immediately to punish with force Serbia for the affront. The latter still reputed
open the diplomatic road that would have had to conduct to the Serb humiliation,
but not with the weapons.
Promoter of the second conception was the Hungarian minister Tisza that could
count on the support of Francis Joseph. The old emperor, as we have remembered,
didn't feel affection for his nephew, and he was contrary to the war, for the
unforeseeable results. The military circles guaranteed, however, that a conflict
with Belgrade would have remained localized, without any intervention of the other
big powers. News is not had of which information founded such affirmations, yet
they had to have some base since they were also spread well soon among the population.
The great effort of the moderates driven by Tisza had success in delaying a
hasty decision so much that the works of the conference were extended for several
weeks. More the days passed more the position of the Austrian government worsened.
The indecision towards Serbia was exasperating the minds of the population that
felt it as a new affront. In front of the insistences of the “hawks”,
the delegation of Tisza had to surrender and to accept that an official communication
to Serbia with the Austrian-Hungarian requests was sent. The Hungarian minister
got from Francis Joseph that such communication preserved the name of diplomatic
"Note". The nominal pretense could not hide that the document was, in
conclusion, an ultimatum. This was inferred from the brief time for the answer,
only two days from the date of the delivery (July 25 1914) and from the tenor
of the content that was the following:
- Official condemnation of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Serb territory.
- Recognition from Serbia of the involvement of officers of the royal army in
the attack against Francis Ferdinand.
- The Serb government had to handle with the maximum quickness the institution
of a committee of investigation for the punishment of those military men who had
been recognized guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda. To the Committee would also
have participated some Austrian officials of imperial nomination.
- The authorities and the Austrian army would have participated in the repression
of the irredentist activity.
- The assassins that were refugees in Serbia (Tankosic and Ciganovic) had to
be immediately halted and the trial had to be developed in collaboration with
the Austrian judicial authority.
- The administrative officials that had publicly shown favor for irredentism,
had to be deposed by their charges with immediate effect.
- All the conditions of the Note had to be made public with an official communication
of the Serb government.
It is evident how whatever nation would never have been able to accept so great
limitations to its own sovereignty. The alternative was the war. A well clear
alternative to Serbia that the same day of the delivery of the Note, started the
general mobilization of the army. In Belgrade, they waited for an Austrian attack
few hours after the expiration of the term for the answer and they did not want
to waste time. If the military vertexes of the Slavic country had known in which
chaos the Austrian government was debated, they would have had fewer fears. Francis
Joseph had accepted to sign the Note only after ample guarantees that France,
Great Britain and Russia would have objected nothing. Instead, the rapid mobilization
of the czarist army allowed glimpsing a contrary solution. The Hapsburg's troops
were not ready. Only on 27 July a partial mobilization was ordered, recalling
to the weapons only enough men to face the enemy to South, leaving untrimmed the
oriental front. The emperor, badly advised, still believed that Russia would not
have declared war to Austria. In the night between 27 and 28 July, the last feverish
negotiations were developed to stop the conflict without results. The following
morning the declaration of war to Serbia became reality.
From the Memories of Margutti, we can draw a sentence of the count Paar, personal
collaborator of the emperor, that mirrors the feelings of many illustrious Austrian
political men of the time:” Everything this can be also right, but […]
at 84 years old he cannot undersign a manifesto of war!”
What followed that date, the speedy exchange of declarations of war among the
nations of the Entente and the Triplex, the general mobilizations of the populations
of the European continent and the massacres that started on the vast lowlands
of Europe is beyond the object of this writing and it won't be treated. We will
stop on the consideration that when on November 21 1916, the emperor Francis Joseph
died, he left Austria in a position of strength, in defense only on the Italian
front, but without worry. Russia had been chased away again by the territories
of Hungary of which it had taken possession in the first months of war and Serbia
was on the point to capitulate. New allies (Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) had
strengthened the Central Powers and the future seemed rosy. He never knew that
on July 28 1914 he had signed the sentence to death of his own nation.
Drawing up a balance sheet of the life of Francis Joseph can be difficult.
His kingdom lasted 68 years, studded of wars and destruction. Personally, he loved
peace, but he was forced more times to the violence and the war from an old conception
of the international relationships. Was he a good head of government? We cannot
affirm it. Was he a good sovereign for his own people? Not even. However, It would
be unfair to see him as the ante litteram model of “Man without quality”
described by Robert von Musil. He was, above all, a man that bore personal pains
stoically and conducted Austria in the better way that the qualities given from
the Destiny, or who for it, allowed to him.
Sources and quotation: Albert Friederich von Margutti “The emperor
Francis Joseph", Fratelli Melita Publishing; Edward Crankshaw “The sunset
of an empire: the end of the Hapsburg.” Mursia Edition; Sergio Stocchi “Frank
Jo reigned for 68 years, but not in his own house.” Historia Quadratum Publishing.
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