Hitler: Persuasion and Power

            There are those who say that a good education is a requirement for fulfilling one’s dream.  For creating impact on this world.  For becoming immortalized in the minds of others… forever.  Not so.  Such doubting must linger in no one, for deep within the labyrinths of many minds, it is a known fact that success has existed for some without the stores of scholarly understanding and the upper class reservoir it once encompassed.  The great industrial tycoons literally enriched themselves after humble beginnings.  Skill was the basis, though not alone.  Under the right circumstances, with the right amount of luck and opportunity, virtually anyone could achieve beyond their typical prospects, even beyond the nineteenth century.  Yet, how often, in the modern world, does a high school dropout devastate a nation?  Not too often.  When it comes down to the individual, it takes more than a terrorist.  It takes a dictator, whatever his original intention.  During the passing of five quick-paced years, Adolf Hitler brought Germany, his chosen nation, to ruin.  But it goes back further, for he had to rise from the ashes of crushed hopes of an aspiring artist. Yet, how does any such man come to lead people evidently capable of doing better?  The circumstances are trivial.  In any such rise, each coincidence serves a purpose.  But they who succeeded were able to use those opportunities and maintain their new statuses.  Hitler, the Fuhrer of the Third Reich did this by a blend of theatric talent, honed with practice, and a keen understanding of people.  He rose to and retained power partly by using oration and propaganda incorporated into his public image, with the assistance of a core group.  Anything disagreeable was kept hidden away from the masses: his imperfect humanity, the faults of an ideology that held no water, even human beings.  Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil.  “…Propaganda was part of its essence” (Fest 83).  This was how he had meant for it to be.

Not through actual reasoning but by emotional theatrics was Hitler able to convince the crowds.  His appeal lied in broken barriers of logic, dismantled as he spoke, so that impressions penetrating to the senses might be met with naïve consent to agreement.  “His speeches delivered with theatrical gestures and rising intensity induced in audiences a sort of hysteria that overwhelmed the critical faculties of most listeners” (“Time” 24).  Who could resist such artistry, well executed yet saturated with malevolent intent?  Beneath the veneer layered with drama and enthusiasm, ‘happy’ thoughts drawing the masses, were the blatant accusations nestled within.  But all this did not matter – his antics were successful, confirmed in the roars of exultant approval by the thousands.

While all seek to become well-rounded persons, it is always good to expand upon and refine an innate skill.  Hitler had discovered his previously hidden talent during his time at the University of Munich, via debates in the classroom (Stewart 34-5).  “One who heard him speak in class described Hitler’s as ‘a strangely guttural voice….I had the peculiar feeling that the man was feeding on the excitement he himself had whipped up’” (Stewart 35).  Such is the response of an individual untouched by a powerful propaganda program to appear in later years.  Of course, his competence for the art needed no defending at all – the results themselves are proof enough.  He was convincing, but not through something akin to the plain text on toneless paper.  “His speeches were highly emotional, and his voice would range from whispers and high-pitched screams to a thundering baritone…at the end of a speech, sweat would plaster his limp black hair to his forehead” (Stewart 35).  Few have ever considered oration to be a weight-losing solution, though to suggest the thought ever crossed his mind might be amusing, bordering on the ridiculous: “…it was not unusual for him to lose five pounds in a single evening” (Stewart 35).  Sheer proof in itself of the liveliness of his speeches.

            Ornate ‘decorations’ accompanied the persona of Adolf Hitler known to the people in body and in thought.  For instance, “American College type of music was used to excite the German masses who had been used to very dry-as-dust political lectures” (“At Home” 21).  It was also such when it came to publicity and the press on paper.  “ …[he created] striking circulars in black and blood red …as the party grew larger, the bold black swastika seemed to be everywhere…” (Stewart 34-6).  Though he disliked modern art, “he embraced cleanly abstracted and geometric styles, which later informed his own design work (notably, the stunning Nazi flag)…” (Schjeldahl 171). One could only guess at the support he would have earned, were he as a political entity skinned down and scraped to the bone, into his words alone – the messages, the arguments, compared to that which he won by combined means.  Disastrous indeed.  Even more so than his capability for outstanding orations, fanfare, banners, and such ‘accessories’ are not to be attributed to his credit when considering persuasion in its ‘purer’ forms.  “…Hitler employed artistic means – hypnotic oratory, moving spectacle, elegant design…to gain power” (Schjeldahl 171).  Reason was irrelevant, persuasion of utmost importance.  A relatively mild means to an end.  And so the actuality of his character was bound up in an appreciable package. People liked him, the politician.  But that would not have been enough for all.  Like a pearl upon close examination, even the surface was marred.  Certainly then, for him at least, there were many more issues boiling within.  Those nearer were at a natural advantage, or disadvantage, to realize more.  It was essential that the support be strong, lest the building collapse from underneath itself.

            Among the barriers, the military was a formidable one.  “…The SA [Hitler’s entourage of thugs] had created hard feelings among the military.  The SA behaved as an army itself and threatened to take over the responsibilities of the professional soldiers…not so, Hitler assured the ruffled military commanders” (Stewart 56).In the patchwork of the big picture, he needed for National Socialism to seem complete without holes. He, Hitler, could build his own prestige upon that of the armed forces.  “He needed the commanders’ support, and to prove that he was sincere, Hitler ordered a gesture of goodwill – a bloody sacrifice known in history as ‘The Night of the Long Knives’” (Stewart 56).  It was another fine example of a means to an end.  “…Hitler, together with Himmler …disposed of the SA by murdering its leaders…the gesture was appreciated by the military, which now felt more secure in its role in the new Reich, and more willing to lend its support” (Stewart 57).  The oath of allegiance of the officer corps was a tool with which loyalty could be ensured; Hitler ‘exploited’ this conveniently for his own purpose (von Luck 22).  Also, since “the [German army had] declared [its] loyalty to Hitler if he disposed of the Storm Troops,” (kanzler 3) and he had fulfilled his promise; it was as if it were a hound leashed and muzzled.  Yet another hurdle overcome for the Fuhrer, assisted by the fact that “tradition and the oath taken were regarded as sacrosanct and determined the behavior of the officer corps” (von Luck 22).

Not so with the SS, Hitler’s elite.  More professional, just as loyal (if not more so) they increasingly made their mark as their brown shirted counterparts, the SA, receded into the background, obscured units, with the fatal fall of many of their leaders.  They also must have made quite an impression upon spectators, their professionalism and ‘irrational zeal’ emitting through black garb attired from head to toe.  Certainly, it was good for the Fuhrer to have total power over the armed forces, but it is even better to also have some dogs you raised as pups.  After all, it has been said that you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.  Tricks indeed – these men would do anything the Fuhrer asked of them.  In a sense, they too were political entities.  As for the true political subordinates, well, they were contending for power eager to please.  Some were able, others less so.  He was the Fuhrer, a dignified statesman who was at the same time an object of idolatry.  As a human being, he had to shape himself into that uncompromising cast.  “In order to live up to the dimensions of his self-portrait he forced himself into the mould of a monument, at the price of what self mutilation one can only guess” (Fest 46).  He was perhaps the only one ‘mutilated’, but certainly not the only one to be subjected to its restraints.  Did they not also partake in the enhancement and emphasis of image, if not fully indulged in the complete ideology as well?  Himmler demanded much of his SS in terms of self-sacrifice, quite possibly in itself a form of self-mutilation; these demands could be linked to the Fuhrer and his influences.  The SS are to be lauded, in any case, for their differences from the SA.  “Unlike the SA…the elite SS succeeded…in attracting a type who sought scope for his idealism, his readiness to serve, and his vague need for faith” (Fest 119).  An ideological path of inhumane apathy was determined for them; they were urged to suppress the very human feelings of sadism.  They chose to take that path with the fanatical beliefs so characteristic of them collectively.  This was apathy synonymous with cruelty, but where outright, ‘selfish’ brutality was frowned upon:

The SA…with a blend of political and criminal techniques gave way to its rational counterpart…the new type of man of violence recruited…was concerned with the dispassionate extermination…not with the primitive release of sadistic impulses. Whatever sadism occurred…was included…among those ‘exceptional cases of human weakness’… they occurred in contradiction of the ‘idea’ of the type…he took ruthless measures in cases where corruption, brutality, or any other personal motives were apparent, and even trusted henchmen were not spared (Fest 118).

Such was a twisted ideology, the trying obligations demanded from the men resembled ethnical standards; Himmler had imposed doctrines in which, apart from the segregative distinction in treatment and concerns, the values by large were decent and respectable (Fest 119). 

Hence the messianic leader had his closest ring of selfless followers, relentless in their pursuit of the “inner values” of the SS. Despite its actual purpose, their myopic loyalty also served to enhance the vision of the Fuhrer’s entourage.  Considering what Hitler himself had actually demanded from his cohorts directly, on a minor note, “For parades he [used] an open car regardless of the weather.  He [demanded] the same of his entire entourage.  Hitler [said]: ‘We are not bourgeois but soldiers” (“At Home” 20).  The National Socialists had a cookie cutter ideal for their people.  The emphasis was on the physical.  Hitler wanted soldiers.  It was only right that he present himself as one too.  This was not entirely just for show, though.  As a corporal, he had earned the Iron Cross in WWI (Stewart 28-9). Also, he himself was “quite robust and [had] a good deal of physical endurance (“At Home” 20).  Such was the Fuhrer of a people whose country “was gradually transforming [into] one, huge barrack” (kanzler 1).

Speaking of bourgeois, or rather, Hitler’s interpretation of the word, “partly through his contempt for the ‘Professor Type,’…[Hitler] probably resisted…reading glasses for as long as it was possible” (“At Home” 20).  One likes to preserve what one likes to think of as one’s finer traits; there was more to his form of virility, however, than a mere distinction from the desk-bound, petty little bourgeois.  Despite his love for dogs, or all animals, “Hitler [had] once remarked [to his personal photographer], ‘…A statesman does not permit himself to be photographed with a little dog.  A German sheepdog is the only dog worthy of a real man’” (Fest 40).  No doubt, then, it was unfavorable to be seen (caught) playing with a woman’s little pipsqueak of a canine friend.  Some activities were in themselves considered improper for a statesman such as the Fuhrer himself. One can suppose, safely, that a rigid guard was not part of the job application for politicians.  Nor is it a perk.  But a reputation, an image, is always something to be maintained, especially when one attempts to lead a nation.  Perhaps it was a small price to pay as part of the package, or but an unnecessary hindrance, that decision to present himself as a proper statesman at all times, while he flowed so vibrantly back and forth as an orator.

Whatever one does, so long as others have differing opinions concerning such, one can never completely convince everyone.  Nor did he, Hitler.  But the Fuhrer could silence.  Heydrich’s Gestapo was quite useful in dealing with those who dared to criticize.  Outspoken opposition could very well have meant death.  But the secret police was more of a form of ‘repair work,’ so to speak. It is always preferable to go to the root of any problem and then compose a solution.  Joseph Goebbels, as Hitler’s propaganda minister, controlled the media.  Propaganda refined the Fuhrer’s image, made him into a messianic statesman, a hero to the German people.  What was not so in reality, was patched up with propaganda in the press.  “To Goebbels, it made no different whether the information he presented was real or not – as he was fond of saying, ‘Propaganda has nothing to do with the truth.’  The most important thing was to keep the image of Hitler and the Nazi party positive and pure” (Stewart 58). Just as Hitler had outlawed all other political parties save his own, there was something to be done about the thousands of journals, magazines, and newspapers scattered about in Germany at the time of his arrival to power; in the end, they too were confined to one view (Stewart 59).  Goebbels was the main reason for success in this ‘department’.  He “found the techniques of persuasion, the rationalizations, the slogans, myths and images.  It was from Goebbels that der Fuhrer, the term by which Hitler appeared as redeemer, demiurge and blessed saviour, received its visionary content” (Fest 84).  He was a man more than willing to serve, and a man of more than mediocre skill (Fest 86 -7).

Propaganda was not limited to local work.  For the purpose of enticing American and British listeners towards defeatist concepts, with their obligatory less-than-perfect optimism, the National Socialists were willing to broadcast degenerate art (Morton 33-4).  This meant compromises, considering their beliefs.  “…During the war Goebbels … found a way of harnessing modern technology with the most flexible and responsive form in popular music and creating a propaganda weapon of considerable power.” (Morton 37).  It was effective.  In fact, “…even some [Allied] intelligence officers were convinced that they were listening to the real thing” (Morton 37).

            Their ideology would have held little water upon close inspection.  “Propaganda was the genius of National Socialism.  Not only did it owe to propaganda its most important successes; propaganda was [the] only original contribution to the conditions for its rise and was always more than a mere instrument…” (Fest 83).  For all the theatrical skill of an artist then, Hitler’s orations were part of the propaganda. They too made it even more compelling to believe him.  After all, “…all people are ready to follow idols and ideals if they become sufficiently emotionalized” (von Luck 19).  That was the beauty of drama: emotion.  It was Adolf’s gift to his words.  As a whole, propaganda was so affective in carrying on an explicitly undesirable regime, that “carrying it to an extreme…National Socialism was propaganda masquerading as ideology…a will to power which formed its ideological theorems according to the maximum psychological advantage to be derived at any given moment” (Fest 83). 

“…the moods and impulses of the masses, in the sensing of which it was abnormally gifted,” (Fest 83) were in agreement with Hitler’s words.  It was a part of the ‘manipulation.’  What is straightforward to the mind may not necessarily be simplistic to the senses.  And so, many were deceived, satisfied with face value. Propaganda alone was capable of convincing the better part of a whole people to accept, or at least keep their peace.  Force ensured it.  In their silence, they witnessed what zealous followers were capable of in their radical fanaticism.  Those followers…they believed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

“At Home with Hitler:” Harper’s August. 2001: 20-2.

Fest, Joachim C. The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership. NY: Pantheon Books, 1970.

Morton, Brian. “Swing Time for Hitler.” The Nation 15 September. 2003: 33-4, 36-8.

Neumann, Paul.  Adolf Hitler seizes power. [Online] Available http://2ndww.tripod.com/Germany/kanzler.html, March 1, 2004.

Schjeldahl, Peter.  “Hitler as Artist.” The New Yorker 19-26 August. 2002: 170-1.

Stewart, Gail B. World History Series: Hitler’s Reich. San Diego, CA: Lucent Books, 1994.

The Time Editors of Time-Life Books. Shadow of the Dictators: Time Frame AD 1925 – 1950. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1991.

von Luck, Hans. Panzer Commander. NY: Dell Publishing, 1991.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Research Paper Outline

Thesis: Hitler was able to rise to and retain power partly by using oration and propaganda incorporated into his public image.

I.                    Appealing to the Masses

A.    Usage of oration and theatrics

B.     Various crowd-pleasing methods

C.     Principles of aesthetic design

II.                 Keeping Subordinates in Check

A.    Military power apart from Hitler

B.     Yes-men in the high ranks

C.     Military power with Hitler

III.               Public Image

A.    ‘Soldiers’ not ‘bourgeois’ emphasis on public image

B.     The ideal ‘statesman’ from his own viewpoint

C.     Continued and careful maintenance of ‘dignity’

IV.              Propaganda

A.    Refined Hitler’s image

B.     Restricted all viewpoints to the facets of one

C.     Success largely due to Goebbels

D.    Manipulating contemporary forms for political purposes

E.     As the emphasized essence of National Socialism