The Battle of the Jutland by Simone Pelizza
The greatest maritime battle of World War 1
The First World War, fought essentially on land, reduced the importance of
the European military Navy, dominator of the world scene for all the19th century.
This was true above all for the British Royal Navy that lost its own position
of pillar of the international equilibrium. In fact, the immense conflict 1914-18
had destroying effects for the Great Britain, especially from the military point
of view: the entrance in war (August 5 1914) put in crisis soon the traditional
strategic conceptions of the government of London, based on the prominence of
the maritime element in comparison to that earthling one. In front of the successes
of the German military machine on the Oriental Front (battles of Tannenberg and
Lakes Masuri, August 1914) and on the Western one (until the battle of the Marne,
September 1914), the British Government chose a radical change, privileging the
army in comparison to the Marina. But also so the English unpreparedness to the
war was heavy, considering that they succeeded in mobilizing and sending to the
French front only five divisions, little outfitted and with scarce military technique.
To have a mostly elevated number of soldiers would have been necessary to introduce
the obligatory conscription, but this solution would have brought to strong popular
protests, since it openly violated the liberal tradition; so, it was decided to
continue with the voluntary enlistment, that however it succeeded in assuring
an insufficient contribution of men. The only less expensive option for London
stayed therefore in the Navy that was used in the total Block of every commercial
way toward Germany and Austria-Hungary, either in the Sea of the North either
in the Mediterranean. But Berlin had, in the scenery of the Sea of the North,
an ace up in the sleeve, to oppose with decision to such movement: the Kriegsmarine,
the second strongest fleet of the world (after the British one), constituted in
the last decade of 19th century for wish of the Kaiser and the admiral Von Tirpitz.
The Kriegsmarine had strengthened very much during the first decade of 1900, so
that at the beginnings of 1914 it could boast a substantial parity towards the
adversaries, either for number of unity either for technical quality. The Second
Reich could try to break the forced isolation with good probabilities of success
then.
The first clashes
As told in precedence, the principal theater of the war comparison they were
the waters of the Sea of the North where the there were the base-ports of the
two great battle fleets: the British Grand Fleet, commanded by the admiral Jellicoe,
at Scapa Flow, in the northern extremity of Scotland; and the Hochseeflotte or
Fleet of high sea, headquartered in the base of Jade, connected by the channel
of Kiel to the Baltic Sea, driven initially from the admiral Von Ingenohl. This,
however, revealed himself incapable to conduct German naval forces toward the
attainment of its own objective this is to say not the simple defense of the country's
coasts, but on the contrary the breakup of the English Block, finding in open
see the Grand Fleet and destroying it.
It was dealt with a matter tied up to political-strategic motivations rather
than economic-material reasons, because Germany could get raw materials very well
through the near neutral Countries, eluding therefore the maritime Block. But
it was essential, for William II, to also conquer the control of the water, interdependent
with that of the Land, in way to be able to face in benefited position the next
challenges of the enemy. The hesitant Ingenohl was quickly replaced with the most
experienced admiral Von Pohl who nevertheless was decidedly skeptic respect to
the potentialities of its own forces, and therefore he used it in few actions
of interdiction. For his fortune, English were not better from the point of view
of the command; the admiral Jellicoe was anything else other than brilliant, rather
his negligence invalidated the quality and the power of the Grand Fleet. Obsessively
tied to the power, mediocre and respectful, Jellicoe broadly showed to have neither
moral force nor strategic ability; his not quality would have brought to the worse
humiliations in the history of the Royal Navy.
Already in the August 1914 the first clash happened between the two contenders
near the island of Helgoland, English won and succeeded in sinking three hostile
cruisers. Frightened by the failure, the Germans made recourse to the submarine
succeeding in straining, in the following months, well six adversary cruisers.
The British losses resulted therefore more heavy in comparison to those Germanic;
besides, the battleship Audacious, one of the best ship of the Grand Fleet, ended
unfortunately in a mined zone near the Irish coast, suffering serious damages.
After this loss, the admiral Jellicoe, pressed by the criticisms of government
and public opinion, chose a "waiting" tactic, holding its own fleet
confined in the bay of Scapa Flow, sheltered from mines and hostile torpedoes.
It was create so an eccentric situation: the British admiralty terrorized by possible
ulterior serious losses, on a side, didn't allow its own ships to push up to the
hostile coastal waters, provoking so the reaction of the Hochseeflotte; on the
other side, also the Kaiser and the German admirals feared that their own war
ships could bring substantial losses, and so they waited for the favorable tactical
conditions to go down in open field. In poor words, for the Germans was up to
English to favor the clash, and for English was the contrary one: they would have
entered in scene only in front of a precise threat from the adversaries. This
way, during 1915, there was no or almost no movements in the Sea of the North,
frozen in a condition of maritime stalemate that was not of advantage to anybody
of the two contenders, especially to the Germans who suffered the restrictions
of the naval Block. The failure of the maritime war threw disrepute on the Kriegsmarine,
and it fed the doubts of the Kaiser on the abilities of his ships. At the beginnings
of 1916 Von Pohl dismissed from the command of the Hochseeflotte; at his place
the admiral Scheer, energetic and determined man who immediately impressed a turn
in the comparison with the British fleet.
A new strategy
Unlike his predecessors, the admiral Scheer was well aware of the abilities
of his own fleet; He was strongly determined to show them on the field. So, on
May 31 1916, the Hochseeflotte left the base of Jade wanting to look for the battle
with the prudent British fleet. The meeting between the two mighty forces happened
exactly the same day, in the Danish Strait of the Jutland: the battle between
the fleet of Scheer and the cruisers of the vice admiral Beatty would have become
greatest one of the first world conflict and one of the most important in the
Naval History.
The war situation had slowly changed and the two contenders had had to adjust
their own initial intentions to the Novelties. In the first months of 1916, in
fact, the Sea of the North had become a nest of U-Boote, since, as already remembered
above, the German Headquarter, without trust toward its own Marina, had recalled
a lot of submarine units from the Atlantic ocean. This also responded to a political
necessity: the United States had forwarded numerous protests against Berlin, since
their commercial ships (neutral) often were attacked and sunk by the Germans.
he admiral Scheer saw in this a unique possibility to surprise and to beat
the adversary fleet. In concomitance to the army's offensive toward Verdun, the
Hochseeflotte would have simulated, with the move of few units, the occupation
of the Strait of Denmark, important for the Great Britain, because it was the
only way of communication remained with allied Russia. The Grand Fleet would have
fallen in the ambush, and it would have sent the larger part of its own forces
toward the Strait; here, in an arm of limited sea, the German ships, lighter and
more maneuverable, would have attacked the adversaries, destroying them. The plan
got the approval of the military vertexes and the Kaiser. To make more believable
the act, the German Navy Command transmitted a particular radio signal, that would
have been intercepted by English, allowing believing that only some cruisers were
moved, while instead there the Fleet of high sea was employed.
The admiralty in London fell in full in the trap ordering to the admiral Jellicoe
and to his vice admiral Beatty, as head of a squad formed by six cruisers of battle
and four heavy battleship, to go toward the point where it thought the little
German cruisers would have found (the Strait of the Jutland, of course). Beatty
started, besides his square, also twenty-four simple battleships, three battle
cruisers, twenty-six light cruisers and 79 destroyer. Scheer lined up sixteen
battleships, eleven light cruisers, five battle cruisers and 61 destroyers.
Already in the first afternoon hours on May 31, the first units of the two
fleets were sighted, beginning a violent shell exchange. In little time all the
units that arrived in the scenario of the operations took part to the clash. The
British fleet immediately had difficulties: one after the other numerous cruisers
remained seriously damaged already after only an hour of fight; some exploded,
sinking quickly and dragging toward the depths if the sea thousand of men. However,
the acumen of Beatty allowed straightening the situation. The ships with the Union
Jack assumed new tactics and new positions, more offensive, succeeding in inflicting
serious losses to the enemies. After around five hours, the battle, gigantic for
the number of involved ships, had finished. The two fleets were separated, directing
toward the respective ports. On the British side, the losses were 6097 casualties,
three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, eight destroyers; while the Germans
were counting 2551 casualties, the sinking of a pre-battleship, of a cruiser and
of four destroyer.
On the point of view of the moral and the losses, the German victory resulted
sure; but the admiral Scheer had missed his own principal objective: the annihilation
of the Grand Fleet and this would have had heavy consequences for the following
years of the war and for Germany itself.
Who has won?
In England, the serious defeat had great effects. Indeed, the conviction of
the invincibility of the fleet entirely fell. The admiralty understood that the
numerical supremacy of its ships was not enough against the qualitative superiority
of the German shipping. On this point of view, the blow was useful and brought
to the construction of faster and lighter ships and, able also to fight in narrow
spaces. Besides, on Beatty's suggestion, new naval tactics were studied and tried
with success, based on the rapid action and displacement, not on the wait anymore.
Already twelve days after the battle, the Grand Fleet had entirely reabsorbed
the losses, with the launching of twenty-six battleships and six cruisers, built
according to the new criterions and ready for the action. Other positive effect
of the Jutland was the leaving of Jellicoe (in August), and his substitution just
with Beatty; it was an important turn, that gave efficiency and trust to the whole
Royal Navy.
Contrarily, the winning Germans didn't know how to gather the fruits of the
really important success. Rather they didn't even realize to have won. The Kaiser
judged excessive the losses suffered in relationship to the bad results picked.
Admiral Scheer was ostracized and isolated by the military vertexes. The German
government, disenchanted up to the paranoia towards its own fleet, decided to
entrust to the only able force, according to it, to guarantee meaningful strategic
results: the submarine. The Hochseeflotte was sealed inside the base of Jade and
it could go out only for some little sally. Forced inactivity would have irremediably
destroyed the moral and the trust of the sailors and the officers toward the institutions,
opening the road to the violent revolutionary motions of the first months of 1919.
Besides, the intensified submarine war, not only in the Sea of the North but also
in the Atlantic ocean, continued to irritate the United States, that would have
chosen to enter the war in 1917 spring.
In short words, not to have understood its own naval strength and the possibilities
opened after the battle of the Jutland clearly changed the result of the war for
the Germans, pushing the Second Reich toward the defeat and toward the inside
collapse.
Sources: Gianfranco Benedetto, "Maritime Power and international relationships
in the contemporary age. The British maritime power in the 19th and 20th centuries"
(pag. 113-123), publ. Mursia
Benedetto's Sources: A. Santoni, "From Lissa to the Falklands", Milan,
1987; G. Bennett, "Naval Battles of the first world war", London 1983;
J. Steinberg, "Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German
Battle Fleet", London 1965
A thanks to Darren Milford, for the information and the beautiful images that
I have found in his site http://www.geocities.com/darrenmilford/
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