NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOM:
PHILOSOPHICAL RUMINATIONS

Wolfgang Grassl

Hillsdale College

October 3, 2002

 

Philosophical questions about freedom 1

n   meaning of terms

u  what does “freedom” mean ?

n   conceptual distinctions

u  how do we use the term “freedom” ?

n   conditions of application

u  when can we rightly call someone “free” ?

n   real distinctions

u  are there different types of freedom ?

n   value judgments

u  why is freedom important ?

 

Philosophical questions about freedom 2

n   free will: freedom vs. determinism

n   social and political freedom

u  freedom of individuals as members of a society

§    factual questions: how free are people in fact ?

ü how free do members of a society actually want to be ?

ü which freedoms are ranked highest, or regarded as dispensable ?

ü do societies with greater personal freedom perform better ?

§    normative question: how fee should people be ?

ü is freedom without limits good ?

ü are we free by nature or does government “make” us free ?

ü is freedom a right (human right, civil right, natural right) ?

ü should freedom be traded off for other goods (equality, “social justice”, security) ?

ü is it justified to “protect” persons against their will (e.g., mandatory seatbelts, minimum drinking age) ?

 

Semantics of “freedom” 1

n   what does “freedom” mean?

u  spheres of application: philosophical, social, political

n   freedom of the will vs. social and political freedom

u  individual level vs. social level

u  are the two independent of each other ?

§    can we be “personally free” but socially or politically not ?

ü Václav Havel     ü Mahatma Gandhi

    likely answer: YES

§    can there be social and political freedom without people having a choice in matters of their personal lives ?

   likely answer: NO

 

Semantics of “freedom” 2

§    therefore:

   if (PersF =¹=> PolF) Ù (PolF ==> PersF)

   ==> PersF É PolF : necessary but not sufficient condition

ü what else is necessary for political freedom ?

ü does personal freedom = “inner freedom” make sense (if not, personal and political freedom must be identical: reciprocal implication)

 

Four traditions of understanding: 1-1

n   “The ability in a moment of decision to select any one of two or more alternatives”

u  Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, James, Sartre

    “Liberty, it is plain, consists in a power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. (…) Freedom is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs.” (John Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690], vol. I, bk.. II, ch. xxi, sect. 57)                                     

    Þ freedom is a power

   Þ does “power” mean a passive ability or an active                             disposition ?

 

Four traditions of understanding: 1-2

n   Problems:

•     “To walk home from college, I can take either A Street or B Street”

•     “Money or life”

•     “If a worker doesn’t like what we pay he can always quit”

•     “I am free to walk across the Atlantic Ocean”

Þ   possible confusion between freedom and power

•     if freedom depends on the power (ability, means) to act on it, does not every policy that increases such power (public welfare, free education) increase freedom ?

 

Four traditions of understanding: 2-1

n   “Doing what one wants to do”

n   The condition of not being constrained or coerced

u  Hobbes, Leibniz, Voltaire, Hume, Edwards

   “To be truly free, is to have power. When I can do what I wish, I am at liberty: but I necessarily wish what I wish; otherwise I wish without reason, without cause, which is impossible. My liberty consists in walking when I am inclined to walk, and when I have not the gout.” (François Voltaire: Le Philosophe ignorant [1765], ch. 13)

   Þ freedom is a power

 

Four traditions of understanding: 2-2

n   Problems:

§    natural conditions may impose constraints or compulsion

§    counterintuitive implications (freedom in communist Albania vs. freedom in the West)

Þ  value of the choices available to the people is important

Þ  are we truly free to choose some preferred alternative if we lack the means or power to achieve it ?

ü negative freedom  (“freedom from”)

ü positive freedom  (“freedom to”)

 

Four traditions of understanding: 3-1

n   Reflection of inner nature

n   Acting in terms of one’s inner (real, true) nature, rather than of external factors

u  Epictetus, Spinoza, Hegel, Nietzsche, Skinner, Zen

    “He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject neither to compulsion, nor hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what they would avoid.” (Epictetus: Of Freedom [50-125 A.D.], ch. 1, bk. IV)

§    Stoics: one can be enslaved on the outside (have one's body in chains) and be free “internally” (be at peace with oneself in aloofness from all pleasure and pain)

 

Four traditions of understanding: 3-2

n   Problems:

§    Romanticism and essentialism

ü “be natural, be yourself”

ü emancipation from slavery to passions, ignorance, prejudice, etc.

ü Marx: revolution liberates the “true” self of proletarians from alienation (“commodity fetishism”, “false consciousness”)

§    what is one’s “essential” or “inner” nature ?

ü why should one’s “inner” nature be more “natural”?

§    who is to decide which facet of my personality on which I act is more essential than another ?

 

Four traditions of understanding: 4-1

n   Doing what one ought to do

u  Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Montesquieu

    “(…) liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will (…) Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.” (Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws [ ], bk. Xii, sect. 2)

   Þ freedom is a power

 

Four traditions of understanding: 4-2

n   Problems:

§    implies ultimately that there is no freedom as commonly understood

ü Hegel: “freedom is insight into necessity”

§    tautologous (“do we manifest freedom by not speeding”?)

§    what is this “ought”, and who is to decide ?

§    if a clear moral imperative cannot be recognized, does this exclude freedom of action ?

 

Issues in traditional understanding

n   freedom and power

u  reductionism

n   essentialist vs. nominalist definitions

 

Positive and negative freedom 1

n   distinction has long history in philosophy

§    Hobbes: freedom as the absence of obstacles to the satisfaction of desires

§    Spinoza: social union is a condition whereby men develop their powers in freedom (individuals want to assert them-selves in the world as the individuals they are)

n   distinction formulated by

§    Kant: “positive concept of freedom”

§    Bentham: “negative liberty”

§    Constant: “De la liberté chez les anciens comparée à celle des modernes” (1819)

ü ancient world: entitlement to participation in collective decision-making (liberty in polis = self-rule but no immunity from control)

ü modern world: protected sphere of non-interference or personal independence under the rule of law

 

Positive and negative freedom 2

§    Isaiah Berlin:“Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958)

n   usual interpretation: freedom from vs. freedom to

u  positive: freedom as autonomy and entitlement to participate in public life (“empowerment”)

§    stronger claims than negative concept

ü freedom depends on real options

§    individual freedom in its full sense involves having an opportunity for self-realization (non-restriction of options whether coming from external or internal forces)

ü Plato, Stoics, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant (?), Hegel

ü defenders (Spinoza) and opponents (Plato, Hegel) of liberal values

ü personal autonomy an essential liberal idea (Kant)

ü “Free from what? As if that mattered to Zarathustra! But your fiery eyes should tell me: free for what?” (Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra [1885], Part 1, ch. 17)

 

Positive and negative freedom 3

n   usual interpretation: freedom from vs. freedom to

u  positive: freedom as autonomy (“self-mastery”) and entitlement to participate in public life (“empowerment”)

§    stronger claims than negative concept

ü freedom depends on real options

§    individual freedom in its full sense involves having an opportunity for self-realization (non-restriction of options whether coming from external or internal forces)

ü Stoics, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant (?), Hegel

ü both defenders (Spinoza) and opponents (Hegel) of liberal values

ü personal autonomy an essential liberal idea (Kant)

“Free from what? As if that mattered to Zarathustra! But your fiery eyes should tell me: free for what?” (Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra [1885], Part 1, ch. 17)

 

Positive and negative freedom 4

§    truth conditions of (positive) freedom: A is free to do X if A is not prevented from doing X by some emotion, desire, or lack of ability (= if A is not autonomous)

   Þ dyadic relationship

 

Positive and negative freedom 5

u  negative: individual independence from external coercion or privation

§    weaker claim than positive concept

ü Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill

ü not restricted to defenders of liberal values

“That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” (J.St. Mill: On Liberty [1859], ch. I)

§    truth conditions of (negative) freedom: A is free to do X if A is not restrained from doing X by B

   Þ triadic relationship

 

Political implications

n   liberals

u  negative freedom (= absence of coercion)

u  freedom is an end in itself

n   social conservatives, socialists

u  positive freedom (= requires some normative goal)

u  freedom is only a mean towards some other end

§    social conservatives: freedom itself does not generate virtue

ü government intervention in social (“moral”) sphere

§    socialists: freedom itself does not generate equality and solidarity

ü redistribution, public welfare programs, etc

 

Criticism of positive concept 1

n   freedom and power must be separated

u  the beggar is free to do anything he likes but he cannot do so

n   freedom and self-realization are not identical

n   bifurcation of the self into higher and lower part

u  rationalistic metaphysics of the self

n   essentialism

n   identification of threats to with conditions of liberty

u  Hayek vs. Mill: custom, norms, conventions

 

Criticism of positive concept 2

n   assumption that all men have only one true purpose (“Unity of all positive values”)

n   freedom cannot be defined in abstraction from society

ü “The concept of freedom makes sense only as far as it refers to interhuman relations.” (Mises: Human Action [1949], ch. XV, 6)

n   implies right to be benefited

n   invites political interventionism

u  in order to enlarge someone’s freedom one must take away someone else’s freedom

   Þ interventionism justified

 

Criticism of negative concept 1

n    what value is freedom to the beggar sleeping on the streets ?

ü  if freedom is a human right, does this not give everyone rights to these goods (= entitlement) ?

n    how can we have a “free society” without autonomous citizens ?

ü  “(…) freedom is not to be increased by a mere diminution of government.” (Bertrand Russell: “Freedom in Society” [1935])

n    if freedom is only negative freedom, how about freedom from want, from ignorance, from crippling disease ?

ü  “(…) in the communist world, there is more freedom from the power of private money, from the influence of religious institutions, and from periodic unemployment.” (John Somerville: “Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and its Relation to Value” [1962])

 

Criticism of negative concept 2

n   total amount of freedom not a zero-sum game

u  it is possible to increase a person’s freedom without diminishing anyone else’s freedom

 

Synthesis

n    are positive and negative freedom antithetical concepts ?

u   are they even at the same logical level ?

§    positive: individual liberty vs. negative: political liberty

n    is the equation with freedom to/from tenable ?

u   autonomy (= positive) is equal to self-ownership (negative)

u   equivocation: only autonomous persons can act (Mises)

n    basic liberties (freedoms of speech, religion, association, movement, lifestyle etc.) are compatible with either philosophical conception

u   these are necessary conditions of autonomous agency: a free person is one who possesses the power to think and the right to act autonomously

§    one precondition alone avails no freedom

§    but: this does not imply a duty of others to “empower” anyone

 

Finally: A workable definition of freedom

n   workable minimum definition: free action is

u  voluntary (absence of external compulsion or restraint

u  personal (free action applies only to individuals)

§    in collectives there is no free choice (Mill)

ü freedom presupposes individualism

ü “The American people is free to choose their President” makes no sense

ü “This is a free country” is equivocal

u  based on choice (individual preference orderings)

u  restricted only by minimally necessary coercion under the rule of law

 

What does this definition mean ?

Þ we are free in performing an action if we could have done otherwise (= if we would have done otherwise had we chosen to do so)

Þ freedom is a right that counterbalances democracy

§    only individuals dispose of rights, not groups (Federalist No. 10: “Republic”)

Þ  coercion must be legitimate under the rule of law

•     due process, impartiality, no retroactive laws, etc.

Þ  applicable to all spheres of life

§    no distinction between economic and social freedom

Þ  distinction positive/negative liberty unnecessary

•     negative freedom presupposes personal autonomy

 

Conclusion

n   distinction positive/negative freedom is philosophically obsolete

u  value of freedom is different between persons according to their opportunity sets (= powers)

u  still important for normative political debate

n   personal identities are chosen, not ascribed

n   personal freedom requires value pluralism

§    Mill: “the individual pursuing his own good in his own way”

n   definition reflects tradition of liberalism