The British are responsible for depriving
the Palestinians of self-determination*

By Dr. Abdul-Latif Teibawi

The year 1917 was a decisive one in the history of the First World War when the United States joined the allied forces and Russia had withdrawn as a result of the Communist Revolution. Both incidents put an end to the war, and there were great expectations to achieve a peaceful compromise based on the 14-point proposal suggested by American President Wilson. This proposal led to a misunderstanding between the Arabs on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. The new Russian ruler disclosed the items of the Sikes-Picot agreement upon which both Britain and France divided the Arab countries that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, these regions fell directly or indirectly under the sovereignty of either Britain or France. Consequently, the Arabs were shocked by this betrayal, and they aspired to become independent, especially after the declaration by the American President of his liberal principles. It was known on a large scale that Russia began to persuade both its allies, Britain and France, to annex Istanbul, Durduneel and the Bosphorus straits to its property. Consequently, France gained the Russian support to colonize Syria but Russia had reservations about Palestine because of its religious status. Moreover, France was assured by Britain that the latter had not been concerned with Syria as long as it remained a part of the Ottoman Empire. However, when the Ottoman Empire joined the war against the allied forces and Russia was recognized by its allies, especially its regional ambitions in Istanbul and Bosphorus, both Britain and France became more frank with Russia about deciding the interests of each of the allies in the Asian States of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, the British reply was that the Islamic State would be established away from this region, probably in the Holy Places in Arabia, when the Turkish sovereignty over Istanbul and the Straits was eclipsed, but the regions of this State must be agreed upon. This was in March of 1915, and it is quite important to consider the British policy that had preceded the McMahon correspondence in 1915, the negotiations about the Sikes-Picot agreement in 1916 and then the Balfour Promise in 1917 because Britain was planning to establish the independent Islamic State away from Turkey in Mecca, Madina and maybe Jerusalem, with full sovereignty over Arabia at the very least. If the British government replaced the term “Islamic” with “Arabic”, it would have been the realization of the political independence sought by the sharif of Mecca in July of 1915. The main difference was that the sharif had been more precise in determining the regional limits but the British government had not terminated this issue yet. One must ask: Why did the sharif’s proposals appear to be inconsistent with the above-mentioned British political plans? The sharif’s proposals were nationalistic and patriotic not religious, and it would create less trouble in the future of the caliphate and the requirements of the Ottoman Sultan. Therefore, the Indian Muslims were sympathetic with the Sultan as the legal caliph, and they considered the Arab Revolt as a rebellion against Islamic unity. However, this was not the main reason for the radical change in the British policy and the double-dealing toward the Arab Revolt because it had been conceived as a military action against Turkey.

The Arab-British understanding failed and therefore the Arabs lost their independence and land because of a series of reasons, some of which we can conceive of in the present day, such as the French and the British interests, the Zionist plans, and the romanticism and arrogance of some influential British politicians. A close reading of the McMahon correspondence reveals that the French appeals in Syria were behind the British reservations concerning the regional limits mentioned in the sharif’s proposals because France soon claimed the entire geographical area of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine, but Britain rejected this because of its policies in Iraq and they needed to have a free and safe passage from Iraq to Acre on the Mediterranean. Both France and Russia had religious and cultural interests in Palestine, and this was the problem of the exceptional items of the Sikes-Picot agreement, which led to the division of the Arab States in Iraq and Syria between France and Britain after it had given Russia great interests in Turkey while Palestine had been kept under an international system after discussions with the allies and the sharif. This indicates that both Islamic and Christian religious affairs were given great attention.

The Zionist aspirations were confronted by at least two components generated by British, French and Russian interests, especially before the revolution. The Zionists were quite resourceful when they became allies with the British because the latter were the least strict of the parties involved. The Zionists began supporting British interests, especially the issue of Palestine as a base to protect these interests in the Suez Canal. Although the Zionists were aware of the fact that they would be resisted by almost everybody, they risked gaining British approval to establish a national Jewish State in Palestine despite the influential opponents and the fact that the vast majority of the Palestinians consisted of Muslims and Christians who had been living there for thousands of years even before the Islamic conquest. We will not narrate in detail the reasons which made the Zionists successful in their efforts despite the disagreeable conditions and how they were able to persuade the major British politicians to be their allies, but rather we will emphasize the fact that the success of the Zionists in winning over British Premier Lloyd George and Foreign Affairs Minister Balfour made Sir Mark Sikes (the romantic cynic who designed the Sikes-Picot agreement) quite active in the implementation of the Zionist proposals in Palestine and made him compromise the interests of France and the Vatican.

When the Balfour Promise was declared by Britain in November of 1917, more than half of Palestine was under Ottoman control, and the promise given to the Arabs by McMahon in October of 1915 did not exclude Palestine but it did not mention it openly. The agreement held by Russia, Britain and France in 1916 had decided to establish an international system in Palestine after consulting with the sharif, but the decision to establish a Jewish State was a gross and unforgettable political and moral mistake because it ignored the indigenous people and even the sharif himself. On the other hand, Lord Carson, the British deputy in India, was the most deliberate about the Balfour Promise when he discussed it in front of the British Cabinet because, as he pointed out, the Promise was against Arab and Islamic interests, and he asked during the meeting held on 14 October 1917 how anyone could believe in the idea of replacing the native Palestinians—both Muslims and Christians—with Jews? He suggested giving the Jews equivalent civil and religious rights in Palestine as a better procedure than bringing them into Palestine on a large scale. He considered this as exaggerated sympathy toward the Jews, which the Cabinet of Her Majesty, the Queen, had nothing to do with. He crystallized his attitudes in a memo dated 26 October 1917 and presented it to the Cabinet, showing the remarkable status of Jerusalem for Muslims and Christians, and pointing out the humane threat included in the Promise saying, “It is impossible for more than 500,000 Arabs, who have been living in Palestine for more than 1,500 years, to give up their predecessors’ land easily for the Jews or to become their servants and tenants.”

The British Foreign Affairs Minister, Balfour, pointed out in a meeting held by the British Cabinet on October 1917 that what he meant by a national Jewish State was a form of British or American protection which would make it easy for the Jews to establish this State by founding the necessary educational, agricultural and industrial installations as a base for their self-rescue and nationalistic life, but it did not mean establishing a Jewish State overnight because this issue depends on gradual, political growth. Undoubtedly, he was not only able to put forward his ideas clearly but he also deformed and concealed facts as he did in the meeting held on 4 October 1917 when he said that American President Wilson had wanted Britain to issue such a Promise to help the Jews; however, Montague, a Jew and the Minister of State for India, refuted this saying that Wilson had been against this. The most formidable deformation of the Balfour truth was when he said that all of the Russian Jews had supported the Zionist expectations, ignoring in the process the advice of the British Ambassador who asked him if the Promise would support the allies’ interests. He then replied that he doubted this very much because the Jews in Russia had not been sympathetic with Zionism since the end of Caesar. Thus, Balfour ignored the advice of his real mentor and favoured the ideals of the Zionists living in London—thousands of miles away from Russia. Montague described the Zionists as outsiders born abroad, and they were the only Jews who claimed a nationalistic State. Similarly, he exaggerated the French sympathy toward the Zionist expectations, and he warned his colleagues that Germany would follow suit; in addition, this would have a pleasant reaction amongst the American Jews, but he did not say a word about the Arabs and he ignored the observations made by Lord Carson. He did not even answer Carson’s questions, something that Balfour had never done to other partners of serious causes as he did in this context.

Balfour and his colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were both deaf and blind to the protests of Muslims and Arabs in London as well as the majority who were in Palestine. However, they were very sympathetic with the Zionists. Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, who made and explanatory translation of the Holy Qur’an, delivered a speech in Kacstone Hall in London in June of 1917 concerning the Islamic interests in Palestine, which were published in a pamphlet later on. The lecture was dedicated to removing the serious and widespread ignorance amongst the British, both the general public and the members of the government, about the dangers and the risks of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine under the protection of a Christian State. The lecturer pointed out the significant status of Palestine and Jerusalem in Islam and in Arab history as well. The lecture was presented to the British government in the form of a pamphlet as an Islamic protest. It was read by all of the officials, including Balfour and Sir Sikes, both of whom accused the person who delivered it as an ally of Turkey because there was no indication of any wrongdoing, even though the charge had been a notorious one at that time, however, it has lost this notion nowadays. This accusation by Balfour and Sikes was enough to cause the British government to neglect Pickthall’s advice presented to it and for the government to admonish that it was a gross mistake to pay more attention to the Jews and the Christians while ignoring the Muslims because Palestine is sacred and holy to all three monotheistic religions.

The Islamic community in London protested five days later and presented a letter to Balfour to acquire more guarantees concerning Al-Aqsa and the other holy places, but Sir Sikes considered those who signed the petition not only Turkish allies but also spies and agents for Turkey. Another protest letter was directed by Mr. Ameer Ali, a member of the King’s consultation board, to Lord Harding, the British deputy in India, on 10 November 1917 to inform Balfour that Palestine is a holy land for Muslims, and it is next to Mecca and Madina in importance to Muslims throughout the world, and it is unfair to put it under Jewish control. Actually, both Balfour and his assistants were fully aware of these facts, especially through the experience or the observations made by Lord Carson on both nationalist and religious levels. However, Balfour was fully ignorant to these facts and was supported by his Premier, Lloyd George. He carried on until the issue had been officially discussed by the Cabinet. Meanwhile, the Arabs were not taken into consideration except by taking some precautions to silence them in case of any protests. This strategy was obvious in the message sent to General Wingate, the British Deputy in Egypt: “You should watch the comments of the newspapers closely in order not to provoke Arab feelings.” It is no wonder that the most widespread newspaper published in Cairo, Al-Muqattem, reported the message, which included the Promise, as a cable from the office of Rueters in London dated 9 November 1917. This Promise marked the end of the first stage of the official unfair policy of Britain. Several tasks still needed to be implemented in order to finalize this policy, including the capture of all of Palestine, the complete defeat of Turkey, the review of the items of the Sikes-Picot agreement, and legalizing the British attitude by persuading France to abandon Palestine and put it under the British Mandate. These tasks were achieved before July of 1920 when Sir Herbert Samuel, a British Zionist, was appointed as a British Deputy in Jerusalem under the authorization of the United Nations in order to establish the national Jewish State in Palestine without consulting its people, even the sharif of Mecca, who had been recognized as a king in the Hijaz.

Sir Samuel thought that the Anglo-French statement issued on 18 October 1918 was directed at him by the political British authorities, but the rapid end of the war with Turkey and the dissatisfaction amongst the peoples of the regions occupied by the British and allied forces transformed this statement into a common appeal by the British and French governments. This joint common appeal aimed at appeasing the feelings of Arabs after the Sikes-Picot agreement and the democratic forces within the Allies’ bloc were in accordance as much as possible with the 14-point proposal of Wilson. This appeal was preceded by a lot of diplomatic hesitation and discussion when France suggested to include all of the regions surrounding Syria and Iraq. However, Lord Robert Sicil, the right hand of Balfour, announced that this attitude was against the declared British policy in Palestine. Thus, the French became sure that Britain was keen on controlling Palestine under the pretext of the Zionist expectations by depriving the Palestinians of their self-determination and autonomy in order to establish the national Jewish State. Although this common appeal was announced in Palestine, the British military officials there were unable to make it conceivable for the people because it was originally vague and ambiguous. Consequently, the chief political officer in Palestine asked his government to make it clearer, but the reply he received indicated that the message was just to inform him since Palestine had been excluded from the appeal, which was another aspect of the British double-dealing and fraudulence.

The cunning British policy was disclosed because the British Premier held a secret bargain with his French counterpart, Clemenceau, to change the items of the Sikes-Picot agreement in the first week of December, less than one month after the declaration of the Promise. Thereupon, Britain became free to operate in Palestine whereas France in Syria ignored any consultation with the sharif of Mecca, as shown in the original text of the agreement. Meanwhile, there were political upheavals throughout Palestine despite restricting the political activities by the military forces. It is noteworthy that the British records include full documentation of the Arab protests, and these records have been the best resource ever found, making them worth special . Even though the British forces could have restricted these protests, they could not have concealed them from their office in London. This wave of tremendous protests frightened the disciples of Zionism in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, forcing Sir Sikes to threaten Prince Faisal, who was visiting London, to make him use his influence to subdue these protests against the Zionist plans. The last British step taken was the British Mandate over Palestine in order to implement the Balfour Promise in detail before the peace conference held in Paris approved these procedures. An independent committee was sent to investigate the situation. This committee discoverd that the Arabs of Palestine had already rejected the Zionist programme and any form of British Mandate to implement this programme, which frightened Balfour, and so he protested against including Palestine in the investigation, as shown in his memorandum to his Premier, Lloyd George. He added that they refused any investigation or the right of self-determination. The British officials were in close cooperation with the Zionists while the former were formulating the items of the British Mandate, but they had never referred to the Arabs or Palestinians, which was against item-22 of the UN charter, which considered the development of these territories a sacred duty of the civilization. Moreover, it is necessary to take the expectations of the natives of these regions into consideration, but the items of this Anglo-Zionist conspiracy were completely different from those in Syria and Iraq because these countries had been considered independent but in need for assistance for some years, whereas Palestine had not been considerd an independent country, and thereafter came under the British Mandate to deprive its citizens from independence and self-determination in order to establish a national Jewish State. All of the Arab efforts and protests during the peace conference in Paris or at the UN were fruitless.

The only Arab spokesman and authority was Faisal Bin Al-Hussein, who protested vehemently and sent an official letter to the British government concerning Zionist claims saying that he had approved the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine but with recognition of the rights of the native Arabs and Palestinians. He pointed out that there was fierce resistance from the Palestinians because Palestine was one of the States the British government had promised to grant them their independence and this promise could not be canceled by another British promise to the Zionists. He added that his father, Sharif Hussein had been authorized according to the Sikes-Picot agreement to be consulted regarding any issue concerning Palestine, but he was astonished by the letter his father received from the British, signed by Hougart, in which the Promise was subject to political and economic freedom of the native Palestinians, ending his letter saying that if we could keep the unity of Syria and Palestine, we would reach a solution in favour of all the concerned partners. The situation was similar to a dialog between deaf people because Britain had determined to separate Palestine from Syria after it had been agreed upon with France, and the Zionists were unwilling to be ruled by an Arab prince, whomever he was, while they had a Zionist ruler disguised in British uniform. On the other hand, France was upset with the little independence King Faisal had in Damascus although both the peace conference in Paris and the UN had been controlled by Britain and France. Consequently, the Arabs were confronted by fierce opponents who were also the judges to whom the Arab would complain.

The British State was extremely obstinate and ignorant to all the warnings of its representatives on the scene of the incidents. In light of this, General Gilbert Caleton, the chief political officer of the general chief-in-command of the British forces in Syria and Palestine, cabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the items of the agreement had been implemented, and they were in need of an efficient military force for several years to come, which was true because the British occupation forces were replaced by the Israeli occupation army.

Britain had been implementing its policies since 1917 without taking into consideration the Arab resistance, which had been frequently suppressed. In addition, the successive British governments had never thought to review this policy. It is useful to mention two examples of the early British reactions toward the Arab protests. The first was the official statement issued by Herbert Samuel after he had become the British Deputy in Jerusalem as an attempt to discourage the Arabs and to wipe out any hopes about changing the British policy: “The British policies have never been and would never be changed.” The second reaction was recorded by a high-ranking official in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who labeled a petition of establishing a representative government suggested by the first Arab-Palestinian conference saying, “I do not think that we must pay any attention to such a proposal, even a notice of reception.”

Britain had once thought of re-considering its policy in Palestine in 1939 when a fierce and widespread armed revolution lasted for three years, which made the British government accept to establish a ten-year local transitional representative government. Regardless of all other considerations, this was a gross mistake because the fierce Zionist resistance, the hesitation of the Arabs, and the outbreak of the Second World War contributed to abolishing this regime and so Britain abandoned the Palestinian Cause in 1947 after it had authorized the UN to deal with it but without being fair toward the Palestinians. Moreover, Britain had always forced the Arab majority to accept the establishment of the Jewish State until the Jews, whose number was less than 8% of the total population in 1917, became one-third of the population while the British forces had constantly been rejecting any representative government. So, if it was possible to force the majority and deprive it from its rights for the benefit of the minority, why had it not been possible to do so toward this minority? Deep consideration of this miserable situation is a sorrowful commentary about the British sense of fair play and justice.

Finally, Depriving the Palestinian Arabs of their right to self-determination has made them lose their predecessors’ land, and it has also led them to this miserable and tragic current situation.

* Published by Palestinian Affairs Magazine/August 1972.

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