Reading Assignment Jeremy Chapman

Leibniz's Relationalism 3726223

In his correspondence with Dr. Samuel Clarke, Mr. Leibniz expounds a new way of thinking about space, time and spacetime. They are heavily religious, as most intellectual discourses of the time were. Clarke's replies to Leibniz can be seen as the 'official' Newtonian position. This position stated that: The issue of a substantival vs. a relational view of the nature os space can be resolved using experimental or observational facts.

According to a Newtonian substantivalist view, even if the universe were utterly devoid of matter, space would still exist with a three-dimensional Euclidean structure, and moments of time would still form a temporal order. In the Newtonian framework, space is an object, albeit an infinite, unchanging and unobservable one. Sklar outlines the conventional argument used by supporters of the substantivalist view: because a view of space, time, or spacetime as real, existent, and independent in their existence - is presumed in everyday ordinary and scientific discourse. Sklar also notes a split in the substantivalist camps, composed of 1) those who believe that spacetime be accepted as one of the many real existents that form the world and 2) those who believe that spacetime is real and exists but that it is the only existent of the world.

The relationalist holds that the postulation of space, time, or spacetime as entities existing in their own right with structures properly attributed to them in reality is simply a confusion. This is Leibniz's position, and he argues it eloquently thus: "... I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together; without enquiring into their manner os existing. And when many things are seen together, one perceives that order of things among themselves."(Huggett p.146). This excerpt manifestly denies the possibility of talking of spacetime "points" without reference to material objects inhabiting that "point", for without an object to measure from, there is no relational yardstick by which to measure and define. How then to define and talk about areas which hold no matter or events? Sklar gives us a possibility with the notion of possible but nonactual spatial relations. For instance, when speaking of the unoccupied space in a vacuum jar, we would be speaking of the spatial relations one might have to the bell jar or other material objects, but which no object actually does have to these extrinsic objects. Sklar notes that one cannot meaningfully ask where things would be if there were any, but one might ask what type of structure the spatial relations would be if there were objects present. Leibniz's philosophy of space, time and indeed most everything is based on the postulate "There ought to be some sufficient reason why some things should be so, and not otherwise..."(Huggett p.160). This Huggett calls his Principle of Sufficient Reason, and states that Leibniz made use of this argument in numerous sections of his correspondence with Clarke. This postulate, along with the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernables ("To suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same thing under two names" (Huggett p.164)), which is further bolstered by Leibniz's kinematic shift problem, allows Relationalists a strong foothold in the struggle to characterize their philosophy rationally.

In conclusion, a handy way to sum up Leibniz's arguments is in his line "...If there were no creatures, space and time would only be the ideas of God..."(Huggett p.151). In order for there to be order in the universe, there must be someone to perceive that order, there is no underlying template or container like space or time, only objects and their relations to each other.

Questions?

1. Why does Clarke not seem to use the argument about substantivalism being part of the everyday lexicon and operating procedures?

2. Will Relationalism allow us to radically change travel? If we are measuring distances in this way, wouldn't a conceptual shift in the way we view a distant object make it possible to do away with that pesky "space" between us and the planet, thus essentially diminishing the absolute distance from the observer?