Rosemarie Daly
0213144
UN
specialized agencies are older than the United Nations itself. Specialized
agencies differ from one another in the extent to which their functional
operations as opposed to wider political considerations dominate. Many of these
organizations are important to developed as well as developing countries,
especially in their roles as standard setters and sources of information. The
domestic activities of all governments could now not take place without the
international regulation as well as the information provided by some of these
specialized agencies, as their functions impinge so widely on the economic and
social life of most states.
Functional considerations are dominant and are
likely to remain so in specialized organizational agencies such as the World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) or the Universal Postal Union (UPU). In
others such at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) functional
concerns are dominant while at the same time these concerns are politically
charged. A trend in this presentation was to outline the political persuasion
that is behind these types of functional organizations and the method by which
this is channeled.
Activities maybe ‘political’ and a source of friction from time to time between states that have different social and economic policies. Telecommunications has been a controversial functional organisation in particular over the past few years. Although it is one of the oldest organisations in existence it is an illustration of how stronger states can influence to serve their own interests. The growth of developing countries involvement in the ITU has shown that for an international organisation to maintain its validity it needs to maintain a proper balance of interests and benefits for all its members. The February 1997 multilateral liberalisation of telecommunication markets under the WTO is a most prominent example. As this has ended international monopolies and cosy international cartels in this sector.
I have focused on the structure and the process of influence associated with functional institutions. It has been noted by Cox and Jacobson in 1973, when they did a specialised study of eight specialised agencies, that the legal and formal character and the content of the decision, is less important than the balance of forces that it expresses and the inclination that it gives for the further direction of events. Although this reflects an American viewpoint it is noteworthy when viewed for the point of view that politicians regulate the national economy to maximise political support, through using international institutions. Through assigning property rights in international markets they thereby increase the amount of resources available for domestic redistribution.
In understanding how a functional organisation is constructed and then reconstructed I have taken aviation as an example. The growth of international trade has posed major analytic issues in our understanding of international institutions. In the aftermath of the Second World War, domestic interest groups lobbied politicians to create international institutions favorable to their interests. States can agree on rather inefficient international institutions as long as they provide additional wealth to important domestic interests. In post-war aviation the Bermuda regime facilitated international air travel by standardising many elements of international air travel, it provided a blueprint for state allocation of landing rights to foreign airlines. The British and American positions at Bermuda however proved irreconcilable. Although the convention did create the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and adopted the International Air Services transit Agreement which established basic safety and technical standards, no multilateral agreement on commercial rights was concluded.
States created a cartel in international aviation through creating a set of multilateral and bilateral rules. The British pressed for strict regulatory agreement and the US favoured a more competitive one. Due to the considerable bargaining leverage of the UK in this instance, the result was strict governmental control over entry and market place capacity and delegated fare setting authority to the IATA. This Bermuda bilateral agreement created a cartel in international aviation far from what the US had desired. The IATA uses a one-vote one-airline system, which essentially guaranteed high fares and the economic viability of inefficient airlines.
The potential for gains from institution building does not automatically translate into the creation of international institutions. The aviation regime was stable until the 1970’s when the international environment began to change. Business and consumer pressure for more competitive international aviation markets promised substantial political gains. Change in the structure of demand altered the incentives of the Bermuda institution, which began to become a political liability. International aviation markets have provided an example as to why particular institutions are constructed and why states restructure existing institutions.
Codding Jr., George A., ‘The International
Telecommunication Union’, in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (eds),
International Institutions at Work, (London: Pinter, 1988)
Jonsson, C., ‘Sphere of flying: The politics
of international aviation’, International
Organization, 35:2 (1981)
Martin, L & Simmons B, ‘Theories and
empirical studies of international institutions’, International Organization 52:4 (1998)
Richards, John E., ‘Toward a positive theory
of international institutions: regulating international aviation markets’, International Organization 53:1 (1999)
Williams, Douglas, The Specialized Agencies
and the United Nations: A System in Crisis, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987)