1. Devlin claims society will disintegrate if it does not enforce its moral code with the weapon of law. However, an historical account of America will quickly verify that new values are at once adapted when old ones are given up. For example, upon the success of the American Revolution, the old political values were cast aside and replaced with new ones. Even assuming the same moral values were kept, there nevertheless arose a new society. Devlin�s theory neither accounts for such events nor considers that such upheavals may be a good and necessary thing, as in the case of the American Revolution.
2. There is no more justification for holding that society is an organism than there is for holding that society is an aggregate of individuals. So, while such a view may reasonably serve as a starting point for discussion, it is hardly reasonable to expound a theory of law which, according to Devlin, is �true� and must be imposed.
3. In order to determine what society�s moral views actually are, one would not only need to be outside of that society, but the values contained by that society would have to be completely foreign to the outside observer.
The claims of the members of society are not sufficient, particularly considering that so many refer to certain �American� values which are clearly prohibited by the Constitution. Further, there is, in any society, substantial disagreement about what its values are. Therefore it seems to more reasonably serve the interests of society by defining it as an aggregate of individuals.
4. Mill claims, in the argument reproduced on pages 2 and 3, that society cannot advance the interests of the individual by restraining him for his own good. Devlin agrees with the first premise, but not the others. That premise is in conjunction with Devlin�s assertion that we must allow maximum individual freedom consistent with the integrity of society. There seems to be a conflict, considering that the weapon of law may be used to regulate actions which inspire �intolerance, indignation and disgust.� With the exception of this point, Devlin�s entire theory rests upon society first, individuals last. How, then, can there be �maximum individual freedom� when society may outlaw anything they don�t like. One cannot escape this contradiction by stressing the powerful intensity of the enumerated emotions; those who decide what constitutes �intolerance, indignation and disgust� are those who make the laws. Thus, not only is this part of Devlin�s thesis entirely subjective, but it is subject to interpretation by those in power and not really conducive to freedom at all.
5. Finally, Devlin�s theory is not spiritually correct. A society which truly values freedom will look to itself for the cause of its problems as well as its solutions. A society such as Devlin proposes, which would be very attractive to Fundamentalist Christians, looks to others for the cause of its problems (and the eradication of them as its solution). When Devlin allows feelings of �intolerance, indignation and disgust� to dictate law, he automatically places the blame for such feelings on the person committing a certain action, not upon the person who possesses the feeling. As any spiritually minded person, of any religion, can tell you, this is not only spiritually unsound, but an inaccurate description of what is really happening.