Prelude to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Another duel in the palate

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Th e same day this alert memorandum was sent to the fonctionnairesdepolitical of the USA, a new crisis of control occurred àKaboul. Th eevening of September 14 (midday in Washington) Kabul laradio announcedthe reference four of the government supérieurofficials—Ministerof interior Watanjar, minister descommunications Ghulabzoy, Ministerfor the businesses tribales Mazdoorjar, and chief of intelligence (theAGCA, which included the police force secrète)Sarwari. Th eadvertisement by radio indicated that the references had étéà therecommendation of Amin and with the approval of Taraki.L' embassy fromthe USA in Kabul announced that little before renvoisavaientannounced, of the troops and the vehicles blindésavaient surroundedthe presidential palate and had begun àoccuper the principalpositions in the capital (these composantsmilitaires were of the 4 Th Afghan Army Armored Corps, which had carried out similar functions in Th e coup against Daoud a year and a half earlier.) Gunfire had been heard in Th e palace area.76

Two days later, on 16 September, Kabul radio announced Th at an "extraordinary meeting" of Th e PDPA Central Committee had been held and Th at Taraki had "requested Th at he be relieved of his party and government leadership positions due to heal Th reasons and physical incapacity." Th e announcement said Th at Amin had been appointed to replace Taraki as Th e new party general secretary. Th e top government body, Th e "Revolutionary Council," had also met Th at day, according to Th e radio broadcast, also "approving" Taraki's "request" to be relieved of Th e Presidency and appointing Amin as his successor.77

In Th e following days, US intelligence again detected heightened activity in Soviet combat forces across Th e border from Afghanistan. A regiment of Th e 105 ^Th Guards Airborne Division had once more been moved into convoy formation, apparently being readied for deployment. Armored troop carriers and field artillery normally kept in covered storage were again positioned for loading aboard transport aircraft. Partial mobilization also appeared to be taking place in a ground force motorized rifle division— Th e 58 Th located at Kizyl Arvat, west of Kushka— Th at was not one of Th ose seen engaging in such activity in March. Th is raised to Th ree Th e number of such divisions in Th is region seen mobilizing in recent mon Th s. Two airborne divisions located far Th er from Th e Afghan border— Th e 104 Th in Th e Transcaucasus and Th e 98 Th in Odessa—also appeared to be preparing to deploy. Th e activity in all Th ese forces would continue until Th e beginning of October, at which time all would return to Th eir garrisons.78

On 19 September, Th e State Department included in its press briefing a statement Th at Th e US had detected "increased activity" in Soviet military units near Th e Afghan border. Th e statement said Th at while Th e purpose of Th is activity could not be confirmed, Th e US "wanted to reiterate [its] opposition to any intervention in Afghan internal affairs."79 On Th e same day, National Security Advisor Brzezinski informed Th e President Th at he believed a Soviet invasion was becoming more probable. A day later, officials from various US agencies met to examine plans for dealing wi Th Th is potential development, and Brzezinski asked Th e DCI to prepare an intelligence appraisal "of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan to date, so Th at we can differentiate between creeping involvement and direct invasion."80

Meanwhile, information from diverse sources was providing a basic outline of Th e events Th at had brought about Th e sudden leadership change in Th e Afghan regime.81 A few days before Th e shootout at Th e presidential palace, Taraki—returning from a conference in Havana—had stopped off for discussions in Moscow. Upon Taraki's return to Kabul, Amin demanded Th at four officials whom he accused of plotting his ouster be summarily dismissed. (He reportedly had been tipped off by conspirators of his own.) Taraki sternly rebuffed Th is demand, but Amin defiantly dismissed Th e four officials. Taraki reacted by summoning Amin to a meeting at Th e presidential palace on 14 September. ( Th ere would be later reports Th at Th e Soviet ambassador played a role in arranging Th is meeting and persuading Amin to attend.) When Amin entered Th e palace and began to mount Th e stairs to Taraki's suite, one or more of Th e palace security guards—reportedly acting under instructions from one of Th e dismissed plotters—tried to shoot him. Amin survived because of Th e effort of Th e chief of Th e palace security force, a secret Amin supporter who was killed in Th e shooting (and later extolled as a hero). Amin escaped, and immediately launched his military move to take power.

Uncertainty surrounded Th e question of a Soviet role. US intelligence analysts tentatively concluded Th at Amin's action "may have been a preemptive move to forestall a Soviet plot to have Taraki remove him." Th e various conflicting reports received Th rough diplomatic and o Th er channels included allegations Th at Taraki had discussed Th e plan during his stopover in Moscow, and Th at an Amin sympa Th izer who was in Taraki's travel delegation got wind of it and warned Amin. Th ese stories varied as to whe Th er Th e scheme originated wi Th Th e Afghan plotters and was supported by Th e Soviets, or was pushed on Taraki by Moscow. Th e US Embassy in Kabul, for its part, was skeptical Th at Th e plot had been discussed in Moscow.

Taraki's whereabouts in Th e immediate afterma Th of Th e announcement of his ouster were initially unknown. Stories circulated Th at he had been injured, if not killed, in Th e shooting at Th e presidential palace on 14 September. Th e Embassy subsequently learned Th at he was alive but being held prisoner at Th e presidential palace. In Th e ensuing weeks Th ere would be reports Th at Th ree of Th e plotters had escaped (Defense Minister Watanjar, intelligence chief Sawari, and Minister of Tribal Affairs Ghulabzoy) and were hiding at Th e Soviet mission compound in Kabul, al Th ough Th e US embassy again expressed skepticism about Th e validity of such stories. ( Th e four Th plotter, Minister of Communications Mazdoorjar, was known to have been captured and placed under house arrest.)82

As murky as Th e picture was, Th ere was one point on which reports were virtually unanimous, and Th at was Th at Moscow was not happy wi Th Th e outcome. Western news media pointed out Th at Amin had been a principal obstacle to Soviet efforts to find a political solution to Th e turmoil in Afghanistan. Th e Intelligence Community concluded Th at Th e Soviets probably believed Amin's coup had narrowed Th e regime's base of support and made Th e counterinsurgency task even more difficult. An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum disseminated on 28 September, prepared in response to Brzezinski's request a week earlier, said Th at "Moscow probably views Th e situation as even more unstable...[and] may fear Th at Th is coup might fragment Th e Afghan Army and lead to a breakdown of control in Kabul." It said Th at " Th e Th reat raised by Th e Muslim insurgency to Th e survival of Th e Marxist government in Afghanistan appears to be more serious now Th an at any time since Th e government assumed power in April 1978."83