Luke Morris
PHL 217 – 19th Century Philosophy
2/16/04
Hegel on Freedom
Some philosophers present systems that are difficult to grasp. Then there is Hegel. Hegel gives us a system that is nearly impossible to comprehend in its entirety, (at least on the first twelve readings or so), and even more difficult to adequately critique. This roadblock arises from the fact that Hegel’s ideas really do form a system – that is, they are all connected, each one dependent on another, in one great circle. To refute one aspect of the system, therefore, it seems on the outset that one might have to refute the entire thing; a mammoth venture, to be sure. However, it is at least cursorily possible to pick out certain aspects of his thought, and to show how they fit in to the system as a whole, or in what way they might not find support there. With that in mind, let us now turn to look at Hegel’s conception of freedom – a central topic in his thought, if there is one.
Hegel’s conception of freedom drastically diverges from the typical one. As he sees it, liberal, “abstract” freedom is not freedom at all. True freedom is not the liberty to do as we choose. In fact, “the individual choice, considered in isolation from everything else, is the outcome of arbitrary circumstances,” since “our wants and desires are shaped by the society in which we live” (Singer 143-44). Our preferences do not come from within; in a liberal economic system, for instance, other members of society constantly fight to influence our desires – an attack that we are helpless to overcome. What we think of as “free choice” actually involves us choosing what others want us to choose. As Singer writes, “abstract freedom, the freedom to do as we please, is effectively the freedom to be pushed to and fro by the social and historical forces of our times” (144).
If personal liberty of choice and action does not give us true freedom, then, what does? Hegel answers that we are only truly free when we choose in accordance with reason – when we choose by applying universal principles (Singer 155). The desires of man enslave him – he must use reason to control such natural impulses. To achieve this freedom, one must first turn inward and examine his self, through his self. He must use his thought to discover his thought, for this is where freedom begins. In other words, “I am free when I am within myself” (Hegel 69). But how do we attain this realization? And how do we bring this freedom from the inside of the individual’s mind and apply it to the reason of the world? For these questions Hegel gives us the concept of Geist – the process by which an individual comes to self-awareness, and the nature through which history develops as the growing consciousness of freedom. As Hegel puts it, “Two elements must enter into our investigation: first, the Idea, secondly, the complex of human passions . . . Their contact and concrete union constitutes moral liberty in the state” (72). The Idea of Freedom is the essence of Geist (68). Geist, as we saw, is the process of history. And since “World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom” (69), Geist is the process by which the consciousness of freedom progresses.
To return to the main point: Hegel’s conception of freedom involves us acting in accordance with Geist, and reason is the means by which we can follow that path. On this point, Hegel agreed with Kant that “reason is implicitly universal” (Singer 145). Neither philosopher believes that constraining oneself the dictates of reason places and constraint on one’s freedom; on the contrary, “Hegel’s concern is with freedom in the sense in which we are free when we are able to choose without being coerced either by other human beings or by our natural desires, or by social circumstances” (Singer 155) – in other words, we are free when we may choose in accordance with reason alone. But then the question arises: whose reason? Which dictates of reason do we follow? After all, dialectic reason led Karl Marx to communism and Ayn Rand to free-market capitalism. Which factors determine which branches of the tree of reason we should climb? Hegel answers this through his concept of the State.
As Hegel defines it, the State does not mean the government; instead it refers to the totality of the individuals who comprise society, covering every aspect of social life. Freedom, then, can only attain its height within a State. But for freedom to find its expression therein, the State must be ruled by principles of reason. As Singer writes, “Free thinking beings can only give their allegiance to institutions that they recognize as conforming to rational principles” (Singer 151). A State can only be properly organized, though, when every individual’s private interest harmonizes with the common interest of the state. Only then can all act in accordance with reason. Hegel views reason as a universal end, a potential which the whole world strives to actualize (Hegel 73). Freedom, then, involves acting through reason in all one does; and when one does his duty, when he follows as his conscience dictates, one chooses rationally, and therefore freely (Singer 147). The rationally ordered state, therefore, is the objective form of the universal Reason (Singer 155). Freedom involves synchronizing one’s desires to those of the state, each deriving its benefit from the other (Hegel 72).
The state, by Hegel’s definition, is more than the sum of its parts; it is greater than the individuals that comprise it. We have here an organic view of the state – the state is the body, of which the individuals are parts. The parts serve the whole, and in return the body cares for each of its parts. As Singer puts it, “because our needs and desires are shaped by society, an organic community fosters those desires that most benefit the community” (150). (This organic conception of society is a direct outgrowth of Hegel’s system – it is unfortunate that the doctrine is virtually identical to that put forth later by the fascist philosophers Alfredo Rocco and Marco Palmieri.) In the organic conception, one sees oneself as no longer alienated from his fellow man – he sees that, in their living humanity, he and his fellow men are all fundamentally the same (Hegel 76). In this state, individual purposes “are interwoven with general and essential considerations of law, the good, duty, etc.” (76). The state guarantees freedom, not by protecting each individual’s right to do as he pleases, but by determining the laws and customs that create a rational morality in which the individual may operate according to his social position (76).
The question remains: from what does Hegel derives his concept of freedom? We return, now, to the concept of Geist, and the idea of history as a process, a movement towards a certain end. “Freedom of Spirit [Geist] is the very essence of man’s nature,” Hegel writes (69). From this presumption springs the rest of his theory. It is the spiritual world, the world of the universal, that is substantially real; the physical world contains no truth in comparison to it. The process of freedom is the process of self-consciousness – Geist knowing itself, through itself, by “coming to” itself. Geist must work to attain self-knowledge, to actualize its own potential. This process is demonstrative of freedom – and the process of Geist is man himself, as demonstrated in his development throughout world history (69).
Geist then attains its end in the state – the collection of men from which each individual derives his distinct identity. A person could not know himself as a self – he could not view his consciousness objectively – without seeking its acknowledgment in the person of another (Hegel 43). The state is the organic manifestation of the universal Idea of freedom, the culmination of man’s existence as man, and he exists in it as a part of a body, mutually dependent.
It [the state] is the realization of Freedom, of the absolute, final purpose, and exists for its own sake. All the value man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state. For his spiritual reality is the knowing presence to him of his own essence, of rationality, of its objective, immediate actuality present in and for him. (84)
Man is only free when he knows himself, when he lives his life rationally. And he can only truly know himself, and live according to moral law, when he sees his nature objectified in the state, and the ethical life presented in its laws.
Hegel’s theory as a whole has many problems, possibly the worst of which is this last culmination. By placing the universal above the particular individuals who instantiate it, he ipso facto denies man the individuality and distinction that makes his life worth living. Man’s value does not depend upon the determination of the other men who comprise the state. When Hegel says that “law, morality, the State, and they alone, are the positive reality and satisfaction of freedom. The caprice of the individual is not freedom” (83), he objectifies rationality and morality apart from the individuals in whom it is instantiated.
The real difficulty, though, begins in Hegel’s foundational epistemology. We may need to interact with others to see ourselves as distinct from others, but does it actually follow that from this process alone we obtain our whole identities? The master-slave development presents an interesting theory, and we could certainly agree that man needs social contact to develop properly as man, but there is a leap of logic required to then say that the group, or the state, holds some importance over that of the individual. Granted, the individual could not exist without the group; but it also follows that the group could not exist without the individuals that comprise it. To be sure, this is not meant as a proof, or a substantial argument to refute Hegel’s system; but it does show how accepting his premises can lead us to dangerous conclusions – conclusions that, if implemented, could very well destroy the individual (as man-in-himself) forever. Maybe Hegel would be okay with this, but I am not.