"Small Titans" by Simone Pelizza
The first armored battle of the history during World War 1. The first clash
among tanks happened on the western front in proximity of Villers Bretonneux among
British and German units. The strength, the planning and the curiosities of the
invention of this modern weapon.
The situation on the western front
On March 21, 1918 the German army launched a large offensive on the Western
Front: at East, Russia, upset by the Revolution, had surrendered; this fact had
allowed the transfer of thousand of German soldiers to the Flanders and to occupied
Belgium, in sight of the last decisive attack against the Anglo-French defense
lines. The German High Command, driven by Feld-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and
by General Erich Ludendorff, was aware of the fact that the game had to be closed
as soon as possible: either Germany either Austria-Hungary, the Central Empires,
were next to an economic-social collapse, strangled by the deadly British naval
block; it was necessary to win the war as soon as possible by exploiting some
favorable situation happened in the latest week.
This "conclusive" feeling was also shared from the Allies. The long
and bloody conflict had exhausted France and Great Britain too. London and Paris
also wanted a rapid and victorious end of the war, otherwise they would have had
internal problems as in Berlin and Vienna. There was, however, a great obstacle
to this solution: the defeat of Russia forced the Allies to defend their own territories
against a stronger enemy with better human and military material. Only the intervention
of the United States, with their industrial power, could turn the events in favor
of the Allies; but the Americans, already at war against Germany since April 1917,
were still preparing their attack for Summer 1918. until that moment, English
and French had to fight alone. In a nutshell, during Spring 1918, Germany had
an important advantage for winning the war. France and Great Britain had absolutely
to withstand, but their conditions were extremely difficult.
The plan of the German High Command foresaw a large attack in the low hills of
the Flanders, to the north of Amiens. The objective was to break the front down
and to march in direction of the Channel; the conquest of this area would have
put in crisis the Allies, decreeing German victory. It was impossible that the
exhausted Anglo-French troops could stand a similar assault. However, this calculation
was wrong: when the offensive started, on March 21, Germans succeeded in letting
the adversaries withdraw for 80 Kms., but they could not achieve their initial
goals.
The BEF (British Expeditionary Force), though with heavy losses, succeeded
in maintaining the control of Amiens, as well as of almost all the principal roads
and railways. The German attack immediately risked getting into a defeat. Ludendorff,
following a suggestion of General von der Marwitz, decided to attack the small
towns of Cachy and Villers Bretonneux. A fake manoeuvre, without any important
objective, except confusing the Allies and dispersing their forces. Nevertheless,
the skilled German general didn't think about the possibility that such a simple
local action could change into a chance of forcing the front. This new, serious
evaluation error would have let the whole offensive fail and the definitive defeat
of Germany start. Yes, because Villers Bretonneux was an important road crosspoint:
because of the difficult situation, every point was vital for the Allies and it
has to be defended until death. The battle for this small town in the North of
France would have been, thus, hard and bloody. And it would have been an historical
milestone because Villers Bretonneux was the battleground of the first armored
battle.
The "land ships": the tanks during First World War
In 1915, the war on the Western Front had become a position type one. Thousand
of soldier, independently from their nationality, died in the trenches without
succeeding in doing some definitive attack against the enemy. It was an inhuman
and constant slaughter.
The British Navy was the first one to look for methods and means to break such
a catastrophic stalemate. The Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, call the
best military and civil technicians of his country for a solution. Among these
technicians there was also Colonel Ernest Swinton who had already served during
the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902). After careful reflections, he achieved the conclusion,
an absolutely revolutionary one, that only armored vehicles, propelled by an engine,
could overwhelm the hostile trenches and reopen the front. Despite doubts and
distrust, Swinton succeeded in attracting Churchill's attention about his unusual
intuition.
Studies, projects and experiments started. On January 6 1916, the first armored
tank did its first steps: the Big Mother, a vehicle with a 57 mms. cannon and/or
a machine gun, protected from a 10 mms thick plates. In few months, after having
sustained with success the initial tests, they were produced more than 100 "Big
Mothers". In September 1916, the tanks (or "land ships", because
they were realized and produced by the Navy according to precise naval criteria)
were employed for the first time on a battleground during the offensive of the
Sommes. Without cooperation, however, they were easily overpowered by the hostile
fire; despite the final failure, they succeeded, however, in breaking down some
points of the German trenches by overcoming, without problems, grids and obstructions.
The new weapon gained trust among the military high ranks. Special Armored
Head Quarters were founded, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles and Major
J.F.C. Fuller. Both men were active supporter of the armored tanks. After months
of hard job, Fuller succeeded in conceiving valid tactics of fight for the new
means; instead, Elles created a thicker armor (12-16 mms.) able to bear the bullets
of the enemy artillery. In spring 1917, two new armored models were designed:
Mark I and Mark IV. Some months later, the Whippet was completed, lighter armored
in comparison to the precedent models, but weaponed with the same armor of the
Mark IV and fast (it could reach 13 Km/h - for the epoch, an extraordinary speed).
All the vehicles had a 75 mms gun and at least four machine-guns.
During autumn 1917, Fuller launched a mini-offensive of tanks, next to the
city of Cambrai: this time, the tanks acted in group and they had to follow precise
directives. The results of the operation were amazing. The tanks overwhelmed the
German defenses and reached in a couple of hours almost all their objectives near
the city. The missing support of the infantry, nevertheless, prevented English
fully to exploit the success . But, by now, the way toward the armored war had
opened. At the beginnings of 1918, also the French had tanks (for example, the
light Schneider M16).
And the Germans? The battle of Cambrai was a shock for them. The defeat they
had had, however, didn't convince the High Command of the importance of the new
weapons. Ludendorff was suspicious and hostile toward the motor armored vehicles
for some time studied in Germany too. Despite the skepticism, he authorized the
construction of 100 fight vehicles : they were A7V, heavy and with few efficient
weapons (the principal gun was only a 57 mms one), but as fast as the Whippets
and with an impenetrable armor (30 mms. of thickness). Produced in December 1917,
they stayed inactive for weeks; the mistrust of the military high ranks was total.
Nevertheless, in April 1918, Ludendorff incredibly decided to employ them in the
diversionary manoeuvre towards Cachy and Villers Bretonneux. At that time, every
mean could be useful to win the war; but the supreme German commander continued
to look with contempt at the new weapons. His incapability to understand the real
qualities of the armored tanks would have conducted him to the defeat.
The battle of Villers Bretonneux (April 24, 1918)
On April 17, the German artillery started a heavy bombardment on Villers Bretonneux,
especially on the wood of Aquenne, a forest to west of the town where it had assembled
the based British principal contingent. The cannonade continued in constant manner
for seven days, provoking numerous wounded among the English. At 7.00 AM on April
24, four infantry divisions, covered from smoke produced from special bullets
and sustained by 13 A7V, attacked Villers Bretonneux and the Allied defenses near
Cachy. The apparition of the German tanks brought disarrangement and panic among
the defenders: the English, in fact, didn't think that the enemy could also have
their own armored vehicles (in precedence, the High German Command had effected
only some small operational tests using few English Mark IV captured during the
fights). Shortly, many British soldiers were mowed without pity from the machine-guns
of the hostile tanks, while the German infantry was neutralizing the survivors.
At 10.00 o'clock, only three hours after the beginning of the attack, Villers
Bretonneux had been occupied entirely and the A7V, followed by the infantry, had
broken the English lines down for nearly10 Kms., arriving to threaten Cachy from
south.
When news of the hostile assault came, the British companies that were present
in the Wood of Aquenne tried to reorganize themselves and to counterattack. In
the forest, there was a small armored detachment, composed by three Mark IV and
commanded by Captain J.C. Brown. One of the units was driven by Lieutenant Frank
Mitchell. Brown ordered to Mitchell to support the infantry that have to consolidate
its own positions in front of the enemy. Mitchell left with his vehicle in direction
of Cachy, also accompanied by other two tanks. After 45 minutes of marching, the
three armored vehicles finally reached the fighting sector. Unexpectedly, an A7V
crossed the road near Mitchell's vehicle; he had just seen a German tank! When
the surprise was over, the Lieutenant informed the other tanks about the news
and they started to pursue the enemy vehicle. For the first time, two enemy tanks
were facing in open field, the one against the other.
Colonel Biltz, who drove the A7V, saw the pursuers and it attacked with violence
the Mark IV of Mitchell, opening the fire with his 57 mms gun. The hit failed
and the English immediately responded, but they also missed the target. It began
long series of manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvre with mutual exchanges of hits,
but nobody succeeded in destroying the adversary. At the end of a charming duel,
Mitchell succeeded in mortally hitting the enemy tank. Biltz and his men abandoned
the damaged A7V and they joined their infantry. After having won his first fight,
Mitchell's Mark IV attacked other two enemy tanks that arrived during the previous
battle. Perhaps, frightened by the fate of Biltz's vehicle, the two A7V withdrew
from the scene : one of them, however, was stopped from a bullet of the British
artillery that destroyed a large part of its armor . After the new victory, Mitchell
helped the other Mark IV of his unit that were busy against the hostile infantry.
Shortly, the Germans withdrew. In the meantime, a recognition airplane informed
the garrison of Cachy that numerous hostile contingents were advancing towards
them, supported by many tanks. At Cachy, there was a small squad of Whippet, commanded
by Captain T.R. Price. He immediately took the initiative and left in direction
of the German assault troops; during the march, he was reached by Mitchell and
his vehicles. The Whippets and the Mark IV attacked the hostile infantry together
spreading death and terror. Though they lose some units, Price and Mitchell inflicted
heavy losses to the Germans and they forced them to retreat. In the pursuit, Mitchell
found another A7V: after a brief exchange of hits, the German vehicle withdrew.
Two-three hours later, Mitchell's tanks stopped its run: a hit of artillery, in
fact, destroyed completely its tracks. The untiring crew of the Mark IV went out
from the vehicle and reached a trench defended by British soldiers. The first
battle of the History among tanks ended.
During the afternoon on April 24, it was clear that the English had succeeded
in rejecting the first German mechanized assault of World War 1. This was not
only due to the courage of Mitchell and Price, but also to the ability of the
British artillery that continued to bomb incessantly the assailants when the situation
seemed seriously compromised. Several A7V had been destroyed or damaged from the
Allied artillery batteries. Then, although the Germans had succeeded in conquering
Villers Bretonneux, the Allied units near Cachy had held the ground very well.
On April 25, two Australian brigades supported from the aviation and from the
fire of the artillery, launched a sudden attack, re-conquering Villers Bretonneux,:
the further German movement in direction of Amiens failed.
Ludendorff didn't give too importance to the event; his attention was already
directed to other zones of the front. The German High Command continued to move
men and vehicles up and down along the French-British lines, launching useless
and bloody diversionary manoeuvres anywhere, hoping that the Allies dispersed
their own forces and allowed therefore a new breakup of the front, as it happened
in March. Such breakup of the front never happened; the Germans wasted precious
human and material resources, decreeing so their own defeat. At the beginning
of May, in fact, the offensive toward Amiens and the harbors of the Channel was
a complete failure. In summer, the United States concretely helped France and
Great Britain on the western front, and they could consider themselves as the
winners of the war.
Really, the failure of the German army was due to the incapability of its commanders
to assemble the efforts of the offensive attack on a single point: this would
have allowed a definite victory. If at Villers Bretonneux they had been employed
more men and A7V, probably the English units would have withdrawn and the road
toward Amiens would have been opened without too problems. The incapability to
understand the real potentialities of tanks by its own supreme commander was clearly
one of the most important causes of the final defeat of Germany.
The lessons learned during the battle
But which were the lessons of the battle of Villers Bretonneux for the two
contenders? Which lines would the following developments of the tanks have had?
The lessons of the battle were very important, but they were fully understood
only from the officers and from the crews of the tanks. The high command have
considered Villers Bretonneux a secondary battle, one among others during a situation
in progress. Instead, it was fundamental for the Future. Ludendorff and the principal
generals aside, a lot of German soldiers had finally realized the importance of
the tanks. But by now that discovery was too slow to upset the fates of the conflict:
the industry of the Reich was practically collapsing, and certainly it could not
face the French or English one (and American too). The development of special
antitank weapons was begun, with calibers between 13 and 37 mms.; these weapons,
palliatives for the absence of armored tanks, got also some good results in the
tests and in the real employment on the front. Serious studies about the tanks
and their different applications during a battle also started. The awareness of
its own errors brought Germany, in less than 20 years, to possess the most powerful
force of tanks in the world. An imposing and terrible tool, that the new Nazi
regime would have exploited in the most complete and merciless manner in its crazy
desire of European and World predominance.
As usual, the winners learn a lot less than the defeated enemies. After Villers
Bretonneux, Fuller and the Armored Corp were actively hocked for the search of
improvements for their armored vehicles. From these efforts, the Mark V was born,
the more advanced tank of the epoch. Armed with 2 guns from 57 mms. and 4 machine-guns,
faster and more resistant of its predecessors, the Mark V was the undisputed protagonist
of the Battle of Amiens on August 8 1918, when the Anglo-French-Americans troops
, with an amazing and vigorous offensive, broke the front and defeated the whole
German army. The new tanks overwhelmed the hostile positions opening a breach
40 Kms. long and 14 deep ; all this, in a brief amount of time. The offensive
battle near Amiens, leaded not only from the Mark V but also from the Whippets
and from the new French Renaults FT, marked the beginning of the end for the Central
Empires. Nevertheless, at the end of the conflict, tanks were practically abandoned
by the Allies despite the protests and the resistances of Fuller and Elles: in
the twenties, the experiments with the tanks in England were scarce, even if important.
The British High Command as the French one, judged negatively the tanks, in the
conviction that they were in front of a period of perpetual " peace "
(an illusion destined to be paid to an expensive price). Besides, it also weighed
the hostility of the infantry and cavalry commanders, desirous of maintaining
their own privileges. In this way, Great Britain and France recorded a new progress
in the development of dynamic armored forces, but to an inferior rhythm in comparison
to the equivalent German searches. In addition, the commanders were still educated
to antiquated strategic conceptions and tactics, unsuitable in front of the big
possibilities of the new vehicles. English and French Generals did errors similar
to those of Ludendorff, and they also paid a heavy price for this: during spring
1940, the Allied forces would have had one of the greatest disasters of the modern
military History, right in the same places that had seen them winning in summer
1918.
A small final curiosity: Mitchell, the hero of Villers Bretonneux, survived
to the war and wrote, in the twenties, a book about his war experiences. He also
sent, together with the members of his crew, a formal request to the Admiralty
to receive a money prize: their Mark IV, in fact, had destroyed an A7V at Villers
Bretonneux; the Royal Navy, from which the Armored Corp formally depended, gave
a reward to the crew of the ships that had sunk hostile vessels. But the War Office
refused the claim of Mitchell & co., judging a tank as "a land weapon"
that didn't have anything to do with the naval operations. Yes, the era of the
first "land ships" was really ended…
Sources:Article of J.H. Roberts on the monthly MILITARY ILLUSTRATED (title:
When Monsters collides), number 154 of March 2001. Kenneth Mackseys, "TANK
VERSUS TANK", Salem House Publishers, USA 1988 (published in Italy from Fratelli
Melita Edizioni with the title Carri Armati : gli scontri decisivi)B.H. Liddel
Hart, "The Real War 1914-1918", BUR 1999 (reprint).
Top of Page
|
