"The earth I tread on is not a dead, inert mass; it is a body, has a
spirit, is organic and fluid to the influence of its
spirit." ~Henry David
Thoreau[1] To claim that
the earth is alive is to label oneself a mystic, a new-age spiritualist, or a
poet. Certainly the metaphor is not a unique one--the idea of a living earth
turns up everywhere from Thoreau to Chief Seattle, and back to the ancient
Greeks. Yet, when such a statement falls from the tongue of a scientist, the
idea is greeted with something more than skepticism, something more akin to
distaste or moderate embarrassment. Such an idea cannot possibly be scientific;
maybe a compelling analogy, but not science. This is precisely the reaction
British scientist James Lovelock received when he suggested a model of a living
earth in the 1960s as the Gaia hypothesis. After a long period of neglect, the
scientific community turned to the Gaia hypothesis in the 1980s with a critical
eye and, for the most part, objected not to the science behind it, but to the
notion that it was science at all.
James Lovelock maintains a conception of
science that is fundamentally different from what he views as the "mainstream"
trends in modern science. It is this fundamentally different vision of what
science is, how it should be done, and what it can accomplish that is evidenced
in his Gaia hypothesis and reflected in the reaction from the mainstream
scientific community to Lovelock's conjectures. Where the scientific practice
is currently dominated by the reductionist style of scientific inquiry, Lovelock
favors the holistic. Where scientists seek out theories that make applicable,
falsifiable predictions, Lovelock seeks out metaphors that explain the world
around him. Where biologists, physicists, geochemists, and theoretical
ecologists assume a vague definition of life relevant to their own specialty,
Lovelock asks what it means to be "alive". These differences--whether for the
better or for the worse--are apparent in his most notable accomplishment, the
Gaia hypothesis that first gained wide attention in 1979 with the publication of
his book,
Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth in 1979.
The main
focus of this paper will be an examination of how Lovelock's anti-mainstream
vision of the scientific practice is articulated in his Gaia hypothesis and how
this unconventional perspective affected the original hostility of the
"scientific community" whose prior expectations and preconceived notions
regarding the nature of science ran counter to the ideas expressed in Lovelock's
hypothesis. The reaction of the scientific community focused on three issues
raised by Lovelock's unconventional approach: (1) the conflict between
reductionism and holism as a means of scientific inquiry; (2) the problematic
definition of what it means to be alive; and (3) the question of what
constitutes science. The serious critical response to the Gaia hypothesis
largely consisted of objections to the answers Lovelock gives to these
questions.
Foundations of Gaia"I think of the Earth as a
living organism. The rocks, the air, the oceans, and all life are an
inseparable system that functions to keep the planet
livable." ~James
Lovelock[2] To begin, an
explanation of the main scientific implications of the Gaia hypothesis may be
warranted. Gaia, first presented by Lovelock in 1979 as a completed theory,
sought to explain the amazing improbability of the equilibrium of the earth's
atmosphere in a state conducive to life. In his theory, Lovelock supposes that
the whole earth is a self-regulating system that will preserve an environment
suitable for life against all threats. The Gaia hypothesis proposes, then, that
the whole biosphere participates in a complex network of interactions that has
resisted physical changes, of which the most often referred to is the thirty per
cent increase in the sun's radiation since life first appeared three and a half
billion years ago.
[3] Scientifically,
the hypothesis is concerned primarily with the chemical composition of the
troposphere, the lower atmosphere of the earth. In Lovelock's theory, the
chemical composition of the reactive gases in the troposphere, the
oxidation/reduction state and the pH in the atmosphere, are actively maintained
by the activities of the biota. Biota, in this sense, refers to the sum of all
living organisms on the planet: flora, fauna, and most importantly,
microbiota.
[4] Essentially, then, the
Gaia hypothesis as Lovelock introduced it asserts that the biota and its
environment constitute a single homeostatic system that opposes changes
unfavorable for life, through the use of negative feedback mechanisms. In this
way, as Lovelock states, '"Life, or the biosphere, regulates or maintains the
climate and the atmospheric composition at an optimum for
itself."
[5] From the position of
conventional science, an ecosystem is thought of as a stable, self-perpetuating
system, composed of a community of living organisms and their non-living
environment.
[6] According to this
perspective, organisms do not alter their environment, they merely adapt to it.
In contrast to this, the Gaian view of an ecosystem, sees the two components of
the system, the living and the non-living, as two tightly coupled interactive
forces, each one shaping and affecting the other. The end result of this
intertwining is a sort of biological relativism where the line between life and
the inanimate environment cannot clearly by demarcated, where life and death
cannot be seen as absolute, just as Einstein blurred the line between the
radically different phenomena of matter and energy, demonstrating that they are,
in fact, functions of one another.
[7]
It is for this reason that Lovelock believes he can refer to the earth as a
"living planet" or as his superorganism, even though most of the planet is
"un-living" by any conventional definition.
As a conception of the earth as
a self-regulating superorganism, Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis is not without
antecedents. In citing the foundations upon which the Gaia hypothesis was
constructed, it becomes apparent that the theory was, in fact, echoing back to a
tradition dating from the eighteenth century--not just a tradition in chemistry
or earth science, but in the very manner in which science was practiced in
contrast to that of the modern scientific profession.
In a 1789 Edinburgh
lecture, James Hutton stated, "I consider the Earth to be a super-organism and
that its proper study should be by
physiology."
[8] Lovelock cites the
eminent eighteenth-century British scientist James Hutton, regarded as the
father of geology, to be his most direct forerunner, not only in terms of
Hutton's similar conception of the earth as a "living being", but also as a
multi-disciplinary scientist of broad interests who was equal part farmer,
physician, and natural philosopher. It is from Hutton, in fact, that Lovelock
borrows the concept of "geophysiology"--a term Lovelock has adopted as the title
for the new discipline of planetary systems that he envisions as the practical
outcome of his Gaia hypothesis.
[9]
Hutton, then, serves as an antecedent of the Gaia hypothesis' implications
regarding the living earth, but also as a model for the way in which Lovelock
views the scientific inquiry, a view that de-emphasizes the specialization of
science and the dominance of the reductionist mentality. Lovelock asserts that
geophysiology is a legitimate discipline whose study is the properties of large
systems on the global scale: the most basic example being the regulation of
climate and temperature by the biota. It is also the basis of an empirical
practice, planetary medicine. While still far from acceptance as a discipline,
geophysiology maintains, in Lovelock's opinion, the honorable traditions of
scientific thought and experiment of the natural
philosophers.
[10] The most
"illustrious predecessor" in Lovelock's opinion is the soviet biochemist V.I.
Vernadsky, considered the founder of both biogeochemistry and of our
contemporary conception of the
biosphere.
[11] In his work,
Vernadsky built upon the works of organic chemistry pioneers like Liebig,
Boussingault, and Dumas in exploring how chemical cycles interacted with the
mechanisms of biological populations, connecting all organisms, including
microorganisms, soils, and the atmosphere. In blending these areas of
scientific specialization, Vernadsky practiced a holism that helped produce our
modern global ecological world-view. In this way, Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis
can trace back its lineage after Hutton, through the more recent work of
distinguished scientists such as Vernadsky, G. E. Hutchinson, and Alfred
Lotka.
[12] Lovelock believes that
these men were closer to an era before the fragmentation of science, a time when
science was whole, and served as the vocation of wise and broad-minded natural
philosophers.
[13] In a way, it is
this sort of atmosphere of scientific endeavor that Lovelock seeks to attain
with his holistic, multi-disciplinary conception of science--a conception of
science whose influence is made evident by his Gaia hypothesis.
Lovelock's Holistic Science"Real science, the wondering
about how the world works and the design of simple experiments to test the
theories that thus come to mind, is like its companion creative activity, art,
and best done quietly and inexpensively." ~James
Lovelock[14] Lovelock
portrays himself as an amateur scientist, a British eccentric living the life of
a recluse in the Devonshire countryside, harking back to the style of scientific
inquiry applied by those broadly curious natural philosophers such as Hutton.
Generally regarded by others as a biologist or atmospheric scientist, Lovelock
considers himself an inventor.
[15]
Though he paints himself with the brush of an eccentric hobbyist, Lovelock's
scientific credentials are not unsubstantial. As an interdisciplinary tinkerer,
Lovelock holds degrees in both chemistry and medicine, taught engineering,
physiology, and cybernetics at a number of universities on both sides of the
Atlantic, including the medical schools at Harvard and Yale. In addition,
Lovelock has consulted with NASA, working on the Viking program's satellites
intended for Mars in the 1960s.
[16]
With no formal academic affiliation, Lovelock holds the rare honor of being a
self-employed researcher admitted to Britain's prestigious Royal
Society.
[17] For Lovelock,
science is less useful in sanctifying an hypothesis than it is as a sort of
looking glass through which to see the world
differently.
[18] In this vision of
the scientific endeavor, the merit of a theory is more accurately measured in
whether or not it causes one to ask valuable questions that may inspire these
new ways of seeing nature, rather than if it is technically "right" or
"wrong".
[19] It is here where
Lovelock believes modern science has faltered--by accepting the misconceived
idea that science may be right or wrong
absolutely.
[20] Instead of this,
Lovelock asserts that science consists of making guesses and then trying to
refine them. "Look at Newton," Lovelock writes, "He made a damn good guess.
You can still navigate all the way around the solar system using Newtonian
mechanics, except possibly between Mercury and the sun. You hardly need
Einstein at all. A bloody good
guess."
[21] Lovelock establishes
his vision of science as contrary to what he sees as the major failings of the
modern scientific profession already touched upon above: the fragmentation and
specialization of scientific disciplines, and the position of reductionism as
the prevalent mode of scientific inquiry. Lovelock clearly expresses
frustration at the specialization of modern science that he views as a
distancing from the more noble work of earlier natural philosophers who worked
as polymaths, dabbling in many disciplines while looking for interconnections
and broad themes that explained the workings of the world. In his 1988 book
The Ages of Gaia, Lovelock highlights this as one of the major trends in
the modern scientific profession that prevented scientists, specifically
biologists, from accepting the Gaia
theory.
[22] In Lovelock's
opinion, this fragmentation that has accompanied the increasing specialization
of the scientific profession makes it difficult for biologists and environmental
scientists to properly understand the implications of the Gaia hypothesis as a
scientific model of the
biosphere.
[23] Lovelock laments
this trend in science, wherein "the boundaries between the sciences are
jealously guarded by their Professors and within each territory there is a
different arcane language to be
learnt."
[24] In Lovelock's vision,
the Gaia hypothesis blends these fragmented fields, applying equally to the work
of biologists, geochemists and atmospheric physicists--yet, this
multi-disciplinary nature made the theory unlikely to be fully appreciated by
scientists who toil in "narrow specialties proud in their ignorance of other
sciences."
[25] As collaborator
Stephen Schneider recalls,
Lovelock once observed that there are
biologists studying bugs on the ground who have noticed that methane was being
released, but it didn't mean much to them. And that there are aeronomists
studying the upper atmosphere who have noticed the methane but knew nothing
about the bugs.
[26]In this
way, a theory that links the behavior of all organisms to the functioning of the
earth's processes would appear counter-intuitive to a scientific community
accustomed to increasing specialization. Such a holistic, "big-picture" theory
runs in opposition to the dominant trend of narrow specialization of modern
science, and as a result, in the opinion of Lovelock, the scientific community
was not prepared to see the significance of the Gaia theory or the science
behind it.
[27] In response to the
question of why scientists should join earth and life sciences together,
Lovelock writes, "I would ask, why have they been torn apart by the ruthless
dissection of science into separate and blinkered
disciplines?"
[28] Continuing in
this vein, it is no surprise, then, to find that Lovelock favors a holistic view
of science over the reductionist method that has dominated modern science.
Reductionism is the method of inquiry that seeks to explain the properties of
complex wholes--molecules, for example, or societies--in terms of the units of
which those molecules or societies are composed. According to the reductionist
line of thinking, the compositional units of a whole, as well as the properties
of those units, exist before the whole, and there is a chain of causation that
runs from the units to the
whole.
[29] Although the development
of systems theory and numerous ‘bottom-up' methods of viewing ecology have
emerged in the last twenty years, since the 1950's reductionism has pervaded as
the dominant paradigm in the sciences of ecology and
biology.
[30] For Lovelock, the
problem with reductionism lies with its belief that the method of examining
systems by dissection is all that is needed--reductionists maintain that there
is nothing in the whole system that cannot be predicted from a knowledge of its
divided parts.
[31] Lovelock writes,
as understanding grows, we are more and more aware that the universe we
inhabit is both self-organizing and in many ways unpredictable. To understand
it and its most complex entities--living systems--reduction alone is not
enough.
[32] Such broad
concepts as life, intelligence, or Gaia, are comprehensible in a general way to
the public yet bewilder scientists who remain fixed in their reductionist
mentality. From the perspective of Lovelock's conception of science, the
puzzling constancy of the climate and other problems that seem obscure within
the rigidly divided fields of science become clear when viewed holistically, as
phenomena of a living planet.
[33]
In contrast to Lovelock's mode of scientific endeavor, the model of
scientific advance that dominates the manner in which most scientists are
educated, and which is largely grounded in the work of Karl Popper and
like-minded philosophers of science, sees science as progressing in a somewhat
abstract way, through a continuous procession of theory-devising and testing,
conjectures and refutations.
[34]
While the updated Kuhnian model of scientific inquiry asserts that this sequence
of theorizing and refutations in "accepted" science is occasionally disturbed by
periods of "revolutionary" science in which the entire framework (the paradigm)
within which the conjectures and refutations are framed is shifted, Popper's
conception of science seems more welcome by the scientific community as it
upholds science as distinguished from other forms of knowledge. In any event,
the manner in which hypotheses are defined as legitimate in modern science is
still heavily influenced by Popper's model of what constitutes "real"
science.
Popper's "falsificationist" method of
scientific inquiry considers a theory to be "scientific" according to the
following criteria: (1) the theory is liable to be falsified by data (2) the
theory is testable by observation and experiment, and (3) it makes valid
predictions.[35]
While Popper's philosophy of science can certainly be debated, the application
of this style of inquiry by scientists objecting to the Gaia hypothesis served
as a most pointed critique of Lovelock's work and method. From the perspective
of a scientific community that bases its vision of science in the Popperian
model, Lovelock's method of inquiry is likely to be at best neglected, and at
worst rejected, as pseudo-science. This is not to say that the reaction
was unwarranted or inappropriate--as Lovelock himself states, "the scientific
community is reluctant to accept new theories as fact, and rightly
so."
[36] It is certainly not
surprising, then, to find that the majority of criticisms to the Gaia hypothesis
were less concerned with the hard scientific data than with the
multi-disciplinary, holistic philosophy of science behind Lovelock's
theory.
The Metaphor of "Life"
"Why do scientists dislike
the word Gaia? I think it is because they instinctively rejected the theory when
it was first proposed - we all do this with new theories; it is a necessary part
of their natural selection. Because I expressed the theory in metaphor, not the
jargon of science-speak, they overreacted and attacked the metaphor instead of
the science." ~James Lovelock
speech at the launch of
the Gaia Society on 9th Feb., 1998
Lovelock's conception of science as
a "looking glass", a tool to explore the workings of nature in a new way, is
articulated in his work, as he weaves together his theory using analogy and
metaphor. This practice of science through analogy has lead to dismissive
criticism from more traditional scientists, such as eminent biochemist and
current director of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research in Evolutionary
Biology, W. Ford Doolittle, who claims that the Gaia hypothesis is more metaphor
than theory, more poetry than
science.
[37] This objected to use
of metaphor, and the association with pseudo-science that accompanies it, is
clearly observed in the often confusing analogy at the center of the Gaia
hypothesis--the claim that the earth is alive.
The biology textbooks we
remember from introductory college courses discuss what it means to be alive:
response to stimuli, reproduction, energy transformation, and the like. From
such textbooks one receives the conception of the biotic community as a
generally static environment that serves as an "un-living backdrop" for the
activities of organisms. Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis rejects this idea that the
environment is an "un-living backdrop", a dead stage on which living organisms
act out their complex lives. In contrast, the Gaia hypothesis asserts that
organisms and their environment are intertwined, and in doing so, forces a
rethinking of what is "living" and what is "un-living".
The question of
what it means to be alive has long been a problematic one to accurately
answer--in the scholarly
Dictionary of Biology, one finds entries on
"leptotene" and "limnology", but not one on "life", and each scientific
discipline has its own interpretation to which it adamantly
holds.
[38] Indeed, the
specialization of the scientific disciplines in modern practice that Lovelock
emphasizes as one of the dominant trends in science contrary to which his theory
runs, further complicates the question of what is life. In reference to the
problems of defining life, Lovelock again mentions his frustration with this
compartmentalization of disciplines as he writes,
If we ask a group of
scientists 'What is life?' they will answer from the restricted viewpoint of
their own particular disciplines. A physicist will say that life is a peculiar
state of matter that reduces its internal entropy in a flux of free energy, and
is characterized by an intricate capacity for self-organization.... A
neo-Darwinist biologist will define a living organism as one able to reproduce
and to correct the errors of reproduction through natural selection among its
progeny. To a biochemist, a living organism is one that takes in free energy as
sun light, or chemical potential energy, such as food and oxygen, and uses the
energy to grow according to the instructions coded in its genes.
To a
geophysiologist, a living organism is a bounded system open to a flux of matter
and energy, which is able to keep its internal medium constant in
composition and its physical state intact in a changing environment; it is able
to keep in homeostasis. . . Gaia would be a living organism under the
physicist's or the biochemist’s
definitions.
[39] In this
way, the initial reaction of skepticism to a theory that purports that the earth
is alive is understandable and, as James Lovelock himself points out,
appropriate. In response to this unwillingness to consider a hypothesis that
implies such an analogy, Lovelock calls upon an additional comparison, liking
the earth to a giant Redwood tree that is alive and majestic, yet is composed of
97% dead material.
[40]
The very name Lovelock adopted for his hypothesis at
the suggestion of novelist William Golding--"Gaia"--is, itself, an analogy that
draws connections back to the earth goddess in Greek mythology. Concerning this
metaphorical nature of the Gaia hypotheses, Doolittle, who taught at both
Harvard and Stanford, states that Lovelock's theory suffers from flawed
terminology, in that the use of Gaia as an "Earth-as-organism" metaphor applies
the same terminology to both Gaia and recognized biological organisms--a
decision both unwise and
misleading.[41]
Though some may find it useful to view the Earth as if it were an organism,
Doolittle maintains that viewing the Earth as an organism itself is neither
scientifically meaningful nor scientifically answerable, insisting that, with
Gaia, Lovelock offers only "a myth to express our wonder and gratitude, . . .
Gaia is the muse of many who care deeply about this
planet."[42]
While these criticisms of Lovelock's use of analogy are valid, it
is important to highlight that, in speaking of a "living planet" Lovelock is not
suggesting that the earth is alive in an animistic way of a planet with
sentience. Instead, Lovelock insists that he refers only to the activities of
the earth, such as regulating the climate through the mechanisms of the biota,
which function automatically, "not through an act of will, and all of it within
the strict bounds of science."
[43]
Lovelock describes the planetary ecosystem as alive because it behaves like a
living organism to the extent that, like other organisms, its temperature and
chemistry are self-regulated at a constant state favorable to life in the face
of perturbations. Gaia, in this way, is the Earth seen as a single
physiological system. At the same time, Lovelock admits the problematic use of
his "living planet" idea, writing that he is
well aware that the term
itself is metaphorical and that the earth is not alive in the same way as you or
me, or even a bacterium . . . Real science is riddled with metaphor. Science
grows from imaginary models in the mind and is sharpened by measurements that
check the fit of the models with
reality.
[44] Here, again,
is an expression of Lovelock's anti-mainstream conception of science, with its
holistic view that is best articulated through analogy that inspires new ways of
looking at nature and deeper questioning. While maintaining this principle,
Lovelock does insist that Gaia theory is proper science and is not limited to
mere metaphor.
Clearly then, this metaphorical nature of Lovelock's
philosophy of science, specifically as evidenced in the Gaia hypothesis as it
was first presented, served as an obvious stumbling block for scientists
assessing the merit of the new theory. To some in the scientific community--if
we may take the reaction of men like
Doolittle to
represent a sample of the larger community--the Gaia hypothesis, with its heavy
use of analogy and its questioning of the very definition of life, was more
metaphorical than scientific, more of a worldview than a theory in terms of the
reigning conception of science. Certainly, these objections to the
"living earth" metaphor were not alone in their criticism of Gaia as
unscientific, as we shall see in the next section.
Is the Gaia
Hypothesis Science?"[Darwinian processes] probably explain all that
the more extreme Gaia hypotheses do, without invoking global entities, imputing
teleological intentionality, or assuming optimal control. It is testable at
many scales, from the laboratory to the globe." ~James
Kirchner[45] Just as
the definition of life is so difficult to discern, perhaps no one can absolutely
answer the question of what is science. For this reason, the struggle over this
issue has been a consistent thread woven through the history of science and,
unsurprisingly, reappears in the criticism of the Gaia hypothesis. The
unorthodox vision of science that Lovelock presents, beyond his broad
application of metaphor, certainly made his Gaia hypothesis more difficult for
the scientific community to swallow. The two dominant objections to Lovelock's
theory as unscientific focused on two main issues: (1) the possible teleologic
implications of the Gaian conception of the interactions between the biota, the
solid earth, and the atmosphere; and (2) its apparent untestability which,
referring to the Popperian criteria for an acceptable
scientific hypothesis, makes Gaia unfalsifiable and, thus, devoid of meaning as
science. In the wake of attention given to the Gaia hypothesis
following the 1988 AGU conference, a new wave of more scientifically-bound
criticisms emerged--criticisms that no longer stalled simply at the issue of the
living earth as a metaphor. Among the most commonly argued of such objections
brought against the Gaia hypothesis from the scientific community was that it
was distressingly teleological. Teleology asserts that there is an element of
purpose or design behind the workings of nature, and, like the definitions of
"life" and legitimate science, is part of a very old debate in the history of
science: this time between the mechanistic vision of nature as essentially
behaving like a machine, and vitalists who maintain that there is a non-causal
life force.
[46] This dissension
to the Gaia hypothesis on grounds that it was teleological, again using the
biochemist Doolittle as a figurehead for this group of critics that includes
Richard Dawkins, insists that the theory suggested the presence of some design
or purpose behind the nature and administration of the biosphere, an idea that
runs in opposition to the accepted position of Darwinian evolutionary doctrine
of natural selection--a mechanism without a
mind.
[47] Lovelock's collaborator,
the brilliant microbiologist Lynn Margulis, had much to reply in this area
regarding the systematics of Darwinian evolution in regard to the smallest and
earliest of living things upon the
earth.
[48] In his own right,
Lovelock sought to counter this criticism in his further research and writings
by way of theoretical ecology, clarifying the role of Darwinian evolution in
linking organism natural selection to the optimization of the environment:
When the activity of an organism favors the environment as well as the
organism itself, then its spread will be assisted; eventually the organism and
the environmental change associated with it will become global in extent. The
reverse is also true, and any species that adversely affects the environment is
doomed; but life goes on.
[49]
Expanding on his defense of the Gaia hypothesis against these
accusations of teleology, Lovelock proposed the thought problem that became
perhaps the most effective counter-argument to criticisms of his theory as
teleological and unscientific:
Daisyworld. This simple computerized
metaphor has since become an integral part of the debate about the Gaia
Hypothesis.
[50] In this model,
Lovelock presents the systematic behavior of the theoretical planet Daisyworld
within which, the environment has been simplified to a single variable
(planetary temperature), and the biota consists of only several species of
daisies. Like the earth, Daisyworld maintains its global temperature
reasonably constant in the face of time and the problematic increasing energy
output of its sun. Gaia theory sees the evolution of organisms as so closely
coupled with the evolution of their physical and chemical environment that
together they constitute a single evolutionary process, which is
self-regulating. Any species that adversely affects the environment, making it
less favorable for life’s progeny will ultimately be selected against,
just as surely as will those weaker members of a species who fail to pass the
evolutionary fitness test. It is this model for the automatic, unteleological
functioning of the Gaia hypothesis that is articulated in
Daisyworld.
[51] In the
Daisyworld parable, then, this imaginary planet maintains conditions for its
survival simply by following its own natural processes. The Daisyworld planet
contains two species of daisies: light daisies and dark daisies. Light daisies
tend to reflect light, which has a cooling effect, while dark ones absorb
radiation, and therefore warm the planet. In the distant past, when the star
was less luminous, only the equatorial region will have been warm enough to
permit the growth of daisies, and the dark daisies flourish due to their ability
to absorb more warmth from sunlight. In this manner, the dark daisies gradually
colonize most of the planet, and by absorbing heat, begin to warm the surface
environment. At this point, as the star's luminosity increased, the lighter
daisies become the species favored by Gaia due to their ability to keep both
themselves and the planet cool by reflecting more light. In the model's
conclusion, the star becomes so luminous that the ability of the white daisies
to keep themselves and the planet cool fails and life is
extinguished.
[52] Growth of the
daisies thus depends on the present population, the natural death rate, the
available space and the temperature (the equations that Lovelock used to model
them were based on the dynamics of real daisy
growth).
[53] Lovelock asserts that
when the model is run with the sun's luminosity gradually increasing, the
population of the light and dark daisies adjust themselves naturally so as to
keep the temperature constant at the optimal level for daisy growth up to the
point where the sun's luminosity overpowers the daisies.
In this way,
Daisyworld is an example of a self-regulating system. Feedback loops between the
daisies and the planet temperature, contained in the equations relating growth
rate to the proportion of light reflected from the planet, somehow conspire to
maintain the conditions suitable for
life.
[54] The Daisyworld model as
presented by Lovelock is only a kind of thought experiment, but serves as an
effective demonstration of the principle of self-regulation--it is a viable
ecosystem which regulates its temperature, without any recourse to selection or,
most importantly, teleology.
The Daisyworld model also served as a
counter-argument to an additional criticism of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis,
answering the critics claim that Lovelock's "living earth" had evolved without
any recourse to natural selection--contradictory to traditional Darwinian
evolution.
[55] These critics, the
eminent biologist Dawkins among them, asked if the Earth is alive, where is its
"selfish gene", and who will it pass it
onto?
[56] How can a superorganism
with a population of one evolve with no competition to enable natural selection?
In Lovelock's Daisyworld
model, the planet evolves through its own
mechanisms towards the optimization of conditions for life, making use of
natural selection in the microcosm to regulate the system in the macrocosm. In
this way, the Daisyworld model served as Lovelock's reaction to the objections
raised against his theory as unscientific both on the grounds that it is
teleological and also contradicts the tenets of modern Darwinian
theory.
[57] Perhaps
the most well executed anti-science criticism of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis came
from UC Berkeley professor of theoretical ecology James Kirchner partly as a
response to the Daisyworld model. With impeccable credentials, including
a masters degree in systems analysis from Dartmouth College and a Ph.d. in
energy and resources from Berkeley, Kirchner's criticisms challenged the
validity of Gaia as a hypothesis by directly questioning Lovelock's application
of his against-the-mainstream mode of scientific inquiry. In his arguments,
presented at the landmark 1988 AGU conference that placed the Gaia hypothesis
firmly on the scientific radar, Kirchner dissected the clutter that he saw
obscuring the Gaia hypothesis, dividing Gaia into a number of coherent, specific
hypotheses that were held by various groups of Gaia supporters. Kirchner then
analyzed each of the divided hypotheses for validity and scientific testability,
and in doing so, illustrated the vast ambiguities of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis
that seemed to allow any two supporters to maintain two fundamentally different
interpretations of the
theory.[58] In
his 1989 paper, The Gaia Hypotheses: Are They Testable? Are They
Useful?, Kirchner fleshes out his argument, asserting that the Gaia
hypotheses (recalling that Kirchner actually divided the Gaia hypothesis into
five separate, somewhat conflicting hypotheses, ranging from "weak Gaia" to
"strong Gaia") are unscientific in that they are untestable and fail to make any
applicable
predictions.[59]
The subdivided Gaia hypotheses presented by Kirchner were clarified as
follows: (1) Influential Gaia:
"weak Gaia"--the concept that life is but one participant in the global system
(Kirchner dismisses this as a restatement of accepted
theory). (2) Coevolutionary
Gaia: life and the environment have evolved as an intertwined system
(similarly dismissed as unoriginal by
Kirchner). (3) Homeostatic
Gaia: the assertion that the biota maintains control of the global
environment (this more traditional Gaian notion was set aside as poorly defined
and circular). (4) Teleological
Gaia: the notion that the biota asserts its control with intent and
purpose (rejected by Kirchner as a transparent
tautology). (5) Optimizing
Gaia: "strong Gaia"--life's collective purpose is specified as the
perfection of the planet (according to Kirchner, this belief is internally
contradictory and also
tautological).[60]In
dissenting to the various forms of Gaia, Kirchner reiterates that in order to be
testable, and therefore, scientific, a hypothesis must be made in terms that are
both clear and unambiguous in their relationship to observable phenomena.
Beyond this, any hypothesis must generate predictions of two kinds: confirmatory
predictions (phenomena that should be observed if the hypothesis is true and
that would not be predicted by the existing body of accepted theory) and
falsifying predictions (phenomena that should be observed if the hypothesis is
false).[61] As
is made clear in these arguments, Kirchner's ideas regarding testability and the
constitution of the scientific process rely mainly on the work of Karl Popper.
In criticism of the Gaia hypotheses, Kirchner makes use of Popper's definition
of science as opposed to pseudo-science in judging the scientific validity of
the Gaia hypotheses. Popper's "falsificationist" method of scientific inquiry
considered a theory scientific if it meets the following criteria: (1) was
liable to be falsified by data (2) was testable by observation and experiment
and (3) made valid
predictions.[62]
Kirchner's employment of this definition of science reveals a pointed critique
of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis. Applying
Popper's conception of science, Kirchner dismisses each of the subdivided Gaia
hypotheses as untestable and scientifically invaluable. In formulating his
arguments, Kirchner asserts that Gaia is untestable because it can be endlessly
re-interpreted to fit almost any data, is tautological in that it is true by
definition, and is unfalsifiable due to its failure to make any predictions that
might be
falsified.[63]
To support this claim of unscientific tautology, he points to Lovelock's
explanation of the oxygen crisis--the switch from oxidizing to reducing
conditions in the Precambrian atmosphere. Lovelock cites the fact that
terrestrial life survived the oxygen crises as evidence for Gaia's ability to
adapt to changing conditions, which Kirchner responds to in stating,
If the most destabilizing biotic event in
Earth's history can be construed as evidence for Gaia, and the relative
stability since then can also be cited as evidence for Gaia, one wonders what
conceivable events could not be interpreted as
supporting the Gaia hypothesis. If there are none, Gaia cannot be tested against
the geologic record . . . If Gaia stabilizes and Gaia destabilizes . . . is
there any possible behavior which is not
Gaian?[64]With
these criticisms, Kirchner dismisses the Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis as
unscientific, untestable, and excessively ambiguous in that they fail to conform
to his model of scientific inquiry. In concluding, Kirchner offers the damning
prediction that attempts to test this metaphor (Gaia) as a scientific
proposition will be, in my opinion, ultimately
futile.[65]
To be fair, Lovelock himself recognized this potential failure of his
hypothesis, explaining in his 1979 book Gaia: A New Theory of Life on
Earth, that "like a religious belief, it [the
Gaia hypothesis] is scientifically untestable and therefore incapable in its own
context of further
rationalization."[66]
In his final evaluation, Kirchner
concludes that the Gaia hypothesis is crippled by its great generality, and
insists that, while it may be a compelling worldview, it is not the kind of
vision that can be scientifically validated, and thus, is
unscientific.[67] Clearly,
then, Kirchner's criticism was grounded in a fundamental difference between his
view of the mode of scientific inquiry and that which Lovelock was attempting to
assert. The objection was not so much to the hard science, the data or
mechanisms, but to the anti-mainstream conception of science that was behind
Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis. In this way, Kirchner takes his place among that
group of critics that include Doolittle and Dawkins, critics that see Gaia as a
metaphor and as teleology--in responding to the question of whether Gaia is
science with a resounding no.
Conclusion"
A day like today I
realize what I've told you a hundred different times--that there is nothing
wrong with the world. What's wrong is our way of looking at
it."
~Henry Miller, from
A Devil in
Paradise[68] It is clear
then, that the scientific community was unprepared to accept the Gaia hypothesis
as presented by Lovelock in 1979 due to a fundamental difference in the way
Lovelock viewed science. Lovelock's work was closely tied to the conflict
between the characteristics of modern science as opposed to pre-revolutionary
natural philosophy, leading Lovelock to reject the practice of science as an
activity of a special group of self-validating experts, objecting to the appeal
to the "scientific" for legitimacy and to scientists as the ultimate authorities
as a quintessentially modern
idea.
[69] Appropriately, the
self-supported researcher breaks with the mainstream of modern science:
praising multi-disciplinary work in the face of increasing specialization; a
broad, holistic perspective in place of reductionism; and metaphorical theories
meant to spark a re-looking at nature rather than rejecting theories that fail
to pass the falsification criteria. These nonconformist tendencies found a
compelling expression in his Gaia hypothesis, and as a result, served to
undermine its legitimacy as a scientific theory. In looking back to the method
of the natural philosophers, Lovelock maintains an unorthodox view of science
which damns his theory to a position on the fringes of science. In that realm,
on the fringes of "accepted" science, Gaia will share the company of homeopathic
medicine and psychiatry, crystal-wearing New-Age spirituality and extra-sensory
perception. But also there, on the edge of science, Lovelock will join the
poets and the dreamers. And among them, I suspect he will feel quite at
home.
[1] as cited in Lovelock,
Ages
of Gaia, 17.
[2] Lawrence E.
Joseph,
Gaia: The Growth of an Idea (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1990) 3.
[3] James Lovelock,
The
Ages of Gaia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988)
19.
[4] Lynn Margulis, "James
Lovelock's Gaia" in
Gaia in Action: Science of the Living Earth, Peter
Bunyard, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
54.
[5] James Lovelock,
Gaia: A
New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)
7.
[6] James Lovelock,
Gaia:
The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine (London: Gaia Books Limited,
1991) 12.
[7] Joseph
52-53.
[8] James Lovelock,
"Geophysiology--The Science of Gaia," in
Scientists on Gaia, Stephen H.
Schneider and Penelope J. Boston, eds., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
3.
[9] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Study of Planetary Medicine,
10-11.
[10] Lovelock,
Gaia:
The Pracitical Science of Planetary Medicine,
10
[11] Joseph
220.
[12] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 30.
[13] Joseph
52.
[14] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
15.
[15] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, xiv
[16] Joseph
4
[17] Joseph
2
[18] James Lovelock, "Gaia: A
Model for Planetary and Cellular Dynamics," in
Gaia: A Way of Knowing,
William I. Thompson, ed., (Great Barrington, Mass: Lindisfarne Association,
Inc., 1987) 94.
[19] Lovelock,
Gaia: The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
15.
[20] Joseph
79
[21] Joseph
79.
[22] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 11.
[23] Lovelock,
Ages of Gaia, 61.
[24]
James Lovelock, "Mother Earth: Myth or Science?" in
From Gaia to Selfish
Genes, Connie Barlow, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
4.
[25] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, xvi.
[26] Joseph
9.
[27] Lovelock,
"Geophysiology--The Science of Gaia,"
3-4.
[28] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 11
[29] R.C. Lewontin,
Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin, "Not in Our Genes," in
From Gaia to Selfish
Genes, Connie Barlow, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
178-179.
[30] Lynn Margulis,
"Biologists Can't Define Life," in
From Gaia to Selfish Genes, Connie
Barlow, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
237.
[31] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
36-38.
[32] Lovelock,
Gaia:
The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
38.
[33] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 13.
[34] Lewontin,
Rose, and Kamin 184.
[35] Peter
J. Bowler,
The Norton History of the Environmental Sciences (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1993)
17-19.
[36] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, xv.
[37] W. Ford
Doolittle, "Questioning a Metaphor," in
From Gaia to Selfish Genes,
Connie Barlow, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
235.
[38] Lovelock, "Mother
Earth: Myth or Science," 9
[39]
Lovelock,
Gaia: The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
29
[40] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 14.
[41] Doolittle
236.
[42] Doolittle
236.
[43] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
31.
[44] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
6.
[45] James Kirchner, "The Gaia
Hypotheses: Are They Testable? Are They Useful?" in
Scientists on Gaia,
Stephen H. Schneider and Penelope J. Boston, eds., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT
Press, 1991) 43.
[46] Margulis,
"James Lovelock's Gaia," 64.
[47]
W. Ford Doolittle, "Gaia's Critics," in
From Gaia to Selfish Genes,
Connie Barlow, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991)
32-33.
[48] Joseph
5-8.
[49] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 112
[50] Joseph
121.
[51] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
62.
[52] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
67.
[53] Lovelock,
Gaia: The
Practical Science of Planetary Medicine,
67-68.
[54] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 45-47.
[55] Margulis,
"Biologists Can't Define Life,"
236-238.
[56] Margulis,
"Biologists Can't Define Life,"
237.
[57] Lovelock,
Ages of
Gaia, 45.
[58] Kirchner
38-41.
[59] Kirchner
40.
[60] Joseph
88.
[61] Kirchner
40.
[62] Bowler
17-19.
[63] Kirchner
42-43.
[64] Kirchner
45-46.
[65] Kirchner
43.
[66] Lovelock,
A New
Theory of Life on Earth,
ix.
[67] Kirchner
43-44.
[68] as cited in Lovelock,
Ages of Gaia, 152.
[69]
Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 182