WAKE UP SLAVS
Irena Knehtl
THE WEST AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE SLAVIC
CIVILIZATIONAL SPACE
Elena Guskova
PUTIN WAR-WHOOP:
THE IMPENDING CLASH WITH RUSSIA
WHAT IS A "UNIPOLAR" WORLD?
Mike Whitney
After the German Summit, Limits to E.U. Political Integration Appear Strong
Dr. Federico Bordonaro
THE SEMI - PERIPHERAL EUROPE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE
Yuri Pakhomov
FROM CLOSED CIRCUITS TO COMMUNICATING TUBES � THE WAY TOWARD A EUROPENA PUBLIC SPHERE
Adam Krzeminski
WAKE UP SLAVS
Despite confronting other values the Slavs remain very much themselves, with their specific identity and values of their own.
I understand Slavs from the point as original carriers of white culture.
The Slavic nations are in
TRANSITION
each trying to sort out their living, fiercly searching what to do with their newly found freedom, and sorting out what is rightly theirs.
Due to their turbulent history, they had little time to sitt down, and think who they are. They do not know one another well, and are suspicious of one another intentions.
In the past Pan Slavism was the only common ground the Slavs ever had. It used to the an exchange of political, cultural, and other ideas and experiences.
The Pan Slavic idea is alive. It is neither a myth, nor it was romantic:
IT WILL BECOME A NECESSITY FOR THE FUTURE.
Smaller Slavic nations fear they would be simply incorporated, or will have to give up their languages, traditions, and different religious practices.
It also represents fear that unlike USSR, Russia will once again take advantage of such undertaking or thought or economic cooperation, dominate it, and impose its will on others.
Their enormous
SOCIAL EXPERIMENT
did not simply fail.
One should see it in perspective. It is very much on the shelf for TOMORROW
with modifications, of exclusively Slavic "ingrediens". This then will be the new future trend, new thinking, and or wave.
It is due to their unmistakable identity that Slavs
COMPLEMENT EUROPE,
and will so in the future.
They will have the place they deserve, and not defined by others. Their present pain and misery will form a new experience of reality.
In political terms the power centres and economic blocks in the world today, have increased. The development trend is unmistakable in favour of
SOCIAL CONTROL OF NEEDS.
The development philosophy for 21st century is step by step reform corresponding with nature of humans and society as the only effective way. Also dismantling the big and develop the people.
Many of the answers to their problems of development, however, lie not so much in the wholesale adoption of foreign values and ideas, as in a more realistic perception of ourselves, our past, our culture, and splendidy complex ecosystem may well provide some exciting alternatives as we have to be ten to twenty times more efficient in the use of resources.
FOOD HAS BECOME POWER.
Time has come that Slavs should see their economic position in global terms, and strive towards greater integration, cooperation AND PARTNERSHIP on equal footing, as well as self sufficiency in products and enterprise in order effectively compete with other emerging blocks. It should be also explored as political resource. The argument is in favour combining ethnicity, or history with economic power and no longer foreign policy.
BUT UNITY, IF ANY, IS ONLY ADVANTAGE IF ORGANIZED.
If organized, with their land, agricultural potential, water resouces, oil/gas/mineral deposits, and above all with their human resources and intellectual capital Slavs would be a force to reckon with.
Nationalism should be viewed as their response for not being appreciated properly.
Slavs hold noble values. For example:
FREEDOM
One of the essential feature of Slavs was that they were free, and so differed from others. Another is JUSTICE, and unlimited capacity to suffer, forgivness, and communality.
There are some new fascinating ideas in making originatelly their own, home grown, from their own lands.
The future Slavic ideas for cooperation whatever shape or form it will take is in making by closer economic cooperation. The events in Russia will be most important, and vital to all Slavs with difference, however, that Russia itself will be different.
To overcome the mounting problems of a country it is simply no longer enough to have a leader, or a programme, or a political party. People need to move. Every single man and women is needed.
Foreign policy is understood in terms of strategies and tactics. And here the Slavs have victimised themselves.
The Balkan region, for example, is a strategic area that attracted outside powers from the very down of civilization. It is not for any administration to leave out or include somebody into its strategies. This provides evidence of old habits.The power after all belongs to people. It is they who suffer. So far we have heard very little from Southern Slavs (former Yugoslavia) themselves who inhabit the Balkan region, how they would like to have their place organized.
As much as other Slavic peoples have to change perception about Russia, so Russia needs to change its perception about other Slavic peoples in form of respect, partnership and cooperation on equal footing. This would mean progress.
It has been continues history of Slavic peoples to fall down, put themselves together, and move forward. And who can claim to be able to do it so well as Slavs?
TOGETHER with our human and natural resources, technologies, and our cultural heritage, we can achieve european, and world standards.
THINK ABOUT IT.
Should you have proposal, thought,idea, comment in order to carry this discussion on Wake up Slav effectively further, do not hesitate to write, and or contact.
07.06.2007
Elena GUSKOVA
THE WEST AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE SLAVIC
CIVILIZATIONAL SPACE
Today�s Europe is the arena of a grand experiment. Peoples of various development levels, cultures, religions, and mentalities, with various perceptions of their own histories are living together in a unified and fairly limited space. How do the Slavic peoples feel under the circumstances? They have lived for decades in a system of political coordinates different from that of the rest of the European nations. From the geographic and political viewpoints, they used to share the space where historical, ethnic, cultural, and even religious distinctions were made irrelevant by the common ideological and political tasks, interests, and objectives. Under the circumstances, the Slavic unity was something obvious.
Distinct features of the spiritual and cultural lives of various groups of Slavic communities � those of the western and the eastern types - became important in the post-socialist epoch, when the peoples found themselves navigating the waters of the global economy and politics independently in search of the possibilities to get integrated into Europe. The distinctions became visible in the 1990ies, when Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia resolved their problems in a fairly civilized way and headed towards the European integration. At the same time, parallel to the separation of the western and the eastern Slavic peoples, it transpired that there also existed the southern branch of the Slavdom.
Fragmentation of the once united Slavic home into smal nationa "appartments" became manifest in the 1990ies. Furthermore, the Yugoslavian group, which emerged as a distinct entirety among the southern Slavs, started to disintegrate into south-western Slavs (Slovenia and Croatia) and the southern subgroup (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia). The south-western Slavs of the Balkans gravitated to the traditionally western Slavs (Czech, Slovak, and Polish), the Roman Catholic religion being the common factor. International organizations introduced the term �Western Balkans� to reflect the distinctions. The interplay of words makes the whole process hard to discern and stabilizes the division. A considerable distinction also surfaced between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox groups of the Slavs. The above tendency manifested itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a republic with a mixed population � the division lines coincided with the religious differences, breaking the republic into three groups � the Muslim, the Roman Catholic, and the Orthodox one. As a result, the formation of yet another Slavic group � the Muslim one � was finalized.
Therefore, we witness several parallel processes � the fragmentation of the Slavic space, its shrinking, a regrouping in the pan-European home joined by the Slavic peoples, and the emergence of �second-grade� peoples and countries, some of them being Slavic. The processes of the fragmentation and the shrinking of the Slavic space are still in progress. They manifest themselves clearly in Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia. International organizations play an important but oftentimes negative role in the processes.
For example, the international organizations have an agenda of their own with respect to the decision on the status of Kosovo and Metohija. Preparations have been going on since 1999, when the NATO troops moved into the province. There are political, judicial, and administrative systems in Kosovo and Metohija which are independent from Serbia. Belgrade�s permission is not needed to enter the province, which maintains a visa system of its own. The province has its own passports and car license plates � basically everything needed to let it exist independently. All that remains is to give the situation a legal shape. Therefore, the negotiations between Serbs and Albanians in Vienna in 2006 were a show whose outcome was known a priori. It was an imitation of negotiations rather than any real activity. The purpose was to be able to say at the end of the year that since the sides couldn�t reach a compromise, a solution would be imposed. M. Ahtisaari�s mission was to prepare the document which was to serve as the foundation of the resolutions adopted by the Contact Group and the UN Security Council. The positions of Moscow (a dissenting one, on this particular occasion) and Belgrade violated the plans to a certain extent and postponed the adoption of the resolution on the status of Kosovo and Metohija. However, the situation will not remain indefinite for a long time. Albanians have already scheduled the independence celebration for June, 2007. They are preparing the independence symbols. This is an indication that the status of the province is going to be decided shortly.
Currently there are two resolutions in the UN Security Council. One of them, which is based on the Ahtisaari plan, comprises 13 points. It approves the Ahtisaari plan completely and suggests the province�s independence under the international supervision. This resolution is justified by the need for peace and accord in the region. It mentions a progress in the compliance with the standards, but does say that further efforts in this direction are needed. On the other hand, Russia insists that the developments should not be accelerated, since there is no compliance with the standards, nor are some of the provisions of Resolution 1244 fulfilled. Russia�s position is that negotiations should continue in order to reach a compromise accepted by both sides.
Debates on the issues will take place in the UN shortly. Moscow finds itself increasingly under pressure as it continues to oppose the acceleration scenario, since the timetable promised to Albanians is challenged. They expect to get independence in June, and any delay can destabilize the situation in the province. The representatives of the extremist faction of the Kosovo administration tell openly that they are running out of patience and that they are ready to take up arms. Besides it would not be easy to suspend the activities of numerous groups like the EU planning group for Kosovo and the one preparing the international civilian presence in the province, which had been making arrangement for the independence for a long time.
Currently, Russia adheres to its position strictly and threatens to make use of its veto right in the Security Council in case its position is ignored. Still, more powerful arguments and more specific suggestions are needed to channel the developments in a different direction. In my opinion, the format of the discussions should be changed � we should return to the issues of the Kosovo partition and the security of the Serbian border, that is, to the task of reaching a real compromise to suit both sides.
The logic of the Balkan crisis which has been evolving since 1991 makes it possible to predict further developments � double standards persist in the treatment of the conflicting sides, nor are there any norms of the international law that are applied to both sides of the conflict and the negotiations equally. In other words, everything is ready for the resolution unfavorable to Serbia � the fragmentation of the Slavic civilizational space continues.
Discussing the events which took place in the post-Yugoslavian space during the past two decades, one must pay attention to the following. The importance of Serbia (the country opposed nearly universally) is due to the fact that it has delayed by 15 years the implementation of the plan of the global governance from a single center, thus giving mankind the time to find instruments of resistance to this evil. Today�s Serbia is at the frontier of the transformation of the international relations again, though now it has Russia�s support. The way of the Kosovo crisis resolution will demonstrate the extent of the maturity of the present-day civilization. This resolution will also determine the speed of the transformation leading from the unipolar to the multipolar world. The foundations of the new world system are laid at the Balkans again.
Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov said that a �polyarhy� � an international system involving numerous and diverse players � is emerging in the modern world, and that the present-day international relations are increasingly determined by horizontal ties. Yet, what we see in the Balkan crisis case is the operation of the crisis control mechanism from a single center.
Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov expressed the view at the XV Foreign and Defense Politics Council Assembly on March 17, 2007 that increasingly the factor of force imposed on the global politics is perceived in the world as a passing phenomenon. In the case of Kosovo, Russia is opposing the practice of unilateralism and the politics of double standards. Russian Foreign Minister says that the world will not break along the civilizational lines, and that every country must have the ability to decide for itself in accord with its own vision of national interests. He also opined that neither the bloc nor the ideological discipline works automatically any longer, though attempts are made to replace them by the solidarity of one civilization against all the others.
For Russia, developing a new foreign politics doctrine is on the agenda (previous doctrines were adopted in 1992 and 2000). The doctrine must be based on a non-bloc position and a dialogue between civilizations. It should envision the restoration of the international balance, the protection of Russia�s national interests, the possibility of choosing value systems and development models being made available to all countries and peoples, the abandonment of the attempts to violate the natural evolution of the historical process, and the promotion of the interactions between countries. On the whole, the new doctrine should reflect Moscow�s wish to make others respect its greater role in the world while maintaining its partnership with the West.
PUTIN WAR-WHOOP:
THE IMPENDING CLASH WITH RUSSIA
WHAT IS A "UNIPOLAR" WORLD?
by Mike Whitney
June 22, 2007
What is a "unipolar" world?
It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign-- one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.
It has nothing in common with democracy, which is the power of the majority in respect to the interests and opinions of the minority.
In Russia, we are constantly being lectured about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.� Russian President Vladimir Putin�s address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2-10-07)
The deployment of the US Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe is a de-facto declaration of war on the Russian Federation . As Russian President Putin said in a recent press conference, �If this missile system is put in place, it will work automatically with the entire nuclear capability of the United States . It will be an integral part of the US nuclear capability.� This will disrupt the current configuration of international security and force Russia to begin work on a new regime of tactical nuclear weapons. This is a very serious development. Russia will now have to rethink its current policy vis-a- vis the United States and develop a long-range strategy for fending off further hostile encroachments into former-Soviet states by NATO.
Putin cannot ignore the gravity of the proposed system or the threat it poses to Russia �s national security. Bush�s Missile Defense is not defensive at all, but offensive. His plan would put American military bases--with nuclear infrastructure and sophisticated radar-systems-- right on Russia�s doorstep giving the US a clear advantage in �first-strike� capability. That means that Washington will be able to intimidate Russia on issues that are of critical international importance. Putin cannot allow this. He must force Bush to remove this dagger held to Moscow �s throat.
Bush�s Pyrrhic Victory at the G-8
The central issues on the agenda at the G-8 meetings were downplayed in the media. Instead, the press focused its attention on the �anticipated� clash between Bush and Putin. But, the brouhaha never materialized; both were respectful and gracious.
President Bush, however, was adamant that his plan for missile defense in Czechoslovakia and Poland would go ahead according to schedule. Putin, for the most part remained politely silent. His objections were censored in the media.
Less than 10 hours after the closing ceremonies of the G-8, Putin fired off the first salvo in what will probably be remembered as �the war that brought down the Empire�.
Putin addressed 200 corporate leaders at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg and his comments left little doubt that he had already settled on a plan for countering Bush�s missile shield in the Czech Republic .
Putin�s speech articulated his vision of a �Moscow-centered� new world order which would create a ``new balance of power'' that was less dependent on Washington. He said, ``The new architecture of economic relations requires a completely new approach. Russia intends to become an alternative global financial center and to make the ruble a reserve currency for central banks.�
The world is changing before our eyes. Countries that yesterday seemed hopelessly behind are today the fastest growing economies of the world." Institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the IMF are "archaic, undemocratic and inflexible''. They don�t "reflect the new balance of power.''
Putin's speech is a repudiation of the present system. He is announcing the beginning of an asymmetrical war that is designed to cripple the United States economically, weaken the institutions which have traditionally enhanced its wealth, and precipitate a shift of global power away from Washington .
Putin�s challenge to the US dollar is particularly worrisome. He emphasizes the inherent unfairness of "dollar hegemony" which has an extremely negative effect on the economies of smaller countries.
"There can be only one answer to this challenge,� he boomed. �The creation of several world currencies and several financial centers.�
Putin imagines a world where goods and resources are traded in rubles or �baskets of currencies�- not just greenbacks. This would create greater parity between the countries and a more even distribution of wealth.
He intends to depose the dollar as the world's only "international currency". There are signs that this process may have already started. In the last 6 months, Norway , Iran , Syria , UAE, Kuwait , and Venezuela have announced that they are either cutting back on their USD reserves or converting from the greenback to the euro or a �basket of currencies�. The slumping dollar is weakening on all fronts. If the greenback loses its place as the world�s �reserve currency�; the US will have to pay-down its monstrous current account deficit and live within its means. America will lose the ability to simply print fiat money and use it in exchange for valuable resources and manufactured goods. Putin is now threatening to cut-off the flow of cheap credit which is the source of the Superpower's strength.
Can he carry it off?
What kind of damage can Russia inflict on the dollar or on the many lofty-sounding organizations (WTO, World Bank, IMF, NATO and Federal Reserve) which prop up the US Empire?
Russia �s power is steadily growing. Its GDP is leaping ahead at 8% per annum and by 2020 Russia will be among the five biggest economies in the world. It now has the third largest Forex reserves in the world and it is gradually moving away from the anemic dollar to euros and rubles. Nearly 10% of its wealth is in gold.
Russia has also overtaken Saudi Arabia as the world�s leading supplier of petroleum. It produces 13% of the world�s daily output and has the world�s largest reserves of natural gas. In fact, Putin is working energetically to create the world�s first natural gas cartel an alliance between Russia , Qatar , Iran and Algeria . The group could potentially control 40% of the world�s remaining natural gas and set prices as it sees fit.
Putin�s ambitions are not limited to the energy sector either-although he has strengthened the nation by turning away foreign investment and through �re-nationalization� of vital resources. As Pavel Korduban says in his article �Putin Harvests Political Dividends from Russian Economic Dynamism�; Putin is looking beyond energy to technological modernization. As Korduban says:
�The shift in official discourse to �innovations� reflects an attempt to reorient economic policy from the goal of consolidating the status of �energy superpower� to the emphasis on industrial modernization and catching up with the technological revolution. The key role in formulating this new policy is given to Sergei Ivanov, who promised that by the year 2020 Russia would gain leadership (measured as 10% of the world market) in such high-technology sectors as nuclear energy, shipbuilding, aircraft, satellites and delivery systems, and computer software.�
Putin has also strengthened ties with his Central Asian neighbors and engaged in �cooperative� military maneuvers with China.
Last month it signed deals with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to revive the Soviet-era united system of gas pipelines, which will help Russia strengthen its role of the monopoly supplier from the region�. (Reuters) He has transformed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a formidable economic-military alliance capable of resisting foreign intervention in Central Asia by the United States and NATO.
The CIS is bound to play a major role in regional issues as the real motives behind the �war on terror� are exposed and America's geopolitical objectives in Central Asia become clearer. So far, Washington has established its military bases and outposts throughout the region with impunity. But the mood in Moscow and Beijing has soured and there may be changes in the near future. We should also remember that Putin is surrounded by ex-KGB agents and Soviet-era hardliners. They�ve never trusted America's motives and now they can point to the new US bases, the �colored-coded� revolutions, the broken treaties and the projected missile defense system---to prove that Uncle Sam is �up to no good�.
Putin sees himself as leading a global insurgency against the empire. He speaks for the emerging-market economies of Russia, China ,India and Brazil . These 4 nations will progressively overtakethe �old order�. Last year, 60% of the world's output was produced outside the G-7 countries. According to Goldman Sachs, by 2050 Brazil , Russia , India and China will be the world's leading economies.
The transition from �superpower rule� is already underway. The centers of geopolitical power are shifting like giant tectonic plates. The trend is irreversible. The deployment of Bush�s missile defense system will only hasten the decline of the �unipolar-model� by triggering an asymmetrical war, where Forex reserves, vital resources and political maneuvering will be used as the weapons-of-choice.
War with Russia is pointless and preventable.
There are better choices than confrontation.
URL of this article: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
02 July 2007
After the German Summit, Limits to E.U. Political Integration Appear Strong
By: Dr. Federico Bordonaro
http://www.pinr.com
On the eve of June 23, after very difficult negotiations, the European Union's leaders struck a deal that opens the way to a new European treaty. The German E.U. semester has, therefore, ended with a compromise that enables Chancellor Angela Merkel to claim a diplomatic success, but the compromise's details show that European political integration has probably reached impassable limits.
From a political-strategic and international point of view, the most significant results of the deal are that European states will continue to exist, an E.U. super-state is not going to form, and Europe will unlikely become a unitary geopolitical actor in the coming decades.
Crucial Points: The Deal's Key Decisions for Foreign Affairs
The deal prepares the way for drafting a "Treaty on the Functioning of the Union." As a consequence, it eliminates the constitutional nature of the post-Nice accord. As such, it will be approved by national parliaments without the need for a referendum, with the sole exception of Ireland.
The decision-making issue is by far the most significant from a political and geopolitical point of view. Decisions in foreign and defense policy, taxation, cultural policy and social security will continue to need a unanimous vote. This means first and foremost that Europe will not be functioning as a geopolitical unit on the global stage. In other words, this puts an end to the Gaullist dream of a European superpower.
Also, European states will continue to pursue distinct social and cultural policies, hence maintaining differences that will continue to shape different political traditions and geopolitical representations.
The qualified-majority principle will be nonetheless extended to almost 50 new areas such as judicial and police cooperation, education and economic policy. Such progress is what resembles most the federal-oriented policy pursued by committed Europeanists. For this reason, anti-European parties in Britain accuse Tony Blair and Gordon Brown to have accepted a concealed version of the rejected constitution.
Another considerable point is that the proposed E.U. foreign minister will not be appointed. Instead, a high representative of the European Foreign and Security Policy will gain control over aid budget and the European network of diplomats and civil servants. This will strengthen Europe's role as a "civil power" and is also hoped to help the Euro-American strategic dialogue.
In addition, a European president -- chosen by E.U. leaders and not by voters -- will represent the Union abroad. Such a high-level figure, however, is in no way comparable to a national president.
Britain also reserved the right to opt-out from common legislation regarding workers' rights, as it feared it would undermine its successful business and job-creation model.
Background: E.U. Powers Seek to End Political Impasse
As France and the Netherlands rejected the proposed E.U. Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005, the European Union entered a deep political crisis. In fact, the 2004 big expansion that had made Europe a 25-state union had already shown how Western European core-states such as France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands suffered from an enlargement malaise.
France's elites and middle classes especially feared that the European Union had become merely a big economic space dominated by Anglo-American economic and cultural trends, unable to project Paris' power worldwide and to protect French jobs from the perils of the globalized economy.
On the other hand, Euro-skeptic parties in Britain and elsewhere feared paradoxically that the opposite was true, that Europe had become too similar to a big, centralized bureaucratic state, and that national parliaments had lost too much political control over national policy, economic, and social issues.
The E.U. Constitution ended up as the symbol of a failure that risked undermining efforts to proceed toward a European political unity decisively. A fundamental political reality emerged: European member-states have different perceptions of the E.U. and of its political integration. For Poland or the Czech Republic, the E.U. is not a synonym for the abandonment of national sovereignty, and its political value is directly connected to national security, i.e., limiting the power and influence of Berlin and Moscow via a strong strategic link with the United States.
For Britain, a Franco-German-led Europe would dangerously impose economic rules and legislation at home, which is traditionally unacceptable for London.
French and Dutch elites had to take into consideration their public opinion's negative view of the proposed constitution and said they would accept either a simple new treaty conceived without the constitutional function, or, like some French socialist personalities, as a redrafted constitutional treaty to be once again submitted to referendum.
On the contrary, states like Italy, Spain and Belgium appeared more interested in re-launching the idea of a full-blown European constitution, although simplified in some way.
When Merkel opened the German semester in January 2007, it appeared clear how Berlin wanted to find a way out of the political impasse by re-launching the idea of a European constitution, although revised. However, it rapidly became clear that France would unlikely accept such a solution and would lobby instead for a simplified treaty, conceived to go beyond the Nice Treaty (2000) without taking the shape of a constitution.
When Nicolas Sarkozy finally became the new president of France on May 6, France definitively joined Britain and more Euro-skeptic members such as Poland and the Czech Republic in preferring a new treaty without revamping the full-fledged constitution.
Just by analyzing the internal and international political preferences of the main E.U. actors before the June 21-22 Summit, one could spot that the E.U. Constitution was buried, and that the choice for a new, post-Nice treaty was the most likely outcome.
However, even this second possibility, the less cherished by Europeanist governments like those of Italy, Spain and Germany, faced the risk of not seeing the light as Poland battled to fundamentally change some of its pillars.
Warsaw tried to change the decision-making process in Europe. Worried about Germany's rising political influence, it tried to reduce Berlin's weight by proposing a square-root voting system that should have replaced the current one (based on the double majority principle: 55 percent of member states and 65 percent of the population). In that way, states like Poland would have gained more political weight at the expense of Berlin, Paris, London and Italy (the demographically strongest states in Europe).
Warsaw failed to achieve that goal, but obtained an extension on expanding the qualified majority principle to the new areas from 2009 to 2014, and that in the 2014-2017 period states could adopt the old principle. In the end, the new decision model will kick in after ten years.
Implications for the E.U. in the Short-to-Middle Term
While the E.U. has become an increasingly important global player and key E.U. economies such as Germany are displaying new vitality and good prospects, the future of Europe as a geopolitical heavyweight appears problematic.
As always in history, alliances, alignments, partnerships or federations must be pressure-tested if observers are to judge their real strength. The new treaty will make Europe advance a little further in its integration, but in no way will it ensure the birth of a stable, unitary geopolitical actor because foreign and defense policy will remain subject to national preferences.
In the short-term, the nightmare of a complete paralysis of the political and institutional integration has been avoided, and political elites will be able to "sell" Europe as a worthy goal for implementing reformist policies. Also, the door remains open for further enlargements, although the Turkish question is likely to remain a thorny one in the coming years.
However, Europe's inability to forge a real, unitary energy security, foreign and defense policy will force continental elites to take different decisions as new important crises will emerge in economically and security strategic matters.
In the mid-term, this means that the European Union risks being perceived by its member-states as an overly big and expensive enterprise, and one that requires too much national wealth to be sacrificed on its altar. On the other hand, such efforts remain unable to create a well-functioning geopolitical power, so that European member-states will likely remain dependent upon Russian hydrocarbons and U.S. military might when it comes to energy and strategic security.
Conclusion
Europe's political future appears to be similar to its present. The Union is an original combination between national and supranational sovereignties, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. However, enthusiasm for European integration has dramatically dropped within European core-members in the last years, which makes it more difficult for decision-makers to propose reforms in the name of the Union.
Hence, populist movements in Europe will try to exploit any sign of failure or malaise with the European unification process and its new challenges, especially if such dynamics are perceived as being inextricably linked to welfare reforms, difficult cultural interplay, and new immigration waves.
As a result, even key E.U. players like Germany and France will face the high risk of rising anti-European sentiments if and when new significant crises pressure-test the Union in the coming decade. Such a variable must be closely monitored by decision-makers and observers alike.
05.07.2007 Strategic Culture
YURI PAKHOMOV
THE SEMI - PERIPHERAL EUROPE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE
Europeanism is an old pan-Slavic idea. This approach is also embraced by the West. For example, recently Z. Brzezinski made a statement of great importance for the Ukrainian audience � he opined that �a real hope and a historical prospect for Europe is the Europe reaching from its western-most point in Portugal - Cabo da Roca - to Kamchatka�. Much earlier, Arnold J. Toynbee wrote in A Study of History that the strategy of Peter the Great aimed both at incorporating Russia into the Western community as an equal member and at preserving its political independence and cultural autonomy. A. Toynbee considered it as the first case of a voluntary Western self-identification of a non-Western country.
This was a recurrent theme in A. Toynbee�s writings. He emphasized that, unlike the retrograde Poland, Russia borrowed progressive ideas from France, Great Britain, and Germany. We know too well how the process ended. The progressive idea of a proletarian revolution lead to the catastrophe that destroyed Russia and frightened the West.
The present situation is different. The Western Europe is a macro-region with an exceptionally powerful economy, superb standards, and a prosperous population. There is no other place in the world (including the US) where life is as enjoyable and comfortable as in the EU in terms of the liberties, human rights, social justice, and even the environment criteria. Ukraine�s motivation for joining the EU seems absolutely explainable.
Nevertheless, we should not forget that there is a difference between the emigration of Ukrainian citizens to Europe (there is an impression that this is what our Euro-dream is all about) and the integration of the whole country into the EU. Probably, a mass migration of �everything that moves� to France, Germany, or Austria is not what Ukraine wants. Upon joining the EU, Ukraine as a country is to remain at its current location. Therefore, we must decide what we hope to achieve as a result of our hypothetic Euro-integration.
No doubt, the freedom to travel across Europe is important. But in a while this should become possible even without Ukraine�s joining the EU. The human rights problem and the task of learning to comply with the European standards and regulations are examples of more serious issues. However, difficulties await us in this respect. First, not all of the European regulations are suitable for Ukrainians (or anybody else, in fact). The bulk of European standards (which we naively tend to see in an idealistic light) is disastrously excessive. The continuously changing list of mandatory standards is already 80,000 page-long. This situation reeks of the Soviet era, when, for instance, an instruction for a toy manufacturer required that a toy hare was to hold up one paw and to be colored in optimistic tones. Andreas Oslung, a Western political analyst, says that the economies of the East and Central European countries are more efficient because they are free from the harmful influence of the EU with its Jesuit non-tariff regulations.
Secondly, we do not have to break into the EU just to order our regulations, to learn to respect laws, and to borrow those of the standards which are indeed useful (and to comply with which we need to become more mature as a nation). On the contrary, taking care of all of the above issues � as well as doing something about the lack of culture in our daily life and about our economic vandalism - are prerequisites for the admission to the EU. The EU will never open its doors for us unless we get rid of this �baggage�.
We must also learn democracy independently, without hoping that our enlightened neighbors are going to make us do so. As for our values and mentality, so far they are simply incompatible with those of Europe. The life in all of Ukraine�s social strata shows this quite clearly. Thus, there remains only one significant goal Ukraine can hope the EU to help us reach. The goal is to be admitted to the highly developed community famous for its wealth and technological level. At his point, we do have to understand that an improvement of Ukraine�s living standard is possible only on the basis of the country�s own modernization. Traditionally, integration with the EU helped boost the process in new member-countries. In other words, we want to join the EU as an economically weak country, expecting the stronger peers to assist us in attaining their level.
In this context, it is important to realize that the impact of the integration into the EU on the economic development of the novices varied depending on the phase of the EU expansion. When Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and other countries joined the EU in the 1990ies, the EU, represented by the major European powerhouses, was the driver of the scientific and technological progress and, therefore, of the increasing prosperity. Very soon, less developed countries like Ireland came close to catching up with the leaders, both generally and in terms of the criteria of the high development level. However, unlike nowadays, in that epoch the European powerhouses were making rapid progress, evolving into postindustrial societies and competing with the US. Europe was a global leader. Moreover, the EU, as an alliance of 15 countries, intended to outpace the US in terms of the development level criteria on the basis of the effect of combining the potentials of its members � the effect of a successful regionalization - within several years (as stated by the Lisbon strategies). The expansion tendency was natural for the EU under the circumstances. The Europeans anticipated a future success and believed that the admission of 10 Central and East European novices would open new avenues (due to the resulting synergy and scale effects) and secure the union�s global leadership. Correspondingly, every new member country which joined the EU in the early 2000ies had reasons for raised expectations. Ukraine�s appetites have been stimulated by the above considerations, though in fact the country�s wish to join the EU never came under careful scrutiny. Our Euro-integration leanings used to be more of a slogan and betrayed our hopes to get something for nothing.
In practice, the superficial character of the Ukrainian Euro-integration tendencies is not quite harmless. The �Europeans we are� mantra not only relaxes the population and prevents people from making real efforts � the society fails to understand what is going on in that part of the world. The belief in belonging to Europe is linked to the axiom �Europe is our dream and we are going to be there�. Whereas Poland, the Czech Republic, and other countries have gone through a phase of debates clarifying the actual situation in the evolving EU, in Ukraine an element of doubt about the European orientation is perceived as sacrilege.
Yet, the EU actually closed its doors while the so called �elite� in Ukraine was looting the country and talking about the European paradise just to divert the public attention from its machinations. This closing was caused not so much by the difficulty of accommodating the 10 underdeveloped (in terms of the EU criteria) novices, as by the sudden and currently deepening degradation of the EU �kernel�, the countries making Europe Europe.
This is a catastrophe for the corrupt Ukrainian elite (which is the only elite we have). The abolition of the hypnotic �way to Europe� slogan may have equally disastrous consequences as the fall of the communist creed in the former USSR. The �naked king� phenomenon would mean more than just a disappointment - quite possibly, it would trigger a violent uprising of the population against the disreputable elite.
By the way, Ukraine�s Euro-failure poses a serious problem for the orange leadership. Whereas the country�s east and south can draw inspiration from Russia, which is getting stronger and securing its place among the global powers, the sole remaining hope of the orange is the chronically failing and chanceless GUAM. This (and not the European values) is the reason why the orange leaders continue to advertise their Euro-optimism, begging the European bureaucracy for at least some kind of promises as a consolation.
However, the present reality is that the EU instills pessimism concerning the key issue � its potential for development in the foreseeable future. The economies of the major EU countries that recently used to be the global development leaders � France, Germany, Italy, and others � are not just sluggish � they are going down. There are three factors responsible for this degradation and for the EU transition to a semi-peripheral status. First and foremost, the EU countries are becoming increasingly unable to rely on their own sources of high-tech innovation. They find themselves depending on others for innovations, thus getting involved in an exchange on the conditions of a progressing inequality and falling behind the global leaders. Secondly, due to the depressive situation, the EU is increasingly diverting funds to investments in foreign (primarily the US) federal and corporate bonds, which results in a systemic loss of potential revenues. Thirdly, more and more successful companies are leaving the EU space, a process which also entails losses.
Generally, the problem amounts to the inequality of Europe�s exchanges with the global leaders such as the US, China, and India. According to the US forecasts, this nonequivalent exchange already channeling revenues to the economies of the leading countries is to become even more nonequivalent. This makes foreign analysts speak of the EU transition to a semi-peripheral status.
Certainly, some of the EU countries appear quite successful. Interestingly, this is true of the countries just recently admitted to the EU � Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and other Central and East European ones. However, these �small guys�, no matter how active they are, cannot transform the alliance�s overall situation. Besides, their success is largely due to the flow of investments from the EU �kernel� countries to those with cheaper labor and not so heavily oversupplied markets. The capital �fleeing� from the EU goes through a kind of a double selection process. First, all the best (high-tech in particular) goes to China and India, whereas the EU novices, as well as Ukraine, by the way, get the stuff rejected by the giants carefully picking the most effective ventures. Secondly, the EU novices appear successful only when their current performance is compared to their own past one or evaluated using oversimplified and rather unreliable criteria based on comparisons with the older EU members. In reality, examining the situation in the context of the global economy one sees that the new EU countries suffer from the nonequivalent exchange even more than their older peers. Whereas the nonequivalent exchange index for the EU �kernel� countries fits into the 1.13 (Germany) � 1.29 (Italy) range, the performance of the novices is twice as poor (Poland � 2.16, Slovakia � 2.91, Hungary � 2.07, etc.). Consequently, the new EU countries - the Central and East European ones � are also found to be victims of the nonequivalent exchange when compared to the relatively more successful players (Russia already being one of them). The peripheral evolution of the EU novices only appears to be offset by the growth they owe to the investment dumps from the EU �kernel�.
The conclusion that the EU is evolving towards a peripheral status can seem unexpected and must be supported by further arguments. As a beginning, it must be noted that the EU project was vulnerable from the start. Its major fault was the excessive liberalization combined with the downsizing of the roles played by the EU national states. There was a belief (largely attributed to the US influence1) that the market, even lacking the modern institutional infrastructure, would automatically support the European unification processes and guarantee the EU a global high-tech break-through.
The outcome of the project, which was doomed to failure from the very beginning, was easy to predict. In fact, the market as conceived by the Western economic theories does not ensure the progress in science and technology. The institutional infrastructure of the market is important, as well as the symbiosis of the market drive and the state regulation activity. The EU had none of the above, and the roles of the states within the leading countries of the EU became less important upon the formation of the union.
The lack of the supranational regulation bodies in the EU that could interact with the market was compensated by administratively enforced standards and the emergence of the oversized Brussels bureaucracy. This hardly made things work any better.
The above design of the economic space was clearly inferior to that of advanced national states, the US in the first place. Inertially, the EU �kernel� countries were successful in the beginning, and the success further fostered their ambitions stated by the Lisbon strategies. However, in a while the regulation deficiencies resulted in an amorphous economy and the EU�s falling behind, a process which finally evolved into degradation. Falling behind in the most important race � in science and technology � was fatal to the EU economy. This failure was caused by the easiness with which powerful transnational companies bringing their own technologies could expand into the EU economy due to the erosion of the national states. The national science and technology sources which used to guarantee the primary intellectual rent started to wither due to the insufficiency of the demand. As for the imported technologies employed by the transnational corporations, those were not so novel and were simply replicated for the EU, and thus could not yield high revenues. The dominance of the transnational corporations in the EU led to a shrinking of the revenues due to the nonequivalent exchange, first with the US, and later with other global leaders who got the primary intellectual rent. Finally, Europe � pretty much like the post-Soviet Ukraine - ended up developing an import-replacement (technological) dependency. The result was a chronic falling behind in terms of the key success criterion � the one measuring revenues generated by high technologies.
Obviously, the erosion of the pan-European economic space due to its infrastructural shortcomings and to the reduction of the roles played by national states unleashed processes fatal to the EU. Caught in the import-replacement trap, the EU countries (except for Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) had to accept the fact that other countries were the ones who benefited from the intellectual rent. This proves that only the primary effect (and not its replication) ensures the highest returns, generating both revenues and a diversification related to the creation of new and initially vacant market niches.
A country, no matter how developed, which ends up in the state of an import-replacement technology dependency gets involved in a nonequivalent exchange and cannot remain a global leader. The domino effect contributes additional losses to the general degradation process. One of the channels of losses of this type in the EU case is the nonequivalent exchange due to the massive investments in foreign bonds combined with the damage caused by the capital flight to the continuous economic growth zones (India and China).
I am aware that the �Euro-adoration� situation in Ukraine makes it impossible to accept the statement that a degradation of the EU �kernel� countries has commenced. So, I find it useful to refer to the conclusions drawn by foreign authors. Arno Tausch, a political science professor from the Innsbruck University, Austria, wrote in his paper �The European Union: A City Upon a Hill and the Lisbon Strategy� (World Economy and International Relations, 2007, N 3, p. 71) that gradually, the peripheral features of Europe�s development are getting increasingly obvious and that Europe risks to fall into the negative development zone. A. Tausch cited the above data reflecting the tendency of the EU to fall behind. Table 3 of his paper is eloquently entitled �Europe as a Semi-Periphery. 1998-2002�. A. Tausch�s comment on the data presented in Tables 3 and 4 of his paper is: �The results of the integration are deplorable�.
Of course, there are certain sociopolitical processes which complicate the EU situation. Nevertheless, the economic aspect of the matter should make us rethink our motivation for getting integrated into Europe. Unlike Russia, which is getting rid of its dependency on foreign technologies, Ukraine with its present course is heading for the same situation in which the EU currently finds itself. One could hardly expect anything else amidst the orange leadership�s political cacophony. A peripheral status is an imminent result of the course. Besides, in contrast to the Europeans who are concerned over the EU degradation, we watch unemotionally as our once outstanding domestic science is dying, preferring ready technologies supplied by foreign investors2. Thus, Ukraine (like the EU, though due to a different set of reasons) is becoming increasingly dependent on imports. This dependency leads to a nonequivalent exchange and, consequently, to falling behind. I mean falling behind the worlds (continuing to emerge3) earning the intellectual rent by scientific innovations, the rent yielding revenues which, at the initial phase, are many times higher than those generated when the corresponding technologies are replicated. Certainly, the intellectual primacy tends to be short-living and requires investments, time, and patience needed to foster innovations, as well as the creation of the mechanisms for their use. It is a lot simpler to go the easy way and to suffice with the technologies supplied by foreign investors. But while doing so we neglect the fact that the technologies considered new in our country, no matter how important they are, are no longer novel in reality, and, consequently, cannot ensure a breakthrough. Relying on them, we have no chance to catch up with the leaders and to provide for our country�s genuine success. Finland, a country that used to be technologically retarded in the recent past, focused its efforts, ignored transient business temptations, acted with great patience, and (unlike the EU �kernel� countries) succeeded in becoming one of the global leaders on the basis of primary innovations. In the meantime, Ukraine deliberately concentrates on passing opportunities and simply drives itself into a peripheral state. Whereas the faults of the EU project made Europe a zone on which transnational corporations prey, Ukraine fell victim to the mentality of its corrupt officials and business bandits. Another distinction is that in whereas true giants are losing ground in Europe, Ukraine is a country which simply has failed.
One might ask � where should we go? This is a difficult question. On the one hand, upon joining the EU (suppose that this incredible plan materializes!) we will find ourselves increasingly falling behind the fast-growing worlds. On the other hand, we have no chance to expand to the lucrative Asian markets autonomously � we are of little interest to China and India since these countries have steel and chemical industries of their own. We can supply our modern industry products (especially the defense-related ones) to Asia in massive quantities only in the framework of joint projects with Russia. But implementing joint projects is not like selling lard � this business requires a totally different type of relations with our neighbor, not the hostile relations with Russia that we currently have. This is something we have no hope to get so far � Russia is regarded as an enemy by the present Ukrainian authorities.
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Academician Yuri Nikolaevich PAKHOMOV is the Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine.
In the meantime, the government played an increasingly important role in the US. The process was not limited to initiating grand innovations like Internet within the federally owned sectors including the defense industry. Long-term indicative planning was considered ever more important in the country as well as the system of federal procurement contracts. The nomenclature of the latter included 85-90% of the types of products (not volumes!) annually, and the quantities of services, products, and human resources involved reached 17%-20% or more of the country�s total.
The point is not that the country should be closed for foreign investments, but that the availability of domestic sources of the intellectual rent is of prime importance (as in the case of China which attracts enormous investments).
3
Currently, not only the US and Japan, but also China and India are getting ahead of Europe. Russia will also get ahead of it in the future � it has opted irreversibly for the course of restoring its scientific potential and, consequently, of generating the technologies yielding the primary intellectual rent.
*
THE SLAVS. Judged by the language, the Slavs are the most numerous race in Europe , amounting to some 140,000,000 souls . Outside Europe there are the Russians in in Siberia, a mere extension of the body, and a large number of emigrants settled in America. The Slavs are divided geographically into three main groups, Eastern, North-Western and Southern; linguistically also the same division is convenient . The Russians stand by themselves as the Eastern group . They hold all European plain from the 27th meridian to the Urals. Beyond these limits to the east they stretch into central Siberia and the narrow bands along the rivers all the way to the Pacific. O nthe west the Ruthenians (q.v.) of Galicia form a wedge between the Poles and the Magyars.
Slavs completely surrounded by Germans. The Southern Slavs, the Slovenes , The Serbs, the Croats and Bulgarians are cut off from the main body by the Germans of Austria proper and the Magyars, both of whom occupy soil once Slavonic, and have absorbed much Slavonic blood, and by the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Lower Danube, who represent the original Dacians.
