Luke Morris

10/31/2003

Plato – Politics from Metaphysics

              While the Greek philosopher Plato sets forth the ethical foundation upon which modern liberal democracy stands, his political theory itself is far from democratic.  Plato not only advocates clear distinctions between the duties of each member of society, with each person relegated to his specific job, but he also supports separating natural classes of people, holding wives in common, and State raising and educating of children, under a monarchical or aristocratic system.  While a Westerner today may find these conclusions appalling, though, looking into the rest of Plato’s thought reveals premises that are quite agreeable to our modern sensibilities.  The purpose of his Republic is to give us a broad view of what the form of “justice” may look like when applied to a State, so that we may have an idea of how to narrow the concept down to individual action.  To this end he promotes the values of wisdom, courage, and temperance, and demonstrates their relation to the ideal state.  This state as conceived revolves mainly around Plato’s idea of justice, by which he means that, in social matters, everyone should carry out the employment towards which his nature guides him. 

            Like most of Plato’s works, the Republic involves a discussion between the character of Socrates, through whom Plato speaks his own thoughts, and other thinkers of the time with whom he questions and debates.  This particular dialogue begins, then, with a debate over the form of “justice,” or “what is right.”  Socrates takes upon himself the task of proving an objective nature to which the term “justice” applies, that may refute the statement that “what is ‘right’ is the same everywhere: the interest of the stronger party” (218).  He must go beyond this argument, though, to not only prove that justice is and what justice is, but that it is inherently better, both for the individual and for society, than injustice (224).  But only after he has made his case tying the just life and the happy life together may he begin to delve into the form of justice itself, and this is where the political theory begins (228).  How do we prove that justice is truly worthwhile, “a thing to which anyone who is to gain happiness must value both for itself and for its results” (229)? 

            In answering this question, Socrates must create a concrete example to illustrate what justice really is.  To narrow down the entire abstraction of justice to the life of a single individual in one fell swoop, however, proves too tedious a task for Plato’s protagonist, so he instead applies the form to a broad, yet still more concrete, abstraction – the creation of an ideal state (232).  So, what does an ideal state require?  Socrates begins with a strict stratification of labor, since “no two people are born exactly alike.  There are innate differences which fit them for different occupations” (233), and, “no one man can practice many trades or arts satisfactorily” (235).  This leads him to conclude that, if nations are to compete for land, this will lead to war, and the state must have a class of “Guardians” dedicated to its protection (236).  But, even above these, the state must have “Rulers” to direct the Guardians and keep them in harmony with the working class.  So, from among the Guardians, Rulers are chosen who “are found to be full of zeal to do whatever they believe is for the good of the commonwealth and never willing to act against its interest” (238).  And who could possibly fit the qualifications of such a duty-bound saint?  A philosopher, of course!  Only a true, life-long lover of knowledge has the ability to govern wisely and for the benefit of all.  So, only “These, then, may properly be called Guardians in the fullest sense, who will ensure that neither foes without shall have the power, nor friends within the wish, to do harm” (239).

            Socrates (or Plato) will thus break society up into three classes: the worker, the warrior, and the ruler, with each person fitting into his proper role.  He will do this to adopt such values as will bring on and tie in to the form of justice.  In particular, he wants the state to include wisdom, which is knowledge that takes into account “the best possible conduct of the state as a whole” (242), and belongs to the smallest class – the Guardians or Rulers.  In addition, the state must possess courage, particularly within the class of “Auxiliaries,” or warriors, who are to defend it.  Courage, in this sense, entails a conviction towards the preservation of some value in society, meaning “the right conviction about the things which ought, or ought not, to be feared” (243).  And, to tie both values together, the state must adopt the principle of temperance, or “a control of certain pleasures and appetites” (243), within itself as well as within the individuals that compose it.  Temperance applies to the governors as well as the governed, and thus establishes a harmony between classes of people. 

After he applies these values to the government of his ideal state, then, Plato, through Socrates, may finally present a definition of at least the social aspect of justice.  In a state that encompasses wisdom, courage, and temperance in their proper assignments, justice conforms to the principle that “everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him” (245).  We have thus a naturalist/functionalist version of ethics in the social sphere, wherein justice involves a person acting only towards his natural purpose.  In a sense, says Socrates, justice very literally means “minding one’s own business.”  As the state contains three orders, no one should attempt to transfer his station in life between them, as any such violation of the natural hierarchy constitutes an injustice against the community as a whole (246). 

After Plato has established his tripartite ordering of society and has applied his ethical concepts to it, he seeks to prove justice a true universal denominator of happiness by applying it to the life of the individual.  He therefore divides the soul, as he did the state, into three parts, containing reason, spirit, and appetites (250-51).  Reason governs the well-ordered soul as wisdom, through the Guardians, rules the state.  Likewise, the spirited element, or passion, works with reason to aid the soul in the same way the courage of the Auxiliaries helps the Guardians.  And, lastly, these two virtues work together to keep the appetites in check, as temperance applies to the individual as well as the state.  Therefore, as Plato writes, “each one of us likewise will be a just person, fulfilling his proper function, only if the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs” (251). 

The essence of Plato’s ideal state centers on his concept of justice, which consists in the ordering of people in society into their proper roles.  All people, women as well as men, fall into natural castes.  Some few will become the philosopher-Guardians, more will grow into Auxiliary warriors, and the majority will fill the roles of tradesmen.  To ensure a happy world, then, a person must act his part in the organic whole of the state, even as the separate parts of his soul fulfill their roles in creating justice within himself.  The achievement of this civilization therefore requires the proper education of children into their natural roles; the elimination of property-ownership and other such temptations of power for the Rulers; and a community of women to allow for the best breeding of future generations (265). 

In the Republic, Plato gives us, essentially, an early and very frightening version of utopia, based upon rational principles that we might consider the foundation of our society today.  Modern political thought, for instance, often takes for granted certain Platonic premises.  We still explicitly prize wisdom, for instance, though implicitly it may make little difference in our voting decisions.  We see this in numerous debates for office, such as the 2000 Presidential election, in which many people belittled G.W. Bush for a demonstrated lack of intelligence.  Western society also prizes courage in those whom we assign to defend us, regardless of whether or not we agree with the governmental policies that guide them.  For this reason, many Americans who might otherwise have disagreed with the war on Iraq decided instead to “back our boys” overseas.  Civilians also show a similar respect for firemen and policemen on the streets.  And, of course, while people may gawk at decadence, temperance still makes its presence known as a virtue, even in today’s affluent societies – it is wrong to abuse drugs, for instance, or to go chasing after prostitutes, whether such action is legal or not.  In addition to such moral standards of society, all liberal nations at least nominally attempt a political organization based some principle of justice, though they may hold different conceptions of the term than Plato does.

Platonic thought is not only for laymen, however.  Indeed, many major schools of social and political philosophy throughout the past century or so have held a basis in some form of the absolutes of the Republic.  Socialism and communism, for instance, though they do not believe in Plato’s natural class distinctions, agree with him as regards the elimination of property and state control of interior matters, while advocating their own version of “social justice.”  Fascism, by contrast, views society, like Plato does, as an organic whole, and seems to follow many of Plato’s practical suggestions in stratifying society according to people’s functions, and in setting up a sole monarch as their “Guardian.”  Hitler and Mussolini, however, hardly seem to fit the Platonic vision of wise and unselfish philosopher-kings, particularly since they were not subject to the social constraints against property ownership that the Guardians are.  And then, of course, liberalism also upholds the virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance, with justice as its one absolute demand, and it agrees that the Rulers should act in the best interests of the people in their community; although, by a great degree, liberal thought disapproves of Plato’s conclusions on the organization and regulation of such an ideal society. 

So then, what are we to say about Plato’s Republic, in light of the two-and-a-half thousand years of history since its invention?  We would certainly hope that no sane, intelligent person, having grown up under the benefits and freedoms of a liberal republic, would seriously advocate all of Plato’s authoritarian conclusions on the ideal state, but at the same time, for the long-term life of that republic, we might hope that most people would accept his major premise – that the ideal state should present a good picture (or physical representation of the form) of what justice looks like.  But if this is our goal, then Plato may very well be right in saying that, “Unless either philosophers become kings in their countries or those who are now called kings and rulers come to be sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom; unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy meet together . . . there can be no rest from troubles” (271).