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Israel and the Yom Kippur Conflict

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After more than twenty-five years from the beginning of the fights, happened on October 6th 1973, the Arab-Israeli war called of the Yom Kippur in the Jewish country or of the Ramadan in the Arabic nations, has been commonly recognized as a point of turn in the relations between the Middle East states. The offensive of the Arabic nations started around midday with a surrounding maneuver that had the maximum effort by the Egyptians on the front of the Sinai and on the hills of the Golan under the Syrian command. The taking part of small military corps sent by Jordan, Iraq, besides the material support of Morocco and Algeria, immediately put in evidence the wish of the Arabic League to proceed to a definitive solution of the problem with the uncomfortable Israeli neighbor. The army of Israel, surprised by the attack during the festivities of Yom Kippur, it would have well soon find out that the enemy had learned the lesson imparted during the war of the six days, transforming itself in an efficient and well ornized war machine.

The Egyptians who had been the more harshly defeated during the preceding hostilities, acted with extreme hardness and agility, assembling their own attacks against the fortified line of Bar Lev. In only three days, they crossed the channel of Suez in ten points virtually destroying every resistance opposed by the Israeli armed strengths. The facility with which this could happen was due in maximum part because of the extreme accuracy with which they had prepared the plans of invasion through military exercises along the delta of the Nile. The military political decision to effect the attack was taken in November 1972, therefore straight with two years of advance. However, the great tactical experience would not have been enough to overpower the adversary if the Egyptian president Sadat had not gotten the strong Soviet support, which consisted in the supply of two categories of weapons that they immediately were revealed winning: the anti-aircraft missiles of the class Sam and the correspondent antitank of t class Sagger. Without the usual impunity of the Israeli Phantoms that had done what they wanted in the war of the six days, the land troops of Egypt could acquire a good advantage on the counterpart, threatening of annihilation the armored Centurions and Sherman of the star of David.

On dawn of October 8th, the Egyptians broke down the line Bar Levi, going to engage a hard battle of annihilation with the Israeli tanks for the possession of the Sinai. For six days, whole armored companies were sacrificed for preserving the initial advantage. Only toward on October 14th a certain stability of the front was reached, a situation that was decidedly disliked by Israel that considered fundamental to conduct a war of movement to counterbalance the enemy's superiority of men. Indeed, the war of trench was well welcomed by the Egyptian commands, because one of the pre-arranged objectives was to reconstruct a military credibility of Egypt for then to proceed to negotiations at political level from a position of strength.

On the highland of the Golan, the Israeli worries were greater. The immense desert vastness of the Sinai granted enough territory to reorganize the resistance and to get ready to the counterattack. Instead the Syrian front gave access to the heart of the Jewish nation, threatening the lines of command and restocking. On day 6th October a thousand of Syrian tanks had broken down the front in three points: in the north at Ahamadya, in the center in the zone of Hushniya and to south in the proximity of Rafid. The epic defense of the bridge of Bnot Yaakov near the Jordan well soon disenchanted the Syrian leader who in the first day of fight had tasted the possibility to reenter in possession of the territories, lost in 1967 during the war of the six days. On the third day the Israeli army, in concomitance with the arrival of strong reinforcements, led off the counteroffensive, succeeding in chasing away the Syrians on the positions of departure on October 10. Unlike the battles in open field that was developed othe Sinai, where the impossibility of aerial coverage favored the Egyptians, the conformation of the territory of the Golan already made difficult the support of the aviation, assembling the maximum effort on the armored divisions. Just counting on this fact the Syrians had lined up the new Soviet tank T-62, hoping that it was more effective than the Israeli Centurion was. Unfortunately it was had to show a vain expectation, since on the day 12th the Israelis entered in Syrian territory, occupying the place of Kuneitra on the road that brings to Damask, the capital city of Syria. With only few more than 35 kilometers of asphalt that separated them from the heart of the invader, Israel mysteriously stopped its march.

Contemporarily on the front of the Sinai, the Israelis had individualized, beginning since on October 14th, the Egyptian weak point, identified with the northern extremity of the big salty lake, point of conjunction of the II and III Armies of the Cairo. The zone had only defended by two brigades, one mechanized, the other of infantry. The fragile defense allowed the men of the general Sharon to throw a bridgehead beyond the channel of Suez. The defense of the conquered posting had extended for the whole following day, allowing to more than twenty thousand men and 400 tanks with consolidating the front. From a favorable position the counterattack stroke following two precise directions: to south toward Suez with the declared intention to encircle the III Army and toward north to isolate the II. Not too far from the attainment of the objectives there was the intervention of the Organization of the United Nations with the resolution 338 that proclaimed a cease-fire. The communion of intent shown in the occasioby the Security Council showed the wish of United States and Soviet Union to arrive to a solution of compromise. The two super powers had already intervened during the first days of the war with military restocking to the respective allied, but with the prolonged fights the situation degenerated and the conflict was growing without control. In fact Israel, seeing to be stopped while it was being about to gather an unexpected victory, refused to comply to the resolution of the UN continuing its own work of encirclement of the Egyptian troops.

On October 23rd, the III Egyptian Army could be considered encircled, while the II, thanks to the reinforcements quickly sent by the Cairo, it succeeded in not demoting from its own positions. It was evident that for the Egyptians the situation was critical. To avoid a crash that would have canceled him from the political scene, the president Sadat launched an invitation to the two superpowers, so that they were used for putting an end to the conflict. Rather than to improve the already strained relationships between USA and Urss, the request let fall the situation, because it seemed reasonable the possibility of a solitary armed intervention of the Soviet Union. At 11 AM on October 25th, President Nixon set in atomic alert all the bases of the European scenery. We succeeded in avoiding the atomic apocalypse thanks to the accord reached in the evening of the same day, in which Israel and Egypt agreed to depose the weapons.

From the military point of view the war was concluded with a clear victory of Israel, however from the exquisitely political point of view, the rulers of the Jewish state immediately realized the enormous cost that had had to sustain their country. The unpreparedness if not in some cases the ineptitude of the troops during the Egyptian attack had underlined the slow lying down in the carelessness of the army with the Star of David. The ability of resumption of the enemy had guiltily underestimated and even the Mossad that was reputed to be the better service of information in the world had neglected aside important signals of Egyptian and Syrian mobilization. It arrived even to declare that the leaders Mosha Dayan and Golda Meyer were to knowledge of the imminent attack, but that they did not activate themselves for taking suitable measures, confiding in the adversary shortage of the armaments. Only after having discovered the falsehood of such preconception they acted to throw in the fray all the available serves, creating the presuppositions, in case of defeat, of the disappearance of Israel as is independent state. On the internal front the incompetent political behavior was let pay during the following elections, where the Likud, the conservative party of Begin, won.
Instead, in Egypt the figure of Sadat rose to international profile, though before the war he was considered a simple petty politician. His role in the negotiations was of such importance to give great international credit that he spent with extreme success during the accords of Camp David that would have brought peace between his country and Israel.

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