



The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways

Audrey Singer

“Traditional gateways have become former gateways; new gateways have emerged; and even newer ones may still develop.”

Findings

An analysis of immigration to metropolitan areas during the 20th century using U.S. Census data reveals that:

- The U.S. foreign-born population grew 57.4 percent in the 1990s; by 2000 nearly one-third of U.S. immigrants resided outside established settlement states. Thirteen states primarily in the West and Southeast—including many that had not previously been major destinations for immigrants—saw foreign-born growth rates more than double the national average. These states included, Colorado, Georgia, Nevada, and North Carolina.
- Historical settlement patterns along with recent influxes of immigrants have produced six major types of U.S. immigrant “gateways.” *Former gateways*, like Cleveland and Buffalo, attracted immigrants in the early 1900s but no longer do. *Continuous gateways* such as New York and Chicago are long-established destinations for immigrants and continue to receive large numbers of the foreign-born. *Post-World War II gateways* like Los Angeles and Miami began attracting immigrants on a grand scale during the past 50 years. Atlanta, Dallas, and Washington, D.C., meanwhile, stand out as *emerging gateways* with fast immigrant growth during the past 20 years. Seattle and the Twin Cities—places that began the 20th century with strong immigrant pulls—waned as destinations during the middle of the century, but are now *re-emerging* as important immigrant gateways. Finally, Salt Lake City and Raleigh-Durham are very recent immigrant destinations, having attracted significant numbers of immigrants in the 1990s alone. These are the *pre-emerging gateways*.
- Newly emerging immigrant gateways experienced rapid growth of both the foreign- and native-born between 1980 and 2000, while the more established gateways experienced slower percentage growth of both—albeit from a larger base population. The continuous gateways, for example, would have lost population or stagnated absent the arrival of the foreign-born. By contrast, emerging and pre-emerging gateways exhibited strong population growth while also watching their foreign-born populations surge by as much as 817 percent (Atlanta) and 709 percent (Raleigh-Durham) over the two decades.
- By 2000 more immigrants in metropolitan areas lived in suburbs than cities, and their growth rates there exceeded those in the cities. Most notably, immigrants in emerging gateways are far more likely to live in the suburbs than in central cities.
- Recent arrivals to the newest immigrant gateways tend to come from Asia or Mexico, are poorer than the native-born population, and have low English proficiency and lower rates of U.S. citizenship. By contrast, continuous and post-World War II gateways have longer-residing immigrant populations, immigrant poverty rates similar to those of the native population, and relatively higher rates of naturalization, although English proficiency remains low.

Introduction

The United States is in the midst of a wave of unprecedented immigration. Immigrants comprised 11.1 percent of the U.S. population in 2000. During the 1990s alone, the foreign-born population grew by 11.3 million, or 57.4 percent, bringing the Census 2000 count of immigrants to 31.1 million. The rapidity of this influx, coupled with its sheer size, means that American society will confront momentous social, cultural, and political change during the coming decades and generations.

Perhaps most importantly, immigrants' settlement patterns are shifting. Specifically, significant flows of the foreign-born are shifting from more traditional areas to places with little history of immigration. More than two-thirds of America's immigrants lived in just six states in 2000—California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey or Illinois. However, the share of the nation's immigrant population living in those states declined significantly for the first time during the course of the 1990s—from 72.9 percent of the total in 1990 to 68.5 percent in 2000. Thanks to “hot” job markets in their construction, services, manufacturing, and technology sectors, for example, states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Nevada gained immigrants—who moved both from within the U.S. and directly from abroad—at rates not previously witnessed. Notably, many of the areas with the highest growth during the 1990s have little 20th-century history of receiving immigrants. The impact particularly at the metropolitan level has been great, as many cities and suburbs have had to adjust to new populations that place immediate demands on schools and health care systems, particularly with regard to language services.

In terms of absolute numbers, the bulk of immigrants are still going to a

handful of metropolitan areas. This explains why current research remains focused on the largest contemporary immigrant-receiving metropolitan areas: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Miami.¹ However, a new research agenda is suggested by the fact that metropolitan areas with few immigrants in 1980—such as Atlanta, Dallas, Fort Worth, and Las Vegas—are now seeing extraordinary growth in their immigrant populations. Among these four metropolitan areas, all saw their immigrant populations more than quadruple during the past 20 years.

This paper analyzes the new geography of immigration during the 20th century and highlights how immigrant destinations in the 1980s and 1990s differ from earlier settlement patterns. The first part of the analysis uses historical U.S. Census data to develop a classification of urban immigrant “gateways” that describes the ebb and flow of past, present, and likely future receiving areas. The remainder of the analysis examines contemporary trends to explore the recent and rapid settlement of the immigrant population in America's metropolitan gateways. Metropolitan areas that have seen little immigration to date may represent a new policy context for immigrant settlement and incorporation. This paper takes an important first step in understanding how these changes are altering a range of receiving areas by examining the demographic, spatial, economic, and social characteristics of the immigrants that reside in them.

In sum, the findings that follow confirm that the U.S. experienced unparalleled immigration in the 1990s that transformed many new destinations into emerging gateways and changed the character of more established ones. Most large metropolitan areas across the country now need to meet the challenges of incorporating new immigrants with diverse backgrounds and needs.


Background

The U.S. has a long and varied history of immigration; its 20th-century flows can be seen in Figure 1, which depicts both the number of immigrants and the share of the population that is foreign-born by decade. In 2000, the number of immigrants in the U.S. reached 31.1 million—a population three times larger than that in 1900. At the same time, the 11.1 percent portion of the population that is currently foreign-born remains proportionally smaller than the 13.6-percent 1900 figure.

Across the last century immigration ebbed and flowed. The immigrant population steadily increased during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Subsequently, immigration stalled in the late 1930s during the worldwide depression. Through the next four decades restrictive immigration policies instituted during World War II kept legal immigration levels low. These lower levels of immigration combined with elevated fertility rates and the resulting “baby boom” depressed the proportion of the nation's population that was foreign-born during the 1950s and 1960s. But then the Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1965 (which went into effect in 1968) repealed national origin quotas, opening up immigration from regions other than Europe. This policy change, together with the mobility fostered by economic growth in many developing nations, combined to produce an immigration boom during the 1980s and 1990s. The immigrant population of the U.S. more than doubled during those twenty years—growing from 14.1 million to 31.1 million.

Not only did the tempo of immigration speed up, but the source countries also shifted from Europe in the first three-quarters of the century to Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa in the last quarter. During

Figure 1. Total Foreign-Born and Percent Foreign-Born in the United States, 1900–2000



Source: *Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 1997, Current Population Reports, Special Studies P23-195, Figure 1-1; Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Summary Tables, Profile of Selected Social Characteristics: 2000, QT-02, U.S. Bureau of the Census.*

the first two decades of the century, 85 percent of the 14.5 million immigrants admitted to the U.S. originated in Europe, largely Southern and Eastern Europe. During the last two decades, an equally large percentage of the two decades' 14.9 million immigrants hailed from the countries of Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

Both periods—the beginning and the end of the century—meanwhile saw broad restructurings of the nation's economy, from agriculture to industry in the early period and from manufacturing to services and information technology in the later period. Moreover, the social conflict and competition that accompanied the recent shift in immigrant origins to countries with different ethnic backgrounds, languages, religions, and political traditions resembles dynamics that unfolded in the earliest decades of the 20th century.

For American cities that developed during the 19th and early 20th cen-

turies, immigration was an enormous driver of population growth. The burgeoning growth of manufacturing jobs in Northeastern and Midwestern cities attracted surplus labor from domestic rural areas, as well as from abroad. As the growth of industry and commerce in metropolitan areas continued through the 1950s, so too did the rapid population growth of cities. At that point, many cities in the older industrial core began to lose population as their suburbs boomed and as metropolitan areas in the west developed. By the 1970s, both economic and population growth in the West and the Southwest began in earnest. While some of the older Eastern cities maintained their status as immigrant gateway cities through the century, others—mostly in the West and Southwest—have become central destinations.

Methodology

This study uses decennial census data for the years 1900 to 2000 to describe the changing geography of immigration to America over the entire 20th century. First, a typology of immigrant “gateway” types is determined by examining historical immigration flows over the decades to the nation's largest central cities, because cities dominated urban areas in the earlier part of the century. Then, this typology of gateways anchors an examination of more recent immigrant settlement trends in 45 U.S. metropolitan areas, including their suburbs.

The 45 selected metropolitan areas represent a variety of experiences and conditions. Thirty-two of these 45 metropolitan areas had at least 200,000 foreign-born residents in 2000, higher-than-average immigrant population shares, and faster-than-average growth in their immigrant populations.² Five other metropolitan areas had smaller populations but very fast immigrant population growth, while eight other immigrant destinations were studied for historical and comparative reasons. For the historical analysis, the study employs data for central cities that are comparable across the entire period.³ The contemporary sections use data for metropolitan areas with consistent 2000 definitions for all decades. Immigrants residing in these 45 metropolitan areas comprise 73 percent of the foreign-born population in the U.S. in 2000.

Definition of Immigrant


The terms “immigrant” and “foreign-born” are used interchangeably to describe all persons living in the U.S. who were born in another country (and were not born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent). In official parlance, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) uses the term “immigrant” to denote a

person admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence. The Census Bureau considers anyone who is not born a U.S. citizen to be foreign-born. Although the U.S. Census contains a question on birthplace, it does not ask about a foreign-born person's legal status. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether a person born outside the U.S. is here, for example, as a legal permanent resident, a temporary worker or student, or whether they are undocumented. Other relevant questions regarding the foreign-born determine place of birth, period of arrival, citizenship status, and English language proficiency.

Geographic Definitions

This report uses a variety of geographies. The cities studied in the historical portion of the analysis are based on an examination of the 50 largest urban places at each census as presented by Gibson and Lennon (1999). The contemporary metropolitan areas analyzed, for their part, are those defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs). Central cities for the contemporary section of the analysis are defined in this study as the largest city in the metropolitan area in combination with any other city of over 100,000 (in 2000) that is named in the official MSA or PMSA name.¹ Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) are not used as the unit of analysis, but their PMSA components are included if they qualify under the criteria stated in Table 1. The suburbs are the portion of the metropolitan area located outside the central city or cities.

Urban gateways, meanwhile, serve as immigrants' residential entrance point to the United States. Immigrants settle in these places to live, work, and raise families. They also represent a phenomenon of consequence for the population residing in those places



and for the institutions, services, and people that are affected by the movement of immigrants who may be culturally, socially, and linguistically different than the resident population. The word “gateway” also implies that the region functions as a symbolic destination. Such portals hold out opportunities for newcomers, and beckon to others as well-known centers populated by significant numbers of immigrants. As such, cities and localities become identified with immigrants, and their reputation itself may generate further settlement as social networks circulate information on employment, housing, and educational opportunities there. In this regard, only the largest U.S. cities and metropolitan areas are considered in this study.

Findings

A. The U.S. foreign-born population grew 57.4 percent in the 1990s; by 2000 nearly one-third of U.S. immigrants resided outside established settlement states.

During the second half of the 20th century, six states reigned as the primary regions of immigrant settlement: California, Texas, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Florida. In 2000, more than two-thirds of all immigrants lived in these states. These primary destinations are outlined in red in Figure 2, which depicts immigrant growth and settlement patterns across all states as of 2000. Twenty states had 1990s foreign-born growth rates that were lower than the national average (57.4 percent), including three of the largest contemporary gateway states: California, New York, and New Jersey.

Table 1. Six Immigrant Gateway Types, Metropolitan Areas, 2000

Former	Continuous	Post-World War II	Emerging	Re-Emerging	Pre-Emerging
Baltimore	Bergen-Passaic	Fort Lauderdale	Atlanta	Denver	Austin
Buffalo	Boston	Houston	Dallas	Minneapolis-St. Paul	Charlotte
Cleveland	Chicago	Los Angeles	Fort Worth	Oakland	Greensboro-
Detroit	Jersey City	Miami	Las Vegas	Phoenix	Winston-Salem
Milwaukee	Middlesex-Somerset-	Orange County	Orlando	Portland, OR	Raleigh-Durham
Philadelphia	Hunterdon	Riverside-	Washington, D.C.	Sacramento	Salt Lake City
Pittsburgh	Nassau-Suffolk	San Bernardino	West Palm Beach	San Jose	
St. Louis	New York	San Diego		Seattle	
	Newark			Tampa	
	San Francisco				

How the Gateways Were Defined

All of the gateways have metropolitan populations greater than 1 million population. Continuous, Post-World War II, Emerging, and Re-Emerging gateways have foreign-born populations greater than 200,000 and either foreign-born shares higher than the 2000 national average (11.1 percent) or foreign-born growth rates higher than the national average (57.4 percent), or both. Former gateways are determined through historical trends (see below). Pre-Emerging gateways have smaller foreign-born populations but very high growth rates in the 1990s.

The gateway definitions and selection are also based on the historical presence (in percentage terms) of the foreign-born in their central cities:

Former: Above national average in percentage foreign-born 1900–1930, followed by percentages below the national average in every decade through 2000

Continuous: Above-average percentage foreign-born for every decade, 1900–2000

Post-World War II: Low percentage foreign-born until after 1950, followed by percentages higher than the national average for remainder of century

Emerging: Very low percentage foreign-born until 1970, followed by a high proportions in the post-1980 period

Re-Emerging: Similar pattern to continuous gateways: Foreign-born percentage exceeds national average 1900–1930, lags it after 1930, then increases rapidly after 1980

Pre-Emerging: Very low percentages of foreign-born for the entire 20th century

For the first time in recent decades it appears the dominance of California as a destination is beginning to wane, as new states absorb more immigrants, including many that have never attracted many immigrants.

In fact, the 1990s saw unprecedented immigrant growth in many non-traditional areas. Thirty states plus the District of Columbia saw their foreign-born growth rates outstrip the national average. These fast growers include the three other major destination states (Texas, Illinois, and Florida), but they were not the fastest growers. Thirteen states saw more than double the nation’s immigrant growth rate. These states include several clustered in the West (Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho) and the Southeast (North and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky), as well as Minnesota,

Nebraska, and Arkansas. Many of these states have not been major receivers of immigrants during the past few decades.

B. Historical settlement patterns along with recent influxes of immigrants have produced six major types of U.S. immigrant “gateways.”

Six basic types of immigrant gateways can be identified by examining trends in immigrant settlement in cities and metropolitan areas over the last century. Table 1 defines these gateway types and lists the metropolitan areas included in the analysis. City-based immigration data were used to identify the gateway types; data on metropolitan areas were used to analyze contemporary trends.

Former gateways—like Cleveland, Buffalo, and St. Louis—attracted immigrants in the early 1900s, but no

longer do. These cities appear in the 1900 panel of Table 2, which lists the central cities that had the largest numbers of immigrant residents at each end of the 20th century. The cities, along with others shown in Figure 3, were important immigrant destinations at the beginning of the century, but saw their foreign-born populations decline throughout the remaining decades of the 20th century. As Figure 3 shows, all but Milwaukee had populations that were 95 percent native-born by 2000.

By contrast, a number of cities—such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco—have always been dominant residential choices for immigrants. These cities appear in both the 1900 and 2000 panels of Table 2 and can be identified as **continuous gateways**. Like the former gateways, these cities began the century with large

Table 2. Central-City Immigrant Gateways, 1900 and 2000


1900		Population	Foreign-Born Population	Percent Foreign-Born	2000		Population	Foreign-Born Population	Percent Foreign-Born
1	New York	3,437,202	1,270,080	37.0	1	New York	8,008,278	2,871,032	35.9
2	Chicago	1,698,575	587,112	34.6	2	Los Angeles	3,694,820	1,512,720	40.9
3	Philadelphia	1,293,967	295,340	22.8	3	Chicago	2,896,016	628,903	21.7
4	Boston	560,892	197,129	35.1	4	Houston	1,953,631	516,105	26.4
5	Cleveland	381,768	124,631	32.6	5	San Jose	894,943	329,757	36.8
6	San Francisco	342,782	116,885	34.1	6	San Diego	1,223,400	314,227	25.7
7	St. Louis	575,238	111,356	19.4	7	Dallas	1,188,580	290,436	24.4
8	Buffalo	352,387	104,252	29.6	8	San Francisco	776,733	285,541	36.8
9	Detroit	285,704	96,503	33.8	9	Phoenix	1,321,045	257,325	19.5
10	Milwaukee	285,315	88,991	31.2	10	Miami	362,470	215,739	59.5

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

shares of immigrants; like them, they then saw such populations decline for two generations, so that they reached a low point in 1970. But unlike the former gateways, the continuous gateways again registered high immigrant growth in the last three decades of the century. Figure 4 documents that by 2000 the foreign-born population share in the continuous gateways had nearly reached the peak they registered in the early 1900s.

Other cities were meanwhile becoming increasingly attractive for immigrants during the latter part of the 20th century, in a development that coincided with the liberalization of immigration from the Western hemisphere. Figure 5 depicts immigration flows to the large *post-World War II* gateways of Los Angeles, Miami, San Diego, and Houston. Los Angeles and San Diego (along with Houston) show similar patterns. Although on different scales, each city first witnessed dramatic immigration after 1970. By 2000, more than 40 percent of the city of Los Angeles and more than 25 percent of both Houston's and San Diego's populations was foreign-born. Miami experienced the sharpest growth in its foreign-born population among the post-World War II gateway cities. The immigrant population there comprised

Figure 3. Percent Foreign-Born Population in Former Gateways, 1900–2000




Source: U.S. Census Bureau

nearly one in four persons in 1920, declined to 12 percent of the total in 1950, but then jumped significantly with the influx of Cuban refugees, climbing to a high of 60 percent of the overall population in 2000.

The trends described so far stand in sharp contrast to those for the *emerging gateways*. Figure 6 illustrates the degree to which these cities—Dallas; Washington, D.C.; and Atlanta were some of the fastest-growing centers in the 1990s—experienced tremendous growth in their foreign-born popula-


tions only in the last decade or two. These gateways saw their initially minimal immigrant populations rise from less than 10 percent to as much as 25 percent of their total populations during the past 20 years. Dallas is a case in point: Dallas' foreign-born population remained below 10 percent of its total population for most of the century, sagged to its lowest shares during the middle decades, and then rose significantly after the 1970s, reaching 24 percent of the total population in 2000.

Figure 4. Percent Foreign-Born Population in Continuous Gateways, 1900–2000



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 5. Percent Foreign-Born Population in Post-World War II Gateways, 1900–2000



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 7 shows the fifth pattern of foreign-born population growth: that of the *re-emerging gateways*. These largely Western cities—such as Portland, San Jose, Denver, and Seattle—

harbored high foreign-born shares in the early 1900s, saw them decline through the 1970s, and then grow again in the 1990s. In the case of San Jose the 2000 share exceeded the

city's prior 1900 immigration height. Should such growth continue some of these places may soon reattain full gateway status.

These five gateway types, while identified by trends in their central cities, still hold when applied at the metropolitan level. A sixth category—the *pre-emerging gateway*—can be discerned *only* when examining contemporary metropolitan area immigrant growth.⁶ Pre-emerging gateways are places such as Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston-Salem, and Salt Lake City that had very small immigrant populations in 1980 but experienced sudden, very rapid growth in the 1990s. For example, Charlotte's immigrant population numbered less than 15,000 in 1980 but jumped to 100,000 in 2000, a 315-percent growth rate over the 20-year period.

In sum, the changing geography of opportunity has altered the American immigration map and has begun to reshuffle the nation's major immigrant destinations. Traditional gateways became former gateways; new gateways emerged; and even newer ones may still develop. Affecting this geography, moreover, has been the fact that Sun Belt and Southern cities (whose development postdated their Midwestern and Northeastern counterparts) lack long-term development of densely populated central cities and are overall more “suburban” in form. That has ensured that immigrant growth in these metro areas has frequently occurred where most of the overall growth is taking place: outside the central cities in the suburbs.



C. Newly emerging immigrant gateways experienced rapid growth of both the foreign- and native-born between 1980 and 2000, while the more established gateways experienced slower percentage growth of both—albeit from a larger base population.

Important relationships exist between regions' overall and foreign-born popu-

lation growth, and underscore the critical role that immigration can play within larger population dynamics. Examining foreign-born growth in relation to overall growth can reveal the varying degrees to which immigrants contribute to metropolitan-wide population trends.

In the slow-growing *former-gateway* metropolitan areas immigration did not often contribute much to overall growth. Figure 8 shows that slow overall population growth (4.5 percent) prevailed among the former-gateway metro areas. Absent the arrival of immigrants, these metro areas would have still grown by 3.4 percent, suggesting that most of the growth in these metropolitan areas came from natural increase (Schacter, Franklin, and Perry 2003 show net domestic out-migration for most of the former gateways). Such Rust Belt metropolitan areas in the Midwest as Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh illustrate this dynamic. All lost overall metropolitan population during the 1980–2000 period, and all saw their foreign-born populations decline in both the 1980s and 1990s as well, as older immigrant cohorts aged and new immigrants settled elsewhere. Other former gateways saw fairly large percentage gains in immigration, though. Baltimore led the way in this respect, doubling its immigrant population during the period to 146,000. Detroit and Philadelphia, meanwhile, retain larger immigrant populations in absolute terms, and also saw them grow considerably in the 1990s. If such trends continue these two metro areas may soon attain re-emerging gateway status. (See Appendix A for total-population and foreign-born population growth data for all 45 metropolitan areas.)

Overall populations in the *continuous gateways* also grew relatively modestly during the last 20 years. On average these gateways' populations grew by 12.1 percent, with some metropolitan areas such as Newark, Jersey




City, and Bergen-Passaic declining slightly during the 1980s but coming back stronger in the 1990s. Immigrant growth, however, remained strong across the entire period with nearly an 80-percent surge across all the continuous gateways. Collectively, these met-

ropolitan areas would have experienced very little growth had it not been for their immigration gains (Figure 8), and New York would have lost population were it not for its 1.3 million net immigrant newcomers.

Post-World War II gateways grew

Figure 8. Population Growth in Metropolitan Areas by Gateway Type, 1980–2000



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

much faster by comparison. Taken together, these seven metropolitan areas grew by nearly 50 percent overall during this period. At the same time, their immigrant population shot up by a collective 150 percent between 1980 and 2000—not surprising given that all of these gateways are in Florida, California, and Texas, three of the top immigrant-receiving states in the second half of the century. However, this growth was neither evenly distributed across metro areas, nor across the time period. Riverside-San Bernardino and Houston, for example, saw their immigrant populations nearly quadruple over the two decades. Los Angeles' and Miami's populations “only” doubled, but they grew much more quickly in the 1980s than the 1990s. Indeed, all of the individual post-World War II gateway metro areas at least doubled their immigrant populations and all but Fort Lauderdale exhibited slower growth in the 1990s than in the 1980s. As Figure 8 shows, moreover, immigration drove much of these metro areas' overall population

growth, and Los Angeles and Miami would have grown very little without the influx of immigrants.

Emerging gateways, for their part, saw their aggregate metropolitan population nearly double during the 1980s and 1990s. In these metropolitan areas, immigrant populations increased five-fold, from just over half a million to 2.7 million—growth that nevertheless constituted only about one-third of the overall population growth. Las Vegas stands out as the only Western metropolitan area in the group and for its simultaneous ultra-fast growth in its total and immigrant populations (238 and 637 percent growth, respectively). In contrast to the continuous and post-World War II gateways, most of the emerging gateways experienced faster immigration during the 1990s than the 1980s. For example, Orlando's immigrant population grew by 120 percent in the 1980s and then by another 140 percent during the 1990s to reach 197,119 immigrants in 2000. Washington, D.C. is notable in that although it had virtu-

ally no immigration for most of its history, it has quickly climbed to the top of the immigrant destination list. Washington's 832,016 foreign-born residents place it seventh on the list of all metropolitan areas in 2000 (Singer 2003). Indeed, Washington may have actually already “emerged” as a leading immigrant gateway.

Although *re-emerging gateways* did not increase their overall populations as fast as emerging gateways during the past 20 years (their aggregate population grew 51.8 percent over the period), these reviving gateways were marked by steady immigration in both decades. These metro areas tripled the size of their immigrant communities over the last two decades of the century. And except for those in California, all re-emerging gateway metro areas saw the pace of their immigration accelerate in the 1990s. Like the other gateway types, re-emerging gateways would have grown more slowly—by 30 percent—were it not for the newcomers from abroad. Absent immigration, the Minneapolis-St. Paul and Portland metropolitan areas, for example, would have grown by only 20 percent.

Finally, the *pre-emerging gateways* include some of the fastest-growing smaller metropolitan areas in the country. Together these five metro areas grew by some 66 percent, and grew more rapidly in the 1990s than the 1980s. But meanwhile, their immigrant population exploded, as their foreign-born population increased by an aggregate 464 percent during the period. Three North Carolina metro areas in this group—Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and Raleigh-Durham—averaged no less than 600 percent growth over the two decades. The absolute size of the foreign-born population in the five pre-emerging gateways must now be taken into account, moreover. These areas' miniscule initial immigrant population (collectively, they contained less than 100,000 immigrants in 1980) had by 2000 surged to 547,470 residents.

In sum, immigration has slowed in the more established continuous and post-World War II gateways at the same time it has accelerated in the emerging, re-emerging, and pre-emerging gateways. Certainly, the continuous and post-World War II gateways will remain dominant due to the large numbers of immigrants residing in them and their continuing ability to attract newcomers. However, job creation in fast-growing metro areas is simultaneously attracting both the native- and the foreign-born, raising sensitive issues of how to incorporate and accommodate the needs of a rapidly growing and rapidly diversifying population.

D. By 2000 more immigrants in metropolitan areas lived in suburbs than cities, and growth rates there exceeded those in the cities.

Calculations by the Louis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research indicate that 94 percent of the nation's immigrants lived in metropolitan areas in 2000, and that within those metro areas 48 percent lived in central cities, while the remaining 52 percent resided in the suburbs.⁷ This divide reflects a slight shift from 1990, when immigrants were nearly equally spread between suburbs and central cities. And it foreshadows a more pronounced suburban tilt within the 45 mostly larger gateway metropolitan areas examined in this study: In 1970, 54 percent of gateway immigrants favored central cities but by 2000 only 43 percent did. That meant that by 2000 57 percent of immigrants in these metro areas resided in suburban areas.

This marks a new development. For most of U.S. history, immigrants have been concentrated in central cities. Early waves of European immigrants initially located themselves in neighborhoods close to the factories, shops, and institutions that employed them. As immigrants became more upwardly mobile they moved out of immigrant

enclaves to neighborhoods with better housing and schools—often in the suburbs. This classic scenario of European settlement was first described by the “Chicago school” of sociology and further elaborated on by social scientists who have found empirical support for the “spatial assimilation” of immigrants.⁸ In this view, immigrants clustered—often by national origin—mostly in urban neighborhoods initially and the residential mobility that followed from socioeconomic mobility was seen as an indicator of assimilation. More recently, though, Richard Alba and his colleagues used data from the 1990 Census to analyze suburban residential patterns among immigrants and found that: 1) Immigrants were a growing presence in the suburbs; 2) immigrant suburbanization was related to education and income and less to English language proficiency; 3) immigrant suburbanization reflects individual metropolitan areas' urban growth patterns; and 4) multiethnic suburbs were taking root in the 1990s.⁹

These developments have begun to define several distinctive patterns of immigrant settlement in different types of metropolitan areas. Most notably, while the city-to-suburbs movement has been prevalent in the nation's historical immigration gateways, it has not occurred on the same scale in cities that began receiving immigrants in large numbers only recently. The central cities of continuous and former gateways, as well as of some of the re-emerging gateways, developed to their full urban scale much earlier than the other gateway types, and so accommodated immigrants first in their cities. Then they saw many move to the suburbs as newer arrivals replenished central city neighborhoods. By contrast, immigration to the emerging and post-World War II gateways took place entirely in an era of metropolitan decentralization and suburbanization. These metropolitan areas are much more suburban in

form with larger shares of their total populations living outside of central cities. It follows that metro areas with more recent and extensive suburban development will have higher shares of their immigrants in the suburbs.

Contemporary data, in this regard, suggest that many immigrants are moving directly to the suburbs. The classic pattern of city to suburban migration no longer predominates.

Appendix B shows the changing reality by displaying city and suburban numbers and the varying percentages of immigrants in metropolitan areas for the 1970–2000 period. Keep in mind that the 1970 share of the national population that was foreign-born (4.7 percent) was at its lowest point of the 20th century.

Right off it can be seen that a shift in residential preference, from central city to suburbs, occurred across the 45 metropolitan areas during this 30-year period. In 1970, half a million more immigrants lived in cities than in suburbs. By 1980, the reversal had begun: In that year, approximately 100,000 more foreign-born resided in suburbs than in cities. Over the course of the next decade suburban immigrant growth continued. The suburbs gained 1 million more immigrant residents than the cities in the 1990s, and by 2000, more than three million more immigrants lived in suburban areas than in cities. Although immigrant settlement in cities in the 1990s expanded by a robust 43 percent, suburbs tallied 66-percent growth (see Appendix C). Suburban areas in the gateway metros now garner both absolutely greater numbers of immigrants and faster percentage growth as a group than cities.

And yet, the nature and degree of this suburbanization varies widely.

To begin with, cities continue to attract large numbers of immigrants, retain greater foreign-born population shares, and continue to grow increasingly foreign-born.

Central cities in all gateway types

but the emerging ones began the 1970–2000 period with higher percentages of their populations foreign-born than their suburbs and, across all types, ended the period that way. Moreover, the fact that an absolute majority of immigrants resided in suburbs by 2000 did not keep the percentage of the foreign-born in gateway cities from rising faster, and higher, than it did in gateway suburbs. In 2000, nearly one out of every four city residents was foreign-born—up from one in ten in 1970. By contrast, the corresponding immigrant share of the larger suburban population rose from 6 percent to 15 percent between 1970 and 2000.

In part these patterns reflect broad outflows of the general population from cities to suburbs during this period, which have helped elevate the proportional immigrant presence of many cities. But even so, the absolute growth of the immigrant population in central cities was sustained or grew over this period even as immigrant suburbanization came to the fore. Among the continuous gateways as well as in Los Angeles and Miami, the share of the central-city population that was foreign-born was in the double-digits in 1970. Miami was particularly high at nearly 42 percent, and San Francisco was the next highest at approximately 22 percent. All the rest of the metro areas in other gateways had smaller shares in the single digits ranging from an average of 2 to 3 percent for the emerging and pre-emerging gateways, to 6 percent for the re-emerging and former gateways. By 2000, the central cities of continuous and post-World War II gateways were on average approximately one-third foreign-born, while immigrants made up 18 percent, 20 percent, and 13 percent, respectively, of the emerging, re-emerging and pre-emerging gateways' center cities. Notably, however, Miami's central-city immigrant growth stalled in the 1990s, and Los Angeles's was largely curtailed (see Appendix C

for 1990s foreign-born growth rates).

Meanwhile, a variety of different experiences of suburban immigrant growth can be discerned across the gateway types (see www.brookings.edu/urban for maps of immigrant settlement for all 45 gateway metropolitan areas).

Very few gateways, in fact, had truly large foreign-born presences in their 1970s suburban populations. And in most *former gateways* tepid immigrant growth assured those presences remained modest—in the range of 2 to 8 percent. At the same time, though, the former gateways did nevertheless see a higher share of their regions' immigrants residing in the suburbs. This is not surprising, given the extreme decentralization that has dispersed these largely Midwestern and Northeastern metropolitan regions. With very low levels of contemporary immigration, many of the foreign-born in these gateways represent an earlier immigrant cohort whose “spatial assimilation” followed a broader outward-migration to the suburbs beginning in the 1950s and 1960s.

Other gateway types exhibited more profound changes.

Most continuous and post-World War II gateways, for their part, began the 1970–2000 period with fairly large numbers and shares of immigrants in the suburbs, and then saw the presence of the foreign-born in their suburbs expand robustly during the following decades. Decades of steady immigration and assimilation, followed and ensured that in 1970 more than 1.2 million immigrants made up about 8.5 percent of the suburban population in the *continuous gateways*.

In similar fashion, the *post-World War II gateways* evolved from 8.5-percent foreign-born to more than 27-percent foreign-born between 1970 and 2000 as their collective foreign-born population increased from 750,000 to 4.8 million. Miami's suburbs were nearly 50-percent foreign-born by 2000 (compared to 17.9 percent in

1970), while Los Angeles' were one-third foreign-born by the later year, up from 9-percent in 1970. Suburban Houston began the period with just a 1.5-percent foreign-born presence and ended it 15.2-percent foreign-born—a percentage 10 times higher.

As to their rates of growth, the solid 35- and 26-percent growth rates notched by the central-city immigrant populations in the continuous and post-World War II gateways during the 1990s were in each case significantly outpaced by the new suburban growth. Continuous-gateway suburbs saw their foreign-born populations grow by 55 percent; post-World War II gateways saw theirs grow 46 percent between 1990 and 2000.

In the case of Chicago, the suburban growth of the foreign-born in the 1990s was nearly double the average across the continuous gateways. There, the suburbs came to house a majority of the area's immigrants, moving from 47 percent to 56 percent of the total during the 1990s. None of the other 45 metropolitan areas saw greater absolute growth in its suburbs during the 1990s. By comparison, the continuous gateways of New York and San Francisco still house more immigrants in the city than the suburbs.

Big influxes of immigrants have also begun to reorient the emerging and re-emerging gateways' suburbs—especially in the 1990s. *Emerging gateways'* suburbs, for instance, absorbed almost the same absolute number of immigrants as the post-World War II gateways' (1.3 million compared to 1.5 million newcomers) in the 1990s but their rate of foreign-born growth dwarfed that in the suburbs of the longer-standing gateways thanks to their small initial immigrant populations. These suburbs' foreign-born population soared by 131-percent compared to the 46-percent growth of the post-World War II gateway suburbs in the 1990s. During that decade, Atlanta, Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C. notched 283-, 251-, and 76-per-

cent increases in their suburban immigrant populations, respectively, that brought their suburban foreign-born presences to 10.7 percent, 15.5 percent, and 17.4 percent of their suburban populations, respectively.

Also noteworthy are the *re-emerging gateways*, which experienced metropolitan immigrant growth patterns that favored their suburbs—but only slightly. These gateways saw their collective suburban immigrant population grow by 100 percent, or nearly 900,000 immigrants, during the 1990s. However, foreign-born city populations in these gateways also grew rapidly, as foreign-born populations surged by 94 percent, or 626,106 residents. As a result, only 500,000 more immigrants resided in re-emerging gateway suburbs than in their central cities in 2000, as the two locales' populations reached 1.8 million and 1.3 million respectively. Of course, it should be noted, that this relatively balanced aggregate growth owes in part to the peculiar jurisdictional maps of metropolitan Phoenix and San Jose, whose central cities include vast quasi-suburban areas.¹⁰

Similarly large central cities in some of the *pre-emerging gateways*, finally, ensured that slightly more immigrants lived in cities than suburbs there—and both locales were growing rapidly in the 1990s. The pre-emerging gateways, although small in population, experienced astounding suburban immigrant growth rates of nearly 250 percent, but their central cities also grew by 213 percent. This may reflect the nascent nature of the immigration to those areas. But it also reflects the larger central cities of places like Austin, Greensboro, and Charlotte, which—like the central cities of the Phoenix and San Jose emerging gateways—encompass large swaths of essentially “suburban” territory.

In short, then, historical factors and broader population dynamics are clearly important influences on the residential location of contemporary

immigrants. The lack of historical immigrant neighborhoods in emerging and post-World War II gateways, for example, has a direct bearing on immigrants' settlement patterns.¹¹ Meanwhile, contemporary immigrants, like their earlier counterparts, frequently settle close to where the jobs are; however, this time around, the jobs are mostly in the suburbs.¹² Moreover, many inner suburbs are distinguished by the affordability of their housing, especially as compared with dwindling options in many central city neighborhoods, particularly those experiencing gentrification.¹³ This in part explains the sharp contrast of settlement patterns in continuous gateways (where more than half of the immigrants reside in central cities), and emerging gateways (where fully three-quarters of immigrants resided outside the central cities) in 2000 (see Figure 9). In some emerging gateway metropolitan areas such as Atlanta and Washington D.C., nearly all of immigrants lived in the suburbs in 2000, whereas in 1970 only 55 percent of the areas' immigrants did.¹⁴ In those metro areas, immigrant settlement patterns resemble those of the native-born population, so that similarly high shares of both populations reside in the suburbs.

E. Recent arrivals to the newest immigrant gateways tend to come from Asia or Mexico, are poorer than the native-born population, and have low English proficiency and lower rates of U.S. citizenship.

In addition to the changing geography of immigration, variations in the characteristics of newer and older immigrant flows are also creating locally diverse challenges of incorporating large new populations.

Not only does the recentness of an immigrant cohort strongly influence the process of social and economic integration in a particular destination. So, too, do the particulars of a local immigrant flow's region of origin, English proficiency, affluence, and citizenship sta-


tus. For example, some refugees from Southeast Asia are very poor, have little formal education, and few aspirations beyond survival. Meanwhile, some recent Latin American immigrants spend part of the year in the U.S. and part in their home country, always with the intention of returning to their home communities. In view of that, Census data provides an important first look at the varying challenges gateway communities and their foreign-born residents face as they move into the 21st century.

The sheer recentness of the phenomenally large immigrant influxes of the 1990s presents a first challenge. With more than 11 million new immigrants arriving in the U.S. in the 1990s, the impact of so many newcomers with very heterogeneous backgrounds is being felt far and wide. The three categories of emerging gateways, not surprisingly have the highest shares of the newest of immigrants.

The *emerging gateways* are particularly full of new arrivals: Just over half of immigrants living in these metropolitan areas reported entering the U.S. sometime during the decade of the 1990s. In the *pre-emerging gateways* the share is even higher (although smaller in absolute terms): Nearly two out of every three immigrants arrived in the 1990s. Even the foreign-born in *re-emerging gateways*, which represent a mixture of newcomers and older immigrants who have been aging in place, are also relatively recent: some 47.5 percent of foreign-born residents in those metro areas arrived during the 1990s. These trends contrast with the set of more established gateways. In the *post-World War II* metro areas for instance, only 37 percent of immigrants were recent arrivals. Forty-two percent of the foreign-born in *continuous* and *former gateways* arrived during the decade, which is on par with the national average for this decade.

These variations are important because newer immigrants—often possessing more limited language skills and weaker social networks than ear-

Figure 9. Share of Foreign-Born Population that Live in the Suburbs by Gateway Type, 1970–2000



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

lier arrivals—frequently encounter greater difficulty availing themselves of economic opportunity than longer-established newcomers. But they also point to the broader importance of human capital and employment skills in immigrant integration—issues into which some insights can be gained by exploring Census data on the national origins, language, income, and naturalization characteristics of the foreign-born by gateway type.

Table 3 displays the varying origin-region profiles of the six gateway types. The distinctive profile of the former and continuous gateways makes itself apparent: In these older gateways, there is a layering of immigrant settlement and incorporation that includes the pre-1965 flows (largely European) as well as the post-1965 immigrant streams. Consequently, both types of gateway exhibit much higher shares of European immigrants than any other gateway type, and much lower shares of Mexican arrivals. In the case of the *former gateways*, more than two-thirds of the foreign-population in 2000 hailed either from Europe or Asia, while just

6.6 percent of the aggregate foreign-born population came from Mexico.¹⁵ There was also a dearth of Latin Americans, although 30 percent of Milwaukee’s immigrants come from Mexico (see a list of the 10 largest countries of birth for each metropolitan area at www.brookings.edu/urban). The *continuous* gateways (which are dominated by New York and environs) show greater diversity of national origins of immigrants, although they incorporate the second-highest share of European immigrants (22 percent). Together, these gateways contain high overall shares of Caribbeans and non-Mexican Latin Americans, with nearly half of their newcomers originating from that region of the world. This gateway category also includes places like Boston with a fairly even distribution between Europeans, Asians, non-Mexican Latin Americans, and Caribbeans, as well as San Francisco, which is dominated by Asians (51 percent). In general, East Coast gateway metropolitan areas have very heterogeneous populations and small Mexican populations (although this group is growing in the New York metropolitan area and

surrounding metro areas). For example, New York’s largest group—immigrants from the Dominican Republic—comprises just 12.2 percent of all immigrants, followed by China (6.8 percent), Jamaica (6.3 percent), Mexico (4.6 percent) and Guyana (4.2 percent). As in many of the East Coast continuous gateways, the 10 largest immigrant groups comprise only half of all immigrant groups.

The newer gateways look different—and not just because these regions contain smaller shares of European newcomers in their immigrant populations. Even more noticeable is the presence of Latinos. In the *post-World War II gateways*, for example, more than two-thirds of all immigrants hail from Latin America, with the largest group hailing from Mexico. Los Angeles and other California cities dominate this gateway category, with their huge Mexican-born populations. Miami, however, represents a departure: Although Miami is unmistakably Latin American and Caribbean at 91 percent (dominated by Cubans, followed by Nicaraguan, Colombian, Haitian, Dominican, Honduran, and Jamaican immigrants), it is not Mexican.

Flows into the other newer gateways have idiosyncratic national origins as well. In *emerging gateways*—the most mixed of all destinations by region of origin—the diversity of origin groups embraces relatively even proportions of Asians, Mexicans, and Caribbean and other Latin Americans. Additionally, these gateways have the largest share of Africans in residence at 6 percent. Washington D.C. and Atlanta stand out for their African immigrants: 8.7 percent of Atlanta’s and 11.2 percent of Washington’s immigrants come from African countries. Moreover, Washington’s 93,000 African immigrants are second only to New York’s 99,000, but in New York they only make up 3.2 percent of all immigrants. Among these metropolitan areas, African immigrants’ 14-percent share

Table 3. Region of Origin for the Foreign-Born Population by Gateway Type, 2000

	Total Foreign-Born	Region of Origin					
		Europe	Asia	Africa	Latin America*	Mexico	Other
Former	887,634	35.1	37.7	4.7	10.3	6.6	5.6
Continuous	5,050,012	22.2	26.4	3.0	34.9	12.0	1.5
Post W.W.II	5,772,798	6.2	23.6	1.4	28.4	38.6	1.8
Emerging	1,186,340	10.9	25.7	6.4	25.9	28.5	2.6
Re-Emerging	1,539,902	15.0	38.9	3.1	8.3	29.8	4.9
Pre-Emerging	166,662	12.5	22.5	4.2	13.1	43.3	4.4

* Excluding Mexico

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

of Minneapolis-St. Paul's foreign population is the highest of any single metropolitan area. During the 1990s, the resettlement of refugees from Somalia and other African nations boosted the Twin Cities' African population. Southeast Asian refugees also arrived in substantial numbers.

The *re-emerging gateways* are comparatively more Asian. Latin Americans comprise only slightly more than one-third of all immigrants in these metropolitan areas, while Asians comprise 39 percent. Not surprisingly, Asians dominate the West Coast metro areas in this category. They represent more than half of the immigrant population in San Jose, Seattle, and Oakland (although Mexican immigrants do predominate in Denver and Phoenix). Meanwhile, the eastward spread of Mexican settlement at the very end of the 20th century appears in the noticeable presence of Mexicans in the *pre-emerging gateways*. Mexicans and other Latin Americans dominate the pre-emerging gateways, where they comprise more than half of all immigrants.

In this regard, the Mexicans' eastward dispersal in the 1990s marks a striking addition to that nationality's historical association with the American Southwest. Mexico is now the fourth-largest immigrant source country in New York, where the region's 143,000 Mexicans are on par with re-

emerging San Jose, Oakland and Denver and significantly outnumber San Francisco's 80,000. In Atlanta 120,000 Mexicans rank as that gateway's largest immigrant group, and represent more than five times the number of the next-largest immigrant group, Indians. Mexicans have also made inroads into other East Coast metropolitan areas as well as South Florida.

Language acquisition is another key indicator of integration that also influences many facets of everyday life including community relations. Two-thirds or more of all immigrants in every gateway type reported that they spoke English "well" or "very well" (see Table 4). These rates were highest in the more established gateways that include older immigrant cohorts such as the *former, continuous* and *re-emerging gateways*. Perhaps unexpectedly, English proficiency rates are also relatively high in *emerging gateways*, where 71 percent of immigrants said they spoke English well. More troubling are the more than one-third of immigrants in *post-World War II gateways* and *pre-emerging gateways* that cannot speak English at all or do not speak it well.

Table 4 also shows the 2000 poverty rates of the native-and foreign-born by gateway type. In all gateway types, foreign-born poverty rates outstrip native-born rates. Native-born rates are all

lower than the national average (11.3 percent) except in the *post-World War II gateways*. Foreign-born rates across gateway types are also lower than the national foreign-born average (17.7 percent) except in the *post-World War II* and *pre-emerging gateways*. Not surprisingly, a wider gap separates immigrant and native poverty rates in newer gateways (*emerging, re-emerging, and pre-emerging*) than in the more established gateways. For instance, the immigrant poverty rate of 19 percent on average in the pre-emerging gateways was nearly double the native-born rate there. Similarly, the 14.7-percent foreign-born poverty rate in the emerging gateways remains two-thirds higher than the native-born rate, even though these metropolitan areas have the smallest share of immigrants living below the poverty rate among the various gateway types. But these rates vary across metropolitan areas within the gateway type. For example, the poverty rates in the emerging gateways of Dallas and Fort Worth are nearly twice as high (19 percent) as they are in Washington, D.C. (11 percent). In re-emerging Denver and Seattle, moreover, poverty rates for immigrants are also twice that of natives, at 18 and 14 percent respectively.

And yet, the most disturbing immigrant poverty lies in the *post-World War II gateways* where nearly one-

Table 4. Selected Characteristics of the Foreign-Born by Gateway Type, 2000

	Proportion of Foreign-Born Who Entered in the 1990s	English Proficiency		Poverty Rate		
		Speaks English Well ^a	Does Not Speak English Well ^b	Native-Born	Foreign-Born	Percent Naturalized
Former	41.7	82.6	17.4	10.5	13.7	50.6
Continuous	41.8	73.6	26.4	11.2	15.3	44.5
Post-World War II	37.0	65.3	34.7	13.2	19.7	39.0
Emerging	50.7	70.7	29.3	8.7	14.7	34.1
Re-Emerging	47.5	72.5	27.5	8.3	16.1	38.6
Pre-Emerging	61.0	65.8	34.2	8.9	18.5	26.9

^a Speaks only English, or speaks it "very well" or "well"

^b Speaks English "not well" or "not at all"

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

out-of-five immigrants lives in poverty. Unfortunately, this category encompasses three of the largest immigrant metropolitan areas in the country—Miami, Los Angeles, and Houston. In metropolitan Los Angeles, more than one-in-five immigrants struggles with poverty, compared to about one-in-six native-born residents. In the continuous gateway of New York, by contrast, the immigrant and native poverty rates are nearly the same.

Naturalization status is also summarized on Table 4, and has important bearing on the immigrant experience. For both immigrants and the broader community, naturalization is often viewed as a traditional marker of integration into the U.S. society and polity. Although immigrants are encouraged to become U.S. citizens, they may live out their days in the U.S. without ever doing so. Generally, the longer immigrants live in the U.S., the more likely they are to naturalize. Citizenship status also frequently depends on home-country proximity to the U.S. (the closer the distance, the lower the rate), refugee status which increases the propensity to naturalize), and other factors (such as origin-country literacy rates or English-language use).¹⁶ In keeping with these factors, naturalization status varies across the gateway

types. The average naturalization rate across all metropolitan areas is 40.5 percent. As might be expected, the *continuous and former gateways* have the highest rates, followed by the *re-emerging gateways*. These rates reflect the length of time many immigrants have resided in these metropolitan areas. In the newly emerging gateways, naturalization rates are lower due to the recentness of immigration to the area. One note, however: The proportion of immigrants who have naturalized includes all immigrants, regardless of the amount of time they've spent in the U.S. and whether they are eligible for citizenship.

Discussion and Policy Implications

This paper describes how enormous in-flows of immigrants of recent decades are rearranging America's immigration map, transforming both new communities and old.

To be sure, huge flows of immigrants are still going to the largest, longest-established immigrant gateways, and changing them. But so too are new settlement areas cropping up in new destinations, including unanticipated points across the South as

well as across numerous suburban areas that have long been bastions of the native-born.

Nor is such change coming without some signs of strain. Immigrant settlement is not always welcome or fully embraced. Some people feel immigrants take jobs away from U.S. citizens. Others feel immigrants work hard and contribute to our economy and culture. Some people worry that immigrants who do not speak English will dominate and denigrate American culture. At the same time, others see themselves in immigrant and refugee newcomers who appreciate similar values of democracy and opportunity. Recently, moreover, President Bush renewed public interest in the issue of immigrants in the U.S. economy and society with a call for a new temporary worker program and other changes to U.S. immigration policy. Like most national immigration policy decisions, the new proposal would alter the terms of admittance into the U.S., but does not include provisions for facilitating immigrants' incorporation after arrival.

And yet, the new reality of a growing immigrant population in new destinations invariably raises exactly that issue—of integration and policies to achieve it. Broadly speaking, integration refers to the movement of immi-

grants into the social, civic, and economic mainstream.¹⁷ Implicit in this term is the assumption that integration is a two-way process involving both immigrants and residents. That, in turn, implies that public policy responses should aid immigrants as they seek to facilitate integration.

Unfortunately, the work of easing immigrants' incorporation into American communities is complicated by the fact that the federal government lacks any uniform or explicit set of policies and programs to aid that integration, notwithstanding the large numbers of immigrants and their families living in the United States. By right, Washington retains exclusive authority over immigrant and refugee admissions to the U.S. However, thanks to the absence of a strong federal effort to help immigrants adapt to life in America, policies tend to be ad hoc, reactive, and localized (see Fix, Zimmermann, and Passel 2001). States, cities, counties, and other municipalities play the de facto role of developing and maintaining policies and programs that help immigrants become part of communities where they live, and networks of nonprofit, faith-based, and community organizations have developed some capacity to fill in the gaps.

Also complicating the integration process has been the particular economic period during which recent waves of immigrants arrived. Immigrants who entered the United States during the 1990s arrived during a decade of unprecedented growth that brought about a sharp reduction of unemployment by 2000—the year the Census was taken. These immigrants were attracted to a tight labor market that rewarded both low- and high-skilled labor with relatively higher wages. In the period since the Census was conducted, unemployment has risen and speculation abounds that the currently structured economy may not be able to support the long-term economic mobility of contemporary immi-

grants and their children to the same degree it absorbed earlier European immigrants. Today's labor market, in short, may not offer stable paths to economic mobility nor wages comparable to those that were available to lower-skill immigrants in earlier periods (Sassen 1988).

In this context, how local areas respond to the challenge of immigrant integration is of vital importance. But again, the swiftness, size, and geographical reach of recent immigration poses distinctive challenges to every sort of immigrant gateway.

Established gateways such as New York, San Francisco, and Chicago are in many ways well positioned to receive and serve immigrant newcomers. After all, their long history of immigrant settlement frequently has evoked an organizational, service-delivery, and advocacy infrastructure familiar with the needs of immigrants and their families. For many continuous and post-World War II gateways, moreover, immigration is part of their identity and a source of local cultural pride. A large share of the residents in these established gateways are first- or second-generation immigrants.¹⁸ However, the predominance of the suburbs as the destination of choice in post-World War II gateways and growing suburban trends in continuous gateways means that many established gateways are experiencing immigration and integration issues akin to those in newer, emerging gateways. Moreover, the shift in national origins of immigrants and their growing diversity over the past 30 years has required a corresponding broadening of services as well as clientele in many of these metropolitan areas.

The picture is quite different, by contrast, in fast-growing emerging gateways like Atlanta, Las Vegas, Denver, and Raleigh-Durham. Here immigrants are very recent arrivals on a scene that is already stressed by the pressures of rapid population growth. Consequently, the institutional struc-

tures that can assist in the integration of immigrants—both community-based and governmental—are still being developed and strengthened. For example, in suburban Washington, enrollment in Montgomery County's adult ESOL program last year rose by 58 percent, but only an estimated one-fourth of the demand could be met with classes offered by the county and smaller providers combined.¹⁹ Moreover, many of the emerging and pre-emerging gateways are swiftly transforming from a black-white population to a multiethnic profile. Often immigrants and native-born African Americans must suddenly compete for jobs, housing, and social services, meaning that racial and ethnic relations are changing with the arrival of immigrants, creating a more complex and competitive environment, and causing some degree of social conflict.

Given such differing realities, local policymakers and community leaders face a tall order as they seek to ease immigrants' incorporation into their communities. To even begin to meet that challenge, then, local leaders need to respond sensitively to the changing composition of metropolitan neighborhoods and move to craft a welcoming environment that helps immigrants succeed in their new homes.²⁰ At least six major approaches seem called for:

1. Understand Local Immigration Dynamics

The immigration context varies tremendously between metropolitan areas. Therefore, it behooves every local government, community based organization (CBO), and advocate to understand the characteristics of its local immigrant community. This paper provides a preliminary picture of the changing geographic pattern and varying social and economic characteristics of immigrants in 45 selected metro areas. Still, much more detailed information is often desirable—for example, neighborhood level data by

country of origin. In rapidly changing emerging gateways, after all, it can be challenging if not impossible to design service programs without an understanding of who is living in the community and what their needs may be. Indeed, many community service and faith-based organizations are often “first responders” that have good knowledge about what is happening in their immediate neighborhood but may lack specific empirical data about their local service areas.

Census 2000 data can be used to understand local trends in great detail. For example, planners and CBOs can derive information on how many immigrants reside in their community, which countries they came from, the period in which they arrived to the U.S., languages spoken and English language proficiency, their poverty status, and whether they have become U.S. citizens. These basic data can be supplemented with other data such as school district data on limited English proficient students, which can detect trends among the undocumented and serve as a leading indicator of immigrant growth. Other relevant data include health data (on births to immigrant mothers) and social service data on immigrant participation in public assistance programs. Several recent publications offer guidance on locating and using data for understanding local immigrant populations.²¹

2. Bring Cultural and Language Sensitivity to Service Delivery

Local entities, both private and public, connect immigrants to the broader gateway community—often in the context of service delivery. For many immigrant newcomers, however, limited English proficiency is a barrier to gaining information. Local governments in established gateways therefore know that the first step in overcoming this barrier is to develop the capacity to provide information and signage, deliver basic services, and provide public safety in the dominant

languages of immigrant groups. If a single language such as Spanish predominates in an metropolitan area, as it does in many metro areas with large settlements of Latin Americans, then it may be easier to provide services. More diverse, “layered” metropolitan areas may pose more difficult challenges.

Health care delivery especially can be complicated not just by linguistic problems but by cultural differences between immigrants and American health care systems. Health care providers in emerging gateways may be ill-equipped to deal with the special needs of immigrant and refugee newcomers. For that reason, some community health providers have opened clinics—or dispatched mobile medical clinics—that target particular ethnic populations, although many have not yet been able to do so. In particular, clinics focused on maternal health, domestic violence, and mental health treatment need to develop linguistic competency and cultural sensitivity.

Local and regional collaboratives can be beneficial, in this regard, in helping to organize and disseminate local knowledge, and in promoting the duplication of what works well. In addition, immigrant and ethnic communities themselves can be supportive of new arrivals in providing services, goods and information in a familiar linguistic and cultural setting thus somewhat easing the integration of immigrant newcomers. At the same time, these kinds of networks can be limited and fragmentary. For that reason, partnerships between community organizations and mainstream institutions to deliver services often work well: Mainstream institutions frequently have the ability to supplement the local knowledge and up-to-the-minute ideas of community organizations with resources and organizational capacity the community groups may lack.

“Local leaders need to help shape a welcoming environment that helps immigrants succeed in their new homes.”

3. Build English Language Capacity

The single most important issue for local communities and governments to address is the need for many immigrant newcomers to become proficient in the English language. Employers, governments, and immigrants themselves are concerned with basic communication on the job and in daily life. Local areas can improve immigrant adaptation by addressing the need for English language training in a couple of ways.

First, schools have a major responsibility to assist immigrant students become proficient in English. They must do so, however, at the same time they are striving to have all students—native- and foreign-born—reach the same educational standards regardless of language competency. The challenges can be especially strong in very new areas of immigrant settlement and in localities with very heterogeneous student populations. Those who provide instruction to non-English-speakers in such communities should look to the experiences of educators and administrators in established gateways to identify programs and policies that facilitate student achievement.

However, in confluences of multiple languages and cultures, schools face greater difficulties in addressing the needs of limited English proficient students. Frequently, shortages of appropriately trained teachers hobble newer immigrant communities, though the problem also extends to recent settlement areas in established gateways. In suburban Chicago, for example, approximately 13 percent of the students in Schaumburg School District 54 are “English language learners” who speak 46 languages collectively.²² Other examples include the state of North Carolina, where the number of limited English proficient students has more than quintupled since 1993.²³ There, slightly more than half of the state’s 20,000 public school children that do not speak English as their native language speak Spanish,

but the rest speak 163 different languages.²⁴ One response to such challenges: DeKalb County in the Atlanta metropolitan area has recently created an international center to which all foreign-born students and a parent or guardian must first report in order to attend the county schools.²⁵ This center works to create linkages between parents and schools.

A second critical need is for adult language training. Adult language training is vital for success in the labor market. Immigrants themselves are quick to point out that English is essential; yet learning the language is often the most difficult challenge of life in America. In a recent survey of immigrants by Public Agenda, two-thirds of those interviewed said they believe the government should require immigrants to learn English.²⁷ Yet, education gaps in origin countries coupled with limited opportunities to enroll in English classes for working immigrants in destination communities hamper the acquisition for many.

The private sector has also noticed that translation services are in greater demand, with more languages needed as immigrant and refugee flows change. For instance, a small Minneapolis-based firm called Asian Translations Inc. opened in 1996 focusing on translating, interpreting, and cultural training in a few Asian languages. In 2000, it was renamed International Translation Bureau, in response to the expanding immigrant population with different language needs. The firm now employs translators that cover 100 languages.²⁷

Innovative programs that teach adults English include those affiliated with schools that recognize the importance of parents learning English along with their student children, and employers who offer opportunities to learn English. Models exist among private sector firms, such as those in the construction industry where safety instruction is particularly important,

that provide language training for immigrant workers, often in collaboration with community organizations.

4. Provide Workforce Support

Immigrant youth and adults also need supportive programs that provide workforce development services. Many immigrant workers toil in low-skilled, low-paying occupations with little opportunity for mobility.²⁸ Many must contend with such serious barriers to employment as low educational attainment and weak English language competency. Eliminating such barriers requires strong intervention from community organizations to provide assessable services to help immigrants get the skills and education they need. Accepting day labor gathering sites and even providing skills-building there has been beneficial to immigrant workers in several communities. Other initiatives support immigrant business start-ups.

Community colleges are in this respect playing an increasingly important role in providing higher education to immigrants and the children of immigrants. Some have aligned their curriculum to fit the needs of post-secondary immigrant students. Many provide English classes and special programs on study skills and counseling for immigrant students. One example is Montgomery College in suburban Washington, D.C., which has a student population that is one-third foreign-born and hails from 170 countries, in a county that houses nearly half the foreign-born in the state of Maryland. In recent years the college has received grants from the U.S. Departments of Education and State to strengthen and expand its international curriculum as well as to support faculty development in international issues including migration and globalization.

5. Create Linkages to Mainstream Institutions

Identifying, developing, and maintaining community partnerships and collaborations enhances capacity and can

extend services that aid immigrants. For example, in both Austin, TX and suburban Prince Georges County in Washington, D.C. police departments have teamed up with local banks to encourage immigrants to open bank accounts as a way to reduce the robberies that have befallen vulnerable immigrant workers who lack formal banking experience and who are often reluctant to open accounts because they are undocumented. Many other police departments and banks have instituted policies to accept the *matricula consular*, an identification card issued by the Mexican government to Mexicans living in the U.S., as a legitimate form of identification.

These police departments understand that initiating programs that link them to banks promotes public safety in several ways. Clearly the primary aim is to reduce crime aimed at “unbanked” immigrants who are likely to carry cash and may be reluctant to report crime. But these collaborations also bring immigrants into a relationship with formal financial institutions that may facilitate longer-term financial integration. In addition, such partnerships open a dialogue about public safety and let immigrants know that local police do not enforce immigration laws but are there to serve all members of the community and earn their trust. This matters because immigrants are more likely to seek protection from police when they feel such trust.

6. Encourage Civic Engagement

Ultimately, active participation in civic and community life is a key goal of immigrant integration. Such civic engagement may mean attending a parent-teacher conference, joining a community group that is organizing a neighborhood clean-up day, or attending a neighborhood association meeting. But it may also mean preparing to become a U.S. citizen, voting, or being elected to a political office. All of these activities are desirable as immigrants become more involved with their com-

munities as well as with national issues.

Before immigrants are likely to become involved in their communities, immigrants must feel welcome and know where to turn for help in safety, education, and language training. Because these processes are intertwined, it is likely that as immigrants begin to integrate they will also be more likely to participate in civic life.

Organizations should therefore do all they can to promote interactions between immigrants and established residents—especially across generations. Building a stronger civic infrastructure that includes the collaboration of all residents, regardless of nativity status, will bolster such robust community relations. Such community-building can be achieved through community events and projects that revolve around local issues such as public safety, public space and parks, sports teams, and schools.

Many organizations already have programs that assist immigrants in filling out tax forms, applying for naturalization, and drives to “get out the vote.” For example, the New York Immigration Coalition has mounted several initiatives recently to encourage immigrants to vote. Such efforts have included the recruitment of bilingual poll workers, the distribution of voting instruction cards in multiple languages, and a series of new-citizen voter-education events.²⁹

Conclusion

During the 1970–2000 period, two broad changes have left an indelible mark on the American landscape. The first is the deindustrialization, decentralization, and suburbanization that began after World War II and continues to the present time. Cities have become less dense as suburban areas have emerged as the locales where most Americans live and work.

The second change is the wave of immigration that began in the 1970s.

These influxes have shifted the mix of immigrant source countries, as well as quickened the pace of immigration brought change to more varied settlement areas. Along the way large flows of immigrants have followed the larger post-World War II out-migration from cities to settle in countless American suburbs.

The decade of the 1990s, moreover, represents an even greater departure from historical trends. The scale of the immigration phenomenon has been unparalleled. New areas of settlement and growth have appeared in just the last 10 years. And particularly in emerging gateways extraordinarily rapid growth in the foreign-born has been accompanied by high rates of suburban settlement, diverse nations of origin, and large social challenges.

This study suggests that the process of immigrant incorporation depends heavily on the institutional capacity, resources, and experience of local communities. It also suggests that established and emerging gateways can learn from each other about policies and programs that facilitate the social, economic, and political incorporation of immigrants.

And they will need to. In the post September 11th-era, the question of how metropolitan areas and localities should deal with the arrival of new immigrants has gained new prominence—and complexity. In addition, President Bush re-opened the ongoing national discussion about immigration with his January 2004 announcement of a new immigration proposal. Given all of that, new uncertainties now surround the fast-paced currents of immigration flows. And yet, one thing remains certain. The future of social relations in the United States rests in large part on local communities maintaining a receptive environment for immigrants and their children and meeting the challenges of incorporating newcomers.



Appendix A. Total and Foreign-Born Population, Six Gateway Types, 1980–2000

	Total Population			Percent Change in Total Population			Total Foreign-Born			Percent Change in Total Foreign-Born		
	1980	1990	2000	1980–1990	1990–2000	1980–2000	1980	1990	2000	1980–1990	1990–2000	1980–2000
Former												
Baltimore, MD PMSA	2,172,851	2,382,172	2,552,994	9.6	7.2	17.5	73,759	87,653	146,128	18.8	66.7	98.1
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA	1,242,769	1,189,288	1,170,111	-4.3	-1.6	-5.8	69,355	52,220	51,381	-24.7	-1.6	-25.9
Cleveland-Lorain-Elvira, OH PMSA	2,276,960	2,202,069	2,250,871	-3.3	2.2	-1.1	129,421	100,005	114,625	-22.7	14.6	-11.4
Detroit, MI PMSA	4,387,542	4,266,654	4,441,551	-2.8	4.1	1.2	282,674	234,479	335,107	-17.0	42.9	18.5
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA	1,396,889	1,432,149	1,500,741	2.5	4.8	7.4	58,410	54,043	81,574	-7.5	50.9	39.7
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA	4,780,357	4,922,175	5,100,931	3.0	3.6	6.7	244,063	252,505	357,421	3.5	41.6	46.4
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	2,411,763	2,394,811	2,358,695	-0.7	-1.5	-2.2	81,200	57,708	62,286	-28.9	7.9	-23.3
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA	2,392,828	2,511,698	2,626,411	5.0	4.6	9.8	52,671	49,021	81,212	-6.9	65.7	54.2
Total	21,061,959	21,301,016	22,002,305	1.1	3.3	4.5	991,553	887,634	1,229,734	-10.5	38.5	24.0
Continuous												
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA	1,292,950	1,278,440	1,373,167	-1.1	7.4	6.2	180,211	236,938	352,592	31.5	48.8	95.7
Boston, MA-NH PMSA	3,147,521	3,227,633	3,406,829	2.5	5.6	8.2	307,005	364,632	508,279	18.8	39.4	65.6
Chicago, IL PMSA	7,139,852	7,410,858	8,272,768	3.8	11.6	15.9	746,081	885,081	1,425,978	18.6	61.1	91.1
Jersey City, NJ PMSA	556,341	553,099	608,975	-0.6	10.1	9.5	133,534	169,434	234,597	26.9	38.5	75.7
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA	886,439	1,019,835	1,169,641	15.0	14.7	31.9	76,492	126,653	243,406	65.6	92.2	218.2
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	2,605,655	2,609,212	2,753,913	0.1	5.5	5.7	230,508	273,522	396,939	18.7	45.1	72.2
New York, NY PMSA	8,273,751	8,546,846	9,314,235	3.3	9.0	12.6	1,832,396	2,285,996	3,139,647	24.8	37.3	71.3
Newark, NJ PMSA	1,962,911	1,915,928	2,032,989	-2.4	6.1	3.6	220,907	266,466	385,807	20.6	44.8	74.6
San Francisco, CA PMSA	1,487,519	1,603,678	1,731,183	7.8	8.0	16.4	322,031	441,290	554,819	37.0	25.7	72.3
Total	27,352,939	28,165,529	30,663,700	3.0	8.9	12.1	4,049,165	5,050,012	7,242,064	24.7	43.4	78.9
Post-World War II												
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA	1,017,915	1,255,488	1,623,018	23.3	29.3	59.4	113,313	198,274	410,387	75.0	107.0	262.2
Houston, TX PMSA	2,753,541	3,322,025	4,177,646	20.6	25.8	51.7	215,352	440,321	854,669	104.5	94.1	296.9
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	7,473,005	8,863,164	9,519,338	18.6	7.4	27.4	1,664,472	2,895,066	3,449,444	73.9	19.1	107.2
Miami, FL PMSA	1,625,397	1,937,094	2,253,362	19.2	16.3	38.6	577,987	874,569	1,147,765	51.3	31.2	98.6
Orange County, CA PMSA	1,932,984	2,410,556	2,846,289	24.7	18.1	47.2	257,241	575,108	849,899	123.6	47.8	230.4
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA	1,557,989	2,588,793	3,254,821	66.2	25.7	108.9	134,950	360,650	612,359	167.2	69.8	353.8
San Diego, CA MSA	1,833,215	2,498,016	2,813,833	36.3	12.6	53.5	233,235	428,810	606,254	83.9	41.4	159.9
Total	18,194,046	22,875,136	26,488,307	25.7	15.8	45.6	3,196,550	5,772,798	7,930,777	80.6	37.4	148.1

	Total Population			Percent Change in Total Population			Total Foreign-Born			Percent Change in Total Foreign-Born		
	1980	1990	2000	1980-1990	1990-2000	1980-2000	1980	1990	2000	1980-1990	1990-2000	1980-2000
Emerging												
Atlanta, GA MSA	2,015,703	2,959,950	4,112,198	46.8	38.9	104.0	46,166	116,624	423,105	152.6	262.8	816.5
Dallas, TX PMSA	1,956,740	2,676,248	3,519,176	36.8	31.5	79.8	90,612	234,522	591,169	158.8	152.1	552.4
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA	990,622	1,361,034	1,702,625	37.4	25.1	71.9	33,427	83,877	193,473	150.9	130.7	478.8
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA	463,056	852,737	1,563,282	84.2	83.3	237.6	35,062	74,304	258,494	111.9	247.9	637.2
Orlando, FL MSA	804,756	1,224,852	1,644,561	52.2	34.3	104.4	37,268	82,042	197,119	120.1	140.3	428.9
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA	3,265,485	4,223,485	4,923,153	29.3	16.6	50.8	253,329	489,668	832,016	93.3	69.9	228.4
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA	576,720	863,518	1,131,184	49.7	31.0	96.1	58,004	105,303	196,852	81.5	86.9	239.4
Total	10,073,082	14,161,824	18,596,179	40.6	31.3	84.6	553,868	1,186,340	2,692,228	114.2	126.9	386.1
Re-Emerging												
Denver, CO PMSA	1,428,658	1,622,980	2,109,282	13.6	30.0	47.6	65,023	81,334	233,096	25.1	186.6	258.5
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	2,141,007	2,538,834	2,968,806	18.6	16.9	38.7	70,908	88,093	210,344	24.2	138.8	196.6
Oakland, CA PMSA	1,758,693	2,082,914	2,392,557	18.4	14.9	36.0	186,956	337,435	573,144	80.5	69.9	206.6
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	1,599,727	2,238,480	3,251,876	39.9	45.3	103.3	86,588	161,830	457,483	86.9	182.7	428.3
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA	1,297,332	1,515,452	1,918,009	16.8	26.6	47.8	65,646	88,072	208,075	34.2	136.3	217.0
Sacramento, CA PMSA	986,355	1,340,010	1,628,197	35.9	21.5	65.1	67,140	120,136	225,940	78.9	88.1	236.5
San Jose, CA PMSA	1,294,859	1,497,577	1,682,585	15.7	12.4	29.9	175,815	347,201	573,130	97.5	65.1	226.0
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA	1,603,338	2,033,156	2,414,616	26.8	18.8	50.6	118,992	169,798	331,912	42.7	95.5	178.9
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA	1,568,374	2,067,959	2,395,997	31.9	15.9	52.8	106,017	146,003	233,907	37.7	60.2	120.6
Total	13,678,343	16,937,362	20,761,925	23.8	22.6	51.8	943,085	1,539,902	3,047,031	63.3	97.9	223.1
Pre-Emerging												
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA	536,585	846,227	1,249,763	57.7	47.7	132.9	22,459	56,154	152,834	150.0	172.2	580.5
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	928,573	1,162,093	1,499,293	25.1	29.0	61.5	14,452	24,041	99,760	66.4	315.0	590.3
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC MSA	926,076	1,050,304	1,251,509	13.4	19.2	35.1	9,932	15,318	71,565	54.2	367.2	620.5
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA	634,549	855,545	1,187,941	34.8	38.9	87.2	13,445	29,374	108,803	118.5	270.4	709.2
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA	910,127	1,072,227	1,333,914	17.8	24.4	46.6	36,808	41,775	114,508	13.5	174.1	211.1
Total	3,935,910	4,986,396	6,522,420	26.7	30.8	65.7	97,096	166,662	547,470	71.6	228.5	463.8
TOTAL	94,296,279	108,427,263	125,034,836	15.0	15.3	32.6	9,831,317	14,603,348	22,689,304	48.5	55.4	130.8



Appendix B. Foreign-Born Population and Percent Foreign-Born, Six Gateway Types, 1970–2000

Foreign-Born in Metro

	1970		1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Former								
Baltimore, MD PMSA	57,374	2.8	73,759	3.4	87,660	3.7	146,128	5.7
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA	86,836	6.4	69,355	5.6	52,220	4.4	51,381	4.4
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA	151,033	6.5	129,421	5.7	100,005	4.5	114,625	5.1
Detroit, MI PMSA	299,373	6.7	282,674	6.4	234,479	5.5	335,107	7.5
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA	62,974	4.5	58,410	4.2	54,043	3.8	81,574	5.4
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA	244,860	5.0	244,063	5.1	252,505	5.1	357,421	7.0
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	107,757	4.5	81,200	3.4	57,708	2.4	62,286	2.6
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA	48,418	2.0	52,671	2.2	49,021	2.0	81,212	3.1
Total	1,058,625	5.0	991,553	4.7	887,641	4.2	1,229,734	5.6
Continuous								
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA	151,597	11.2	180,211	13.9	236,938	18.5	352,592	25.7
Boston, MA-NH PMSA	289,800	9.6	307,005	9.8	364,632	11.3	508,279	14.9
Chicago, IL PMSA	563,151	8.1	746,081	10.4	885,081	11.9	1,425,978	17.2
Jersey City, NJ PMSA	107,386	17.6	133,534	24.0	169,434	30.6	234,597	38.5
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA	63,654	7.5	76,492	8.6	126,653	12.4	243,406	20.8
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	192,625	7.6	230,508	8.8	273,522	10.5	396,939	14.4
New York, NY PMSA	1,563,534	17.3	1,832,396	22.1	2,285,996	26.7	3,139,647	33.7
Newark, NJ PMSA	189,868	9.5	220,907	11.3	266,466	13.9	385,807	19.0
San Francisco, CA PMSA	229,936	15.6	322,031	21.6	441,290	27.5	554,819	32.0
Total	3,351,551	12.0	4,049,165	14.8	5,050,012	17.9	7,242,064	23.6
Post-World War II								
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA	49,613	8.0	113,313	11.1	198,274	15.8	410,387	25.3
Houston, TX PMSA	47,678	2.5	215,352	7.8	440,321	13.3	854,669	20.5
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	792,232	11.3	1,664,472	22.3	2,895,066	32.7	3,449,444	36.2
Miami, FL PMSA	307,387	24.3	577,987	35.6	874,569	45.1	1,147,765	50.9
Orange County, CA PMSA	84,766	6.0	257,241	13.3	575,108	23.9	849,899	29.9
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA	68,182	6.0	134,950	8.7	360,650	13.9	612,359	18.8
San Diego, CA MSA	91,108	6.8	233,235	12.7	428,810	17.2	606,254	21.5
Total	1,440,966	9.8	3,196,550	17.6	5,772,798	25.2	7,930,777	29.9

Foreign-Born in Metro

	1970		1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Emerging								
Atlanta, GA MSA	16,368	1.1	46,166	2.3	116,624	3.9	423,105	10.3
Dallas, TX PMSA	24,588	1.6	90,612	4.6	234,522	8.8	591,169	16.8
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA	9,459	1.2	33,427	3.4	83,877	6.2	193,473	11.4
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA	10,637	3.9	35,062	7.6	74,304	8.7	258,494	16.5
Orlando, FL MSA	13,262	2.5	37,268	4.6	82,040	6.7	197,119	12.0
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA	130,328	4.5	253,329	7.8	489,668	11.6	832,016	16.9
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA	27,384	7.9	58,004	10.1	105,304	12.2	196,852	17.4
Total	232,026	3.0	553,868	5.5	1,186,339	8.4	2,692,228	14.5
Re-Emerging								
Denver, CO PMSA	33,838	3.1	65,023	4.6	81,334	5.0	233,096	11.1
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	54,918	3.0	70,908	3.3	88,093	3.5	210,344	7.1
Oakland, CA PMSA	112,298	6.9	186,956	10.6	337,435	16.2	573,144	24.0
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	36,475	3.8	86,588	5.4	161,830	7.2	457,483	14.1
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA	41,277	4.1	65,646	5.1	88,072	5.8	208,075	10.8
Sacramento, CA PMSA	35,691	4.7	67,140	6.8	120,136	9.0	225,940	13.9
San Jose, CA PMSA	82,464	7.7	175,815	13.6	347,201	23.2	573,130	34.1
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA	86,245	6.1	118,992	7.4	169,798	8.4	331,912	13.7
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA	61,128	6.1	106,017	6.8	146,003	7.1	233,907	9.8
Total	544,334	5.1	943,085	6.9	1,539,902	9.1	3,047,031	14.7
Pre-Emerging								
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA	6,187	2.1	24,220	4.1	56,154	6.6	152,834	12.2
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	4,936	0.6	14,761	1.5	24,041	2.1	99,760	6.7
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA	3,968	0.5	10,071	1.1	15,318	1.5	71,565	5.7
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA	5,220	1.3	13,594	2.0	29,374	3.4	108,803	9.2
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA	23,200	3.4	36,805	4.0	41,775	3.9	114,508	8.6
Total	43,511	1.5	99,451	2.4	166,662	3.3	547,470	8.4
TOTAL	6,671,013	7.8	9,833,672	10.4	14,603,354	13.5	22,689,304	18.1
* Metro lacks central city								



Appendix B: Foreign-Born Population and Percent Foreign-Born, Six Gateway Types, 1970–2000

Foreign-Born in Central City

	1970		1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Former								
Baltimore, MD PMSA	28,710	3.2	24,667	3.1	23,467	3.2	29,638	4.6
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA	35,252	7.6	22,025	6.2	14,741	4.5	12,856	4.4
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA	56,400	7.5	33,347	5.8	20,975	4.1	21,372	4.5
Detroit, MI PMSA	119,347	7.9	68,303	5.7	34,490	3.4	45,541	4.8
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA	39,576	5.5	31,718	5.0	29,667	4.7	46,122	7.7
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA	126,896	6.5	107,951	6.4	104,814	6.6	137,205	9.0
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	31,275	6.0	22,195	5.2	16,946	4.6	18,874	5.6
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA	16,260	2.6	11,878	2.6	10,034	2.5	19,542	5.6
Total	453,716	6.1	322,084	5.3	255,134	4.6	331,150	6.4
Continuous								
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Boston, MA-NH PMSA	83,988	13.1	87,056	15.5	114,597	20.0	151,836	25.8
Chicago, IL PMSA	373,919	11.1	435,232	14.5	469,187	16.9	628,903	21.7
Jersey City, NJ PMSA	26,635	10.2	36,352	16.3	56,326	24.6	81,554	34.0
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
New York, NY PMSA	1,437,058	18.2	1,670,199	23.6	2,082,931	28.4	2,871,032	35.9
Newark, NJ PMSA	40,104	10.5	47,739	14.5	51,423	18.7	66,057	24.1
San Francisco, CA PMSA	154,507	21.6	192,204	28.3	246,034	34.0	285,541	36.8
Total	2,116,211	16.0	2,468,782	20.8	3,020,498	25.4	4,084,923	32.0
Post-World War II								
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA	8,890	6.4	15,228	9.9	25,963	17.4	32,938	21.7
Houston, TX PMSA	37,501	3.0	155,577	9.8	290,374	17.8	516,105	26.4
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	410,870	14.6	856,229	25.7	1,440,815	36.8	1,644,888	39.6
Miami, FL PMSA	140,207	41.8	186,280	53.7	214,128	59.7	215,739	59.5
Orange County, CA PMSA	23,284	0.0	100,889	20.8	249,808	37.3	349,786	43.3
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA	12,585	5.2	22,464	7.8	60,452	15.5	89,056	20.2
San Diego, CA MSA	52,977	7.6	130,906	15.0	232,138	20.9	314,227	25.7
Total	686,314	11.9	1,467,573	20.8	2,513,678	30.6	3,162,739	34.8

Foreign-Born in Central City

	1970		1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Emerging								
Atlanta, GA MSA	5,852	1.2	9,777	2.3	13,354	3.4	27,352	6.6
Dallas, TX PMSA	17,426	2.1	54,912	6.1	125,862	12.5	290,436	24.4
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA	5,939	1.5	24,603	4.5	60,306	8.5	138,031	15.9
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA	5,215	4.2	13,117	8.0	26,494	10.3	90,656	18.9
Orlando, FL MSA	3,298	3.3	6,641	5.2	11,436	6.9	26,741	14.4
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA	33,562	4.4	40,559	6.4	58,887	9.7	73,561	12.9
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA	5,515	9.6	8,168	12.9	12,618	18.7	20,152	24.7
Total	76,807	2.8	157,777	5.5	308,957	9.6	666,929	17.6
Re-Emerging								
Denver, CO PMSA	20,926	4.1	30,712	6.2	34,715	7.4	96,601	17.4
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	32,913	4.4	31,395	4.9	42,517	6.6	96,613	14.4
Oakland, CA PMSA	32,239	8.9	42,579	12.5	73,524	19.8	106,116	26.6
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	21,656	3.7	51,242	5.4	98,686	7.8	301,871	17.6
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA	21,080	5.5	27,848	6.8	35,813	7.4	86,482	12.9
Sacramento, CA PMSA	17,489	6.9	27,708	10.0	50,569	13.7	82,616	20.3
San Jose, CA PMSA	33,962	7.6	90,914	14.4	207,041	26.5	329,757	36.9
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA	48,423	9.1	62,432	11.0	79,284	13.1	121,734	18.1
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA	16,367	5.9	37,145	7.3	47,477	7.7	73,942	11.2
Total	245,055	6.0	401,975	8.4	669,626	11.9	1,295,732	19.5
Pre-Emerging								
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA	5,497	2.2	16,704	4.8	40,962	8.3	109,006	16.6
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	3,494	1.2	8,742	2.8	15,119	3.8	59,849	11.0
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA	2,558	0.9	4,833	1.7	7,853	2.4	33,481	8.2
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA	3,861	1.5	7,210	2.9	15,639	4.5	54,954	11.8
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA	11,107	6.3	14,489	6.6	13,258	8.3	33,252	18.3
Total	26,517	2.1	51,978	3.7	92,831	5.4	290,542	12.9
TOTAL	3,604,620	10.4	4,870,169	14.3	6,860,724	18.9	9,832,015	24.7



Appendix B. Foreign-Born Population and Percent Foreign-Born, Six Gateway Types, 1970–2000

Foreign-Born in Suburbs

	1970		1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Former								
Baltimore, MD PMSA	28,664	2.5	49,092	3.5	64,193	3.9	116,490	6.1
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA	51,584	5.8	47,330	5.3	37,479	4.4	38,525	4.4
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA	94,633	6.0	96,074	5.6	79,030	4.7	93,253	5.3
Detroit, MI PMSA	180,026	6.1	214,371	6.7	199,989	6.2	289,566	8.3
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA	23,398	3.4	26,692	3.5	24,376	3.0	35,452	3.9
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA	117,964	4.0	136,112	4.4	147,691	4.4	220,216	6.1
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	76,482	4.1	59,005	3.0	40,762	2.0	43,412	2.1
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA	32,158	1.8	40,793	2.1	38,987	1.8	61,670	2.7
Total	604,909	4.4	669,469	4.5	632,507	4.0	898,584	5.3
Continuous								
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA	151,597	11.2	180,211	13.9	236,938	18.5	352,592	25.7
Boston, MA-NH PMSA	205,812	8.7	219,949	8.5	250,035	9.4	356,443	12.7
Chicago, IL PMSA	189,232	5.2	310,849	7.5	415,894	9.0	797,075	14.8
Jersey City, NJ PMSA	80,751	23.2	97,182	29.2	113,108	34.8	153,043	41.5
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA	63,654	7.5	76,492	8.6	126,653	12.4	243,406	20.8
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	192,625	7.6	230,508	8.8	273,522	10.5	396,939	14.4
New York, NY PMSA	126,476	11.3	162,197	13.5	203,065	16.6	268,615	20.6
Newark, NJ PMSA	149,764	9.2	173,168	10.6	215,043	13.1	319,750	18.2
San Francisco, CA PMSA	75,429	9.9	129,827	16.1	195,256	22.2	269,278	28.2
Total	1,235,340	8.5	1,580,383	10.2	2,029,514	12.5	3,157,141	17.7
Post-World War II								
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA	40,723	8.5	98,085	11.3	172,311	15.6	377,449	25.7
Houston, TX PMSA	10,177	1.5	59,775	5.2	149,947	8.9	338,564	15.2
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	381,362	9.1	808,243	19.5	1,454,251	29.4	1,804,556	33.6
Miami, FL PMSA	167,180	17.9	391,707	30.6	660,441	41.8	932,026	49.3
Orange County, CA PMSA	61,482	5.6	156,352	10.8	325,300	18.7	500,113	24.5
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA	55,597	6.2	112,486	8.9	300,198	13.7	523,303	18.6
San Diego, CA MSA	38,131	5.9	102,329	10.7	196,672	14.2	292,027	18.4
Total	754,652	8.5	1,728,977	15.5	3,259,120	22.2	4,768,038	27.4

Foreign-Born in Suburbs								
1970			1980		1990		2000	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Emerging								
Atlanta, GA MSA	10,516	1.1	36,389	2.3	103,270	4.0	395,753	10.7
Dallas, TX PMSA	7,162	1.0	35,700	3.4	108,660	6.5	300,733	12.9
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA	3,520	0.9	8,824	2.0	23,571	3.6	55,442	6.6
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA	5,422	3.7	21,945	7.4	47,810	8.0	167,838	15.5
Orlando, FL MSA	9,964	2.4	30,627	4.5	70,604	6.7	170,378	11.7
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA	96,766	4.5	212,770	8.1	430,781	11.9	758,455	17.4
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA	21,869	7.5	49,836	9.7	92,686	11.6	176,700	16.8
Total	155,219	3.1	396,091	5.5	877,382	8.0	2,025,299	13.7
Re-Emerging								
Denver, CO PMSA	12,912	2.3	34,311	3.7	46,619	4.0	136,495	8.8
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	22,005	2.1	39,513	2.6	45,576	2.4	113,731	4.9
Oakland, CA PMSA	80,059	6.3	144,377	10.2	263,911	15.4	467,028	23.4
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	14,819	3.8	35,346	5.4	63,144	6.5	155,612	10.1
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA	20,197	3.2	37,798	4.3	52,259	5.1	121,593	9.8
Sacramento, CA PMSA	18,202	3.7	39,432	5.5	69,567	7.2	143,324	11.7
San Jose, CA PMSA	48,502	7.9	84,901	12.8	140,160	19.6	243,373	30.9
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA	37,822	4.2	56,560	5.5	90,514	6.3	210,178	12.1
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA	44,761	6.1	68,872	6.5	98,526	6.8	159,965	9.2
Total	299,279	4.5	541,110	6.1	870,276	7.7	1,751,299	12.4
Pre-Emerging								
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA	690	1.6	7,516	3.1	15,192	4.3	43,828	7.4
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	1,442	0.3	6,019	0.9	8,922	1.2	39,911	4.2
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC MSA	1,410	0.3	5,238	0.8	7,465	1.0	38,084	4.5
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA	1,359	0.9	6,384	1.5	13,735	2.7	53,849	7.4
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA	12,093	2.4	22,316	3.2	28,517	3.1	81,256	7.1
Total	16,994	1.0	47,473	1.8	73,831	2.3	256,928	6.0
TOTAL	3,066,393	6.0	4,963,503	8.2	7,742,630	10.7	12,857,289	15.1
* Metro lacks central city								



Appendix C. Percent Change in Foreign-Born in Metros, Central Cities, and Suburbs; Six Gateway Types; 1990–2000

Percent Change in Total Foreign-Born, 1990–2000

	Metro	Central City	Suburbs
Former			
Baltimore, MD PMSA	66.7	26.3	81.5
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA	-1.6	-12.8	2.8
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA	14.6	1.9	18.0
Detroit, MI PMSA	42.9	32.0	44.8
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA	50.9	55.5	45.4
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA	41.6	30.9	49.1
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	7.9	11.4	6.5
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA	65.7	94.8	58.2
Total	38.5	29.8	42.1
Continuous			
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA	48.8	*	48.8
Boston, MA-NH PMSA	39.4	32.5	42.6
Chicago, IL PMSA	61.1	34.0	91.7
Jersey City, NJ PMSA	38.5	44.8	35.3
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA	92.2	*	92.2
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	45.1	*	45.1
New York, NY PMSA	37.3	37.8	32.3
Newark, NJ PMSA	44.8	28.5	48.7
San Francisco, CA PMSA	25.7	16.1	37.9
Total	43.4	35.2	55.6
Post-World War II			
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA	107.0	26.9	119.1
Houston, TX PMSA	94.1	77.7	125.8
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA	19.1	14.2	24.1
Miami, FL PMSA	31.2	0.8	41.1
Orange County, CA PMSA	47.8	40.0	53.7
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA	69.8	47.3	74.3
San Diego, CA MSA	41.4	35.4	48.5
Total	37.4	25.8	46.3

Percent Change in Total Foreign-Born, 1990–2000			
	Metro	Central City	Suburbs
Emerging			
Atlanta, GA MSA	262.8	104.8	283.2
Dallas, TX PMSA	152.1	130.8	176.8
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA	130.7	128.9	135.2
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA	247.9	242.2	251.1
Orlando, FL MSA	140.3	133.8	141.3
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA	69.9	24.9	76.1
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA	86.9	59.7	90.6
Total	126.9	115.9	130.8
Re-Emerging			
Denver, CO PMSA	186.6	178.3	192.8
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA	138.8	127.2	149.5
Oakland, CA PMSA	69.9	44.3	77.0
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA	182.7	205.9	146.4
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA	136.3	141.5	132.7
Sacramento, CA PMSA	88.1	63.4	106.0
San Jose, CA PMSA	65.1	59.3	73.6
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA	95.5	53.5	132.2
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA	60.2	55.7	62.4
Total	97.9	93.5	101.2
Pre-Emerging			
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA	172.2	166.1	188.5
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA	315.0	295.9	347.3
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA	367.2	326.3	410.2
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA	270.4	251.4	292.1
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA	174.1	150.8	184.9
Total	228.5	213.0	248.0
TOTAL	55.4	43.3	66.1
* Metro lacks central city			

Endnotes

1. See Roger Waldinger, *Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); Nancy Foner, *From Ellis Island to JFK: New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Roger Waldinger and Medhi Bozorgmehr, *Ethnic Los Angeles* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996); and Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan, Wenquan Zhang, and Brian Stults, "Strangers Next Door: Immigrant Groups and Suburbs in Los Angeles and New York" in Phyllis Moen, Henry Walker, and Donna Dempster-McClain, eds. *A Nation Divided: Diversity, Inequality, and Community in American Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
2. In three cases, the 2000 foreign-born population was officially just under 200,000. However, we classify these metros—Fort-Worth-Arlington, Orlando, and West Palm Beach-Boca Raton—as emerging because they meet all the other criteria and because the size of their immigrant populations set them apart from the pre-emerging gateways.
3. Historical data come from Campbell Gibson and Emily Lennon, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the U.S. States: 1850–1990," U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Working Paper No. 29 (1999). These data show the nativity of the population for the 50 largest urban places for each decade, between 1870 and 1990.
4. For example, the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area incorporates both named cities in its "central city" while the central city of Seattle-Bellevue-Everett consists only of Seattle and Bellevue (both cities with more than 100,000 population) but not Everett, which has a population of less than 100,000 people.
5. Many smaller cities and metro areas as well as rural areas are also experiencing booms in their immigrant populations. See, for example, Josh M. McDaniel, "Immigrants and Forest Industries in Alabama: Social Networks and Pioneer Settlements." Paper presented at Immigration and America's Changing Ethnic Landscapes Conference, Athens, GA, April, 12–14, 2002. See also Rubén Hernández-León and Víctor Zúñiga, "Making Carpet by the Mile: The Emergence of a Mexican of a Mexican Immigrant Community in an Industrial Region of the U.S. Historic South," *Social Science Quarterly* 81 (1) (2000): 49–66; and William Kandel and Emilio Parrado "Industrial Transformation and Hispanic Migration to the American South: The Case of the Poultry Industry." Paper presented at the Immigration and America's Changing Ethnic Landscapes Conference, Athens, GA, April 12–14, 2002.
6. For the most part these areas have had so few immigrants that it is not meaningful to graph the share of the population foreign-born.
7. Accessed online at http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/NewAmericans/NAdownload/profiles_download.xls The Mumford Center's Calculations utilize census definitions of central cities and suburbs and therefore differ slightly from those used in this analysis.
8. See Douglas S. Massey, "Ethnic Residential Segregation: A Theoretical Synthesis and Empirical Review," *Sociology and Social Research* 69 (3) (1985): 315–350.; Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan, Wenquan Zhang, and Brian Stults, "Strangers Next Door: Immigrant Groups and Suburbs in Los Angeles and New York" in Phyllis Moen, Henry Walker, and Donna Dempster McClain; eds., *A Nation Divided: Diversity, Inequality, and Community in American Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan, Wenquan Zhang, and Brian Stults, "Immigrant Groups in the Suburbs: A reexamination of Suburbaniza-

tion and Spatial Assimilation,” *American Sociological Review* 64 (1999): 446–60.

9. Logan, Zhang, and Stutts, 1999.
10. Fort Worth is an emerging gateway with a large central city. That central jurisdiction includes both Fort Worth and Arlington, and immigrant settlement patterns favor the central cities here too.
11. In the central cities of continuous gateways, longstanding immigrant and ethnic neighborhoods such as Chinatown in San Francisco, the Lower East Side in New York, and Pilsen/Little Village in Chicago have housed, employed, and otherwise incorporated large waves of successive immigrant groups. In Pilsen/Little Village, adjacent to the Chicago Loop on the West side, the source countries have shifted. In the 19th and early 20th centuries this neighborhood was populated by European immigrants—largely Czech, German, and Polish. Since the 1950s when Mexicans began settling in the area, Pilsen/Little Village has been transformed into a residential, commercial, and cultural center of Mexican life in Chicago. A majority of Pilsen/Little Village residents are now Mexican and Mexican American, and Little Village has been dubbed *La Villita*. Similarly, New York’s Lower East Side once thronged with European Jewish immigrants. In its current incarnation, the neighborhood has been renamed to *Loisaida* (Spanglish for Lower East Side), a reflection of the Puerto Rican and Dominican families that have dominated the area in the latter half of the 20th century.

Major immigrant ports of entry within metropolitan areas have for generations been in these kinds of central-city neighborhoods. In many ways, these neighborhoods served to anchor and establish immigrant groups economically and residentially. For example, Washington D.C. had some early immigrant residential enclaves such as Swampoodle, a neighborhood located near the U.S. Capitol and Union Station. This area first housed Irish workers in the 1800s, followed by Italian

immigrants in the 1900s. However few traces are left of these ethnic neighborhoods as jobs dried up in the area and people moved on. These early settlements tended to be of a temporary nature, and offered very inadequate housing. At first, the temporary housing facilitated the settlement of immigrant workers, but as conditions and housing deteriorated, people found more desirable places to live elsewhere. Often the work was transitory, as in the case of the immigrants of Swampoodle who worked on the construction of the Capitol and other government buildings in Washington. Many of these early immigrants moved to the suburbs or moved on from Washington in search of opportunities in other cities. For more on Swampoodle see (Audrey Singer and Amelia Brown, “Washington, D.C.” in James Ciment, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Immigration* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

12. Ed Glaeser and Matthew Kahn, “Decentralized Employment and the Transformation of the American City.” *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs*, Volume 2.
13. Elvin K. Wyly and Daniel J. Hammel. “Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification,” *Housing Policy Debate* 10 (4) (1999):711–771.
14. To some extent, suburban settlement patterns of the foreign-born reflect the overall likelihood of living in the suburbs within a metropolitan area. In all but the continuous gateways, more than two-thirds of the total population resides in suburban areas. Emerging gateways top the list with 80 percent of their population suburban, followed by former (77 percent), post-World War II (70 percent), re-emerging (70 percent), pre-emerging (67 percent), and continuous (63 percent).
15. The use of *region* of origin categories, while easier to interpret, may also mask variations among gateways various *countries* of origin. Asia is perhaps the most problematic case,

with immigrants grouped together from the various countries of East Asia (China, Japan), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand), South Asia (India, Pakistan), and Western Asia (the countries of the Middle East). All of these national and sub-regional groups have very different characteristics that might have a bearing on their social and economic incorporation.

16. Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, *The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the U.S.* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990).
17. Considerable debate now surrounds which term to use to describe this process. “Integration” is the current word of choice among those in immigrant policy circles, notwithstanding its somewhat awkward parallel to the language of the civil rights struggle. Disuse of the term “assimilation,” meanwhile, reflects immigration scholars’ questioning of the assumption that to move up the socioeconomic ladder immigrants have to adopt mainstream, middle-class, white sociocultural standards (Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind, eds. 1999). These scholars observe that while the empirical evidence reports growing intermarriage and reductions of economic inequalities among European immigrants arriving around the turn of the 20th century, the contemporary context is quite different (Alba and Nee 1999).

Such critiques of “straight-line” assimilation theory based on the experience of European immigrants frame their arguments around the characteristics of contemporary flows—namely race and the number of generations residing in the U.S. This point of view emphasizes mobility and incorporation rather than assimilation into the “mainstream.” It also acknowledges that downward mobility can occur, especially with second-generation immigrant youth.

Latino and Asian immigrants generally have not been settled in the U.S. long enough to prove or disprove either theoretical position in the same way that European immigrants have. However, the “seg-

- mented" assimilation hypothesis attempts to explain the uneven outcomes among and between contemporary immigrant groups. In this perspective, the adaptation of second-generation immigrants may follow three alternative trajectories: (1) upward mobility; (2) downward mobility, particularly among second-generation youth in inner cities; and (3) upward mobility with a retention of ethnic culture (see Zhou 1999 and Gans 1992).
18. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that one-out-of-every-five persons living in the U.S. in 2000 had at least one foreign-born parent. See Diane A. Schmidley, "Profile of the Foreign-Born in the U.S., 2000." Current Population Reports, Series P23-206., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001).
 19. William Branigin, "Demand Overwhelms Adult English Classes," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 2002, p. C4.
 20. See Catherine Fernandez, "Community Development in Dynamic Neighborhoods: Synchronizing Services and Strategies with Immigrant Communities" (Washington: Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2003) for a discussion of the role of community development organizations in the integration of immigrants.
 21. See, for example, Randolph Capps, Jeffrey S. Passel, Dan Perez-Lopez, and Michael E. Fix, "The New Neighbors: A User's Guide to Data on Immigrants in U.S. Communities" (Washington: : The Urban Institute, 2003) and Suzette Brooks Masters, Kimberly Hamilton, and Jill H. Wilson, "Putting Data to Work for Immigrants and Communities: Tools for the Washington, D.C. Metro Area and Beyond" (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).
 22. John Owens, "Districts Struggling to Fill Bilingual-Teacher Posts," *Chicago Tribune*, November 10, 2002.
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 29. See Carnegie Corporation of New York, "The House We All Live In: A Report on Civic Integration" (2003).

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For More Information:

Audrey Singer
Visiting Fellow
The Brookings Institution
(202) 797-6241
asinger@brookings.edu

For General Information:

The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy
(202) 797-6139
www.brookings.edu/urban

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