I had some last thoughts on this matter before it
is finally put to rest. If
others have any comments, questions or criticisms in regard to what I have
to say, I welcome their input.
In prior posts in this thread, I concluded that the principle lesson of the
Abraham/Isaac story is that the believer is expected to act apart from
reason and without consideration of the purpose of his actions. This
conclusion is supported principally by the fact that, in the story, God
commands Abraham to prepare to sacrifice his son, whom God Himself
acknowledges that Abraham loves very much, and upon receiving this command,
there is no record that Abraham questions why God wants him to do this. God
gives only the commandment; He does not give Abraham any reason why he
should do this, and Abraham obeys unquestioningly in spite of this. Indeed,
as Peter’s article on his website indicates, the New Testament, in Hebrews
chapter 11, Abraham’s unquestioning obedience (i.e., his action without
reason or purpose) is praised as a virtuous expression of his faith.
The fact that this is the principle lesson to be learned from the
Abraham/Isaac story is also supported the general ethos of the Bible, as
indicated by such passages as Proverbs 3:5, which states: “trust in the Lord
with all thine heart, and lean not unto thine own understanding,” as well as
others which indicate distrust of man’s reasoning ability (e.g., I Cor.
2:4-14). Clearly, according to the Bible, what is important is that the
believer simply accepts what is commanded to him, whether or not he
understands the nature of the commandment or the reason why he should obey
it. This essentially means: action without reason or purpose is a virtue.
Apparently, if he does not understand (and what believer claims to
understand the incalculable wisdom of his god?), so much the better.
This is morally condemnable according to Objectivism since, according to
Objectivism, the moral is the understood, not the obeyed. According to
Objectivism, morality is a code of values which guides man’s choices and
actions. An Objectivist holds this code of values for a reason which he
understands: he recognizes that his life depends on values. Without values,
his life is not possible. And since these values are not automatically given
to him by nature, he must think in order to identify them, and act in order
to achieve them. And what makes this goal-oriented action possible for man?
One thing: Reason. Reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates the
material provided by man’s senses. It is a process which both requires and
enables man’s understanding. To act apart from one’s understanding, as the
Abraham story teaches, means to act apart from one’s reason. This amounts to
the advocacy of acting irrationally, just as Abraham’s actions modeled in
the story. Indeed, if Abraham were a rational man, he certainly would have
questioned this commandment from God, because Gen. 22:2 clearly notes that
Abraham loved his son (i.e., Isaac was one of Abraham’s chief values). But
nowhere does the story model Abraham questioning God. Instead of acting on
behalf of protecting his value, Abraham willingly acted against it, and at
no point does the story indicate that he knew why.
Theists like Peter typically do not argue for the alleged moral propriety
of stories like Abraham’s willingness to murder his son (i.e., destroy his
values) when a blood-thirsty deity desires it. Instead, their primary
argument is to say that non-believers have no basis to condemn this
behavior. In other words, it is neither commendable (since they do not
provide reasons why one should think that Abraham’s actions are moral), nor
condemnable (since they think no one has any basis to question the story’s
presumed moral propriety). It seems that believers are more concerned with
disabling the validity of their opponents’ criticisms than they are with
establishing their convictions on the basis of reason.
But this is ironic, coming from a believer in tales which model action
without reason as virtuous. What reason did Abraham have for obeying this
commandment? Blank out. Indeed, a reason for actions done in service of a
deity is unimportant; rather, one must have a pretty good reason in order to
refrain from such action. But in order to make such shifting of burdens
stick, theists like Peter must hope that the non-believers onto whose
shoulders they’re trying to shift this burden are not rationally informed
individuals who hold that a morality suitable for man should be based on
reason instead of faith in commandments. For if one’s moral basis is reason,
then indeed he has good cause to question the validity of competing moral
systems and, if he finds them to be irrational (i.e., contrary to or
incompatible with reason), he has the grounds to condemn them as well.
Apparently for theists like Peter, reason is only appropriate when it can be
used by non-believers to condemn their religious beliefs (and I agree, it is
highly appropriate for this), since they do not use reason to commend or
defend these beliefs. It’s simply taken for granted that they’re valid.
Indeed, when one rests his position on faith, he surrenders reason to his
adversaries. And nothing Peter has written, either in his posts to the
Theism vs. Atheism web, or on his website, serves to undermine or bring my
conclusions on this matter into question.
Since a code of values which guides man’s choices and actions is based on a
rational understanding of man’s nature (e.g., he is a living organism which
faces choices and requires values, and which must act in order to achieve
them, hence he is by nature a goal-oriented being), Objectivism views
morality as a species of science. In science, we look at the facts of
reality to determine the nature of things, and from this we determine the
proper course of action given the known alternatives (cf. a code of values
which *guides* one’s choices and actions). As Leonard Peikoff states in one
of his lectures about Objectivism, “I don’t think we should have
commandments in morality any more than we should in physics.”
And I completely agree. One cannot command that men should live on a diet of
rocks and sewage, and have this be the case. One cannot alter man’s nature
or the nature of those values which he needs in order to live by commanding
one way or another. Just as our desires and emotions cannot substitute for
the facts of reality, someone’s whims are not suitable to provide a standard
of morality. “God said so!” is no more a rational basis for morality than
“Gumby said so!” Again, where is the element of reason here? In theistic
moral philosophy, there is none.
Since man requires the free use of his reason in order to live, and his life
is the ultimate standard of his morality, then the divine-command theory of
morality is unsuitable for man if he is to live as man. (Observe how men
live when they are not free to act on their reason.) One would have to
reject reason in order to think that the divine-command theory of morality
is proper for man, and theists implicitly recognize this, and that’s why
they try to use a semblance of reason in order to goad men into surrendering
their reason, thus committing a very ironic performative inconsistency.
Their schemes in trying to make their Bible-based morality seem plausible
rely on the same kind of stolen concepts as do their arguments that logic
points to a god. In the former it amounts to “it is in your best interest to
sacrifice your self-interest,” and in the latter case it amounts to “man’s
mind is invalid and I can prove it!” Prove it using what? A mind? Blank out.
To understand the nature of knowledge, one must understand that it has a
hierarchical structure. That is why you have to learn your ABC’s before you
can read a novel. That’s why you need to take basic math before you can take
geometry. That’s why you need philosophy before you can do science, since
science is the application of principles which philosophy provides to the
problem of identifying and integrating particular fields of study. A
philosophy which allows and endorses stolen concepts can only lead to
irrationality in knowledge, and lethal results for men when that philosophy
is put into practice. Learn to identify and expose stolen concepts, as I
have done in numerous posts to the Theism vs. Atheism web.
For the primitive, knowledge is like a spread out, disjointed and
unconnected village of squat bungalows; such individuals do not recognize
that legitimately valid knowledge is an integrated sum with a hierarchical
structure built on fundamental axioms and principles. For the Objectivist,
knowledge is like a gleaming city of skyscrapers: he recognizes that valid
knowledge is an integrated conceptual sum reducible to the perceptual level,
but not confined to it. Instead of basing his knowledge on faith in
commandments which provide his mind with no reason or his actions with no
purpose, the Objectivist holds reason to be his only epistemological
absolute, just as he holds the facts of reality to be his only metaphysical
absolute. It is on such a basis that he can develop an objective conception
of morality. There is no room for internal contradictions in such a system,
and if theists took the time and care to recognize this instead of railing
against it as if it were their mortal foe, they should put their money where
their mouth is and abandon their sunken theistic vessel, since they
themselves pretend to be on the constant lookout for contradictions in your
mind, while evading the contradictions which infest theirs.
In order for theists to resuscitate any plausibility for the supposed moral
propriety of the Abraham/Isaac story, they will have to argue *for* this
moral propriety, and not simply claim naively that non-believers have no
basis to condemn the lessons it models. In order to argue for this supposed
moral propriety, they must define what they mean by key terms (e.g., how are
they defining ‘morality’, etc.), identify the source of those definitions
(e.g., are they taken from the Bible, or borrowed from non-biblical sources
which are the product of “men’s wisdom,” which the Bible clearly condemns
as alien to divine holiness), demonstrate how the example of the Abraham story
integrates with the definitions they provide and the system which they
imply, and explain this system’s supposed relevance to man’s life now in the
21st century. Furthermore, theists must deal with the crucial problem of how
the believer is expected to determine that the voice he’s hearing is that of
God’s as opposed to other malevolent spirits, or his own imagination. In
this discussion, some explanation should be given which tells us how
Abraham, for instance, was able to determine that the voice he heard was
indeed the voice of God, and not something else (like a lunch bell or a car
horn, etc.). Indeed, if one holds that “the senses are not accurate,” as
Peter suggested, then surely there should be great concern here so that
believers do not mistake what they sense to be of divine or unholy origin.
Without meeting each and every one of these burdens, I see no reason why,
knowing what I know, I should entertain for one moment the claim that the
Abraham/Isaac story has a legitimate moral value for my life.
CertainVerdict