By Omer bin Abdullah
29/10/2001
In the U.K., as British armed forces minister Adam Ingram compared his own party's dissenters opposing military strikes on Afghanistan to Nazi appeasers before the beginning of World War II, and elsewhere, independent thought and action may soon be entering the endangered list.
Asked by Sky TV if he regarded Labor critics of the war as the moral equivalent of Nazi appeasers, Ingram said: "I think we are moving towards that. I think we are dealing with an evil that is stalking the world today which has very clear analogies towards Nazism and Fascism and those who give it succor and support have got to question their judgment."
Despite such dangers, several outspoken writers have stated that the war has been initiated without proving allegations made against the accused. Such thinking does not elude Pakistan, and despite President Pervez Musharraf's claims, many Pakistanis remain skeptical about the legality of the war against Afghanistan.
For its part, the Western media is finding any excuse to drum up the ghost of a "fundamentalist" takeover of Pakistan. The mere rhetoric of Jamaat-i-Islami (a Pakistani religious-based political party) chief Qazi Husain Ahmed commenting that Musharraf's downfall was imminent, was interpreted as the coming of an Islamic revolution in the country. Of course, such a scenario involved the control of Pakistan's nuclear trigger by the "evil", read Islamic, forces.
Consequently, any anti-war protests in Pakistan are assigned to "pro-Taliban", "pro-Bin Ladin", and "fundamentalist" forces, conveniently forgetting that while Pakistan never had an Islamic government, it has experienced three governments led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which includes socialism in its manifesto. Although the party degenerated into perpetuating Pakistan's feudal society, it genuinely does include leftist cadres. Western journalists fail to see that these leftist elements may also be riding the coattails of the Islamic parties, taking their own shots against Western forces. But presently, Western readers are being led to believe that a sinister and monolithic "Islamic" force is solely opposing the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
Understandably, the question of control over nuclear assets by a "friendly", read secular, force, rather than an "adversary", read Islamic, force was on Larry King's mind when he recently brought up issue with Musharraf, who maintained: "I am very, very sure that the command and control set-up that we have evolved for ourselves is very, very, secure, and nuclear weapons are extremely safe and there are no extremists within the armed forces who could try to seize control of them in the current crisis."
On October 23rd, Musharraf, who presided over a special session of the National Command Authority (NCA) - the highest controlling authority of Pakistan's nuclear assets - attended by the foreign minister, the interior minister, joint chiefs of staff committee, the three services chiefs, the vice chief of army staff, senior scientists and other senior military and civil officials, said: "I have reassured the world leaders that the strategic capability is fully safeguarded and there exists no possibility whatsoever of its falling into any wrong hands."
Interestingly, Musharraf's NCA address followed U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, Alan P. Larson, meeting with Pakistani economic journalists at Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin's residence on October 21st, where he stressed that U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, control over weapons of mass destruction and democracy, were not going to change, despite the much hyped recipe for economic cooperation with Pakistan.
Larson reiterated that, "The United States is a country that has global responsibilities. And we are going to be concerned about weapons of mass destruction, making sure that there are controls on them, because that contributes to global security, something that we are going to be always interested in."
It is significant that the State Department aide who came to discuss economic cooperation issues should pointedly hint at the nuclear program. The U.S., thus, delivered a message to Musharraf that economic aid has a price, and that its nuclear assets are among the bargaining chips.
L. K. Advani, Indian home minister, often described as India's prime minister-in-waiting and was part of the gang that destroyed the historic Babri Masjid, talking to Hari Jaisingh of the Chandigarh Tribune on October 24th, described the U.S.'s current war against the Taliban as Phase I of a drive against global terrorism. Advani added: "In Phase II, they have promised support to India's fight against terrorism in Kashmir."
Advani, stressing that India will have to fight its own battles, pointed out that a Kashmiri liberation movement was declared a terrorist organization after he talked to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who in turn lobbied U.S. President George W. Bush on India's behalf.
Advani's statement needs to be read in the context of Larson's statement that being a friend of the U.S., it was India's right "to expect that we would be attentive to their concerns," including discussions on nuclear issues.
It is clear that not only Larry King, but also world leaders are asking Musharraf how he plans to keep Pakistan's nuclear assets in acceptable hands, while also addressing why Pakistan needs nuclear assets in the first place.
Advani is a key figure in the making of India's policies and postures, and every visiting dignitary makes it a point to meet and interact with him - from Tony Blair to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. U.S. ambassador Robert D. Blackwill is reported to be a regular visitor.
Karachi's daily News on October 26th, reported that Pakistan has been informally asked to provide the Mianwali airbase to the U.S. - a site located close to a Pakistani nuclear facility.
Musharraf is not only being asked to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear trigger, but also to pick up the pieces after the American assault, because U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has declared that a post-war Afghanistan is not the U.S.'s concern, and that their focus is to remove the forces that they see as their direct enemies - Osama bin Ladin, al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
But the need for the care of a post-Taliban Afghanistan may not be necessary, as U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney told The Washington Post that the war on terrorism that began on October 7th "may never end. At least, not in our lifetimes." And General Richard Myers, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Cheney's assessment "may be correct."
"I think this is going to be a long, hard-fought conflict, and it will be global in scale," Myers said. "It won't be, as I mentioned earlier, it won't be just military.
"It's going to be all the instruments of our national power with our friends and allies. And the fact that it could last several years or many years or maybe our lifetimes would not surprise me," Myers told ABC's "This Week".
Such long-term goals can only lead to a scenario in which Musharraf will be reduced to a pathetic Yasser Arafat-like figure, allowed to reign, but not rule, charged with jailing, maiming and murdering his own people in order to maintain a status quo favored by the Western alliance.
US commandos train with Israelis to take Pakistan nukes if Musharraf falls
Pakistan has at least 24 nuclear warheads that can be delivered by intermediate-range missiles and F-16 airplanes
October 29, 2001, 02:41 PM
WASHINGTON (AFP)
- A special US unit is training with Israeli commandos to take out Pakistan's nuclear weapons in case of a coup against President Pervez Musharraf, the New Yorker magazine reported Monday, citing past and present government officials.
The US force is training in the United States with members of Israel's Unit 262, a commando team that has engaged in behind-the-lines operations including theft and assassinations, according to the New Yorker.
The US unit, operating under Pentagon control with CIA assistance, specializes in slipping undetected into foreign countries to find, and if necessary disarm, nuclear weapons, the magazine claims.
US sources told the magazine that Pakistan has at least 24 nuclear warheads that can be delivered by intermediate-range missiles and F-16 airplanes.
However US intelligence cannot be sure of the precise location of all of the Pakistani warheads, officials said.
US regional experts quoted by the magazine say they doubt Musharraf's ability to control the military and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal if there is a coup -- and say dissidents within the military might try to seize a nuclear warhead.
One US intelligence officer expressed alarm over the recent questioning in Pakistan of two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists with reported Taliban connections, describing it as "the tip of a very serious iceberg."
The incident shows that pro-Taliban sentiment has overcome state loyalty among Pakistani nuclear scientists, thought to be fiercely patriotic.
Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, has also had close ties with the Taliban in the past and might still include many pro-Taliban elements, according to alleged experts interviewed by New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh.
A senior US military official told Hersh he was concerned about an uprising of dissident ISI officers with access to nuclear storage sites.
A former US diplomat described the ISI as "a parallel government of its own," and a US intelligence officer said that allowing the ISI to be the US "eyes and ears" in the region is "our biggest mistake."
Pakistan and the Rewards of Helping the U.S. Campaign
By Omer bin Abdullah
23/10/2001
"We too believe the Kashmir issue is central to the relationship," Secretary of State General Colin Powell told reporters following talks with President Pervez Musharraf on October 16th. The word "central" was perhaps the only concession to cool frayed tempers in Pakistan, where some thought that it was "a reiteration of the position the American state has taken in regard of the dispute in Jammu and Kashmir." Even Kashmir's All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) welcomed Powell's remarks.
But even before Powell landed in New Delhi from Islamabad, Indian ministry of external affairs spokesperson Nirupama Rao declared her government's disagreement with his remarks, adding that "terrorism" sponsored by Pakistan in Kashmir, and not Kashmir itself, was the problem.
"We are not planning to discuss Kashmir, no matter what General Powell has to say," information minister Sushma Swaraj told a TV channel in a discussion on the visit.
India's public stance was not without significance because Powell had a different declaration to make the next day in New Delhi: "The United States and India are united against terrorism, and that includes the terrorism that has been directed against India."
The General's stance on Kashmir only echoed President George W. Bush's statement given on the eve of his departure for China, October 17th: "You mark my words, people are going to get tired of the war on terrorism, and by the way, it may take more than two years. There's a variety of theaters. So long as anybody is terrorizing established governments, there needs to be a war. And so I've asked - you said one or two years - I envision something taking longer than that. The war on terrorism could last one or two years.
"Now, maybe the Afghan theater will be shorter than that,'' Bush added. "Who knows? But we're patient.''
The U.S. has never stated that the Indian-imposed administration in Kashmir is an illegal one, and that it violates U.N. resolutions. Thus, Powell's statement that "terrorism that has been directed against India" clearly means that the U.S. considers the quisling administration in the occupied territory as an "established" government.
Interestingly, on a mission that amounted to one of damage control, Powell backpedaled and told Indian leaders that Washington was concerned about Pakistani-inspired "terrorism" in Indian-occupied Kashmir and showed solidarity with India by equating the attacks on the U.S. with an October 1st assault in Srinagar, the Kashmiri capital, that killed more than 40 civilians.
Powell also made clear to the Indians that he had done some work on India's behalf while in Pakistan. A senior administration official traveling with Powell said that he conveyed to the Indians a pledge from Pakistan's president, Generla Pervez Musharraf, "to take steps to control or reduce extremism" in the country.
India has also been one of the few large nations making supportive comments about Bush's aspirations for a U.S. national missile defense plan. Understandably, Powell said he had floated several unspecified "ideas" on how India might further contribute to the antiterrorism coalition.
Understandably, when India attacked Pakistan across the Line of Control, Bush said, "India and Pakistan should stand down during our activities in Afghanistan," and as an afterthought added, "and for that matter, forever."
Clearly, the "damage control" that Powell had in mind did not include Pakistan.
Pakistan finds itself in a difficult position to take a stand. First, it is a Muslim country - a genre not favored by the right-wing Bush clique, and second, it is deeply in debt. Pakistan's total debt to the U.S. is about $3 billion and the Bush administration has agreed, so far, to reschedule payments of $379 million. Nothing has been forgiven, which was the big hope being sold to the Pakistani people after Musharraf surrendered to Bush.
Despite Bush's retraction, the crusade-like character of the war cannot be denied. In another act of Islamophobia, the Bush administration jettisoned morality and altered its Chechnya policy to favor Russia and recognized that the Russians have a right "to fight [the] terrorist threat."
Minutes before Powell's plane was preparing to land in Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, who will visit the White House in November, held talks with Russian, Iranian, and Turkish interlocutors.
And right-wingers in the U.S. are harboring great hopes in India. The conservative Wall Street Journal's deputy editorial features editor, Tunku Varadarajan, on September 19th, advised the U.S. would do well to encourage the formation of an anti-terror alliance between India, Israel, and Turkey: "In the long-term war against Islamic terrorism, these are the states in the region with a visceral need to vanquish Islamic fundamentalism, as well as the military capability to fight it. Importantly, they can be relied on to keep their resolve, for they will not be fighting as proxy combatants. Their separate wars against the expansionist forces of militant Islam predate that of the U.S."
Varadarajan added: "India, Israel and Turkey - collectively and, where necessary, discretely - can give Washington the sort of stable, unwavering comradeship in arms and ideas that President Bush [and, let's face it, his successors] will need, at least for another generation."
In addition, at a time when it has been welcomed as a member of the Islamophobic alliance, Pakistan's most reliable friend, China, which has branded the freedom movement in occupied East Turkestan (Xinjiang) as a "terrorist" action, is coming closer to its enemies.
Considering its isolation and suffering from the increasing level of worldwide Islamophobia, Pakistan, as usual, cannot accept just any solution, and may perhaps swallow the bitter pill advised by Powell that it should cool their rhetoric over Kashmir, respect the Line of Control, and avoid any military action there.
Pakistan was never rewarded or even thanked for its role in defeating the Soviet Union, and cannot now expect any laurels for fighting America's war in Afghanistan.
Where the war will go next
Plotting the next phases of America's campaign against terror
By Michael Moran
MSNBC
NEW YORK, Oct. 29 - The Taliban's world is closing in. Progress may be measured in small increments - and certainly the cautious, risk-averse nature of the American military action is putting the shaky coalition at risk. Still, it does now seem likely the year 2002 will dawn with a new regime in control of Afghanistan. President George W. Bush has vowed to take the war to other states once "Phase 1" in Afghanistan is over. So, Mr. President: What's next?
EVER SINCE Sept. 11, the seven nations listed by the U.S. State Department's as state sponsors of terrorism have conducted themselves with a bit less swagger than usual. Iraq, in particular, appears to be laying low, apparently aware at last that the United States may be looking for just about any excuse to handle its unfinished business with Saddam Hussein. The wave of anthrax attacks in the United States may or may not be linked to Iraq's sophisticated biological warfare efforts. Either way, it would not be hard to make the case that no war against terrorism could be complete while Saddam's regime continued to mass-produce weapons of mass destruction.
Still, virtually no one in the Bush administration or in the wider world currently believes that Iraq is Act II on the War on Terror playbill. In fact, the abiding irony of the situation is this: there is no overlap between the State Department's list of "rogue nations" - the Iraqs, Syrias and North Koreas of the world - and the likely targets of the next phase of this war. The U.S. government certainly is not publishing its plans in advance. But according to some military and diplomatic officials, the short list for "stage two" action at the moment does not include Iraq or any other state sponsor of terrorism. Instead, stateless groups operating bases in Algeria, Somalia and the Philippines are heading the list.
"It may be that Iraq ultimately comes into the sights, but not now," said a senior defense official. "An attack on Iraq that sought to overthrow Saddam would be a coalition buster. There are other fish to fry first. Why risk all that trouble while other targets may be just as important?"
ASSYMETRIC THREATS
According to these officials, known guerrilla base camps in Somalia and in Algeria, along with assistance in the Philippine government's fight with a bin Laden-connected group there, currently figure most prominently in war planners' minds. In keeping with the new realities of “assymetric threats, - attacks on these camps would not - officially, at least — be attacks on those national governments. Yet U.S. military action in any of these places would be a far less clear-cut proposition than the current attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
What are the targets?
SOMALIA
As it did in Afghanistan, America disengaged from Somalia after getting its nose bloodied in 1993, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos failed in an effort to snatch Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, who had turned the humanitarian mission into a new phase of the nation's civil war. The botched raid left 18 Americans dead and the United States made a hasty withdrawal. Facts later emerged to indicate that al-Qaida-trained mercenaries were among those who helped bring down U.S. helicopters over Mogadishu that day. In fact, after Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. intelligence sources point to anarchic Somalia as the place Osama bin Laden would be most likely to seek shelter if he were ejected from Afghanistan.
The presence of al-Qaida cells in Somalia - as well as in Kenya and in Egypt - came to light again when two U.S. embassies in East Africa were destroyed by truck bombs in 1998. A Western diplomatic source in Kenya says al-Qaida and associated Islamic militant groups are attracted to Somalia, in particular, because of its unusual mix of relatively good telecommunications links and an almost non-existent central government. Bin Laden, unlike nature, loves a vacuum. "There's no domestic agency to track communications," the source said. "Foreign intelligence agencies do, but it's a tall order without a local partner."
ALGERIA
Since 1993, when Algeria's military government cancelled a vote count that would have given power to a moderate Islamic movement, a more extreme group, the Armed Islamic Group or GIS, has waged a brutal campaign of terror against Algerian civilians that has taken some 100,000 lives.
French intelligence officials say many of the top GIS commanders trained at al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan and have set up similar facilities in the Atlas Mountains of western Algeria, as well as desert regions in the south. The GIS burst into western consciousness in 1994 when its members hijacked an Air France flight and threatened to blow it up as it circled the French capital. The plane landed to refuel in Marseilles, but French commandos stormed it and killed the hijackers. A wave of bombings in Paris in 1995 followed.
Since 1998, many GIS members accepted an amnesty offered by the Algerian government which has slowed the bloodshed. But a splinter group - the Salafi Group for Call and Combat - continues to sow mayhem. Should the United States decide to act in concert with Algeria's government, it would find a ready ally in France. Air raids and commando assaults on the group’s remote bases would be the most likely scenario.
However, Arab Algeria could balk at open cooperation with America and its former colonial master, and the United States will have to confront the fact that Algeria's own army often retaliated against suspected "terrorist villages" with as much brutality as its terrorist foes.
PHILIPPINES
For decades, Muslim separatists on the Philippine island of Basilan have fought the central government in Manila, often using terror tactics like kidnappings of foreigners, bombings and beheadings. The country's primary rebel problem, led by Marxist guerrillas on the large island of Davao, faded with the Cold War. Since then, a group with demonstrated links to Osama bin Laden - the Abu Sayaf Islamic movement - has raised the banner of holy war. Among other things, the arrest of Ramsi Yousef, a ringleader in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, revealed that Abu Sayef was involved in a bin Laden-inspired plot to blow up 11 jumbo jets above the Pacific and to assassinate then-President Bill Clinton.
Already, Manila has confirmed the arrival of a small team of U.S. Army "specialists," most likely Green Berets, to help with counter-insurgency. The Philippine constitution, laden with post-colonial sensitivities, prohibits deployment of U.S. or other foreign combat forces. Then again, it wouldn't be the first time that U.S. advisors in Southeast Asia wound up commanding troops.
APPLES AND ORANGES
The prominence of countries that have not regularly been tagged as terrorist states by the U.S. State Department prompts some defensiveness in counter-terrorist circles. "This is a whole new ballgame," said a U.S. counter-intelligence source. "It's a complicated equation, and there are good reasons why any state that isn't on the list wasn't put there."
Afghanistan, for instance, was kept off the list for two reasons: one, because the United States never recognized the Taliban and the country's legitimate government, and two, because the Drug Enforcement Administration wanted to pursue a policy of giving money to Afghan farmers so they would not grow poppies.
Neither friend nor foe
Leader
Monday October 29, 2001
The Guardian
The Bush administration's insistence that the US and Saudi Arabia are fighting shoulder to shoulder in the "war on terrorism" is unconvincing.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, a bilateral relationship that is founded on an oil-for-arms protection racket has come under unprecedented strain. These tensions exploded into the open last week when Crown Prince Abdullah, the kingdom's de facto ruler, lashed out at "vicious western media attacks" arising from "ancient spite against Islam".
The Saudi royals must worry that vitriolic criticism in the normally staid New York Times, and elsewhere, reflects private US government thinking (as would be the case in the tightly controlled Saudi press). And in this instance they may be right. "One of the disturbing realities clarified by last month's attacks is Saudi Arabia's tolerance for terrorism," a recent NYT leading article pronounced. "With Riyadh's acquiescence, money and manpower from Saudi Arabia helped create and sustain Osama bin Laden's terrorist organisation." But George Bush's spokesman, Ari Fleischer, adamantly denied any rift. "The president is very pleased with the kingdom's contributions to the efforts (to defeat terrorism)," Mr Fleischer claimed. "Press articles citing differences are simply incorrect."
Tell that to the Marines. They and the American public know perfectly well it is bunk. Colin Powell's argument that the US needs Saudi support to keep wider Muslim opinion on board is well understood. But there is no disguising US anger and frustration at Saudi post-September 11 attitudes - and the dismay that is felt as more is understood about Saudi policies prior to the atrocities. The FBI has now established beyond doubt that 15 of the 19 hijackers, like Bin Laden himself, were Saudi-born.
It also claims that much of the recruiting, planning and financing of the attacks occurred in Saudi Arabia. Officials complain, despite Saudi protestations, that Riyadh is not cooperating fully in tracing terrorist funds and freezing assets. But this is now seen as par for the course in a country that funded the Pakistan seminaries that schooled the Taliban, that sponsored Mullah Omar's regime diplomatically, financially and spiritually, and where anti-western feeling (and violence) has been steadily rising. Saudi Arabia's refusal to allow America's state-of-the-art air base at al-Kharj to be used for Afghan raids has been swallowed for the sake of the wider cause. But it has left a sour taste.
Yet amid all this righteous ire, Americans should reflect that they may themselves be partly to blame. Saudi Arabia is primarily of use to the US as a source of cheap oil; secondarily, as an arms buyer - $45bn in cash sales since 1989. It is of use, thirdly, as a diplomatic bulwark in the "moderate" Arab world, counter-balancing US bogeymen in Iran and Iraq. But this utilitarian US policy has given little thought to how best to engage on equal terms with a faith and a culture far removed from its own. It has shored up a monarchy that, for many of its subjects, lacks legitimacy. It has expediently sidestepped the regime's record on human rights and free speech. And it has failed to grasp the depth of ordinary Saudis' fury at Israeli actions in Palestine.
If Saudi Arabia is not now behaving the way America wants, it may be because America has never understood Saudi Arabia. If it is politically weak, it may be because the US has helped keep it so. Here is a case study, highlighted by the present crisis, of why Islam and the west must seek a greater understanding based on mutual respect. And here is an opportunity for Tony Blair to show the way.
